TIBET, CHINA & INDIA 1914-1950

A History of Imperial Diplomacy

ALASTAIR LAMB

ROXFORD BOOKS
1989

© Alastair Lamb, 1989

First published in 1989 in Great Britain
by Roxford Books, Hertingfordbury, Hertfordshire.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing of the publishers.

ISBN No 0 907129 03 X

Printed in England on permanent paper ♾ by
Redwood Burn Ltd, Trowbridge, Wiltshire.
Typeset by Eurotype 2000 Ltd, Hertford, Hertfordshire.

CORRECTIONS

P.52, lines 17 & 21, and p.55, line 39: north-east *should read* north-west.

P.459, lines 28-30: Captain Lax was an Officer in the Royal Army Medical Corps; and the two American enlisted men had been injured while baling out over the "Hump".

CONTENTS

	Acknowledgements	vi
I	INTRODUCTION: THE SITUATION IN 1914	1
II	FROM MCMAHON TO TEICHMAN, 1914-1917	28
III	TEICHMAN, CHAMDO AND RONGBATSA, 1917-1919	52
IV	EASTERN TIBET AND ANGLO-CHINESE NEGOTIATIONS, 1919-1920	83
V	THE KANSU AND BELL MISSIONS TO LHASA AND ARMS FOR TIBET, 1919-1922	106
VI	BAILEY AS POLITICAL OFFICER IN SIKKIM, 1921-1928	141
VII	THE WEIR MISSIONS, AND THE CRISIS IN EASTERN TIBET, 1928-1933	177
VIII	THE DEATHS OF THE 13TH DALAI LAMA AND THE 9TH PANCHEN LAMA AND THE RETURN OF A CHINESE PRESENCE IN LHASA, 1933-1937	225
IX	THE FIRST GOULD MISSION AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE 14TH DALAI LAMA, 1936-1940	270
X	THE WAR, 1940-1945	299
XI	BORDER QUESTIONS, 1914-1947: FROM LADAKH TO SIKKIM	350
XII	BORDER QUESTIONS: THE MCMAHON LINE AND THE ASSAM HIMALAYAS, 1914-1936	401
XIII	BOUNDARY QUESTIONS: THE GENESIS OF THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER AGENCY, 1936-1945	439
XIV	THE FINAL YEARS OF THE BRITISH INDIAN EMPIRE, 1945-1947, AND THE END OF THE OLD TIBET, 1950	477
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	536
	MAPS	558
	INDEX	568

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Over thirty-five years ago I started research for a Doctoral Dissertation in the University of Cambridge on the subject of British relations with Tibet from the latter part of the 18th century until the Younghusband Expedition of 1904. The result was published in 1960 as *Britain and Chinese Central Asia: the Road to Lhasa 1767 to 1905* (revised edition in 1986 under the title *British India and Tibet 1766 – 1910*); and it was followed in 1966 by the two volumes of *The McMahon Line* which took the story from 1904 to 1914.

The present book completes the narrative up to the moment of the British departure from India in 1947 with what amounts to a postscript up to 1950. In this year the last British official to be directly involved in relations with the Government of Tibet, Hugh Richardson, was withdrawn from Lhasa. He had, in fact, been acting on behalf of the independent Government of India since 1947; but he does represent the end of an apostolic succession dating back to the time of Sir Charles Bell when the narrative in this book begins. 1950, moreover, marked a fundamental change in the pattern of Anglo-Chinese relations. Great Britain, once one of the Great Powers in China, was now not even fully recognised as a sovereign state by the new Communist regime; and its Embassy for some years was seen through Chinese eyes as the office of a "negotiating agent".

I have in general retained here the Wade-Giles system of Romanisation of Chinese used in the previous volumes rather than shift to the current *pinyin* for two main reasons. First: a change in system now would make if far more difficult to refer back from the present book to the previous volumes. Second: Wade-Giles or something very like it was usually used in the sources upon which this book is based. While there is no great problem in applying the new system to Chinese place names, the same cannot always be said for names of persons (particularly where the Chinese characters are not available). For some Chinese place names I have retained the traditional English version even if it agrees neither with Wade-Giles nor Chinese usage: thus Peking has remained Peking rather than have been permitted to transmute into Peiping or Beijing. In the transliteration of Tibetan words I have in most cases adopted either the form generally used in the British sources or that employed by recent writers like H.E. Richardson, H. Harrer, G.N. Patterson, Rinchen Dolma Taring and

Tsepon W.D. Shakabpa (who are not always in exact agreement). For words in Indian languages, including place names, I have on occasion used a form common during the British period (Himalayas for Himalaya, Ganges for Ganga and so on).

Apart from the archival and secondary sources, to which reference is made in the notes, I derived a considerable amount of information from discussions with people who were actively involved in the conduct of policy with or relating to Tibet in the period covered by this book. I would particularly like in this context to remember with gratitude the late Lt.-Col. F.M. Bailey and the late Captain G.A. Nevill who talked to me at considerable length about their experiences.

The late Karunakar Gupta urged me over a number of years to complete this narrative which I had virtually abandoned at 1914. During his last two periods of research in England he provided me with copies of material he had unearthed in the India Office Library and Records and the Public Record Office; and when I finally did start on this book I soon realised that Karunakar Gupta had laid down for me some extremely useful foundations. I am indeed sad that I cannot express my gratitude to him in person.

Another scholar who freely discussed with me his researches into the history of British relations with Tibet was the late Sir John Addis. I very much appreciate his making available to me the result of his work in Harvard during the course of which he discovered the strange history of the publication of the text of the Simla Convention in Aitchison's *Treaties*. I am also very grateful to that doyen of Chinese scholar-bureaucrat Tibetan specialists, Liu Shengqi, for telling me about his time in Lhasa.

When I started serious research on a subject which I had not touched for nearly two deacdes, I found the unstinting help of Rajkumari Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh of enormous value. Without her encouragement I would probably not have persevered to the end; and without being able to discuss with her the sources in the India Office Library and Records, of which she possesses a unique understanding, I would certainly have missed a great deal of importance. She also read the typescript of this book and came up with a number of most useful suggestions, some of which I have followed and some I have not. The conclusions to which I have come, of course, are my own; and Rajkumari Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh must be blamed for none of them. Her two books, both of which appeared while this work was nearing completion, *Himalayan Triangle* and *A Guide to Source Materials in the India Office Library and Records for the History of Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan 1765-1950*, have been extremely useful to me.

For the subject of this book, in the main the history of Tibet as seen through British eyes, there are two major archival sources in London, the Foreign Office records preserved in the Public Record Office and

the India Office and Government of India records in the India Office Library and Records. The India Office Library and Records collection contains the key material emanating from the process of British administration in India to which has been added relevant material sent either by the Foreign Office in London to the India Office or direct to India by the British diplomatic representation in Peking. The Foreign Office records contain little of the internal Indian material while the bulk of the Foreign Office material concerning Tibetan affairs is in the India Office archives. For this, and other technical reasons, while I have consulted both archives, I have except in a very few instances referred to both India Office and Foreign Office documents in the context of the India Office Library and Records.

My research in the India Office Library and Records was greatly helped by its Deputy Director, Martin Moir, to whom I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude. I must also thank the staff at the Libraries of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Chatham House, the Royal Geographical Society and the University of Cambridge for various supererogatory services. I would also like to thank Rajesh Borkhataria for his unstinting assistance in the mastery of the electronic wizardry with the aid of which this book was written.

My father, Sir Lionel Lamb, whose experience of British diplomacy in China is surely unique and who was directly involved in Anglo-Chinese relations for some 30 years of the period covered in this book, was an unfailing source of advice and information, particularly about personalities both British and Chinese. His knowledge of the convoluted politics of Szechuan in the 1920s was especially valuable. He must not, however, be blamed for any interpretation of events or assessments of character which I may have made: these are mine alone.

As in everything that I have written, I owe a great debt to my wife, Venice, who in this instance not only read the book in typescript, designed it and advised on other aspects of its production, helped with the index and drew the maps, but also provided constant encouragement throughout the three years during which it was gestating.

Unpublished Crown-copyright documents in the India Office Records and Public Record Office reproduced/transcribed in this book appear by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationary Office.

Alastair Lamb,
Hertford, March 1989.



1. Tibet and its Neighbours.

I

INTRODUCTION: THE SITUATION IN 1914

In 1912 Central Tibet (that is to say the region dominated by the Provinces of Ü and Tsang) became effectively independent of all Chinese control for the first time since the early 18th century. In 1950-1951 the Chinese returned to bring this brief era to an end; and after 1959 under Chinese rule the remnants of the old Tibetan civilisation were destroyed beyond reasonable hope of reconstruction. The period of *de facto* Tibetan independence coincided almost exactly with the life of the first Chinese Republic, whose birth in fact made it possible. It was also roughly contemporary with the final years of British rule in India during which the transfer of power from London to the Indian people evolved from a hope into a promise fulfilled. The interaction between British policy in the last decades of British Empire in the Indian subcontinent and the aspirations of the various components of Tibetan political society against a background of a weak and divided China is the subject of this book.

From the British point of view the story of Indo-Tibetan relations comes to a natural conclusion in August 1947, with a brief postscript extending to 1950. For the successors to the British in India, of course, and for the Tibetans themselves, there was no convenient end. They had to face, as the British never did, the presence in Tibet of the power of the People's Republic of China, the most formidable Chinese regime since at least the great days of the Ch'ing Dynasty in the 18th century. The British themselves were now spectators; but the drama that they were watching from afar was to a great extent couched in a language and concerned with issues which had their origins in that age when the sun never set upon their Empire. It is indeed difficult to comprehend the current situation in Tibet and its place in the policy of both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India without a reasonable understanding of what went on in the British period. The British do bear some responsibility for the present tragedy of Tibet, even though there might have been little that they could have done to avert it.

The British authorities in India from the days of Lord Clive had

appreciated that to the north of their dominions, initially Bengal and eventually the entire subcontinent, there existed a formidable mountain barrier, the Himalayas, beyond which lay Tibet. It was believed that Tibet was in some way part of the Chinese Empire. During the administration of Warren Hastings (1772-1785) a series of attempts were made to establish contact with the dominant figure in Tibetan affairs at that time, the 6th Panchen Lama (or Tashi Lama), in the hope that he might act as some kind of intermediary between the East India Company and the Chinese Emperor in Peking who had shown a distressing reluctance to enter into any kind of direct diplomatic contact with the British commercial establishment at Canton on the South China coast.[1] For a variety of reasons this initiative failed to yield any dividends despite the despatch of British Missions to the Panchen Lama's capital at Tashilhunpo (near Shigatse); but the conviction that in some manner Tibet was a diplomatic route to China persisted until the middle of the 19th century.[2]

In the 1860s the British situation vis à vis China had changed dramatically. By force of arms the British, along with the other Powers, had managed to open a direct relationship with the rulers of China in Peking. Tibet, meanwhile, which once had been willing to enter into correspondence with and accept envoys from the rulers of British India, now showed a desire for nothing but isolation. Tibetan xenophobia had, indeed, already been apparent for many years to those British officials who had to deal with the growing extent of common Anglo-Tibetan border, first created by the British annexations following the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-1816 and then by the establishment in the late 1840s of British protection over the Dogra State of Jammu and Kashmir. It became a subject of particular Government concern following, in 1861, the extension of British control over the small Himalayan State of Sikkim after a minor military operation.

The newly created Anglo-Tibetan border in Sikkim appeared to many observers to offer an ideal route by which British trade could penetrate the markets of Chinese Central Asia from Calcutta, the major port and centre of commerce as well as the capital of British India. There were also political arguments arising from the nature of British relations with the Himalayan States of Nepal and Bhutan, between them, together with Sikkim, occupying a considerable length of Himalayan frontier tract and with their own tradition of relationships with Tibet, which indicated the wisdom of establishing some kind of dialogue with the powers that be to their north. During the 1860s, accordingly, a variety of projects were examined in London and in India for the despatch of some kind of diplomatic and commercial mission to the Tibetan capital, Lhasa.

From the outset it became apparent that a major problem lay in the

nature of Tibet's international status. Was Tibet part of China? Neither the Tibetans nor the Chinese were willing to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. The Tibetans indicated that they could have no direct dealings with foreigners without Chinese consent. The Chinese, on the other hand, maintained that any attempt they might make to open Tibet to external influences would only be resisted by the Tibetans. It was known that there were Chinese representatives in Lhasa, the Amban and his Deputy, who exercised some kind of authority; but it was not clear exactly what their powers were. The Government of India would have on the whole preferred to try to establish their own relationship with Tibet without any reference to the Chinese. The view both in London and in the British Legation in Peking, however, was that it would be as well not to ignore the Chinese in the interests of the wider pattern of Anglo-Chinese diplomacy. Had the Tibetans shown any willingness at all to begin a dialogue with the Government of India it is probable that local Indo-Tibetan contacts would have in the fullness of time expanded into a more elaborate relationship; but the Tibetans manifested no signs whatsoever that on their own they would ever do more than offer polite rejections to British overtures on the frontier.

The wall of obstruction was cracked, but not dismantled, in 1876 by the British Minister in Peking, Sir Thomas Wade. As part of a package of reparations offered by the Chinese Goverment following one of those "incidents" which figured so prominently in China's relations with the Powers in the 19th century, in this instance the killing of a British official on the Chinese side of the Burma-Yunnan border, the Chinese agreed to the inclusion in the Chefoo Convention of 13 September 1876 of the following clause (as a Separate Article):

> Her Majesty's Government having it in contemplation to send a mission of exploration next year by way of Peking through Kansu and Koko-Nor, or by way of Ssu-Ch'uan to Tibet, and thence to India, the Tsungli Yamen . . [the Chinese Foreign Office of the day] . . having due regard to the circumstances, will, when the time arrives, issue the necessary passports, and will address letters to the high provincial authorities and to the Resident in Tibet. If the Mission should not be sent by these routes, but should be proceeding across the Indian frontier to Tibet, the Tsungli Yamen, on receipt of a communication to the above effect from the British Minister, will write to the Chinese Resident in Tibet, and the Resident, with due regard to the circumstances, will send officers to take due care of the Mission; and the passports for the Mission will be issued by the Tsungli Yamen, that its passage be not obstructed.[3]

While these words indicated clearly enough that the Chinese had the right to issue passports for Tibet, yet there was also a stated reservation ("due regard to the circumstances") suggesting that a local factor had to be taken into account which was not under the direct control of Peking. The Chefoo Convention, therefore, while com-

mitting the British to attempt to conduct any Tibetan policy through or in co-operating with China, yet provided no guarantee that with the best will in the world the Chinese would be able in practice to open Tibet to British diplomacy.

No attempt was made to exploit the Separate Article of the Chefoo Convention until 1885 when a British Mission to Tibet was proposed by the Government of India, to be led by Colman Macaulay, Financial Secretary to the Government of Bengal. Macaulay, who had talked with Tibetan officials on the Sikkim-Tibet border and concluded that his presence in Lhasa would be welcome, went to Peking to collect his Chinese passports amidst great publicity. A number of British Chambers of Commerce, attracted by the prospects of Tibet as a source of wool, enthusiastically supported the project. There was also considerable interest in India in Macaulay's argument that Tibet would be an excellent market for Indian tea.[4] The Chinese granted the passports; but they also took advantage of the "due regard to circumstances" escape clause. As the Macaulay Mission assembled in Darjeeling in early 1886 the Chinese began to report to the British Legation in Peking that there were increasing signs of active Tibetan opposition to it.

Sir Nicholas O'Conor, the British Minister in Peking, who was not too enthusiastic about Macaulay's scheme, decided that these reports could not be disregarded. Rather than face the prospect of a clash between the Macaulay Mission and Tibetan troops, which could well lead to a most unwelcome trans-frontier campaign and a grave crisis in Anglo-Chinese relations, O'Conor was happy to negotiate the Mission away in exchange for a Chinese settlement of some outstanding difficulties which had arisen as a result of the recent British annexation of Upper Burma, which the Chinese claimed possessed some form of tributary relationship to the Manchu Dynasty. In Article IV of the Anglo-Chinese Convention "relative to Burmah and Thibet" of 24 July 1886, it was agreed that:

> inasmuch as enquiry into the circumstances by the Chinese Government has shown the existence of many obstacle to the Mission to Thibet provided for in the Separate Article of the Chefoo Agreement, England consents to countermand the Mission forthwith.
>
> With regard to the desire of the British Government to consider arrangements for further trade between India and Thibet, it will be the duty of the Chinese Government, after careful enquiry into circumstances, to adopt measures to exhort and encourage the people with a view to the promotion and development of trade. Should it be practicable, the Chinese Government shall then proceed carefully to consider Trade Regulations; but if insuperable obstacles should be found to exist, the British Government will not press the matter unduly.[5]

The ball was now very much in the Chinese court; and they showed no signs whatsoever of wishing to play it. As far as they were

concerned, circumstances never would be "practicable". At this juncture, however, they rather lost control over the situation. The Tibetans, alarmed by reports of the impending advance into their country of the Macaulay Mission with a substantial escort, sent a body of armed men across the border a few miles into Sikkim to take up a position in an old fort at Lingtu overlooking the route which the British party would probably follow.

The Tibetans at Lingtu refused to withdraw even when instructed by the Chinese to do so. They declared that Sikkim was subject to Tibet and that they had every right to be where they were. After the failure over more than a year of attempts by the British Legation in Peking to secure any practical assistance from the Chinese Government, some of whose officials admitted privately that the influence of Peking over Lhasa was slight, the Government of India decided to drive the Tibetans out of British protected territory by force of arms. In March 1888 an expedition some 2,000 strong duly expelled the Tibetans, who retreated across the frontier passes. It looked for a while as if the Tibetans would try to return in greater strength, and the situation in Sikkim remained tense. At the very end of 1888 the Amban in Lhasa turned up on the border to see for himself what was happening and to talk with the British on the other side.

The Amban, when the Indian Foreign Secretary Sir Mortimer Durand went up to the border to meet him, maintained that the Chinese were alone responsible for the affairs of Tibet, which was an integral part of China. Sikkim, moreover, was a dependency of Tibet and therefore also under Chinese supervision. From these rather unpromising premises both the Amban and his superiors in Peking were eventually moved after considerable argument to accept that Sikkim was now indeed under British protection and that the border between it and Tibet ought to be properly defined. The Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 17 March 1890, signed in Calcutta by the Amban Sheng Tai and the Viceroy Lord Lansdowne, was the outcome of these proceedings. It made clear the status of Sikkim as a British protectorate, laid down the principles for the alignment of the Sikkim-Tibet border, and provided for further Anglo-Chinese negotiations over the future mechanisms for the conduct of trade and official communication between Britsh India and what was accepted as Chinese Tibet.[6]

The Sikkim-Tibet Convention was negotiated between the British and the Chinese without any Tibetan participation; and it established a precedent which was followed by the Trade Regulations of 5 December 1893 which provided for the creation of a Trade Mart at Yatung, just across the border from Sikkim in the Chumbi Valley on the main road to Lhasa, where traders from both Tibet and British India now had a treaty right to visit without obstruction.[7] There would be no duty on goods between India and Tibet (except for a

few specified items which could, indeed, be prohibited) for the next five years, when a scheme of tariffs would be worked out jointly by the British and the Chinese.

So far it looked as if direct Anglo-Chinese negotiations were beginning to open up Tibet in a satisfactory manner. It soon became clear to officials of the Government of India, however, that this was far from being the case. The Tibetans showed every sign of repudiating the Anglo-Chinese agreements of 1890 and 1893. They imposed a tariff of 10% *ad valorem* on all goods passing to and from the Yatung Trade Mart through Phari at the head of the Chumbi Valley in blatant disregard of the Trade Regulations. When the British tried to demarcate the border outlined in the 1890 Convention by means of an Anglo-Chinese commission with Tibetan participation, they found that the Tibetans refused to take part. Thereupon the Chinese also withdrew. The British official involved, J.C. White (Political Officer in Sikkim), then went ahead on his own and erected a number of pillars at boundary points on the main passes between Sikkim and Tibet. The pillars were promptly defaced or removed by persons unknown, presumably Tibetans. Apart from the Phari duties, physical obstacles to the free movement of trade in the shape of stone walls were put up across the road in the Chumbi Valley immediately to the north of Yatung. Finally, the British discovered that in the extreme north of Sikkim, but definitely to the south of the line specified in the 1890 Convention, the Tibetans had established a military post at an isolated spot called Giaogong (or Giagong).

The British officials responsible for the administration of the newly defined Sikkim-Tibet border and the Yatung Trade Mart soon concluded that the Chinese were quite unable to oblige the Tibetans to comply with the agreements they had made on their behalf. They urged a more forceful approach in which pressure would be exerted directly on the Tibetans; and the Chinese, whose role was seen to be little more than a farce, they argued should henceforth be ignored. The Government of India, now under the supervision of Lord Elgin, were inclined to leave things as they were. Elgin did not believe that the commercial advantages of the Tibet trade warranted even a minor crisis in Anglo-Chinese relations.

In 1899 Lord Elgin was replaced by Lord Curzon as Viceroy and the policy of benign neglect of events on the Sikkim-Tibet border was abandoned. This was not, it must be admitted, entirely due to Curzon's own approach to frontier matters. In c. 1895 the 13th Dalai Lama took over the reins of power in Lhasa, the first Dalai Lama to reach maturity since the very beginning of the century. Nearly a hundred years of corrupt and complacent Regency rule came to an end. The Tibetan opposition to the Yatung Trade Mart and the demarcation of the Sikkim-Tibet border was most probably a product of this

development which had resulted in a rebirth of a sense of Tibetan independence and an acute dislike of direct Chinese influence.

The new Tibetan approach to its own status was manifested in three main directions. First: there was a deliberate refusal to co-operate with the Chinese in their dealings with the Government of India relating to Tibet. Second: there was the emergence of what only can be called Lhasa chauvinism in eastern Tibet (Kham) where many Tibetan states were either to all intents and purposes independent or existed as Chinese protectorates. This Lhasa attitude towards Kham can be traced back to the middle of the 19th century; but it acquired a new intensity with the arrival of an adult Dalai Lama at the helm. One of his objectives was to bring the most easterly of all the Tibetan states, Chala (Jala), which was also one of those under the greatest degree of Chinese influence, under his control. Third: the 13th Dalai Lama began to look for some great Power who would support him against what he perceived as the two major threats of his time, the Chinese and the British Government of India. He turned to Russia.

The detailed history of the involvement of the 13th Dalai Lama with the Tsarist Empire is still little understood. At one time it was fashionable to deny its reality. Russo-Tibetan intrigues were dismissed as figments of Lord Curzon's paranoid imagination. Today such a view would not be easy to sustain. Yet we still possess all too little information about the Russian side of the story on which the archives in Soviet care must surely be able to throw some light. The key figure in the connection between Lhasa and St. Petersburg was Aghvan Dorjiev, a Buriat Mongol Buddhist monk of outstanding ability and scholarship who apparently established himself in the Tibetan capital in or before 1895 and soon gained the friendship and trust of the young 13th Dalai Lama. Dorjiev was but one of a considerable number of Buriats visiting or residing in Lhasa at this time, and we only know the names of a few of them. It seems, however, that he was their leader in terms of the respect which he enjoyed, though some of these Buriats (and other Mongol subjects of the Tsar) possessed Russian official rank or position which Dorjiev apparently did not.[8]

One may conclude that Dorjiev explained to the 13th Dalai Lama that, faced with pressure both from China and British India, there was but one direction towards which he could look for help, St. Petersburg. The Dalai Lama duly permitted a correspondence to develop between himself and Tsar Nicholas II which may have produced more than an exchange of compliments; but we cannot be certain. Was there some kind of Russo-Tibetan treaty? What we do know is that in 1899 reports of diplomatic contact between Lhasa and the Russians began to appear in the European and British Indian press; and by 1900 quite precise details had emerged. In October 1900, for example, the *Journal de St. Petersburg* announced the arrival

in Livadia (at the Imperial residence in the Crimea) of a mission from the Dalai Lama headed by one "Ahambra-Agvan-Dorjiew"; and from then on the Russian press continued to report Tibetan comings and goings. It also transpired after investigation by the agents of internal security in British India, who seem to have been singularly inefficient, that some of these journeys between Tibet and Russia by Dorjiev and his friends had involved transits of British Indian territory and the use of British Indian ports.

Lord Curzon was furious not only because of these lapses in his own intelligence arrangements but also because, try as he would, he could find no way to get in touch himself with the 13th Dalai Lama. When he did find a means of delivery of a letter, it was returned to him unopened. Lord Curzon, before being appointed Viceroy, had acquired considerable first hand experience of Anglo-Russian competition in Central Asia; and he possessed very strong views on the subject. The British, he felt, should not be seen to allow the Russians to extend their influence in any way into those parts of the world which fell within the British sphere. Give the Russian an inch and they would take a mile. Something must be done.

In the end Lord Curzon, with the active collaboration of Francis Younghusband, an officer in the Indian Political Service who possessed experience of British Imperial adventure in South Africa as well as in Asia, devised a scheme by which the situation on the Sikkim-Tibet border would be exploited to provide a justification of sorts for the despatch of a formidable British Mission (eventually to acquire a military escort of more than brigade strength under the command of Brigadier-General Macdonald) to Lhasa to force the Dalai Lama to enter into some kind of dialogue with the Indian Empire.[9] The Younghusband Expedition was duly mounted in 1903; and in August 1904 as the result of a process of controlled escalation it entered Lhasa after a contested passage from the Sikkim border which had resulted in large numbers of Tibetans being killed or wounded. The Dalai Lama had fled his capital before the British arrival.

In terms of British political advantage the Younghusband Expedition was not a success. It provided an opportunity for Russian protest which was so skilfully exploited that the British were eventually forced more or less to surrender any claim to the right of direct action in Tibet. It is hard to avoid the suspicion that the considerable publicity given by the official Russian press to the travels of Dorjiev was intended to provoke the British into just such a move. By premature action in Tibet the British had really given the Russians a powerful bargaining card which they could exploit for all sorts of possible exchanges. Tibet was thus manipulated by Tsarist diplomatists to help shape the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 which was to shackle British policy towards the country beyond the

Himalayas for more than a decade. The Younghusband Expedition created a situation which enabled the Russians to prevent the establishment of an equivalence between British interests in Tibet and those of Russia in Mongolia, with the end result that Russia acquired a free hand in Mongolia while the British, after 1907, could hardly make a gesture towards Tibet without having to think about paying off the Russians with concessions in Afghanistan or, even, the eastern Mediterranean.

In the very short term Younghusband acquired what amounted to a British protectorate over that territory under the control of Lhasa. It was, however, for a very brief period indeed because even as Younghusband was on his way back from Lhasa in September 1904 both in India and in London the British authorities were starting to dismantle the structure which he had tried to create. One achievement of Younghusband's treaty which he secured in Lhasa, the so called Lhasa Convention, survived in part in the shape of further Trade Marts opened at Gartok in Western Tibet and Gyantse on the road between Yatung and Lhasa. Other crucial provisions, however, including the right of a British official to visit Lhasa from time to time, were abandoned.[10]

With the repudiation of so many of the gains of the Younghusband Expedition it appeared to the Tibetan experts in the service of the Government of India (but not the British Government in London) that, with the British gone from the Tibetan capital and the 13th Dalai Lama in exile, there was a power vacuum in Tibet into which the Chinese would inevitably be sucked; and subsequent events showed that this impression was correct. By a series of agreements, the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906, and the new Trade Regulations of 1908, the formal position of the Chinese in Tibet was permitted to be greatly reinforced. The Chinese officials at the Trade Marts were able to act in a way which the British considered to be seriously damaging to their prestige. At the same time, the Chinese under the dynamic leadership of one of the last great soldier-bureaucrats of the Manchu era, Chao Erh-feng, the "Warden of the Marches", that is to say the High Official in charge of the Szechuan-Tibet borderlands, proceeded by a sequence of conquests to extend Manchu direct control steadily towards Lhasa from the east. In early 1910 Chao Erh-feng sent a flying column to the Tibetan capital and the Dalai Lama, who had only just returned after his exile since 1904, was now obliged to flee again, this time to British India.

The Chinese occupation of Central Tibet presented the Government of India with what they saw as a most threatening situation. Would the Chinese challenge the influence of the British in Nepal and Bhutan? Would they try to undermine the security of a long Indo-Tibetan border which for most of its length had not been defined and for a considerable stretch followed an alignment which

was far from ideal from a military point of view? Between 1910 and 1912 Chinese actions seemed to provide an affirmative answer to both these questions.

Of particular concern to the Government of India was evidence that the Chinese were seeking to penetrate the barrier of the Assam Himalayas and infiltrate down towards the edge of the plains of the Brahmaputra valley. The possibility could not be ignored. The murder in 1911 by tribesmen of a British official, Nöel Williamson, while travelling in the hills of the Dihang or Siang valley a few miles to the north of what was then the international border of British India, usually referred to as the Outer Line, provided an opportunity for British action. Under the cover of punishing those responsible for Williamson's death, the British were able to mount a series of expeditions which effectively pushed the territorial limits of the Indian Empire deep into the mountains; but, of course, such activity did not in itself produce a new *de jure* international border.

No doubt, had the Chinese retained their position in Central Tibet there would in due course have been some excruciatingly difficult Anglo-Chinese negotiations concerning the line of demarcation between the two Empires. The British were saved, however, from this unpleasant prospect by the fall of the Manchu Dynasty in late 1911 which was followed quickly enough by the collapse of Chinese power in Lhasa.

In 1912 an extremely complex situation had developed. The Chinese, as a result of the history of Anglo-Chinese diplomacy over Tibet since at least the Chefoo Convention of 1876 (the Lhasa Convention of 1904 in this context being an aberration), had been acknowledge by the British as having a legitimate paramountcy over Tibet. Moreover, by the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 the British had agreed "not to enter into negotiations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government". Thus while the Chinese were no longer in effective control of Central Tibet (though pockets of their troops remained there awaiting evacuation), the British were prevented by the corpus of their previous treaty commitments from entering into direct discussions with the Dalai Lama without some kind of Chinese participation. The British recognition of full Tibetan independence, which some officials in the service of the Government of India found attractive, was ruled out by the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. At the same time, the new state of affairs to the north of the Himalayan border could not be overlooked. Something had to be done about future relations between the Dalai Lama (now apparently a good British friend) and the Government of India. The new boundary in the Assam Himalayas urgently required regularisation. Some definition of a border between the new Tibet, whatever its theoretical status might be, and China had to be devised in order to guarantee that the

Chinese did not return to disturb the peace of the Indian frontier. Sino-Tibetan fighting, or the possibility of such combat, so close to British territory ought to be terminated and the remaining Chinese troops sent back home.

When all the variables were analysed it was evident that there were two quite distinct issues. First: there was the question of the relationship of Tibet to China and the delimitation of some kind of border between that Tibet which was now to all intents and purposes free of direct Chinese influence and that which was not. In that fighting between Chinese and Tibetans was still going on in the east, this border could well assume the form of a cease-fire line. Second: there was the problem of the new alignment of what had become, *de facto* if not *de jure*, an Indo-Tibetan rather than a Sino-Indian border. The two issues could only be kept separate if the delimitation of the effective Sino-Tibetan border, irrespective of the theoretical status of Tibet, were so arranged as to keep territory actually still under Chinese control away from direct contact with the borders of British India. The Government of India were determined that this should come about.

In 1913 the new Chinese regime of Yuan Shih-k'ai was persuaded by the British Minister in Peking, Sir John Jordan, to send a representative to India to discuss with the Tibetans, the British acting both as honest brokers and as active participants, the nature of Sino-Tibetan relations and the whereabouts of the geographical line separating the rule of Lhasa from that of the successors to Chao Erh-feng (who had been killed during the Revolution) in the east. The Chinese were extremely reluctant to take part in such an exercise and Jordan had to exert considerable pressure upon them including scantily veiled threats that he might withhold desperately needed financial assistance, and, perhaps, even deny British recognition to the new Chinese Republic, before they would agree. The Chinese, moreover, were under the impression that if they did not participate the British would in all probability negotiate directly with the Tibetans without consulting them at all.

The Simla Conference, which lasted from October 1913 to July 1914, dealt with both issues indicated above. On the one hand the Chinese and Tibetan delegates, Chen I-fan (Ivan) and the Lönchen Shatra (the Dalai Lama's Chief Minister), with a great deal of prompting from the British delegation including Sir Henry McMahon, the Indian Foreign Secretary, and Charles Bell, the Political Officer in Sikkim who had established a close relationship with the Dalai Lama during his Indian exile, discussed at great length the future shape of Sino-Tibetan relations. On the other hand, and without any Chinese participation whatsoever, McMahon and Bell negotiated with the Lönchen Shatra the alignment of what seemed in the new circumstances to be a suitable Indo-Tibetan border in the

Assam Himalayas, the so called McMahon Line.

The Sino-Tibetan discussions gave rise to the Simla Convention, a document which Chen I-fan initialled rather reluctantly in April 1914 and was then repudiated by Yuan Shih-k'ai's Government. It dealt with two major issues. First: it provided for a Tibet (known as Outer Tibet) based on Lhasa which was to all intents and purposes autonomous though acknowledging Chinese "suzerainty". The direct Chinese presence here would be limited to a Resident in Lhasa with an escort of not more than 300 men. Second: it defined another Tibet (Inner Tibet) in which the Chinese position would be far more substantial though not spelled out in detail in the text of the Convention. A small scale (1:3,800,000) map appended to the Convention indicated the boundaries of Outer and Inner Tibet; and it was ostensibly over the alignment of these that the Chinese repudiated the Convention.[11]

The separate Anglo-Tibetan discussions resulted in an exchange of notes between Sir Henry McMahon and the Lönchen Shatra dated 24 and 25 March 1914 which agreed to an Indo-Tibetan border, the McMahon Line, as indicated on an attached map in two sheets at a scale of 8 miles to the inch (1:500,000). The line was to some extent conditional; but its general alignment was clear enough. The McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes were not communicated to the Chinese; and they constitute a transaction quite distinct from the Simla Convention.[12]

After the Chinese Government had rejected the April 1914 text of the Simla Convention the British, both in India and China, tried very hard indeed to induce them to change their minds. On 3 July 1914, after it had become obvious that the Chinese were adamant, the British and Tibetan delegates signed a Declaration to the effect that they would consider as binding the text of the Simla Convention (which had, in fact, been slightly altered since it had been initalled by Chen I-fan in April), and that, until the Chinese signed this document they would be denied any benefits which it might confer upon them.[13] At the same time the British and Tibetan delegates signed a fresh set of Trade Regulations to replace those of 1908. These, too, were not shown to the Chinese. The Conference then broke up.

The final stages of the Simla Conference took place in the beginning of July 1914. A month later the British Empire was at war. The problems of the North-East Frontier of India, let alone the borderland between Eastern Tibet and Szechuan Province in China, suddenly seemed of minor import; and it is not surprising that they ceased to occupy much attention at the higher levels of British Government either in India or in England.

Had war not broken out, it is quite probable that, as Sir Henry McMahon advised in his *Final Memorandum*, some effort would have been expended in extending British administration to those tracts

which had, by virtue of the March 1914 notes exchanged between McMahon and the Lönchen Shatra, been added to the British Empire to the north of the old Outer Line in Assam.[14] In the event, so little was done that by 1918 it was almost as if the McMahon Line had never been negotiated. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that by that time not only was the Government of Assam, immediately responsible for the administration of the frontier tracts in the Assam Himalayas, unaware of the existence of the McMahon Line (which it had forgotten about if, indeed, it had ever fully understood), but even in the centres of power, in Simla and Delhi and in Whitehall, the 1914 frontier had become little more than a vague memory.

When the Simla Conference broke up in July 1914, had there in fact been negotiated a valid new boundary between British India and Tibet along the Assam Himalayas? The exchange of notes between Sir Henry McMahon and the Lönchen Shatra of 24 and 25 March 1914, with the fairly detailed map (in two sheets) showing the McMahon Line, undoubtedly indicates that Anglo-Tibetan boundary discussions took place and that the alignment outlined on the map associated with the notes was in general accepted by the Tibetan representative. There are, however, a number of caveats here.

First: it is quite clear from the text of the notes that they were to some extent provisional. It was expressly understood that the boundary shown on the map might have to be modified in the light of subsequent information, and, moreover, it was also indicated that some kind of Tibetan administration (the precise nature of which being expressed in the vaguest language) would continue in certain areas south of the new boundary. So the McMahon Line, on the evidence of the exchange of notes which brought it into being, required a measure of subsequent discussion before it attained its definitive shape.

Second: there is the question of whether the Tibetans were in a position, in terms of international law as it was understood by the other parties involved, to make any such agreement as that implied in the notes of 24 and 25 March 1914. Tibet could only cede territory to the British if it were deemed to be a fully sovereign state; and there can be no doubt that the transfer of Tawang to the British side of the McMahon Line involved the cession to the British of what had hitherto been Tibetan territory. In March 1914 the British were negotiating with the Chinese a Convention which made it clear that Tibet was part of Chinese territory (appended Note No. 1 to the Convention) and, indeed, had been under some measure of Chinese control as far as foreign relations were concerned since at least 1890 (as implied by the inclusion of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of that year, relating to Sikkim and Tibet, in the Schedule attached to the 1914 document). The Tibetans might consider themselves to be fully sovereign; but within the general legal atmosphere of the Simla

Convention it is hard to see how the British side could actually argue in that sense, and, in fact, they carefully refrained from doing so in their explanation of the 1914 proceedings to the India Office. A case could be made, of course, that the Chinese had deprived themselves of all rights and interests in Tibet so long as they refrained from signing the Simla Convention. But then, what would happen if they should one day sign? Would the cession of what was technically once more Chinese territory now be condoned; or would it be cancelled?

Third: in any case, the British side was precluded by the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 from entering into direct relations with Tibet except through the intermediary of the Chinese Government (which was manifestly not the case with the notes of 24 and 25 March 1914) and from disturbing the territorial integrity of Tibet (which was certainly being disturbed by the British acquisition of undoubted Tibetan territory in the same notes). Even if it might be maintained that the ultimate failure of the Chinese to ratify the Convention conferred a measure of freedom in international relations upon the Tibetans, this still did not absolve the British side from the restrictions of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. This obstacle to British diplomacy did not formally disappear until 1924 when the Convention was expressly cancelled in Article II of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 7 August of that year, though it had to all intents and purposes been removed by 1920 with the Bolshevik victory in the civil war following the second Russian Revolution of 1917.

Fourth: did the notes of 24 and 25 March 1914 have anything like the force of a treaty? Possibly not. They probably required some kind of formal ratification not only by the Dalai Lama but also by the other powers in Tibet, notably the three great Lhasa monasteries, particularly Drepung with such a direct interest in Tawang. Other international agreements to which Tibet was a party were adorned with an array of seals including those of the Abbots of Sera, Ganden and Drepung. Neither the notes nor the attached map seem to have any such embellishments, and the only Tibetan name associated with them is that of the Lönchen Shatra.[15]

Fifth: there is also a question about the powers possessed by the Tibetan representative at the Simla Conference, the Lönchen Shatra, to cede to the British certain Tibetan areas, and Tawang in particular. The Lönchen Shatra was effectively disgraced on his return to Tibet for this very act, which the Tibetans, when they were pressed on the subject from the mid-1930s onwards, endeavoured to avoid discussing.[16] It was clear then that the cession of Tawang to the British had not gone unchallenged in Lhasa, though it is still by no means certain how much, and what exactly, the Lönchen Shatra actually told his colleagues in the Tibetan Government concerning the details of his discussions with McMahon.[17] As we shall see, right

up to the end of British rule in India the Tibetans were, to say the least, ambivalent about the status of Tawang; and the same could be said for a number of other pockets of territory to the south of the McMahon Line, notably along the Lohit, on the upper reaches of the Subansiri and the Siyom, and in the Dihang (or Siang) valley, to which for various reasons the Tibetans could lay claim.

Sixth: the Chinese were not informed, let alone consulted, about the 24 and 25 March 1914 notes and the associated map (in two sheets at a scale of 1:500,000). Even if it could be argued that there was no need for them to be so informed, yet the British Government considered that it would be on the whole undesirable to draw their attention to the fact that the British had been dealing secretly with the Tibetans while at the same time discussing with China the nature of their right to do so. The Chinese would certainly interpret this as an underhand British attempt to subvert the Chinese position in Tibet. In 1914 the British still considered Chinese good will to be a desirable commodity. Therefore, from a wider British diplomatic point of view there was a sound case for playing down the legally binding implications of the McMahon Line notes, all other things being equal.

Finally: there is an interesting point as to whether the British delegation at the Simla Conference was, in fact, empowered by its own Government to negotiate with the Tibetan delegation on such matters as the McMahon Line. On 23 July 1914, while transmitting Sir Henry McMahon's *Final Memorandum* on the Simla Conference to the Secretary of State for India, Lord Crewe, the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, observed that

> we recognise that a consideration of the eastern or Indo-Chinese portion of the North-East Frontier did not form part of the functions of the Conference; and we would therefore request that the views and proposals put forward . . [relating to the McMahon Line negotiations] . . may be regarded as personal to Sir Henry McMahon, and not at present carrying the endorsement of the Government of India.[18]

The 24/25 March 1914 Anglo-Tibetan notes, in other words, could possibly be construed as representing a bit of freelance activity on the part of Sir Henry McMahon assisted by Charles Bell, for which the Government of India would not take specific responsibility even if they did not actually disagree with the general aims and objectives.

Sir Henry McMahon, who had only decided (apparently on the advice of Charles Bell, who, indeed, had a hand in the devising of the greater part of the McMahon alignment) to advance the new boundary northwards from the line of the Se La to include Tawang at the very last moment, was aware that it created special problems.[19] In his *Final Memorandum* on the Simla Conference, dated 8 July 1914, he was at pains to point out that

> the control of the monastery .. [of Tawang] .. and the surrounding country will require great care and tact in order to avoid friction with the Tibetan Government, and in order to open the road and prevent raids from the neighbouring tribes without undue interference with the vested interests of the monastery. I would prefer at present to withhold any detailed suggestions in regard to the treatment of this tract, and would only recommend that a British officer with experience of administration in tribal territory be directed to proceed to Tawang for a period ... and that the settlement of the future administration of Tawang be decided after he has had an opportunity to thoroughly investigate the local conditions.[20]

"Care and tact" was certainly called for by the very terms, explicit or implicit, on which Tawang was ceded to the British. Charles Bell, it would appear, persuaded the Lönchen Shatra to agree to the transfer of Tawang on the grounds that only by so doing would the autonomous status of Tibet be guaranteed by the British at the Conference (and, presumably, thereafter) and the Chinese persuaded to accept it.[21] The Tibetans evidently considered that the guarantee had not been honoured. This was a point which McMahon did not discuss in his *Final Memorandum*.

To question the powers of the Lönchen Shatra over Tawang, of course, is not to say that by the time of the opening of the Simla Conference the Tibetan Government of the 13th Dalai Lama did not consider that they had the power to establish treaty relations with foreign states. In 1913 the 13th Dalai Lama issued what is widely interpreted as a declaration of full Tibetan independence;[22] and in January of that year Dorjiev, acting on behalf of the Dalai Lama, entered into a treaty with the Mongol authorities in Urga which was certainly seen in Lhasa as binding and valid.[23] In 1914, on learning of the outbreak of the War, the Dalai Lama made without any reference to China an offer to the Government of India of a thousand soldiers to fight on their side: this was tantamount to a Tibetan declaration of war on the Central Powers, a sovereign act it there ever was one.[24] The official Tibetan view as it is currently presented is that the Dalai Lama's Government enjoyed a special relationship with the Manchu Dynasty. Once that Dynasty had been overthrown so also did that relationship come to an end in so far as it concerned the successor regime in China.[25]

Had the Chinese still in 1914 been in occupation of Tibetan territory in direct contact to that of British India, as they had been between 1910 and 1912, then it would have been impossible to ignore the many issues arising from the fact of the exchange of notes between McMahon and the Lönchen Shatra on 24 and 25 March 1914; but by 1914 the nearest Chinese outposts in Eastern Tibet were separated from Assam by many miles of extremely difficult mountain country under effective Tibetan control.[26] The McMahon Line

boundary, or something like it, which had seemed so vital to British interests in the immediate aftermath of the advance of Chinese troops to Lhasa in 1910, was now of more or less academic interest. It might perhaps be useful to have it on paper; but in practice India was safe for the time being at least without it. Hence the wisest course, given the inherent problems, appeared to be to let sleeping dogs lie. Why risk the possibility of Chinese animosity and the certainty of Russian protest (accompanied by extremely expensive Russian demands for compensation elsewhere, in Afghanistan or in even less desirable areas) by making a public fuss about a boundary line which no longer solved a pressing problem of British frontier policy? This attitude persisted in London, abetted by the Government of India, to result in the omission in the original 1929 edition of Aitchison's *Treaties* of any mention of the 24 and 25 March 1914 notes.[27]

What about the Simla Convention itself? This was a much more immediate problem than the 24 and 25 March notes. There was nothing secret about the fact that discussions between the British Government of India and the Government of the newly established Chinese Republic on the question of Tibet had actually taken place. It was widely known that the Chinese Government had refused to ratify the convention of 27 April 1914 which their representative, Chen I-fan, had initialled. There existed a slightly different version of this Convention which, on 3 July 1914, the British and Tibetan delegates had accepted (although unsigned) as binding by means of a separate Declaration, but which, without Chinese signature, they agreed would confer no benefits upon China. Precise details concerning this last stage were not available to the general public in 1914; but, again, it was common knowledge that some kind of Anglo-Tibetan deal had been struck at the end of the Conference even though its terms were not revealed. It was widely believed, indeed, that the Simla Convention actually *had* been signed by the British and Tibetan representatives. What was the legal situation here? The Chinese evidently thought that a secret formal Anglo-Tibetan treaty existed (which, of course, the British could not have admitted in the light of the Russian issue already noted); and Peking was unlikely to accept this without, as had happened in the past, trying to replace it by some kind of bilateral Anglo-Chinese agreement reinforcing the theoretical Chinese position in Tibet.

In the circumstances the British had two, not of necessity mutually exclusive, options before them. They could play down in public the import of the 3 July 1914 Anglo-Tibetan agreements, which included not only the Declaration relating to the main Convention but also a new set of Trade Regulations replacing the Regulations of 1908 (signed by both China and Tibet) while actually putting the new Regulations to such practical use as might seem expedient. They could open discussions with the Chinese in Peking (or, perhaps,

London) either for some kind of Chinese adherence to these Anglo-Tibetan agreements or for their replacement by some new and comprehensive Anglo-Chinese understanding on the Tibetan question in its widest context. What they could not do, it seemed, was to argue that the 3 July 1914 agreements provided a final solution to the Tibetan question to be announced publicly as such. Hence the validity of these particular agreements was not asserted in the original version of the next edition of Aitchison's *Treaties.*

We have already noted that one problem associated with the Simla Convention, whether in the April version initialled by the Chinese or in the July version accepted as binding in a separate Declaration by the British and Tibetans, lay in the conflict created for British diplomacy by this instrument with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. For example: Article II of the Tibetan part of the Anglo-Russian Convention declared that "the British and Russian Governments respectively engage not to send representatives to Lhasa", yet the Simla Convention, Article VIII, stated that

> the British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of the Convention of September 7, 1904, between Great Britain and Tibet, which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.

This was, in fact, a revival of the Special Article of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 which Younghusband had negotiated and which, as much in deference to possible Russian opinion as for any other reason, had been cancelled immediately by the then Acting Viceroy, Lord Ampthill.[28] It was extremely unlikely that the Imperial Russian Government were going to accept this provision without demanding costly compensation.

Finally, there was the awkward fact, upon which we have already touched, that the text of the Simla Convention conflicted with the Anglo-Tibetan notes of 24 and 25 March 1914 which created the McMahon Line. By these notes the British in theory, if not at that time in practice, annexed certain tracts of undoubted Tibetan territory, Tawang in particular. By Article II of the Simla Convention, in both texts, "the Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it". Unless it was argued that the McMahon Line annexations represented a *fait accompli* prior to and beyond the scope of the Convention, it is hard to see how the British occupation of Tawang, which had not been undertaken in practice by July 1914 (or, indeed, by August 1947) could be explained to the Chinese, had they adhered to the Convention, in the light of Article II. It rather looked as if in the end the British might have to decide what they wanted most, the Simla Convention or the McMahon Line.

The situation at the close of the Simla Conference must have

seemed to the Government of India and to its Foreign Secretary, Sir Henry McMahon, to be most unsatisfactory with a mass of loose ends left, as it were, dangling over the diplomatic landscape. McMahon, before he left on leave never to return to Indian service, made a number of recommendations in his *Final Memorandum* by the implementation of which he hoped to derive some positive advantages from the Simla proceedings. In the event, only one of his points was acted upon, the provision of some British military assistance to the Tibetans to enable them to keep China, in the short term at least, from re-establishing direct contact with the Assam Himalayas. The Tibetan Government was to be provided in the latter part of 1914, from stocks held in India, with 5,000 old British Lee-Metford or Lee-Enfield rifles and 500,000 rounds of ammunition for them.[29] These, along with a further 200,000 rounds in 1915 and 500,000 more at the very end of 1917 or early 1918, combined with some British assistance in military training, to which must be added a little help from Mongol (Russian-trained) and Japanese army instructors and, perhaps, some further arms and ammunition from Russian and Japanese sources, sufficed to keep the Chinese at bay in Eastern Tibet for a while; and in 1917-18 the availability to the Tibetans of this very modest arsenal was a major factor in the crisis on the Szechuan-Tibet border which almost, as we shall see in a later Chapter, resulted in the negotiation by the British and the Chinese of some substitute for the abortive Simla Convention.[30]

With the end of the Simla Conference British policy with regard to Tibet divided into two streams, sometimes merging and sometimes flowing quite separately.

On the one hand, there was an argument that, China having opted out of diplomatic settlement and, in any case, having been repelled from propinquity to British India by Tibetan force, the Tibetans could now be treated to all intents and purposes as *de facto* independent; and any matters relating to the administration of the border between British India and Tibet could be carried out bilaterally without reference to China at all. This view tended to prevail in India, particularly among officers directly responsible for the conduct of relations with the Tibetans, those whom Sir Francis Younghusband once called "the men on the spot".[31] In the implementation of any policy based on this concept, however, the obstacle of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 had to be in some way surmounted; and this was by no means easy.

On the other hand, there was a line of reasoning which concluded that some fresh instrument would sooner or later have to be negotiated with the Chinese in order to define the nature of Chinese interests in Tibet and the limits of that territory adjacent to Tibet which was under direct Chinese administration. This view was to be detected consistently in the thoughts on the Tibetan question on the

part of the British Legation in Peking, though it must be admitted there was no great enthusiasm for the kind of negotiations which would surely result from any British overture to the Chinese Government on this particular question. Again, this line of policy could not escape entirely from the shadow of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

The Simla Convention itself by 1915 had become in the eyes of the Government of India a document of mainly academic interest, as was pointed out in the clearest possible language to Charles Bell in reply to a lengthy exposition of the British advantages which Bell argued had been obtained at Simla. Bell was told firmly that "the Simla Convention has not been signed by the Chinese Government or accepted by the Russian Government, and is therefore for the present invalid".[32]

From the Tibetan point of view the situation after July 1914 was hardly more satisfactory than it appeared to the British. There was a Chinese force in Eastern Tibet firmly entrenched in Chamdo and other centres which the Dalai Lama considered ought to be within his own sphere of control. The vigilance of the Kalon Lama, the Tibetan commander in the east since 1913, combined with Chinese weakness in the continuing aftermath of Revolution and the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, was holding a line which it seemed certain would one day be challenged by a stronger China. What would happen then? The 13th Dalai Lama had hoped that British intervention would provide a lasting solution to this problem. It clearly had not.

Tibetan policy, too, divided into a number of separate streams.

First: the Tibetans did not rule out the possibility that the British might still deliver what they had, so it must have struck them, failed to do in 1914, namely an effective diplomatic guarantee against a renewed Chinese advance from the east. It was prudent to cultivate links with the Government of India; and this the 13th Dalai Lama went out of his way to do, aided by his friend Charles Bell. The Dalai Lama, however, was constrained both by the limitations which the British themselves had imposed upon their own policy and by the fact that Tibetan opinion was not unanimous in support of an opening of Tibet to British influence. The cession in 1914 to the British of Tawang, the site of a daughter house of the powerful Drepung monastery, for example, was extremely unpopular in certain political circles in Lhasa and, as has already been noted, probably contributed to the decline in influence of the Lönchen Shatra, usually considered the most pro-British of the Dalai Lama's senior advisers.[33]

Second: the possibility of direct Sino-Tibetan negotiations was never entirely ruled out. A dialogue of sorts, often discreet and indirect, between Lhasa and China, be it with the Chinese authorities in Kansu, Yunnan or Szechuan or with the Central Government, continued spasmodically from the time of the Simla Conference right

up to the eventual Chinese occupation of Tibet in the 1950s.

Third: it remained an axiom of Tibetan strategy that an army in the east should watch the Chinese and endeavour to frustrate any attempt to emulate the exploits of Chao Erh-feng. Here, too, there was a complexity of policy. The force of the Kalon Lama, which was the principal Tibetan barrier, was small. Even at the nadir of Chinese strength following the fall of the Manchus it was probably inadequate to cope with a concerted Chinese attack in which the provincial armies of Szechuan collaborated wholeheartedly with those of Yunnan and Kansu and the Mahommedan General at Sining. The Kalon Lama (Kalon Chamba Tendar), who was not only an able soldier but no mean diplomatist, usually managed to isolate the Szechuanese element from those of Kansu and Yunnan.[34] Without this achievement it is probable that the intensified Sino-Tibetan fighting which broke out in late 1917 would have resulted in disaster for the Tibetans instead of that brief Tibetan triumph which was to provide the occasion for a renewed British attempt to reopen the negotiations with China aborted at Simla. There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that from the period when the Simla Conference was still in session right up to the end of 1917 the Kalon Lama never entirely closed his mind to the possibility of some settlement through direct Sino-Tibetan negotiations with or without a British presence.

1. For the missions to Tashilhunpo of George Bogle in 1774-1775 and Samuel Turner in 1783, see: C.R. Markham, ed., *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet, and of the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa*, London 1876; G. Bogle, ed., Wolf-Dieter Grün, *Im Land der lebenden Buddhas*, Stuttgart 1984; S. Turner, *An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet*, London 1800; Schuyler Camman, *Trade Through the Himalayas. The Early British Attempts to Open Tibet*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1951; G. Woodcock, *Into Tibet. The Early British Explorers*, London 1971; J. MacGregor, *Tibet. A Chronicle of Exploration*, London 1970.
   The 6th Panchen Lama (sometimes referred to as the 3rd Incarnation) died in 1780. When Turner reached Tashilhunpo there was a Regency in office.

2. For a history of Anglo-Tibetan relations during this period, see: A. Lamb, *British India and Tibet 1766-1910*, London 1986.

3. Quoted in: Lamb, *India and Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.

4. The Tibetans consumed vast quantities of tea which came in a specially prepared form, as bricks, from Szechuan in China. The tea trade was a major source of wealth for many Tibetan monasteries. In the event during the British period Indian tea never managed to compete with the Chinese product in Tibetan markets.

5. Quoted in: Lamb, *India and Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 134.

6. For text, see: A. Lamb, *The McMahon Line. A Study in the Relations between India, China and Tibet, 1904 to 1914*, 2 vols., London 1966, Vol. I, pp. 237-238.

7. For text, see: Lamb, *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 239-241.

8. On Dorjiev, see: A. Lamb, "Some Notes on Russian Intrigue in Tibet", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 1959.

9. Francis Younghusband had competed against Russian intrigues in the Pamirs and Sinkiang in the late 1880s and early 1890s. He first met Curzon in Chitral in 1894. Soon after, Younghusband became deeply involved in the events which produced the Jameson Raid in South Africa.

10. Another provision in the original Lhasa Convention was a Tibetan indemnity, payable in 75 annual instalments, as security for which the British would occupy the Chumbi Valley. The possession of the Chumbi Valley placed the British right on the edge of the Tibetan plateau; and from it they could easily spread out deeper into the country when a suitable opportunity presented itself. Had the Lhasa Convention stood unmodified, the Chumbi Valley would have still been occupied by India when the Chinese "liberated" Tibet in 1950-1951. In the event, the 75 year period was reduced to 3, and by 1908 both the Tibetan indemnity had been paid off (by China on behalf of Tibet) and the Chumbi Valley occupation had been terminated.

11. The key provisions of the Simla Convention, text of 27 April 1914, were:

> *Article II.* The Governments of Great Britain and China recognizing that Tibet is under the suzerainty of China, and recognizing also the autonomy of Outer Tibet, engage to respect the territorial integrity of the country, and to abstain from all interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama), which shall remain in the hands of the Tibetan Government at Lhasa.
>
> The Government of China engages not to convert Tibet into a Chinese province. The Government of Great Britain engages not to annex Tibet or any portion of it.
>
> *Article III.* . . . The Government of China engages . . . not to send troops into Outer Tibet, nor to station civil or military officers, nor to establish Chinese colonies in the country. . .
>
> *Article IV.* The foregoing Article shall not be held to preclude the continuance of the arrangement by which, in the past, a Chinese high official with suitable escort has been maintained at Lhasa, but it is hereby provided that the said escort shall in no circumstances exceed 300 men.
>
> *Article V.* The Governments of China and Tibet engage that they will not enter into any negotiations or agreements regarding Tibet with one another, or with any other Power, excepting such negotiations between Great Britain and Tibet which are provided for . . [in the Lhasa Convention of 1904 and the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906].
>
> *Article VIII.* The British Agent who resides at Gyantse may visit Lhasa with his escort whenever it is necessary to consult with the Tibetan Government regarding matters arising out of . . [the Lhasa Convention of 1904] . . which it has been found impossible to settle at Gyantse by correspondence or otherwise.
>
> *Article IX.* For the purposes of the present Convention the borders of Tibet, and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet, shall be shown in red and blue respectively on the map attached hereto.
>
> Nothing in the present Convention shall be held to prejudice the existing rights of the Tibetan Government in Inner Tibet, which include the power to select and appoint high priests of monasteries and to retain full control in all matters affecting religious institutions.

To this text were added seven notes, of which the following are of particular importance:

> *Note 1.* It is understood by the High Contracting Parties that Tibet forms part of Chinese territory.
>
> *Note 2.* After the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama by the Tibetan Government, the latter will notify the installation to the Chinese Government, whose representative at Lhasa will then formally communicate to His Holiness the titles consistent with his dignity, which have been conferred by the Chinese Government.
>
> *Note 3.* It is also understood that the selection and appointment of all officers in Outer Tibet will rest with the Tibetan Government.

Note 4. Outer Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or in any other similar body.

12. McMahon wrote to Lönchen Shatra on 24 March 1914 as follows:

    In February last you accepted the India-Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutan frontier, as given in the map (two sheets), of which two copies are herewith attached, subject to the following conditions:

    (a) The Tibetan ownership of private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed.

    (b) If the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a day's march of the British side of the frontier, they will be included in Tibetan territory and the frontier modified accordingly.

    I understand that your Government have now agreed to this frontier subject to the above two conditions.

    You wished to know whether certain dues now collected by the Tibetan Government at Tsöna Jong and Kongbu and Kham from the Monpas and Lopas for articles sold may still be collected. Mr. Bell has informed you that such details will be settled in a friendly spirit, when you have furnished him with further information, which you have promised.

    The Lönchen Shatra replied to McMahon on 25 March 1914 as follows:

    As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map, which you sent me in February last, to Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you subject to the conditions, mentioned in your letter, dated 24th March, sent to me through Mr. Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.

13. The difference between the two texts is to be found in *Article X*, which in the April version contains the following:

    In case of differences between the Governments of China and Tibet in regard to questions arising out of this Convention the aforesaid Governments engage to refer them to the British Government for equitable adjustment.

    This very clear statement of the British role as referee in the squabbles between China and Tibet was considered by the Foreign Office to involve sailing rather close to the wind of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention. In the July text, accordingly, it was deleted.

14. Some Indian scholars still persist in arguing that the old Outer Line was not, in fact, the international border of British India but, rather, some kind of boundary drawn up for administrative reasons which separated territories in varying degrees British on both sides. The argument, which simply does not stand up to investigation on the basis of the available documentary evidence, is advanced rather unconvincingly in D.P. Choudhury, *The North-East Frontier of India 1865-1914*, The Asiatic Society, Calcutta 1978.

15. The absence of seals from the map (in two sheets) is interesting. According to the Lönchen Shatra's note to McMahon of 25 March 1914, "I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other". The published version of the map returned to McMahon, however, has no seal or signature on it, not even those of the Lönchen Shatra. Can this be, indeed, the same map that was one of the two sets originally handed to the Lönchen Shatra? The alleged McMahon copy of the map, in two sheets and at a scale of 1:500,000, was published in: India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India*, New Delhi 1961, Maps 21 & 22; Dorothy Woodman, *Himalayan Frontiers*, London 1969, facing p. 181. The copies in London in the records of the India Office and the Foreign Office, of course, cannot be either of the two original sets signed and sealed according to the note. Up to 1947 the Tibetans never produced, so the British records would indicate, their set; and the British do not seem to have shown their set to the Tibetans.

16. For the disgrace of the Lönchen Shatra over the Tawang issue, see: Mehra, *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, p. 300; also L/P&S/10/434, Bell to India, 17 July 1915, who reported that the Lönchen Shatra was "much blamed for failing in his negotiations in India and for surrendering the Tawang tract and for making other important concessions to the British Government in the recent Convention".

17. For one thing, Tawang monastery was a daughter house of Drepung which, apart from being Tibet's largest monastery, was often more sympathetic to the Chinese than other forces in Lhasa politics – many of its monks came from the Sino-Tibetan border areas – and it was a focus of opposition to the policies of the 13th Dalai Lama. See, for example: Sir Charles Bell, *Tibet Past & Present*, Oxford 1924, p.120; Sir Charles Bell, *Portrait of the Dalai Lama*, London 1946, p. 125. It is hard to see how the Government of the 13th Dalai Lama could explain to Drepung in 1914 and the years immediately following that Tawang was now British without provoking the kind of violence for which Drepung was renowned, unless it was able to produce some very convincing reasons as yet not revealed to the general public. Loseling College of Drepung received the equivalent of c. Rs. 900 each year from Tawang revenues.

    Part of the Tawang area, Mago (to the east of Tawang monastery), was the fief of the Samdrup Potrang family of Lhasa.

    According to a memorandum in Bell's papers now in the India Office Library and Records, the Lönchen Shatra told Bell that he had discussed the Tawang question with his colleagues in Lhasa. But with whom, in what detail, and referring to all of Tawang or merely that part south of the Se La? We do not have the answers to these questions. The Lönchen Shatra also told Bell that the Tawang question had *not* been discussed with the Tibetan interests directly concerned in Tawang itself. Bell's memoranda leave one in no doubt that there were a number of loose ends left in the Tawang question, what he told the Lönchen Shatra he considered to be "matters of detail which can be settled later on". See: Eur MSS F80/5e.

18. Quoted by Karunakar Gupta in "The McMahon Line 1911-45: the British Legacy", *The China Quarterly*, 47, July/September 1971.

19. Apart from the Bell papers, Eur MSS F80/5, see: C.J. Christie in "Sir Charles Bell: A Memoir", *Asian Affairs*, February 1977.

20. L/P&S/10/344, McMahon, *Final Memorandum*. Apart from Captain G.A. Nevill, who had been in Tawang in April 1914 (and before the *Final Memorandum* had been written), no British officer is recorded in the archives of the India Office Library and Records in London (or in the very detailed survey of the Assam Government archives made by Sir Robert Reid, Governor of Assam from 1937 to 1942, in his *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam from 1883-1941*, Shillong 1941) to have gone up to Tawang on official business until Captain G.S. Lightfoot's visit in 1936; though the place had been visited by F. Ludlow and G. Sherriff in 1934 and W. Kingdon Ward in 1935; and, of course, one must not forget F.M. Bailey's visit in 1913.

21. Bell had a vision of Tawang as a potential replacement for the Chumbi Valley (which the British had been unable to retain for more than three years after the Younghusband Expedition) as a British outpost on the Tibetan plateau: from thence would radiate British political, cultural and economic influence which would make sure that the rulers of Lhasa would remain friendly to the Government of India despite manifold temptations to stray.

22. See: Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet. A Political History*, New Haven and London 1967, pp. 246-247. See also: M. van Walt van Praag, M.,*The Status of Tibet: History, Rights and Prospects in International Law*, Boulder, Colorado, 1987, pp. 48-49 where much of the text of this Declaration is quoted.

23. L/P&S/10/432, Memorandum by British Legation, Peking, dated 30 August 1913, which confirms the existence of this treaty. For the text of the Urga Treaty of 11 January 1913, the authenticity of which has been doubted in some quarters, see: M. C. van Walt van Praag, *The Status of Tibet: History, Rights and Prospects in International Law*, Boulder, Colorado, 1987, pp. 320-321.
    It is interesting that during the Simla Conference the Lönchen Shatra told Bell that the Dalai Lama denied that Dorjiev had ever been authorised to sign anything like a formal treaty with the Mongols. See: Eur MSS 80/5, Bell's memorandum of 3 February 1914.

24. See: Sir C. Bell, *Tibet Past & Present*, Oxford 1924, pp. 160-162; van Walt van Praag, *Tibet, op. cit.*, 61-62, 232 n9. The fact of the Dalai Lama's offer was confirmed by a statement by Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for India, in the House of Commons on 20 October 1915.
    The Dalai Lama's offer was turned down by the Government of India.

25. See: van Walt van Praag, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 12-13. The relationship is described as *Chö-yön*, meaning that between a Bodhisattva (that is to say the Dalai Lama as the reincarnation of Avalokitesvara) and his Protector. The Manchu Emperors were recognised by the Dalai Lamas as reincarnations of another Bodhisattva, Manjusri, which added further complexity to this relationship. It is unlikely that international lawyers can have much to say to illuminate the technicalities of relationships between Bodhisattvas,

26. This, however, was not the case with British Burma, as Sir Henry McMahon pointed out at some length in his *Final Memorandum*. The problems of Sino-Burmese boundary policy lie beyond the scope of this book: it should be noted, however, that British Burma possessed a long common frontier with Chinese territory of which the McMahon Line, about half of the Burmese part of which lay in 1914 along Chinese controlled territory, was not the only sector (and certainly not the most important) subject to Anglo-Chinese argument and discussion.

27. Vol. XIV. This was replaced in 1938 by another Vol. XIV, still bearing the date of the original 1929 edition, which *did* in fact print the various Simla Documents. How this odd state of affairs came about will be considered below.

28. The story of the Lhasa Convention is related in: Lamb, *India and Tibet, op. cit.*, Chapter X.

29. It may be speculated that the provision of these weapons was in some way connected with the Tibetan territorial concessions with respect to the McMahon Line. Without the minutes of the discussions leading to the 24/25 March 1914 notes, of course, one can say no more.
    The Lee-Enfield (in small arms terminology) evolved from the Lee-Metford. The rifles in Tibetan military hands which Brigadier-General George Pereira saw in Eastern Tibet in 1921 were, he thought, Lee-Metfords, rather dirty though oiled, and with the sights removed. The rifles in the first British deliveries to Tibet were sometimes referred to as "long" rifles as opposed to the "short" rifles supplied later on. The "short" rifles were all Lee-Enfields.
    See: Sir Francis Younghusband, ed., *Peking to Lhasa: the narrative of the journeys in the Chinese Empire made by the late Brigadier-General George Pereira*, London 1925, p. 148.
    The Lee-Metford was replaced in general British Army service around the time of the Boer War by the Lee-Enfield because the Metford system of rifling, while more accurate, with its shallower grooves was subject to more rapid wear than the system adopted in the Lee-Enfield. Wear in the bore of a Lee-Metford began to be apparent after the firing of about 3,000 rounds. There is some evidence during

the 1917-18 fighting in Eastern Tibet that the rifles used by the Tibetans had badly worn bores, which rather suggests Lee-Metfords; but we cannot be sure. Apart from the rifling and the sights, the two weapons were virtually indistinguishable; and they both used the same .303 rimmed ammunition.

As a matter of convenience I have referred to British rifles provided to the Tibetans by the Government of India as Lee-Enfields even if they might have been Lee-Metfords. The main significance of Lee-Metford over Lee-Enfield in this particular context is that the Lee-Metford by 1914 was quite obsolete. By supplying these weapons to the Tibetans, if they were indeed Lee-Metfords, the British had in no way diminished their military strength because the weapons would otherwise have remained in store.

30. The British archives contain a number of reports on the subject of Japanese military instructors in Tibet, notably one Yasujiro Yajima, as well as on Tibetan attempts to obtain arms and ammunition, either from Russia or from Japan. It is possible that by 1917 a certain amount of rifle ammunition was being manufactured in Lhasa; but, if so, not in quantities sufficient to meet the demand of military action on any scale. It is also possible that .303 ammunition might have been acquired in Afghanistan or on the North-West Frontier and then smuggled into Tibet; but the records show no trace of such a traffic.

Assuming that the 5,000 Lee-Enfields were the only modern rifles possessed by the Tibetan army, then the total ammunition for them supplied by India between 1914 and 1918 only works out at 240 rounds per weapon, which does not provide much for musketry training let alone battle. It seems likely that there were some other modern weapons of various patterns (and calibres) in the Tibetan armoury along with numerous weapons of considerable antiquity. There can be no doubt, however, that the shock fire-power of the Kalon Lama's troops in Eastern Tibet (Kham) came from the British Indian Lee-Enfields.

See, for example: Hardinge to London, 29 November 1913 in L/P&S/10/432; Bell to India, 19 May 1915 in L/P&S/10/434.

On Yasujiro Yajima, see also: Shakabpa, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 250, 259. Yasujiro Yajima had been closely associated with the Dalai Lama since 1912, and in his way was probably as significant a foreign influence over the policy of the 13th Dalai Lama as Dorjiev or Bell. See: Lamb, *McMahon Line*, vol. 2, pp. 421-422. In 1912 the Government of India had discovered the following information about Yasujiro Yajima. He had been a soldier in the Imperial Japanese Army and seen combat in the Russo-Japanese War. He had then become a military instructor in the Toyama Military College, leaving the Japanese service in 1907. In 1908 he was instructing Chinese troops in Szechuan. Between 1907 and 1912 he had travelled widely, visiting Shanghai, Szechuan, Tibet, India, the United States, and Japan. It is extremely improbable that when he returned to Tibet in 1912 he did not retain links with some elements of the Japanese Government.

The further 200,000 rounds of ammunition were agreed to, subject to payment by the Tibetans, in March 1915. See: FO 535/18, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 25 March 1915. On the additional 500,000 rounds supplied in December 1917, see: L/P&S/10/714, which contains the papers on this subject. It is not clear when this last consignment was delivered, probably in the first half of January 1918, in which case it would have arrived in time for use during the Tibetan siege of Chamdo. See, for example: Bray to Political Officer Sikkim, 7 January 1918. This ammunition was supplied at the request of the Tibetan Government; and the Government of India could have been in no doubt that it would be used against the Chinese in Eastern Tibet.

British military training involved the instruction at Gyantse in 1915 of a small number of Tibetan troops, in all 2 officers, 2 Havildars and 50 ordinary soldiers, by the Officer Commanding the British Military Detachment at the Trade Mart.

Training of Tibetan troops at Gyantse, it would appear, was not then resumed until the very end of 1921. See: L/P&S/11/203, P. 4946.

Richardson states, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 119, that in 1916 the British placed a total embargo upon the supply of arms to Tibet and prevented the Tibetans from obtaining arms from Japan.

31. See: Sir Francis Younghusband, *India and Tibet. A History of the Relations which have subsisted between the two Countries from the time of Warren Hastings to 1910; with a Particular Account of the Mission to Lhasa of 1904*, London 1910, p.407. This was reprinted in Hong Kong (Oxford in Asia) in 1985, with an introduction by Alastair Lamb.

32. FO 535/18, Bell to India, 6 August 1915, and India to Bell, 3 September 1915. These remarks have sometimes mistakenly been attributed to Bell himself. Bell, of course, was trying to make out a case that the Simla Convention *did* have some validity. See: A. T. Grunfeld, *The Making of Modern Tibet*, London 1987, p. 66. Grunfeld is misquoting Karunakar Gupta, "The McMahon Line", *China Quarterly*, *loc. cit.* p. 524.

33. The Lönchen Shatra, Paljor Dorje, died before 1920 according to Charles Bell, who during his mission to Lhasa in 1920-21 regretted the absence of one who had been the most pro-British of all the Dalai Lama's Ministers. According to Shakabpa, *Tibet, op. cit.*p. 262, he died in 1923.

34. Perhaps the best, and most sympathetic, account of the Kalon Lama in Eastern Tibet is to be found in: Louis Magrath King, *China in Turmoil. Studies in Personality*, London 1927. This work, far less well known than Eric Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet, together with a history of the relations between China, Tibet and India*, Cambridge 1922, contains a great deal of extremely interesting first hand information on the situation in Eastern Tibet from 1913 to 1922, during which period King was twice stationed at Tachienlu as Special Assistant, from October 1913 to January 1916 and October 1919 to November 1922. In December 1921 King was given the honorary rank of Consul; and in January 1924 he retired on pension from the China Consular Service. The story of the background to King's retirement is related in a Chapter below. Louis King married a Tibetan lady, Rinchen Lhamo, who wrote, no doubt with King's assistance, an account of her life, *We Tibetans*, first published in London in 1926 and reprinted in New York in 1985.

King indicated that the Kalon Lama died in 1922, after his recall to Lhasa. In late May or early June the Kalon Lama was replaced as commander of the Tibetan forces in the East by Trimon Shape. King reported that it was widely rumoured that the Kalon Lama had been murdered.

II

FROM McMAHON TO TEICHMAN, 1914-1917

The three and a half years covered in this Chapter represent one of the most important periods in the modern history of Tibet. During this time nothing very dramatic happened to attract the attention of the outside world which, in any case, was fully preoccupied with the Great War. Yet a number of trends in Tibetan foreign policy and British and Chinese attitudes towards it developed which were to culminate in the crisis of 1917-18 in Eastern Tibet with which the name of Eric (later Sir Eric) Teichman is usually associated. The Teichman episode is the subject of the next Chapter.

The major element which contributed to the significance of this period was the general alteration in the relative strengths of Tibet's neighbours and friends.

Until 1917 the 13th Dalai Lama was certainly still more or less continuously in touch with St. Petersburg (or Petrograd) through his old friend Dorjiev and other Buriat intermediaries.[35] Within the framework of Sino-Russian and Tibeto-Mongol diplomacy which was in progress in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, it might indeed have just been possible for the Tibetans to persuade the Russians to accept some modification in the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention so as to better strengthen links between Lhasa and British India. The Russian *quid pro quo* could have been, again at Tibetan instigation, British formal recognition of some strengthened Russian position in Tibet if only to supervise "religious" affairs in which both Russian subjects in the Tsarist Empire and Russian friends in Mongolia were deeply interested. This approach was logical enough; but it was never explored.

By the end of 1917, of course, Russia was in the throes of an internal agony which left the country in no fit state to decide on diplomatic initiatives in and concerning regions as remote as Tibet; and by 1918 she had dropped out for a while as a player in the Tibetan game even though the influence of the 1907 Convention was to linger on for a few years more.

During the years immediately following the Simla Conference the

Tibetans possessed, though this observation may sound strange in the light of subsequent history, a potentially powerful ally in the Chinese regime of President Yuan Shih-k'ai which genuinely wanted some kind of settlement to the Tibetan problem for a number of reasons not directly connected with Tibet. Yuan Shih-k'ai required British financial assistance. He also needed British diplomatic and political support both for his ambition to turn his Presidency into a new Chinese Monarchy and for his resistance to those increasing Japanese pressures which gave rise to the notorious Twenty-one Demands of 18 January 1915. For this support Yuan Shih-k'ai would probably pay what in Chinese eyes was a high price such as a Tibetan agreement only a little less stringent than that over which the Simla Conference had broken down in 1914. Tibetan initiative could well have precipitated such an agreement, indeed nearly did. In the event the 13th Dalai Lama did not possess either the flexibility of mind or the freedom of action to exploit to the full the possibilities which were clearly apparent to astute Tibetans like the Kalon Lama.

In June 1916 Yuan Shih-k'ai died. The break up of China, already a very real possibility, then proceeded apace; and in the world of warlords and divided government there ceased to exist any one force within the Chinese body politic which was able, let alone willing, to sign the kind of agreement that Tibet required to settle its problems along its eastern frontier.[36]

In this situation the British were hardly adventurous. Had there been the will either in India or in London, it would have been quite possible after the end of the Simla Conference for the British to have treated with Tibet, as Sir Henry McMahon effectively urged in his *Final Memorandum*, much as Tsarist Russia was treating with Mongolia. There could have been a British representative permanently in Lhasa (even if disguised as the British Trade Agent at Gyantse), a British official permanently in Eastern Tibet and a British military presence on the Tibetan plateau which might have sufficed to change the essentials of Tibetan government, diplomacy, administration, economy and society to that degree required to enable it to defend itself effectively against a renewed Chinese challenge which in the circumstances could not be postponed for ever. Such an act of will in this period, of course, involved a decision to the effect that where it came to British Imperial needs the maxim should be "the Russians be damned", as it might well have been resolved in an earlier time. With the outbreak of War the Russians in fact needed the British at least as much as the British needed the Russians. Such an initiative could well have produced the kind of Anglo-Russian compromise over the modification of the 1907 Convention which we have just indicated.

British will on such a scale, however, was lacking. The immediate crisis caused by the arrival of the Chinese in Central Tibet in 1910

had more or less solved itself. The focus of British attention was on the War. There were too many people to please. The Russians had to be kept fighting. The Chinese were economically important and potentially allies in the War (they broke off diplomatic relations with Germany in March 1917 and declared war in August when they began to provide coolies to work behind the Western Front in France). The Japanese, who also had an interest in Tibet on both religious and political grounds, possessed a navy which was seen as a potential factor in the containment of Imperial German seapower. There seemed little to be gained from an active policy towards Tibet, and great deal to be risked. When an official in the India Office in London minuted in the summer of 1915 that "the Government of India have a great deal on their hands at present, and not unnaturally prefer to leave the Tibetan question alone", the Secretary of State for India, Austen Chamberlain, noted that "they are wise!".[37]

It is against this general background that the events leading up to the arrival in Eastern Tibet of Eric Teichman, the British Consular Officer, must be viewed. These can be divided into two categories. First: from late 1913 onwards there was a process of negotiation, initially between the Tibetans and the Chinese and subsequently also between the Chinese and the British Legation in Peking, headed since 1906 by Sir John Jordan, of a substitute for the abortive Simla deliberations concerning the limits of Chinese control in Eastern Tibet and the nature of Chinese relations with the Lhasa authorities. Second: there were a series of endeavours by individual British officials to place some kind of representative in Lhasa despite the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

In November 1913, while the Simla Conference was just getting under way, the Indian Government discovered that talks had been going on for some time in Chamdo between the Kalon Lama and two Chinese representatives, Wang Chien-ch'ing and Kuo Chang-kuang, who had been appointed by President Yuan Shih-k'ai as "Conciliators in Tibet". The Tibetan proposals were reported to be as follows:

(1) the Dalai Lama to be acknowledged by the Chinese as the head of the Buddhist Church;

(2) in Tibet proper, the dominion of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetans would collect taxes, recruit troops and in other ways act as the Government, though with Chinese help if need be;

(3) the Chinese would lend Tibet money to finance projects for economic development, and would help the Tibetans to build a modern system of education;

(4) the Chinese would send no troops into Tibet proper, except in the case of some extraordinary crisis such as a Tibetan civil war or Nepalese invasion, when the Chinese might, if requested, come to the aid of the lawful government;

(5) the Chinese would create no new administrative posts in Tibet, and their presence there would not exceed that which it had been before 1910;

(6) the Chinese would increase the size of the cash subsidies they had in the past been paying to some of the leading Tibetan monasteries;

(7) Tibet would expect to enjoy all the advantages in relations with the Powers which China had secured, the implication being that Tibet would have at least some control over the execution of its own foreign policy.[38]

Such an agenda, if correct, would imply a Tibetan demand for internal autonomy and a measure of freedom in the conduct of external relations; but it would not amount to a reiteration of a declaration of total Tibetan independence. The *quid pro quo* for the Chinese, one presumes, would be symbolised by the return to Lhasa of the Chinese representative, the Republican equivalent of the Amban, with his ceremonial escort of 300 men (as provided for in the abortive Simla Convention). The reports reaching the Government of India did not illuminate the key question of what exactly the Kalon Lama understood by the term "Tibet". Did it mean all the territory inhabited by Tibetans, or merely that area in which the government of the Dalai Lama exercised authority?

While the Lönchen Shatra denied that any such thing was happening, the available evidence is that the talks were real enough and that one of the Chinese delegates, Wang Chien-ch'ing, had been appointed "Administrator of Lhasa and all Tibet" (that is to say a substitute for the old Amban) by President Yuan Shih-k'ai, having been provided with the appropriate seals of office. Wang was intending to come to Lhasa; but the Dalai Lama had issued orders that he be stopped.[39] Presumably Lhasa was anxious to avoid any obvious demonstration of direct communication with China until the results of the Simla Conference were to hand. When the Wai-chiao-pu (the Chinese department dealing with Foreign Affairs) was asked about these particular discussions by the British Legation in Peking, the answer was likewise a denial that anything of this kind had taken place.[40] At this time, probably, Peking was also reluctant to prejudice the outcome of the Simla Conference. From the evidence available, at all events, it seems that the Chamdo talks had been ended by November 1913.

Once the Simla Conference had been concluded, the Peking Government again made overtures to the Tibetans, who used this fact to persuade the Government of India to expedite the promised supply of British arms, the 5,000 rifles and 500,000 rounds, which were then delivered promptly along with the offer of four NCO instructors from the Indian Army to set up a training programme at Gyantse for the Tibetan army.[41] Without these arms, the Tibetans

had suggested, they might have to listen both carefully and sympathetically to what the Chinese had to say.

The Chinese overtures, it seemed, arose in the following way. The moment that the Simla Conference had officially ended Yuan Shih-k'ai sent a letter to the Dalai Lama proposing his own terms, probably much as had been offered in 1913. In late 1914 the Tibetans replied by sending two emissaries to Tachienlu with their counter proposals which, so Jordan reported, seemed to be as follows:

(1) China to keep Chamdo (still held by a Chinese garrison) and the district of the 39 Banners, Gyade (or Jyade);

(2) China to accept Tibetan autonomy;

(3) Tibet to allow a Chinese Resident, with a small escort, to be established in Lhasa;

(4) China to agree to station no other officials or troops anywhere in that part of Tibet defined as "autonomous".

There was, however, some uncertainty in British minds about the precise nature of these terms: they were derived from intelligence gathered at Tachienlu and Chengtu through sources which were sometimes far from reliable, and which frequently reflected Chinese aspirations in one quarter or another rather than objective fact. Jordan noted that the new Chinese officer appointed by Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1914 to take charge of both civil and military affairs in Szechuan, Ch'en I (sometimes referred to as Chang Yi in British sources), could well be exploring a more conciliatory settlement based upon the return of Chamdo to "autonomous" Tibet in exchange for the Tibetan abandonment of all claims in the Kokonor region (Amdo to the Tibetans) including Gyade, the district of the 39 Banners, which rather suggested that point (1) of the earlier report was a distortion or misrepresentation.[42] Some observers considered that it was the Tibetan obstinacy over the 39 Banners (or Tribes) which had been the main factor in the Chinese refusal to accept the final version of the Simla Convention offered to them.[43] The Chinese, so their Calcutta agent Lu Hsing-chi was reported to have declared, thought this area wholly Chinese (that is to say part of the Kokonor territory) and would not accept its location in any form of Tibet, even that defined as Inner Tibet.[44] Administratively, they maintained, all this came under the control of the Manchu Amban at Sining (who in 1915 was replaced by the Mahommedan General) and the region was in the process of becoming a Chinese Province of its own, Ch'inghai.[45] Given the Lönchen Shatra's position on the boundaries of Eastern Tibet which he had maintained at Simla, it seems unlikely, therefore, that any responsible Tibetan official would have at this stage agreed to the abandonment of Gyade. In the event the Sino-Tibetan negotiations of late 1914, despite the undoubted presence of a Tibetan delegation at Tachienlu, came to nothing.

In the spring of 1915 a fresh round of Sino-Tibetan negotiations

opened in Eastern Tibet, mainly at the town of Shuopando situated on the southern side of the Salween adjacent to Gyade, on the Chamdo-Lhasa road and at about the mid point between the *de facto* Sino-Tibetan border and the border (passing through Giamda) between Tibet and Sikang which Chao Erh-feng had tried to establish (and which the Chinese side had done its best to reaffirm at the Simla Conference). The Peking Government had sent two representatives, Li Fu-lin and Ma Shen-chou, with instructions to enter into a dialogue with the Kalon Lama who, so Bell had been told, was quite favourable to the idea. Li and Ma were both born in Tibetan populated territory and bilingual in Tibetan and Chinese, a fact which suggested a new realism behind the negotiations.[46] This impression was reinforced by Yuan Shih-k'ai's instructions to General P'eng Jih-sheng, the Chinese commander at Chamdo and the effective leader of the Chinese troops confronting the Kalon Lama, to refrain for the duration of the talks from any move that looked at all aggressive.[47]

The real Tibetan opposition to any Sino-Tibetan discussions at this juncture came from Sera and Ganden monasteries.[48] Drepung, one must presume, supported the Kalon Lama. Where the Dalai Lama stood was unclear except that he seemed to feel that if any Sino-Tibetan negotiations did take place, it would be most important to have a British representative present. In a way what was implied was the transfer of the Simla Conference, under a new name and with fresh personnel, to Shuopando or somewhere else in Eastern Tibet, perhaps in the neighbourhood of Chamdo. This idea did not please the Government of India.

The basic British Indian objection, both in Simla and in London, lay in the fact that any reopening of the question of the Simla Convention, or anything like it, would require discussion with the Russians. As the Secretary of State, Austen Chamberlain, put it in a minute of 9 July 1915: "the essential point is to come to an agreement with Russia. To sign the Convention with China before this is done is to invite future trouble". On the other hand, "to leave the question an open one between Russia and ourselves till the war is over is to abandon the rights and advantages which our action in the Dardanelles fairly give us". Chamberlain, therefore, suggested that the Foreign Office ask the Russians

> to accept the Convention without conditions as an earnest of the good-will which they are to show us in Asia in return for our acquiescence in their occupation of Constantinople and which we (abandoning our regular policy) are conquering for *them*.

The old hands at the India Office found this line of reasoning rather naïve. As Sir Arthur Hirtzel put it,

> I do not think that they .. [the Russians] .. will be moved by the Secretary of State's argument. M. Sazonof's point was that we are

> "tearing up the . . [1907 Anglo-Russian]. . Convention", and he could not agree to this unless he could show his public something in exchange: for this reason he would not be content with a secret agreement. During the war he could perhaps plead this with less speciousness than before. But in any case Tibet is too good a lever for securing what they want in Afghanistan to be lightly abandoned. I am also afraid that if we approach the Russian Government they will want to tell the Chinese who, scenting concessions, will raise their terms.[49]

Jordan had been approached by the Wai-chiao-pu on a number of occasions in the first half of 1915 to see if it might not be possible to reopen "the Tibet question". The Chinese had pointed to the recent display of co-operativeness respecting Central Asian territories demonstrated by the Russians over Mongolia (which had resulted in the tripartite agreement between Russia, Mongolia and China relating to Outer Mongolia which was signed at Kiachta on 25 May/7 June 1915), and suggested that the British might adopt a similar attitude with regard to Tibet.[50] Jordan thought there would be no harm in talking a bit more about Tibet, but, given the prevailing British policy on Russia and revisions of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, unless authorised to the contrary he would continue to discourage the Wai-chiao-pu. He did observe, however, that the present was probably as good a time as any to try once more to settle the Tibetan problem.[51] The Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, while sharing the general reluctance of his Government to reopen the Simla Conference, as it were, on Chinese territory, yet still retained enough of his old diplomatic training to believe that it would be interesting to know what the Chinese had in mind: let Jordan, he thought, ask the Chinese some discreet and non-committal questions.[52] The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, did not feel strongly one way or another. In the event he authorised Jordan in Peking to go ahead and on an informal basis sound the Chinese out as to what they now considered to be suitable terms and see if there had been any movement from the final Simla position.[53]

On 2 August 1915 Jordan reported to Grey that he had recently (25 June 1915) received proposals on the Tibetan question from the Wai-chiao-pu (through one of its officials who was later to rise to high rank in the service of the Kuomintang, Wellington Koo or Ku Wei-chün).[54] The Chinese would consider something along these lines:

(1) a declaration that Tibet formed part of Chinese territory would be included in the text of the agreement rather than, as at Simla, in an appended note;

(2) Chamdo would be transferred from Inner to Outer Tibet, that is to say from Chinese to Tibetan control, and the Chinese would evacuate it within a year of any new agreement being signed;

(3) other boundaries in Eastern Tibet would more or less follow the line of the final Chinese proposals at Simla (and the rejection of which

by the British and Tibetans ostensibly resulted in the Chinese refusal to ratify the April 1914 Convention), which meant, in effect, that all of Kokonor plus Gyade would be in Inner Tibet and under Chinese control – but Batang and Litang would be in China not Inner Tibet;

(4) Chinese Trade Agents would be stationed at Gyantse, Shigatse, Yatung, Gartok, Chamdo and anywhere else in Outer Tibet which might be opened to trade: the status, and the size of escort, of the Chinese Trade Agents would equal that of their British opposite numbers;

(5) there would be inserted into the text of the treaty a clause in which Tibet would expressly acknowledge Chinese "suzerainty".

Jordan told the Wai-chiao-pu that these proposals were inadmissable; and for the time being the matter was dropped. This initiative by the Wai-chiao-pu had, none the less, revealed a great deal about current thinking in Peking on the question of the Sino-Tibetan frontier and the kind of status China would accept in Tibet. As far as territory in Eastern Tibet was concerned, the Chinese were apparently willing to give up Chamdo in return for a Tibetan abandonment of claims to Gyade and the 39 Banners. In Tibet they were seeking an equal presence to that held by the British; and they were prepared to open up new Trade Marts including one at Chamdo, something which was not in the 1914 text (but which Sir Henry McMahon had advocated for Chamdo at least). They were not proposing a reoccupation of Tibet along the lines of the Chao Erh-feng era; but they did ask for a clear statement that Tibet was Chinese in constitutional theory.

In the opinion of G.E. Morrison, once *The Times* correspondent in China and since 1912 an influential political adviser to President Yuan Shih-k'ai, all this was perfectly reasonable except for the demand for Chinese Trade Agents at the Tibetan Trade Marts. He told his friend Admiral Ts'ai T'ing-kan, one of the politicians closest to President Yuan Shih-k'ai, that

> if there is one thing more certain than another it is that the British Government will not consent to the establishment of these agencies, for in the view of the British Government the whole trouble in Tibet . . [before 1912] . . was caused by Chinese agents and they cannot consent to the restoration of the very officials whose unwise conduct in the past both towards the Tibetans and towards the British representatives brought about the present condition in Tibet.

Morrison denied that he had been consulted in advance on these proposals by the Wai-chiao-pu; but it is extremely likely that he had discussed them with British diplomats. He showed, in his letter to Ts'ai T'ing-kan, a masterly grasp of the British documents on the Tibetan question which could only have derived from a briefing by someone in the British Legation. Morrison made it abundantly clear

to his Chinese friend, who no doubt communicated his views to others, that the Chinese Trade Agent clause virtually guaranteed the failure of the Tibetan initiative since it would never be accepted by the Government of India.[55] It is interesting that this particular clause was not dropped: indeed, it reappeared in the Chinese proposals of 30 May 1919, of which more later.[56]

Meanwhile Sino-Tibetan talks continued either at Shuopando or in Tachienlu where the local Tibetan chief, or *t'ussu*, (often referred to rather grandly as a King) of Chala (or Jala) was in some way involved. The Chala "King" had been deposed by Chao Erh-feng in 1911; but he had subsequently made his peace with the Chinese for whom he from time to time acted as an intermediary with other Tibetan states in the Marches.[57] He had a residence in Tachienlu and was well known to the British observer there, Louis King. He was to play an important part in the Teichman negotiations in 1918. The Chala "King" was a major source of information available to Jordan by way of Louis King as to what was actually going on; but he was not entirely trustworthy. By the middle of August 1915, so King reported, the Chala "King" was still maintaining that all that was happening was that the Dalai Lama was reiterating his demand that the Chinese sign the Simla Convention. Louis King, however, was convinced that something more substantial had been achieved, though he did not know quite what.[58] In any case, whatever provisional agreement might have been arrived at was repudiated by the Tibetans in October 1915; and it looked, Louis King reported, as if war in the Marches would break out again with General P'eng being ordered to advance from Chamdo towards Lhasa.[59]

In fact, of course, war had never ceased in the Marches. A focus of disorder lay in Hsiangch'eng (Changtreng in which district was situated Sangpiling monastery captured and destroyed by Chao Erh-feng in 1906) where a variety of disorderly elements, Tibetan rebels, Chinese deserters, and an assortment of bandits, threatened not only the main route from Szechuan to Batang and Chamdo (that route often referred to as the South or Gyalam Road) but also Tachienlu itself. Louis King was obliged to leave Tachienliu in a hurry in early March 1915 when a force of mutinous Chinese soldiers and rebel Tibetan tribesmen from Hsiangch'eng were advancing on the town, which they occupied briefly before being expelled by loyal Chinese troops from the Litang garrison. King took refuge with the Chala "King", whose palace was a mile or so outside Tachienlu. Here he and the other foreign residents of the region, mainly missionaries and their families, were for a while held captive by the rebels who treated them politely before moving on. Tachienlu was not the secure base that it had been in Manchu times; and General P'eng could not be compared with Chao Erh-feng as a threat to Lhasa.[60]

What was actually going on in Sino-Tibetan diplomacy amidst these

tensions and crises? The best guess, based on the extremely defective information available, is probably something like this. The Kalon. Lama, acutely aware of the realities of the situation in the Marches, was seeking some arrangement with the Chinese which would protect the *status quo*. Some of the Chinese officials in Szechuan might well have been similarly motivated, despite the impression created by General P'eng's belligerent declarations: Peng's bark, experience showed, could often be worse than his bite. President Yuan Shih-k'ai's Government in Peking could well have been exploring the possibilities of a bilateral Anglo-Chinese substitute for the Simla Convention which would confirm the theory, if not the practice, of what was seen in Peking as the rightful Chinese status in Tibet.

In Lhasa the Government of the Dalai Lama could have been trying to achieve the precise opposite, the revival of tripartite negotiations of the Simla pattern in which this time the Chinese would be unable to resist British pressure to sign; or, failing that, a firmer and more formal guarantee of British support. In October 1915 the nature of such support was spelled out to Bell, while on a visit to Gyantse, by Tsarong Shape.[61] The British were asked to use diplomatic pressure to persuade the Chinese to withdraw their troops in the Marches so that the Tibetans could do likewise. If this were not possible, then the British were requested to supply the Tibetans with mountain artillery and machine guns, to provide technical assistance for the manufacture of small arms ammunition in Tibet to replace the rounds (said to be defective) which came in 1914 with the 5,000 British rifles, to extend the telegraph line between India and Gyantse to Lhasa (which would, for one thing, expedite communication between the Tibetan and Indian Governments), and, finally, to waive any objection to the Tibetan imposition of a modest duty on the export of wool, yak hair and the like, the yield from which would help defray the cost of maintaining Tibetan military preparedness in Kham. While the Government of India were not yet ready to face up to the arming of Tibet on anything like the scale now proposed, they accepted the need for the wool duty, which in practice would work out at about 4% *ad valorem*.[62]

Charles Bell was, like Louis King, reasonably certain that the Kalon Lama had come to some kind of understanding with Li and Ma or other Chinese representatives, and that he had then been overruled by the Dalai Lama.[63] The Kalon Lama, evidently, did not give up all hope of some kind of direct settlement with the Chinese. O. R. Coales, who took over from Louis King in Tachienlu in early 1916, reported that during the summer of that year there were further, though tentative, discussions between the Kalon Lama and General P'eng. By this time, however, the situation in the Marches was rapidly changing to the benefit, albeit temporary, of the Tibetans; and Chinese overtures

seemed far less attractive than they had a few months earlier.[64]

During the course of 1916 the power of the Chinese Central Government broke down in Szechuan, in part as a consequence of opposition to Yuan Shih-k'ai's monarchical schemes. In April 1916 Yunnan Province declared its independence; and this step was followed by Szechuan Province in May under the leadership of one of the senior Chinese commanders there, Ch'en I, by which time a number of other Chinese Provinces, Kweichow, Kwangsi, Kwangtung and Chekiang had done likewise.[65] In June Yuan Shih-k'ai died, and the process of disintegration accelerated. Support for Yuan's immediate successors, Li Yüan-hung as President and Tuan Ch'i-jui as Prime Minister, was extremely restricted: by 1917 China had to all intents and purposes broken up into a number of conflicting regimes, each consisting of unstable coalitions of Provincial military commanders. The powers of the authorities in Peking fluctuated; but in the years immediately following the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai their influence over the day to day conduct of affairs in Szechuan was virtually non-existent.

In Szechuan, Ch'en I soon gave way to Liu Jui-heng who in turn was replaced in December 1916 by Yin Ch'ang-heng as overall commander of the Chinese presence in the Marches. Yin Ch'ang-heng had been here before. Indeed, it was his boast (probably untrue) that in 1911 he personally had executed Chao Erh-feng: Yin had then been commanding the Chinese garrison at Chengtu and had sided with the Revolutionaries. He had been appointed commander of the Republican Chinese troops in the Marches in 1912, only to be dismissed and recalled by Yuan Shih-k'ai in November 1913 to Peking where for a while he was placed under arrest. Yin (who had been given his military training by the Japanese) was now about 35 years of age; and his qualities as an energetic professional soldier could not be ignored, particularly against the background of a Szechuan which was being ravaged by conflict between factions representing on the one hand native Szechuanese elements and, on the other, the expanding power of Yunnan (which since 1912 had also established its influence to the north of Tibet in the Sinkiang regime of Yang Tseng-hsin).[66] Yin Ch'ang-heng was of Yunnanese origin and, not surprisingly, owed his return to power in Szechuan to the triumph of the Yunnanese faction. When in the summer of 1917 the Yunnanese lost control of Chengtu, which was severely damaged in the process, Yin found his position in Tachienlu untenable and was obliged to beat a rapid retreat across some extremely difficult terrain to his native Province.[67]

By temperament Yin was a man of action (in contrast to the philosophical pose which he adopted in later years). In early 1917 he was reported to have drawn up an elaborate plan for the reconquest of Tibet in emulation of Chao Erh-feng's achievement, worked out

in great detail and including such features as the establishment of Chinese military colonies in the territories to be taken over.[68] Had the resources been there, it is most probable that Yin (or, for that matter, any other Chinese commander of comparable drive and resource) would have gone ahead; but in the prevailing political climate Yin was helpless. As has been already noted, with the decline in the fortunes of the Yunnanese faction in Szechuan he was obliged to abandon his command, his place eventually being taken in the Marches (what was then known as Ch'uan-pien District of Szechuan, but had been part of Sikang in the last Manchu years, and was to be again after 1928) by Ch'en Hsia-ling.[69]

During the course of 1916, as the regime of Yuan Shih-k'ai gave way to the era of Chinese warlordism, the British Legation in Peking had been thinking about the theoretical nature of the Tibetan question in the light of current circumstances. In as much as there were no vital British (as opposed to British Indian) commercial interests involved in Outer Tibet and a minuscule number of British subjects actually resident in or near Inner Tibet (in 1914, for example, there was one British missionary in Tachienlu, J. Clements, and another at Taowu, T. Cook),[70] the main issues for British diplomacy in China were, first, the need to reflect the views and wishes of the Government of India and, second, and more importantly, the desirability of eliminating Tibet as a cause of Anglo-Chinese friction. In September 1916 the Legation produced a memorandum which summed up its conclusions. Who drafted this document is not known; but it is probable that Eric Teichman, then serving as Senior Chancery Assistant in the Legation and soon to intervene directly in the affairs of the Marches, had a hand in its preparation.[71] It was to serve as a point of reference for subsequent British diplomacy until at least 1921. Given its importance, therefore, the *Memorandum on Thibetan Question* deserves examination in some detail.[72]

The argument went as follows. Since the end of the Simla Conference in 1914 it was "confidently expected that, after some slight delay and the exercise of further persuasion and pressure in Peking, China would fall into line and record her adherence also". However, this had not happened. Now, since the fall of Yuan Shih-k'ai and the emergence of a form of Chinese Government, weak though it might be, less susceptible to British diplomatic pressure, it seemed unlikely that the old Simla terms would ever be accepted in their original form. The Chinese had tried since 1914 to enter into direct relations with the Tibetans to work out an arrangement of their own without British participation. This had so far been frustrated, the available evidence, which was admittedly not entirely conclusive, would indicate; but for how much longer? In the long run, "provided the Chinese are free from domestic troubles, the Tibetans can no

more stand against them now than they could when Chao Erh-feng and Chang Ying, . . . carried out their successful raid on Lhasa in February 1910". Only 2,000 well trained and loyal troops would probably suffice; but the Revolution and its aftermath had denied even these to the Chinese in the Marches. Today (late 1916) "it is not to be expected that the Chinese Government will ever adhere to an instrument so unfavourable to themselves as the present Treaty . . [the 1914 Convention] . . unless it is so radically modified as to become a new one".

The basic defect of the 1914 Convention was that it expected China to sign away the Tachienlu-Batang portion of Szechuan (which in official Chinese eyes was a district of a long established Metropolitan Chinese Province) and a large part of Kokonor as Inner Tibet. China would probably "swallow" the concept of the autonomy of what had in 1914 been defined as Outer Tibet in return for getting her representative back in Lhasa; but nothing short of armed force, or the credible threat of its use, would induce her to give up this stretch of Szechuan and Kokonor territory. Even if the Peking Government did let it go, moreover, the authorities in Szechuan itself, whoever they might be at the time, would surely not acquiesce. The Tachienlu-Batang region had been part of the sphere of influence of Szechuan long before Chao Erh-feng's campaigns which, in the first place, began with the suppression of rebellion by Tibetans in what the Chinese saw as their undoubted dominion, only subsequently overflowing into other not so clearly Chinese tracts.[73] In the Kokonor region the dominant population was Mongol, not Tibetan, and it had never, the *Memorandum* noted, challenged the authorities in Sining in favour of direct rule from Lhasa.

All this being so, what really made the Simla Convention unworkable was the division of the whole area into Inner and Outer Tibet. This was an imitation of something which may have had some validity for the traditions of Chinese government in the context of Mongolia but, the *Memorandum* argued, had never been significant in relation to Tibet.

If the present policy were continued, which the Peking Legation interpreted as waiting for the Chinese to sign the Simla Convention, two major risks could be anticipated. First: the Chinese might come to a separate arrangement with the Tibetans without any consultation with either the Government of India or the British Legation in Peking, let alone active British participation. Second: the Chinese might be able to take more aggressive measures. Here there were several dangers. The Yunnanese, whose prestige was steadily rising, might one day stand at the head of a powerful confederation of the Western Provinces of China. The Japanese might plunge with devastating effect into these troubled waters. All this appeared to

> make it more than ever essential that the opportunity created by the elimination of Chinese power in Tibet through the Revolution of 1911 should not be allowed to pass, and that the matter should be settled for good by the creation of an autonomous Tibet while the time is still favourable. It is therefore submitted that we have waited long enough and that the time has now come to settle the Tibetan question once and for all by the conclusion of a new tripartite agreement on a scale more liberal to the Chinese and more in harmony with the existing facts.

Detailed suggestions for the contents of this proposed new Convention now followed.

(1) The complete autonomy of Tibet under Chinese suzerainty should be acknowledged;

(2) the boundaries of autonomous Tibet ought to follow the lines fixed in the 1914 Convention as representing the boundaries of Outer Tibet, that is to say along the Yangtse-Mekong watershed, the watershed between the sources of the Yellow River and the Mekong, and the mountains south of the Tsaidam swamp;

(3) British and Chinese representatives, complete with escorts of equal size, and in any case not to exceed three hundred men in all, should be stationed in Lhasa

> for the purpose of looking after the interests of their respective nationals, advising the Tibetan Government regarding foreign relations, and, in the case of the Chinese representative, of seeing that the autonomous Government of Tibet does not by its acts violate the suzerain rights of China;

(4) a new Trade Mart should be opened at Chamdo at which both British and Chinese Trade Agents would be stationed with extra-territorial powers which, in the case of the Chinese Trade Agent, would not cover subjects of autonomous Tibet; and Chinese Trade Agents would also be stationed on the same basis at the other Marts open to British trade (as proposed by the Chinese in 1915);

(5) apart from the above, no British or Chinese military officials should be allowed into autonomous Tibet without the agreement of all the contracting parties: the Chinese garrisons would be withdrawn from autonomous Tibet within three months of signature: neither Britain nor China would interfere in the internal administration of autonomous Tibet nor found colonies there for their nationals;

(6) a general provision should be drawn up relating to extra-territorial rights, trade and the like in which both the British and the Chinese would enjoy most favoured nation status in autonomous Tibet;

(7) autonomous Tibet would not be represented in any Chinese Parliament;

(8) anything in existing agreements repugnant to all this would be allowed to lapse;

(9) the new Treaty would be published at the Trade Marts and in "Chinese Tibet", presumably those areas with Tibetan populations which in 1914 were included in Inner Tibet and now would be an unqualified part of China: and the British would agree to keep the Chinese fully informed concerning any negotiations or agreements they might enter into in future with the Tibetans;

(10) the Chinese would adhere to the new Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations signed on 3 July 1914;

(11) the religious rights of the Dalai Lama over Buddhist monasteries in the Kokonor territory (Amdo), Kansu and Szechuan should continue as before.

The Chinese would surely accept these terms, which were quite compatible with the kind of proposals which had been emanating from the Wai-chiao-pu over the last couple of years. The only Chinese concession would be the cession to Tibet of that desolate region in the eastern Chang Tang between the Kunlun and Tangla Mountains, which was in any case uninhabited. In return, the Chinese would secure full title to all the Kokonor territory and the Tibetan Marches adjacent to Szechuan. The Government of India might object strongly to the idea of Chinese Trade Agents reappearing in Gyantse and elsewhere; but if these Chinese Trade Agents were confined to purely Consular activities limited to Chinese subjects they would in effect be harmless. The Chinese set great store by this point, a matter of face.

The *Memorandum* concluded with the following observation:

> the whole subject has been so thoroughly argued out with the Chinese Government in the past that a new conference would be merely a waste of time. China, having agreed in principle to most of the above provisions, might be privately sounded through an intermediary, say a British Adviser . . [perhaps Morrison ?] . . , and the whole question settled with a minimum of negotiations. It is unfortunate that a Parliament is again in existence in Peking, since it would probably prove the chief stumbling block on the Chinese side.[74]

These proposals did not formally reach the India Office until August 1917.[75] The general official Indian view (both in London and Simla) was that if there should be any modifications of the 1914 Convention, they should be as insignificant as possible. The Government of India continued to be horrified at the prospect of Chinese Trade Agents at Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok: they had still not forgotten the bad old days after 1906 when a Chinese official, Chang Yin-tang, acting as just such a Trade Agent surely would, caused Britsh officers much embarrassment along the Indo-Tibetan border; and they were determined that the likes of Chang would not be allowed to reappear. G.E. Morrison was quite right in his prophesy that this would be the Indian reaction. The Government of India would with considerable reluctance accept a Chinese Trade Agent at

the proposed new Chamdo Trade Mart, and nowhere else. They considered that any modification of the Simla Convention at all favourable to China would damage the excellent relations then existing between British India and Tibet; and they urged that all such thoughts should in any case be postponed until the end of the Great War.[76]

In the final analysis, the Government of India would prefer, it was clear, no Convention at all to seeing something along the lines of the 1916 Peking Legation *Memorandum* negotiated in Peking. They suspected, almost certainly correctly, that the terms of the 1916 *Memorandum* had in fact been worked out in informal collaboration with the Wai-chiao-pu – they showed undoubted similarities to the proposals of Wellington Koo in 1915; and the whole process implied by this document conjured up the old Indian nightmare of negotiations with China which had aborted in India, as with the discussions for the Chinese adhesion to the Lhasa Convention in 1905, being subsequently revived in Peking without Indian participation and greatly to China's advantage.[77] Ever since the end of the Simla Conference those officials of the Government of India whose responsibility it was to ponder on the Tibetan question, as well as some British Consular officers in Szechuan, had been exploring a totally different approach to the problem.

It was obvious that if two criteria were met there was from the Indian point of view really no need for any revision of the abortive Simla Convention which would probably result in strengthening the Chinese, rather than the Tibetan, position. What was required was a guarantee that the Tibetans, now effectively free from Chinese control all the way to a few miles west of Chamdo, would be able to keep the Chinese at bay. This meant a steady, even if small, supply of arms to the Tibetans from British India; and it implied the establishment of closer contacts between the Tibetan Government and the Government of India such as could best be achieved by the periodical visits to Lhasa by a British official of suitable seniority. The combination of visits to Lhasa plus arms to Tibet, particularly machine guns and mountain artillery, began to be urged by Charles Bell in 1915, and continued to be until he finally got his way in 1921.

In 1915 the Dalai Lama invited Bell to visit Lhasa, he did so again in 1916 on two separate occasions, and once more in 1917.[78] All these invitations were turned down by the Government of India on the grounds that they involved a violation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.

In 1917 there was also a proposal through the British Legation in Peking for a visit to Lhasa by a British official. In the summer of that year O.R. Coales was about to relinquish his post at Tachienlu to return to England on leave. He suggested that he should travel not by the normal route through China to Shanghai or Tientsin but

across Tibet, calling at Lhasa on the way.

Coales was one of the great travellers in Eastern Tibet; but, unlike Teichman, he wrote no famous book, confining himself to two papers in the 1919 issues of *The Geographical Journal*. In late 1916, accompanied for much of the way by J. Clements of the China Inland Mission at Tachienlu, he set out for Chamdo via Kantze and Derge Gönchen. From Chamdo he made an excursion to a point a few miles eastwards of Enta; and he then returned to Tachienlu by way of a detour to Batang before rejoining a sector of the North Road (the Changlam Road): the Batang-Litang-Tachienlu route was at that time reported to be infested with bandits. He photographed the principal monasteries along the way and he added a great deal of information to the map of this obscure part of the world of which full use was made in subsequent cartography. His two papers are invaluable for the understanding of the geographical and historical background of the Kantze-Rongbatsa region which was to become so important in the history of Sino-Tibetan relations in 1917-18 and again in 1930-32.[79]

During this journey Coales had met a number of important Chinese officials on what had been the effective Sino-Tibetan border since 1913 and had also discovered a great deal about the attitudes of the Tibetan authorities on the other side of the cease-fire line. He had concluded that neither the Chinese nor the Tibetans would object to his approaching the Tibetan capital from the Marches. He now believed that a visit to Lhasa by a British official with experience of the Chinese side would be an excellent opportunity to obtain crucial information on the strength of the Tibetan position and how long it could be maintained in the face of Chinese pressure.[80]

The same objection applied in the mind of the Foreign Office in London to Coales' proposal as it had to those of Charles Bell. The presence in Lhasa of a British official would be a violation of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Of course, by this time there was no question of the British arranging a *quid pro quo* for the acceptance of a modification of the 1907 Convention by conquering the Dardanelles and capturing Constantinople for the Russians: the ANZAC debâcle had seen to that. Moreover, Russia was now suffering the effects of the first of the two 1917 Revolutions. All the same, the Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour opposed the idea of a Lhasa mission. The "collapse of Russian Imperialism" might give the British in practice a freer hand in Tibet; but it would also stiffen China's resolve (and this was also the view of Sir John Jordan) to cling to her rights, real or imaginary, in both Tibet and Mongolia. Lhasa visits would provoke the Chinese and make it even harder to come to some kind of diplomatic settlement with them such as was implied in the Peking Legation's *Memorandum* of 1916; and they still called, technically, for Russian consent.[81]

Lord Robert Cecil, Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office, in September 1917 reflected that these Lhasa proposals came at a moment when it was

> particularly inopportune to ask the Russian Government to revise the Tibetan section of the Convention of 1907. Such a request would look like an attempt to take advantage of their present difficulties, and might raise their suspicions as to the good faith of H.M.G., since hitherto the revision of the Tibetan section has always formed part of a scheme of revision of the whole Anglo-Russian Convention, and particularly of those sections in which the Russian Government desires concessions.[82]

On 2 October 1917 (New Style), a little more than a month before the Second Revolution brought the Bolsheviks to power and removed for the foreseeable future from the diplomatic arena a Russia anything like the State with which British makers of foreign policy had for so long been familiar, Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Petrograd, wrote in agreement with Lord Robert Cecil. As he understood it, the discussions over the revision of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 which had been in progress on the eve of the War were concerned with some kind of exchange of concessions relating to Tibet and Afghanistan. He concluded with surprising optimism that

> it will probably be easier to negotiate a satisfactory settlement of all these questions with the present Russian Government than with the old Imperial Government and, while it is impossible to say what attitude they will adopt with regard to Tibet, it is from China rather than from Russia that I anticipate serious opposition.[83]

In the event, however, it was to transpire that after 7 November 1917 (New Style, 25 October Old Style) Russia ceased to be an acknowledged participant in the Tibetan question as far as the British were concerned. The possibility of a covert Russian role, however, was never forgotten. In 1918, after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk had turned Russia from a enemy of Germany into a possible collaborator, British Military Intelligence expressed some anxiety about the likelihood of German agents reaching India through Russia, Sinkiang and Tibet.[84] Right up to 1947, moreover, the possibility of Communist penetration into India along the same route, either under direct Soviet inspiration or from the Communist faction in Chinese civil conflict which was seen to be sympathetic to the Soviets, continued to worry strategists in the service of the Government of British India.

After the Second Russian Revolution the British both in Peking and in India no longer felt constrained by the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, though no one immediately went out of his way to say this in so many words. For a while yet it was just possible that the Russian situation might again change fundamentally with a White

defeat of the Bolsheviks. The idea of a British mission to Lhasa, however, was from now on interpreted in the light of the needs of British Indian frontier policy along the Himalayas in relation to (and at times in conflict with) the analysis of Chinese attitudes and reactions made by the British Foreign Office and the British Legation in Peking without more than an occasional, and usually casual, glance towards the diplomatists and politicians in Petrograd (which in 1924 became Leningrad).

35. In 1914 one of the old "Tibet hands" in Russian policy making from the Curzon-Younghusband era, the Buriat physician Dr. P. A. Badmaev, still retained influence with Tsar Nicholas II in Mongolian and other Central Asian affairs. See, for example: P.S.H. Tang, *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia 1911-1931*, Durham, North Carolina, 1959, p. 321.
   See also, for example: L/P&S/10/434, Bell to India, 19 May 1915. According to Bell it was expected that in July 1915 Dorjiev would visit Lhasa. He may also have been in Lhasa in late 1914. See: L/P&S/10/433, Memo by Sir A. Hirtzel, 12 November 1914.
   Dorjiev remained in contact with Lhasa right up to the early 1930s; and after the Russian Revolution he came to terms with the Bolsheviks, who during the 1920s continued to make use of Buriats to maintain contact with the Tibetans. This was certainly suspected, if not known for certain, by British officials concerned with Tibetan affairs. See, for example: D. Macdonald, *The Land of the Lama. A description of the country of contrasts & and of the cheerful happy-go-lucky people of a hardy nature & curious customs; their religion, ways of living, trade & social life*, London 1929, p. 99. Bolshevik contacts with Tibet are discussed in later Chapters.

36. For the history of China during this period I have relied on the following: H. F. MacNair, *China in Revolution. An Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic*, Chicago 1931; Li Chien-nung, *The Political History of China, 1840-1928*, Stanford, California, 1956; J. Ch'en, *Yuan Shih-k'ai*, London 1961; E. O. Clubb, *20th Century China*, New York 1972; E.P. Young, *The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1977; J. K. Fairbank, ed., *The Cambridge History of China. Volume 12. Republican China 1912-1949, Part 1*, Cambridge 1983; I.C.Y. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, Oxford 1983.

37. L/P&S/10/344, Bell to India, 6 August 1915 with India Office minutes.

38. FO 371/1612, Alston to Grey, 8 September 1913; FO 371/1613, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 1 November 1913.

39. L/P&S/10/432, Hardinge to IO, 1 November 1913.

40. L/P&S/10/432, Wai-chiao-pu to Alston, 19 November 1913.

41. L/P&S/10/433, India to IO, 16 September 1914.
   As has already been noted, training of Tibetan troops at Gyantse appears only to have taken place, and on a very small scale, in 1915, and then ceased until the very end of 1921.

42. L/P&S/10/434, Jordan to Gray, 18 March 1915
Ch'en I was to play an important part in Szechuan politics in the last days of the Yuan Shih-k'ai regime, being largely responsible for Szechuan's declaration of independence. On Ch'en I in Szechuan, see: E. P. Young, *The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China*, Ann Arbor 1977, pp. 62, 217, 229, 236-237, 314.
Ch'en I went on to perform a significant role in the last days of Chinese control over the affairs of Outer Mongolia, on which comment is made below.

43. The 39 Banners or Tribes were, according to Teichman, of Mongol origin. See: L/P&S/10/714, Teichman to Jordan, 31 December 1917. While Teichman, after looking into the whole question of Tibetan borders on his arrival at Tachienlu in late 1917, concluded that Kokonor had never been Tibetan in any realistic sense, the status of Gyade was rather more difficult to define. In practice, Teichman believed, Gyade was "practically" independent of Lhasa, Sining or Chengtu.

44. Lu Hsing-chi had been given the position of acting Chinese High Commissioner in Tibet by President Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1913, though he was never able to go to Tibet. He resided in Calcutta, where he worked with a trading company called Thinyik. He was still active in the 1930s; and he remained an important source, for those British officials who bothered to cultivate him, of information about Chinese attitudes towards Tibet. From the time of the Simla Conference onwards he was reporting on Indian Tibetan policy, as well as on the activities of Tibetans in India, to whatever Chinese Government happened to be in power in Peking and, subsequently, Nanking. See, for example: Li Tieh-tseng, *The Historical Status of Tibet*, New York 1956, p. 155.
His career seems to have begun with the Dalai Lama's residence in India from 1910 to 1912, when Lu, a Cantonese who was then working as a cobbler in Calcutta, was asked by the Chinese Government to keep an eye on the exiled Tibetan ruler. See: Lo Hui-min, *The Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, Vol. II, 1912-1920*, Cambridge 1978, pp. 428-429.

45. L/P&S/10/433, Minute by Sir A. Hirtzel, 12 November 1914.

46. L/P&S/10/434, King to Jordan, 1 August 1915; Bell to India, 17 July 1915.
For a description of Shuopando as seen by Kaulback and Hanbury-Tracy in 1935, see: J. Hanbury-Tracy, *Black River of Tibet*, London 1938, pp.176-178.

47. L/P&S/10/434, King to Jordan, 2 August 1915.

48. L/P&S/10/434, Bell to India, 17 July 1915.

49. L/P&S/10/434, minutes by Chamberlain, 9 July 1915, and Hirtzel, 12 July 1915.

50. For the text of this, see: Lamb, *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, Vol. 2, Appendix XIX; and for a full account of Russian and Chinese policy towards Mongolia at this period, see: Tang, *Mongolia, op. cit.*, generally.

51. L/P&S/10/434, Jordan to Grey, 28 June 1915.

52. L/P&S/10/434, Viceroy to India Office, 6 July 1915.

53. L/P&S/10/434, Grey to Jordan, 23 July 1915.

54. L/P&S/10/434, Jordan to Grey, 2 August 1915.

55. Lo, *Morrison, op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 426 to 429, Morrison to Ts'ai T'ing-kan, 30 June 1915.

56. The 30 May 1919 proposals, indeed, were explicitly based on the 1915 proposals.

57. L/P&S/10/432, King to Alston, 24 November 1913.

58. L/P&S/10/434, King to Jordan, 11 August 1915.

59. L/P&S/10/434, Jordan to FO, 24 October 1915.

60. Hsiangch'eng continued to be a centre of rebellion well on into the 1920s. The region occupied a strategic position overlooking not only the main South Road from Tachienlu to Batang but also the major link between Eastern Tibet (Kham) and Yunnan from Batang to Atuntze.

61. Bell gives his full name as Chensea Namgang Dazang Dramdu. By 1915 Tsarong had become one of the 13th Dalai Lama's closest advisers and held the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan army. See: Bell, "Leading Men in Tibet", in MSS Eur F112/303 in the India Office Library and Records.

62. L/P&S/10/434, Bell to India, 28 October 1915. See also: Bell, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 255.
• A major objection to the British provision of arms to Tibet lay in the attitude of Nepal, always anxious lest the Tibetans might seek by force of arms to eliminate some of the advantages which the Nepalese had won in Tibet during the course of the 19th century.

63. L/P&S/10/435, Bell to India, 19 November 1915.

64. L/P&S/10/435, Coales, 22 December 1916.

65. Ch'en I went on the become, in 1919, Chinese Commissioner (the Republican equivalent of Amban) at Urga. He demonstrated a sympathy towards the Mongols, and their leader the Urga Hutukhtu (an Incarnation who ranked only after the Dalai and Panchen Lamas), which soon resulted in his removal by General Hsü Shih-ch'ang. General Hsü, a prominent member of the Anfu clique, was overthrown in July 1920; and Ch'en I was then returned to Urga as High Commissioner just in time to see Chinese influence disappear under the impact of the Russian Revolution and attempted counter revolution. Ch'en I, therefore, was the last Chinese official to exercise any real power in Outer Mongolia, the Mongolian Peoples' Republic of today. See: Tang, *Mongolia, op. cit.*, pp. 361-368.

66. For an account of Yang Tseng-hsin in Sinkiang, see: A.W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia. A political history of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949*, Cambridge 1986.

67. For a first hand account of the struggle between Yunnanese and Szechuanese factions in Chengtu at this time, see: Sir Meyrick Hewlett, *Forty Years in China*, London 1943, pp. 92-102.

68. L/P&S/10/714, Teichman, 21 November 1917. It is just possible that what Teichman came across was a version of the plan for the reconquest of Tibet drawn up by Yin in 1912 and recorded in the writings of Fu Sung-mu, who succeeded Chao Erh-feng as Frontier Commissioner, or Warden of the Marches, on the eve of the Chinese Revolution of 1911 when Chao Erh-feng was made Szechuan Viceroy. Fu Sung-mu's *Hsi-kang chien shêng chih* is quoted in: Li Tieh-tseng, *The Historical Status of Tibet*, New York 1956. See also: FO 371/1610, Jordan to FO, 2 April 1913 enclosing extracts from Fu Sung-mu; FO 535/16, no. 45, Report by Major D.S. Robertson on the Chinese Military Situation in the Tibetan Marches, 3 January 1913, which outlines Yin's plan of campaign. Yin, of course, may simply have revived this plan in 1917.

69. For the career of Yin Ch'ang-heng, see: S.A.M. Adshead, *Province and Politics in Late Imperial China. Viceregal Government in Szechwan, 1898-1911*, London and Malmö 1984, pp. 103, 118; R. A. Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic. Provincial*

Militarism and Central Power 1911-1938, New Haven and London 1973, pp. 112-113. In later years Yin Ch'ang-heng retired to Chengtu where he acquired a considerable reputation as a philosopher. As such he is described in King, *China in Turmoil, op. cit.* King reproduces photographs of both Yin Ch'ang-heng and his successor, Ch'en Hsia-ling, in *China in Turmoil*. Ch'en Hsia-ling retired in 1924. He had his faults; but he must rank with Chao Er-feng and Liu Wen-hui as one of the three great Chinese creators of Sikang Province.

70. L/P&S/10/433, King, 7 November 1914. The remaining Europeans in the region were, at this time, 17 French Roman Catholic Fathers and 5 Sisters of Charity (mainly along the Yunnan-Szechuan border, with one Father at Batang and three, as well as the nuns, in Tachienlu), 3 Norwegian Protestants (T. Sorensen, wife and child at Tachienlu), and 13 American Protestants at Batang (Dr. Shelton, wife and two children, Dr. Hardy and wife, J. Ogden, wife and two children, and H. Baker, wife and child). The situation was muoh the same in 1916. The author's father, Sir Lionel Lamb, who was Vice Consul in Chengtu in 1925 and 1926, points out that the British Consulate-General there had no responsibility for foreigners other than British subjects, though it was usually willing to help other nationals within reason. The French were represented at Chengtu: the nearest American Consulate was Chungking.

    Tachienlu was particularly important from both a missionary and diplomatic point of view for the Roman Catholics, mainly at this time French. There was a *Vicaire Apostoloique du Tibet*, Father Giraudeau, based there, and it was the site of a Cathedral. The Roman Catholic missionaries, according to Teichman, were frequently strongly anti-Tibetan. Their endeavours had been rebuffed by the Lamas, often with extreme cruelty and consequent martyrdoms; and the overwhelming majority of their converts were Chinese. They tended to shelter in Eastern Tibet behind Chinese military might which did not win them any love in the hearts of the like of the Kalon Lama. See: Teichman, *Travels, op. cit.*, pp.225-229, for comments on the missionary question in Eastern Tibet and Western Szechuan.

    The earliest Protestant mission station to be permanently established in Tachienlu was in c.1890, founded by Cecil Polhill-Turner, an associate of Miss Annie Taylor and probably the first Old Etonian to live in this part of the world. See: G.T. Bull, *Tibetan Tales*, London 1966, p.28; S.C. Rijnhart, *With the Tibetans in Tent and Temple*, London 1901, p. 383; H.R.Davies, *Yün-nan. The Link between India and the Yangtze*, Cambridge 1909, p. 292. Davies and Polhill-Turner were at Eton at the same time though they only got to know each other in Tachienlu in 1894.

    Since Manchu times there had periodically been a China Inland Mission station at Batang, which was a British responsibility.

71. Mehra, *McMahon Line, op, cit*, seems to have confused this document with a subsequent Teichman memorandum.

72. See: L/P&S/10/714 and FO 535/20, No. 6. The *Memorandum on Thibetan Question* is dated 24 September 1916. The text of the *Memorandum* is printed in Mehra, *The North-Eastern Frontier, op. cit.*, vol.2, pp. 15-20.

73. The historical Sino-Tibetan border from 1727 to 1910 had run more or less along the line of the Yangtze and definitely to the west of Batang. To the east of this line, marked by the famous boundary pillar on the Bum La (Ningching Shan) erected in 1727, lay an assemblage of tribal states which were under the paramountcy (with a few special cases like Nyarong which developed a relationship with Lhasa during the 19th century) of the Chengtu Viceroy.

    This part of ethnic Tibet to the east of the Bum La pillar contained a considerably larger Tibetan population than was to be found under direct Lhasa rule to the west of the Bum La (perhaps some 2,000,000 as opposed to the 1,000,000 or so in Outer

Tibet -though many Tibetans today, and their supporters, would not agree with these figures). In other words, if one accepts this analysis of the traditional state of affairs, as did Teichman, then the majority of Tibetans did not possess a long history of rule by Lhasa. They did, of course, accept the religious position of the Dalai Lama; but then so did many Buddhists who by no stretch of imagination could be said to have ever been under the political control of the Lhasa Government.

It is quite possible, indeed, to interpret Tibetan policy from the mid-19th century onwards as being dominated by an attempt by the Lhasa authorities to establish their control over other Tibetan (ethnically and linguistically) states which had hitherto not been under the temporal rule of Lhasa. Lhasa was the centre of the region of Tibet known as Ü-Tsang, the authority of which extended westwards from somewhere in the region of Giamda (about 150 miles east of Lhasa) all the way to the borders of Ladakh. From the point of view of a Chinese administrator in Tachienlu, Lhasa could well appear to be remote indeed, an outlying district of a Tibet with a centre somewhere in the region of Batang. Even Ü-Tsang possessed a history of division and internal conflict, not least that involving the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, which had never really been resolved.

The British, of course, saw things rather differently since, to them, the nearest bit of Tibet was clearly under the control of Lhasa or Tashilhunpo. To the British, Ü-Tsang *was* Tibet; and Kham and Amdo (the Tibetan name for the Kokonor territory) were outlying provinces.

These two rather different perceptions of what was understood by the term Tibet go far to explain the profound differences in British and Chinese attitudes towards that country, differences which it was hoped by some British officials rather optimistically the device of division into Inner and Outer zones would resolve.

The policy of the Dalai Lama as manifested during the Simla Conference was to establish the rule of Lhasa over all of ethnic Tibet regardless of what the Manchus might or might not have arranged. This is what the 13th Dalai Lama meant when he wrote to Bell on 30 August 1913 as follows:

> I hope that you will be able to render every assistance to Lönchen Shatra during the ... [Simla Conference] ... negotiations so as to establish firm friendly relations between Great Britain and Tibet and to secure once and for all the administration of Tibet by the Tibetans.

See: Eur Mss F80/5e, Dalai Lama to Bell, 30 August 1913.

74. The 1916 *Memorandum* text is compared with that of the 1914 Convention in L/P&S/18/B266.

    The Chinese Parliament provided for Tibetan and Mongolian representatives, as has every subsequent Chinese constitutional assembly.

75. L/P&S/10/714, Langley to Lord Islington, 7 August 1917.

76. FO 535/20, nos. 12 and 15, Chelmsford to IO, 31 August 1917 and IO to FO, 11 December 1917.

77. The story of the abortive 1905 Calcutta Sino-Indian negotiations has been related in some detail in: Lamb, *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, Vol. 1, Chapter III.

78. Bell, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 166. See also: FO 535/20, no. 10, IO to FO, 1 September 1917.

79. O.R.Coales, "Eastern Tibet", *The Geographical Journal*, LIII, 1919. See also: L/P&S/11/126, P. 3710, Coales to Alston, 19 May 1917, enclosing "Narrative of a Journey from Tachienlu to Ch'amdo and back via Batang".

80. FO 535/20, no. 7, Alston to Balfour, 2 June 1917.

81. L/P&S/10/714, FO to IO, 7 August 1917.

82. FO 535/20, no. 11, IO to FO, 7 September 1917.

83. L/P&S/10/714, Buchanan to Balfour, 2 October 1917.

84. L/P&S/10/714, War Office to IO, 27 April 1918, reporting the views of Major-General Sir G. Macdonogh, Director of Military Intelligence. This fear was not without justification. There had been German agents operating in Persia and Afghanistan, notably Wassmuss and Zugmayer. After the Bolsheviks had made their peace with Germany at Brest-Litovsk it was not inconceivable that German, or Turkish, agents might make their way to India through Russia and across Chinese Central Asia and Tibet, perhaps exploiting past relationships between Russia and Lhasa; but it was certainly rather improbable and it did not seem to alarm unduly the Government of India.

The Bolshevik Revolution did give rise to a great deal of active British interest in the affairs of Turkestan, both Russian and Chinese, from 1918 into the 1920s. For some account of the immediate British response to the Bolshevik Revolution in Turkestan, see: Lars-Eric Nyman, *Great Britain and Chinese, Russian and Japanese interests in Sinkiang, 1918-1934*, Malmö 1977; and also the highly readable popular account by Peter Hopkirk, *Setting the East Ablaze. Lenin's Dream of an Empire in Asia*, London 1984.

III

TEICHMAN, CHAMDO AND RONGBATSA, 1917-1919

Towards the end of 1917 three events coincided to alter profoundly the Sino-Tibetan balance in the Marches.

First: by late November it must have become obvious to anyone with access to the world press that something very dramatic indeed was happening in Russia. British officials in India, British diplomats in China, and without doubt many Chinese political leaders both national and provincial, must all have appreciated this fact without the need for confiding to the archives elaborate or unduly specific memoranda. As a restraining component in the Sino-Tibetan equation, and in British attitudes towards it, the value to be assigned to Russia had undoubtedly been so altered that, perhaps, it could or would now be ignored.

Second: armed conflict between Chinese and Tibetan troops broke out with renewed intensity (it had never stopped completely) along the *de facto* Sino-Tibetan border which had been established since 1912, the crisis point now being in the region of Riwoche (Leiwuch'i) about 40 miles to the north east of Chamdo.[85] Riwoche on the Dza Chu or Sze Chu stream, a tributary of the Mekong which joined the main river some distance to the south of Chamdo, was the site of a monastery and also of an outpost of the Chinese garrison at Chamdo commanded by General P'eng Jih-sheng. To its east and north (on the edge of Gyade which had played such a part in the breakdown of the Simla negotiations in 1914) lay territory controlled by the Kalon Lama's army and its auxiliary Tibetan tribesmen from Kham.

Third: at the very end of 1917 the task of acting as British observer at Tachienlu in place of O.R. Coales was assumed by Eric Teichman.[86] Teichman's appointment dates from September; but he had not settled in at his new post until some time later, in October or November.

While the Russian factor was implicit rather than explicit, and its significance open to debate, the importance of Teichman's arrival cannot be questioned. Here, in what was one of the most obscure posts within the China Consular Service, was now established

someone who today would be called a "high flyer" or "on the fast track". Only 33 years old, and already with considerable experience in the Chancery of the Peking Legation, where it is more than probable he had contributed towards the drafting of the *Memorandum* of September 1916 on the Tibetan question, and also with personal experience of the Tibetan border in the Kansu-Kokonor region gained just after the Chinese Revolution, Teichman surely went to Tachienlu to do more than merely observe and report.[87] Indeed, one of his earliest despatches from Tachienlu, dated 31 December 1917, contains a carefully argued analysis of the situation in the Marches and a number of detailed proposals as to the desirable alignment of a stable frontier between autonomous Tibet and Chinese Szechuan, of a kind which neither King nor Coales had felt called upon to advance. Teichman went out of his way to explain to Jordan that his proposals were "the result of private investigations" and "my object is merely to place on record a review of the position as it appears to one locally at the present time, on the chance that such a statement may possibly prove of use to you on some future occasion". He then assured Jordan that "in making these enquiries I have of course given no inkling to anyone that I was investigating old, existing, or future boundary questions".[88]

These words raise the query which was to hang over the entire Teichman intervention in Sino-Tibetan relations in the months that followed. It can be argued that he was from the outset acting on his own authority. His despatches persisted right up to the final explanation of 25 November 1918 in justifying his actions in the light of decisions taken on his own initiative by virtue of his position as "the man on the spot", an argument which had already occurred on more than one occasion in the history of British relations with and concerning Tibet.[89] Jordan, likewise, continued during this period to send letters and telegrams to Teichman instructing him in effect to stop what he was doing and come home. But was all this, in fact, no more than what today would be called an exercise in "deniability"?

We will never be able to answer this question with certainty. The balance of probabilities, given Teichman's status and his possible previous involvement with the Tibetan question, seems to the present author to be that Jordan had privately told Teichman to see what he could arrange, always remembering that the Peking Legation must not be drawn directly into diplomacy authorised neither by the Foreign Office nor the India Office and the Government of India. If Teichman could fix matters up satisfactorily, then well and good. If, on the other hand, it looked as if there would be embarrassments for British policy, then Teichman must accept the fact that he would be disowned. As a working hypothesis, at all events, this explains many features of the Teichman episode and its outcome which are, otherwise, somewhat mysterious.[90]

When Teichman reached Tachienlu (Dartsendo or Kangting) in late 1917, he found a tightly concentrated town of some 10,000 inhabitants squeezed into the deep valley of a tributary of the Tung River. The population was equally divided between Chinese and Tibetans, many of the latter owing allegiance to the ruler of the Tibetan state of Chala (or Jala), a *t'ussu* or Chief (usually at this period referred to by foreign observers as the Chala "King") whose residence on the outskirts of the town was one of the principal features of the place.[91] The other major figures in Tachienlu political society at this time were the British Consular observer, King, Coales and, now, Teichman, and the Chinese Frontier Commissioner, the Republican equivalent of the old post of Warden of the Marches once held by Chao Erh-feng, who represented the generally tenuous and insecure presence of the Chinese Central Government in this region in Szechuan Province which was by now virtually autonomous and racked by conflict both armed and political between Yunnanese and Szechuanese factions. By the time of Teichman's arrival Yin Ch'ang-heng had, as we have already seen, been obliged to remove himself from this office which, thus vacated, had been contended for by the Chamdo (Changtutsung) garrison commander P'eng Jih-sheng. It soon fell into the hands, however, of Ch'en Hsia-ling, a native of Hunan Province who had received his military training in Japan, and had managed, despite having served continuously in the Marches since Chao Erh-feng's day, not to have become involved in the Yunnan-Szechuan contest which had developed to throw the Province into turmoil since 1916. Ch'en, however, was only Acting Frontier Commissioner at this time; and P'eng Jih-sheng had not abandoned all hope that he might still secure this post given yet another shift in the ever changing political balance of power in this remote part of China.

Another factor in Tachienlu society was the presence there of a number of European missionaries, French Roman Catholics and a variety of European and American Protestants. Tachienlu was also the centre of a network of mission stations extending into Eastern Tibet and southwards into the extreme north of Yunnan. Some of these missionaries were very knowledgeable about the problems of Eastern Tibet.[92] Since they tended to make more converts from among the Chinese community than the firmly Buddhist Tibetans, and, moreover, since they depended for their very presence, let alone their survival, upon the general state of Chinese treaty relations with the Powers, they were often considered to be pro-Chinese. Teichman was soon to find one such missionary, Dr. Shelton at Batang, an American, rather a nuisance.[93] They did, none the less, represent a vital source of information.

Tachienlu was at the very edge of the Tibetan world. All travellers of this period (and subsequently) were struck by the fact that on the

road westward from Chengtu Tibetans were extremely rare until, suddenly, in Tachienlu they appeared in large numbers.[94] While it was never seriously questioned that Tachienlu was within the Chinese orbit of Szechuan Province, yet it was clear that it was the ethnic frontier town between Chinese and predominantly Tibetan populations. It was, moreover, of considerable economic importance as the commercial frontier for the important tea trade between Szechuan and Tibet; and through it came the bulk of Tibet's supply of Chinese silk. Merchants, and their porters bearing incredible loads, set out westwards hence for Tibetan markets and returned with their earnings, or with loads of Tibetan wool, yak tails, musk, elk horn and the like for disposal in China.[95] The Tachienlu market was certainly an excellent listening post for news of what was happening in Tibet further to the west.

Using these sources, the Chala "King", the Chinese official establishment in the local Tachienlu administration and in the Frontier Commissioner's office (Teichman always had a reputation as one who could get on, man to man, with Chinese officials, and naturally his knowledge of the Chinese language was good), the various missionaries and the gossip of the bazaar, by the very end of December 1917 Teichman had drawn up a plan for the settlement of the Tibetan question. The ideal, he thought, would be to persuade both the Chinese and the Tibetans to accept the boundaries at this moment being held by them. This had been the *de facto* situation since 1913. He noted that

> both sides are heartily sick of the present unsatisfactory state of affairs, which is probably more dangerous to the Tibetans as being much the weaker party, and since their present autonomy is perhaps dependent on the continuance of civil strife in China. Though the Chinese would be reluctant to abandon at least a Salween boundary, and the Tibetans would be equally loth to give up a Yangtzu-Mekong watershed boundary and Chiamdo, yet there seems little doubt that they would both willingly accept the existing frontier as a sensible compromise.

There were also problems along the northern stretch of the Sino-Tibetan border, between Lhasa controlled territory and Chinese controlled Kokonor; but Teichman thought that a partition of the land of the 39 Banners, Gyade, would probably solve all these in practice. Another difficulty lay in the presence of Chinese advance outposts at Enta and Riwoche (or Leiwuch'i) to the north-east of Chamdo. In Teichman's original solution it was assumed that the Chinese would withdraw from these to Chamdo itself, which would now become the Chinese frontier point as well as the base of the major Chinese military force in the Marches.[96]

It was at these very outposts, Enta and Riwoche, that the old truce in the Marches began increasingly to break down by the second half of 1917. We do not know whether Teichman understood exactly what

was going on when he sent his proposals to Jordan; but it seems highly probable that he had a fair idea as to the situation. The new state of affairs was promptly communicated by the Kalon Lama via Lhasa and Gyantse to the Government of India: and India's reaction to the situation included a decision, implemented in great haste, to supply the Tibetans with a further 500,000 rounds of .303 ammunition.[97]

The story of exactly how the peace of the Marches collapsed in late 1917 is far from clear. The published version given by Teichman does not entirely agree with the account later provided by Louis King. Teichman was at pains to demonstrate that it was the Chinese who were responsible for breaking the truce, while King thought, on the whole, that the Tibetans were at least as much at fault as the Chinese. In late 1919 and early 1920 King devoted a great deal of time and effort to working out in detail how the fighting had started. Neither version may be entirely reliable. An attempt has been made here to create a synthesis of the two narratives.[98]

Here is what, on this basis, seems to have happened. In the summer of 1917, probably late August, a party of Chinese troops in the service of General P'eng Jih-sheng, the Chamdo commander, went out into the countryside, at Mora-Geka in the Yeh Chu valley some sixteen miles to the north-west of Riwoche, to cut grass for fodder. There they encountered a couple of Tibetan soldiers who began to argue with them about their right to cut grass in that particular place.[99] The Chinese detachment commander, Captain Yü, arrested the Tibetans, sent them off to the Chinese post at Riwoche, and then went on cutting grass as if nothing had happened. A few nights later the local Tibetan commander, unaware that his two men had now been removed to Chinese custody in Riwoche, sent a detachment to attack the Chinese grass-cutters' camp and rescue the Tibetan captives. The Chinese fought their way out of their position, a grazier's hut surrounded by cattle pens and the only building for miles around, and retreated to Riwoche pursued by the Tibetans. The local Tibetan commander then demanded that the senior Chinese officer at Riwoche, one Colonel Chang, hand over the two Tibetan captives. Chang refused, instead insisting that the whole matter be referred back to General P'eng Jih-sheng at Chamdo.

P'eng Jih-sheng, for whom the term "bluff" would be a mild description, and on the advice of one of his more nationalist Colonels, decided to turn this incident into something rather more significant. P'eng at first refused to answer further Tibetan requests for the return of the two prisoners, requests which were reiterated several times, finally by means of a written communication from the Kalon Lama himself. Then he replied to the Lama in the most insulting manner which, King wrote, "took the emphatic if barely mentionable form of an envelope filled with dung"; and at the same time ordered

the two Tibetans to be removed to Chamdo. On hearing this news, the Kalon Lama's men attempted an assault on Riwoche to rescue their comrades. They were repulsed.[100] The two Tibetans, by now in Chamdo, were then executed and their heads returned to Riwoche where they were put on display on posts.

General P'eng, having gone so far, thought he might as well see how much further he could exploit the growing crisis, if only to strengthen his hand in the competition for the position of Frontier Commissioner to which he aspired. He wrote to the Kalon Lama pointing out that Tibet was a dependency of China and that, therefore, he intended now to march towards Lhasa to re-establish that relationship; and he ordered the Kalon Lama to render him every assistance. The despatch of this letter, however, appears to have taken place in early January 1918, more than four months after the original affair of the grass cutters.[101] It was followed, moreover, not by a Chinese advance but by a new, and this time successful, Tibetan attack on the Chinese positions at Riwoche and nearby Enta, during the course of which the Kalon Lama's forces managed to capture three or four pieces of artillery.[102]

According to King, General P'eng genuinely believed, probably on the advice of the same Colonel who had helped create the initial escalation of the crisis, that the Tibetans in Kham were reluctant to remain under Lhasa control and would rise up against the Kalon Lama if they were convinced that there would be credible Chinese support. Instead, the Tibetans attacked the Chinese with unanticipated energy; and soon General P'eng found himself invested in Chamdo, a town which was virtually unfortified and where the geography particularly favoured the besiegers now greatly strengthened by the Chinese guns taken at Riwoche. Despite P'eng's own determination to resist, there were many in his command who advocated a negotiated surrender to the Kalon Lama. In fact he was able to hold out for some two months before his own subordinates decided to throw in the towel. The fire-eating Colonel who had so badly advised his General committed suicide by drowning himself in the Mekong. General P'eng allowed himself to be taken prisoner by the Kalon Lama.[103]

It was now the end of April 1918. With Chamdo gone, there remained no Chinese bastion directly between the Tibetans and Tachienlu itself, to within a days march of which the Kalon Lama's vanguard actually advanced before they found themselves overextended and obliged to withdraw to a line which ran from just to the west of Batang (which remained in Chinese hands) to a point on the west bank of Yalung River north-west of Kantze.[104] The Kalon Lama had thus captured not only the states or districts of Riwoche, Chamdo, Draya and Markham but also Derge and, apparently, most of Nyarong. The Dalai Lama wanted him to push on to Tachienlu,

thus taking this opportunity to bring a great part of ethnic Tibet (to which the Lönchen Shatra had laid claim in the initial stages of the Simla Conference) under Lhasa control; but the Kalon Lama was well aware of the limits of his strength and the realities of the situation.

General P'eng, too, appreciated the realities. He decided not to return to China along with the other prisoners taken by the Tibetans, who as in the crisis of 1912-13 were repatriated by way of British India, but to remain in exile (with his Tibetan wife) under Tibetan rule. He knew what had happened to Chung Ying after his failure in Tibet in 1913.[105]

One reality which came to be appreciated by all parties involved, including the British, was that the success of the Kalon Lama's troops would almost certainly have not been possible without the possession of reasonably modern Lee-Enfield rifles (as opposed to the antiquated muzzle loader pieces with which the Tibetans had endeavoured to halt Younghusband's advance to Lhasa in 1904) and supplies of ammunition provided by the Government of India. The Chinese could not fail to conclude that the Kalon Lama was in some way an agent of British policy; and for this reason alone the developments in the Marches could not be ignored by the Peking Legation in its dealings with the Chinese Government.[106]

By the middle of January 1918 the gravity of the situation was becoming apparent not only to Teichman in Tachienlu, but also to Jordan in Peking and to the Government of India. The narrative from this moment becomes from the British point of view a trifle confused. Teichman was directly subordinate to the Peking Legation, but from March 1918 onwards he was in closer communication with India by way of the Tibetans than he was with his own superiors in Peking. Moreover, the possible ambiguities in Teichman's position upon which we have already commented begin from this time to cloud somewhat the records. Finally, the attitude of the Government of India towards, and its information concerning, the crisis did not always coincide with that held by Jordan in Peking. For clarity, it is perhaps easiest to deal with the various strands separately rather than attempt a single chronological treatment. We will, here, first consider Teichman's wanderings in the Marches and then the diplomatic implications as perceived by British observers in Peking, India and London of what Teichman had been up to.

During these opening months of 1918 the Frontier Commissioner, Ch'en Hsia-ling, was away from Tachienlu engaged in a private war with a potential rival, General Chang Wu-lan, near the Yunnan border in the region of Sichang (Ningyuan) on the upper reaches of the Anning River almost 200 miles as the crow flies to the south-east of Tachienlu and at least one month's march from Batang, the nearest major Chinese stronghold in the Marches.[107] There was, therefore, no senior Chinese official at Tachienlu with whom

Teichman could consult even had he so wished. This situation effectively gave Teichman a free hand; and, of course, it may well have been one of Ch'en's objectives to keep himself well out of the way at this juncture, if only to avoid having to help his potential rival General P'eng.

On 3 March 1918, with the situation at Chamdo looking ever more grave for the Chinese garrison, Teichman decided to take some action of his own. He informed Jordan that

> in view of the resumption of hostilities between the Chinese and the Tibetans west of the Yangtzu, and of the difficulty of obtaining early or reliable news at Tachienlu, I consider it desirable that I should be rather nearer the scene of military operations, and am leaving here in a day or two for the frontier. If no serious obstacles are thrown in my way, I propose to remain there for some months, sending my usual reports from wherever I happen to be.

He had no specific permission for this from the Chinese authorities. Should the Wai-chiao-pu protest about it to Jordan, Teichman suggested that "you might reply that I am an experienced traveller, that they may safely trust to my discretion not to run into danger, and that I am merely touring the frontier in accordance with my instructions to watch trade and conditions on the border".

Teichman concluded by noting that it was his understanding that there could be no final settlement of the Sino-Tibetan question, that is to say a revision of the Simla Convention acceptable to China, until after the Great War. However, the present situation on the Marches was at least as grave as that which, in 1912-13, had given rise to the Simla Conference in the first place. In these circumstances

> it might be possible for me, if I found myself near the scene of hostilities and the opportunity occurred, to bring the leaders of both sides together and negotiate a truce on the lines of each party not advancing beyond the positions that they might hold at that time, such a temporary arrangement to be without prejudice to any subsequent negotiations about a frontier line, and to last until a settlement of the whole question was arrived at between the Governments of Great Britain, China, and Tibet.

Teichman pointed out that some such British mediation leading to the stabilisation of the situation would "go far to dispel the suspicions which are entertained by the Chinese that we are supporting the Tibetans in an attempt to invade and conquer Chinese territory". It could, perhaps, be argued that any truce "might prejudice the claims of the Tibetans in any subsequent negotiations for a final settlement of the boundary question on the lines of the 1914 Convention". He did not believe this to be so. Indeed, a truce would enable all the parties concerned to reflect upon the advantages of some more permanent settlement.

To achieve a satisfactory outcome Teichman needed fully authorised representatives of both Tibet and China with whom to negotiate. He urged that the Chinese Central Government in Peking be requested to give such authority to either P'eng Jih-sheng or General Liu Tsan-ting (the commander of the Batang garrison) to act on behalf of the Frontier Commissioner and the Governors-General of Szechuan and Yunnan; and he requested that the Tibetan Government in Lhasa be persuaded to confer similar powers upon the Kalon Lama. "It may seem rather absurd", he added, "to make such a suggestion at the present time when the . . [Chinese] . . Central Government has probably no control in Szechuan, but questions affecting the frontier territory and Tibet have in the past usually been considered to lie outside the scope of internal dissensions between North and South", that is to say, that this was a non-partisan matter in Chinese politics. Teichman thought that both the Chinese under siege at Chamdo and the Kalon Lama desired peace. The position from the Chinese point of view would, of course, change dramatically if some ambitious General like Ch'en Hsia-ling were to be provided with adequate funds and sufficient troops of good quality to undertake a campaign of frontier pacification. The Tibetans would then be in real trouble. It was important, therefore, to seize the present opportunity provided by Chinese weakness.

Teichman concluded this most significant despatch with the observation that, should Jordan not approve of the proposals for British mediation, he had only to send Teichman a telegram to this effect and the negotiations would at once be called off; otherwise, he would welcome a telegram through Chinese official channels confirming Jordan's agreement that he had British authority to do what he could. Since long before Jordan could possibly receive this despatch Teichman would be out of reach of telegrams should he wish not to be reached, this final observation did not signify very much.[108]

There are a number of points of great importance for an understanding of the subsequent course of events in this despatch. First: it is clear that no one, either Tibetan or Chinese, had asked Teichman at this stage to make his way to the fighting and help mediate.[109] The initiative was Teichman's and his alone. Second: it is evident that Teichman had always in mind the preparation of the ground for some future (post Great War) resumption of formal negotiations along the lines of the Simla Conference of 1913-14 in which a permanent solution to the problem of the eastern frontiers of Tibet would be found. Finally: and this became even more apparent in his next despatch to Jordan, written two days before he set out on his travels, Teichman was anxious to pre-empt an attempt by Ch'en Hsia-ling, or for that matter any other Chinese official, to arrive at some direct Sino-Tibetan arrangement without British

participation. As Teichman left Tachienlu on 7 March, Ch'en Hsia-ling was hurrying back (he was then only three days march away) to deal with the crisis. He had sent orders to General P'eng to stop fighting if possible; and he had despatched a letter to the Dalai Lama, probably reiterating proposals he had already made when the fighting first started, to suggest some kind of armistice.[110]

Teichman reached Chamdo on 19 May, just three weeks after the Chinese surrender there. He had come by a somewhat indirect route, through Kantze on the Yalung to Jyekundo in the Kokonor territory (which Teichman found firmly under the control of the Mahommedan General in Sining and strangely isolated from the turbulence in Eastern Tibet with trade and commerce going on much as usual), waiting for the siege to reach its conclusion. At Chamdo he met up with the Kalon Lama and opened discussions about a possible truce. The Kalon Lama's position was made quite clear. He was under considerable pressure both from Lhasa and from some of his own staff to push on towards Tachienlu. He appreciated, however, the dangers of the present Tibetan situation, and was well aware that a concerted Chinese counter-attack in any strength could well put him in grave peril. He would welcome a truce provided a properly authorised Chinese representative, that is to say one who represented more than local, or temporary, Chinese interests, could be found with whom he could negotiate. Without such a person, he would have no option but to press on eastwards whatever the ultimate dangers might be. Teichman had somehow to find a suitable Chinese official, no easy task given the general disarray on the Chinese side. General P'eng, one of Teichman's original candidates for this rôle, was now obviously useless. This left the Batang garrison commander, General Liu Tsan-ting.[111]

Teichman, therefore, had now to find General Liu and persuade him to act as the Chinese representative in the proposed discussions with the Kalon Lama, in the process assuring him of a safe conduct through the Tibetan lines; and he had to obtain by one means or another for General Liu the status, at least in the eyes of the Kalon Lama, of being the fully accredited agent of not only the Chinese in the Marches but also of the Chinese Central Government in Peking. On 4 June Teichman met General Liu at Markham Gartok (to the south-west of Batang) where, with the help of the American missionary Dr. Shelton who had accompanied him from Batang, Liu was already trying to patch up some kind of truce of his own with the local Tibetan Governor, the Markham Teji, an official appointed by Lhasa who was said to rank in Eastern Tibet second only to the Kalon Lama and was in command of the southern flank of the Tibetan forces. The Chinese General and the Markham Teji agreed to sign a truce valid for a month; and Liu then declared himself ready to go to Chamdo with his safety guaranteed by Teichman.[112]

Teichman's next step was to go on to Batang where he hoped to obtain by telegraph from the Szechuan Government some form of official credentials for General Liu; but here on 9 June Teichman discovered, so his narrative reported, that there no longer existed any rapid communication between that place and Tachienlu, the telegraph line having been cut. Teichman decided to proceed to Chamdo anyway, General Liu having been persuaded to discuss an armistice with the Kalon Lama without express authority from his superiors, or at least to wait at Chamdo for such authority while opening talks with the Kalon Lama, and the Markham Teji having agreed to hold back his troops from advancing towards Batang for the time being. In any case, General Liu maintained that he possessed all the powers needed to negotiate a binding cease-fire.

On 14 July Teichman and Liu reached the Kalon Lama's headquarters at Chamdo. By this time Teichman had established a very close relationship with the Kalon Lama. Indeed, Teichman's position depended almost entirely on the Lama's co-operation. It was through the Tibetans that Teichman could communicate, via British India, most rapidly with his superiors; and it was by this same channel that funds reached him both to meet his own daily necessities of life and to help lubricate the whole process of diplomacy including the advancing of cash to General Liu for his personal use and to pay his troops. The Kalon Lama, therefore, held an extremely powerful hand. Teichman had been discussing the shape of a temporary settlement with the Kalon Lama ever since they first met on 19 May. They both agreed that, pending a final settlement with the Chinese in the form of some substitute for the abortive Simla Convention, the course of the upper reaches of the Yangtze made a satisfactory line of demarcation between Chinese and Tibetan control in Eastern Tibet. The state of Derge, the largest of the polities of Eastern Tibet with its capital at Derge Gönchen (Tehko or Kenching) could well be turned into a neutral area under its own ruler. The Kalon Lama, following the views of Lhasa ever since 1865, insisted that there should be no Chinese troops stationed in Nyarong even if the district was not actually occupied by Tibetan forces. Thus the Kalon Lama, in contrast to the Dalai Lama who still urged an advance to Tachienlu, was considering a stabilised frontier along the Yangtze with two buffer zones, Derge and Nyarong, on the eastern side of the river. The Derge situation was, in the eyes of the Kalon Lama, complicated by the fact that its former Chief, who had been expelled by Chao Erh-feng in 1908, was now actually serving as a Depon, or General, in the Tibetan army in Eastern Tibet (Kham).[113]

On 11 August 1918 the Chamdo peace conference formally opened. General Liu, despite having a local Tibetan wife, was virtually ignorant of the more sophisticated forms of the Tibetan language; so interpreters had to be employed.[114] The main problem

at the conference remained General Liu's status. Liu was now only in extremely indirect contact with the Peking Government by way of Teichman, the Kalon Lama, Lhasa, Gyantse, and India; and his communications with the Szechuan authorities, either at Tachienlu or Chengtu, were totally severed. What was his status as negotiator? In his published account Teichman states that

> towards the end of July we at last received the long awaited replies from Szechuan and Tachienlu. The Governor of Szechuan stated that he was agreeable to peace negotiations, and engaged not to move troops towards Tibet pending their conclusion. The Szechuan Frontier Commissioner . . [Ch'en Hsia-ling] . . likewise agreed to make peace, and tentatively suggested the river Yangtze as a temporary frontier pending a definite settlement of the boundary question.[115]

The implications of this statement are, to say the least, open to question. The records, for example, show that on 2 August Teichman reported that

> I have explained to my Tibetan and Chinese colleagues that as Chinese Government will not give Liu full powers to negotiate on their behalf we must proceed to a local settlement and then submit it to our respective Governments for their approval.[116]

Whatever letters might have come from Tachienliu and Chengtu, therefore, could not possibly have conferred any special powers on General Liu; and, indeed, the Chinese subsequently denied on more than one occasion that any such powers had ever been granted.[117] Yet as early as 1 May 1918 the Kalon Lama reported to his own Government in Lhasa that Liu had written to him from Batang to the effect that he had been authorised telegraphically by the Chinese President to negotiate a Sino-Tibetan treaty.[118]

Probably what had happened was something like this. There had been a number of communications of one kind or another including letters and telegrams (as long as the line was functioning) between various echelons of Chinese administration and both the several Chinese commanders in the Marches and the Kalon Lama since at least the opening of 1918 in which the Chinese aim was to open up some kind of dialogue with the Tibetans without British participation. They had, after all, been trying to do this with varying degrees of success since the days of the Simla Conference. For the purposes of the Chamdo discussions it suited all parties, the Kalon Lama, Teichman and General Liu (whose own position was insecure, to say the least), to interpret these various communications as authority for Liu to act as official Chinese delegate. The confusion was, of course, compounded by the existence of a struggle between Ch'en Hsia-ling, Chengtu and Peking as to who actually possessed the real authority on the Chinese side. Teichman, however, can have been in no doubt, as his observations of 2 August indicate, that Liu did not in fact

possess the necessary powers to represent either the Szechuan Government or Peking.

On 19 August 1918, despite these ambiguities, an Agreement was signed on the following basis:

> whereas a state of hostilities arose last year between the Chinese and Tibetans owing to an attack by Chinese troops on Tibetan troops on account of a trifling dispute near Leiwuchi and Chiamdo; and whereas the leaders on both sides are now desirous of a restoration of peaceful relations on the general basis of both sides retaining the territories they now occupy; and whereas the British Government has consented to mediate in the dispute; the following arrangement for a complete cessation of hostilities has been agreed upon between the undersigned, namely, General Liu Tsan-ting, commanding the Chinese troops at Batang, and acting on behalf of China; the Kalon Lama, commanding the Tibetan troops on the frontier, and acting on behalf of Tibet; and Mr. Eric Teichman, of His Britannic Majesty's Consular Service, acting on behalf of the British Government.[119]

These words, some of them certainly open to challenge on grounds of accuracy, sufficed to authenticate for the time being the following terms:[120]

(1) that the agreement was temporary pending "a final and tripartite settlement" between China, Tibet and Great Britain, though in the meantime it would in no way be modified without the "unanimous consent of all three contracting parties";

(2) that there should be a cease-fire along the current line of control, with an understanding that Tibetan and Chinese officials and troops would keep to their respective sides of the line: once the agreement had been formally accepted by the Chinese and Tibetan Governments, the Tibetans would pull back their forces at present in the Kantze and Nyarong (Chantui) districts where, after the Tibetan withdrawal, the Chinese promised not to maltreat the local inhabitants including the monks in the various monasteries there: the existing boundaries between Tibetan held territory and both Kokonor (that is to say the area of control of the Mahommedan General in Sining) and Yunnan would not be altered for the time being;

(3) except for local police purposes, the Tibetans would, once the agreement had been formally approved by the Tibetan and Chinese Governments, station no men to the east of the Yangtze; and the Chinese, for the same function, would limit their presence west of the relevant stretches of the Yangtze and Yalung rivers to 100 constables: all other troops would then be withdrawn by both sides. One result of this provision was to turn Derge, to which the Tibetan claim was acknowledged, into a demilitarised buffer zone;

(4) it was agreed that the Chinese would not interfere in any way in the Dalai Lama's right to appoint monastic officials in the

monasteries on the Chinese side of the line: it was also understood that the Dalai Lama's appointments here would not interfere in "the territorial authority of the Chinese officials";

(6) there were a number of detailed provisions relating to the good administration of the territory on both sides of the line, on the return of prisoners of war, and on the settlement of disputes (which would be referred to the British Consul, which meant Teichman, who was not, in fact, a British Consul in the legal sense of Chinese treaty relations with the Powers, but merely a Consular Officer acting as observer – the nearest British Consulate was at Chengtu);

(7) once the truce had been confirmed, both the Tibetans and the Chinese would limit their military presence in the region to 200 Chinese troops at Batang and Kantze and 200 Tibetan troops at Chamdo and Markham Gartok;

(8) there would in future be no Chinese troops stationed in either Hsiangch'eng or Nyarong provided the local inhabitants there remained peaceful, but the Chinese retained the right to maintain law and order without Tibetan interference;

(9) specifically built into the agreement was a Chinese promise not to maltreat the monks of Dargye monastery, as well as other monasteries not named, after the Tibetan troops were withdrawn;

(10) finally, "when the Governments of China and Tibet shall have formally accepted this agreement, its provisions shall be widely made known by proclamations in Tibetan and Chinese throughout the districts on both sides of the frontier with a view to pacifying the minds of the inhabitants of the border after the recent years of fighting and unrest".

What did all this signify? Provided that the Lhasa Government agreed to it, the Chamdo truce still required, even as a truce of limited duration, Chinese adhesion at a higher level. The position of the Kalon Lama in this respect caused Teichman no anxiety. The truce was expressed very much in language which the Kalon Lama had accepted and which, with the assistance of the Government of India, could be made binding on Lhasa. The position of General Liu, however, did present great problems. It would be much better if the truce were acknowledged by a properly accredited representative of, if not the Chinese Central Government, then at least the Frontier Commissioner, Ch'en Hsia-ling.[121] To become permanent, of course, it would call for further negotiations at Governmental level, in other words the repeat of something like the Simla Conference of 1913-14.

As a truce, the Chamdo Agreement contained one glaring omission. It defined in considerable geographical detail the cease-fire line, but it specified no time limit for its duration.[122] How long would it hold, failing Chinese ratification, which might never be forthcoming given the probable attitude of Ch'en Hsia-ling towards General Liu? [123]

Teichman, therefore, appreciated that he had two more tasks before him. First: he would have to introduce some definition of the intended duration of the truce. Second: he would be much happier if he could get attached to the Agreement the signature of either Ch'en Hsia-ling or someone authorised to sign on behalf of the Frontier Commissioner.

The first direct indication of any serious reaction on the part of Ch'en Hsia-ling and the Frontier Commissioner's establishment at Tachienlu came with the arrival at Chamdo on 29 August of the Chala "King", acting in his accustomed, and somewhat enigmatic, role as Sino-Tibetan go-between. The Chala "King" brought with him letters from Tachienlu and news of Chinese views on what had been happening in Chamdo. It became clear that what General Liu had agreed to might not be accepted either by the Chinese or the Tibetan forces to the north-east on the Yalung River in the region of Kantze and Rongbatsa. Near Rongbatsa there were some 3,000 well armed and tolerably trained Chinese soldiers from the Tachienlu garrison virtually surrounded by Tibetans. If either side chose to disregard the Chamdo truce, then the fighting might break out once more; and this time, Teichman may well have concluded, with no guarantee of continued Tibetan victory.

Teichman, therefore, resolved to go to Rongbatsa. Leaving General Liu to the safe keeping of the Kalon Lama at Chamdo, he set out eastwards in the company of the Chala "King" on 2 September 1918. Just over two weeks later, on 19 September, he passed out of Tibetan controlled territory into the Chinese camp at Rongbatsa where he at last found a Chinese official who could be said to represent the Frontier Commissioner, a magistrate from Tachienlu called Han Kuang-chung. Here, just on the western side of the Yalung River on what was one of the main roads from Tachienlu to Jyekundo in the Kokonor territory leading to the so called North (Gyalam) Road to Lhasa, Chinese and Tibetan forces were more or less evenly balanced. The Tibetans maintained that they still held the military advantage; but Teichman was not so sure. As he remarked:

> the truth, however, is probably, that both sides, in spite of their bellicose talk, were getting uneasy; the Tibetans because they were involved in serious hostilities with a comparatively large Chinese force so far from their base; the Chinese because they knew that the Tibetans were working round in Nyarong and that, in the event of the latter region falling into Tibetan hands, there was grave danger of the Tibetans securing control of all the country in their rear.[124]

In these circumstances both sides were not averse to considering the application of the principles of the Chamdo Agreement of August to their own sector.

Discussions at Rongbatsa began on 20 September 1918. They were prolonged, partly because of the need to refer back to the Kalon

Lama at Chamdo and General Ch'en Hsia-ling at Tachienlu, neither of whom decided to attend in person. The Chala "King" acted as an intermediary between the two sides, though there was no question but that he represented the Chinese. On 10 October a "Supplementary Agreement Regarding Mutual Withdrawal of Troops and Cessation of Hostilities Between Chinese and Tibetans" was signed by Han Kuang-chun and the Chala "King" as special representatives of General Ch'en Hsia-ling, the Kenching Lama (the principal monastic official in Derge) and the Chungrang and Drenton Depons (Generals) on behalf of the Kalon Lama, and Teichman, who no longer described himself as representing His Majesty's Government, but rather as a British Vice-Consul acting as witness and "middleman".

There are a number of interesting features about this "Supplementary Agreement" which distinguish it from the instrument signed at Chamdo. In the first place, it was in effect bipartite rather than tripartite, in that the principals were the Chinese and the Tibetans and Teichman was merely the honest broker. Secondly, it introduced Chinese signatories who, unlike General Liu, could convincingly be argued to represent the main Chinese authority in the Marches, the Frontier Commissioner Ch'en Hsia-ling. Thirdly, it contained a clear time limit. It was to be binding for a year from the date of taking effect pending the "receipt of the decisions of the President of the Republic . . [of China] . . and the Dalai Lama regarding the Chamdo negotiations". For that year there would be no Chinese or Tibetan troop movement along either the North or the South Roads, in other words, it was applicable to the entire Tibet-Szechuan front. It was concerned, however, only with the withdrawal of troops and ending of hostilities: it was "not a definite settlement of the questions at issue", and by the descriptions of the signatories it was clearly an arrangement between the representatives of the local commanders on the spot, the Kalon Lama in Kham and the Frontier Commissioner of Szechuan Province: it avoided the language implying an accord between accreditied representatives of metropolitan governments which is to be found in the Chamdo Agreement. Unlike the Chamdo Agreement, moreover, it lacked anything like a detailed geographical description of the intended truce line.[125]

The Rongbatsa Agreement contained an Additional Article which read as follows:

> the Chinese troops shall withdraw to Kantze, but they shall be at liberty to occupy the strategic point of Beri – beyond which point, however, they must not advance during the cessation of hostilities.

Beri, the neighbourhood of two monasteries as well as the small state capital town of one of the Hor States on an approach route to the North Road, was to be the most westerly outpost of the Chinese presence. This fact, which was to prove to be of great significance in

1930, in the Rongbatsa Agreement was an indirect way to indicate a modification in Tibetan favour of the Chamdo Agreement. At Chamdo it had been clearly stated that the Dargye monastery would end up on the Chinese side of the line. Now it was to be deduced that Dargye was some six miles of so to the west of the line, that being the distance between Dargye and Beri (Beru or Pei-li), and in the Tibetan area of control. It was a contest related to this point, namely whether Dargye controlled one, if not both, of the monasteries in the neighbourhood of Beri town, which precipitated the breakdown of the two Teichman truces in 1930.[126]

One most important achievement of the two agreements, Chamdo and Rongbatsa, taken together was, in Teichman's opinion, that they had created the basis for further negotiations between the Tibetans and Chinese. The key, he thought, lay in Derge, where the tract to the east of the Yangtze might eventually be transferred completely to China rather than remaining part of a buffer as specified at Chamdo. The Tibetans, although they felt strongly that they had claims over all of Derge, might accept this arrangement, the confirmation of the Yangtze boundary as the permanent international border, in exchange for a British guarantee of future military support of various kinds, and in particular the provision of mountain artillery. The Kalon Lama, a realist, would prefer a loss of territory over which the Tibetan hold would always be tenuous in return for the one certain protection against renewed Chinese advance, a properly equipped army. Without heavy weapons, artillery and machine guns, he would not be able to withstand the pressure of a united China which would surely emerge one day.[127] On several occasions Teichman had remarked upon the Kalon Lama's skill, or good fortune, which resulted in his effective truce with the Chinese in both Yunnan and Kokonor while still fighting the troops under the control of the Szechuan Frontier Commissioner.

After Rongbatsa, Teichman continued on his survey of the Tibetan Marches, returning to Chamdo and making his way down to Yenching on the Mekong just north of the point where that great river enters Yunnan. He then turned back northwards to Batang and on to Beyu whence he joined the main route eastwards to Tachienlu which he finally reached in the middle of February 1919. He had been travelling for just under twelve months in one of the least known corners of Asia, and had visited virtually all of Kham. *Travels of a Consular Officer* is a work of considerable geographical importance. What, however, were the diplomatic implications of the events which it describes?

In Peking news of Teichman's activities reached the British Legation from three main sources. First: there were direct communications from Teichman himself, coming by various routes through China and, usually, taking a very long time about it. Second:

Teichman was also in touch with Peking by way of Tibet and India. From India, moreover, there came news of what was going on in Eastern Tibet which was derived from sources other than Teichman. The Political Officer in Sikkim was in constant touch with Lhasa; and reports from the Kalon Lama reached him quickly enough. Much of this was passed directly on to the Peking Legation as well as to the Foreign Office in London by way of the India Office. Finally: the Chinese Government in Peking was continually getting messages of one kind or another from Szechuan, Yunnan and Sining, some of which caused the Wai-chiao-pu to protest to Jordan at the way in which the British were meddling in the affairs of the Marches, apparently on behalf of their Tibetan clients. Because the passage of information through these various channels took varying lengths of time, it is not always easy to correlate the views and actions of the Peking Legation with specific events on the Szechuan frontier.

On 19 February 1918, having received news of the renewal of fighting on the Marches, Jordan asked the Wai-chiao-pu to do what it could to bring the conflict to an end.[128] The Chinese agreed to try; but Jordan doubted whether the Peking Government had, in fact, any power over the affairs of Szechuan. A dialogue over Tibet, however, was now established between the Chinese Central Government and Jordan which was to continue spasmodically until, in May 1919, it very nearly produced a replacement for the abortive Simla Convention. In the third week of April 1918, for example, Jordan called on the Wai-chiao-pu to point out that it might be as well to think some more about a settlement of the Tibetan question in the near future because he, Jordan, would soon be leaving China; and, the implication was clear enough, there was no guarantee that his successor would be so well disposed towards the Chinese point of view.[129]

Jordan was still sceptical about the Central Government's ability to do anything effective; and, privately, he did not consider the present moment a particularly favourable one to press them – they had other matters to occupy their minds such as the breakdown of internal organisation throughout the country and the problem of Japan. He had now heard of Teichman's move to the frontier and had received the proposals contained in his despatch of 3 March which, on the whole, he approved. As Victor Wellesley of the Foreign Office put it to the India Office:

> Sir John Jordan is in favour of . . . Mr. Teichman, who is an officer of proved discretion, to act as proposed, and points out that if he succeeds in arranging a temporary cession of hostilities or in obtaining information which would enable Sir John to convince the Chinese Government that the frontier authorities in Szechwan had a genuine desire for peace, the prospects of a settlement might be mutually improved.[130]

The Government of India concurred.[131]

On 6 July 1918, Jordan had a long talk with the Chinese Prime Minister, Tuan Ch'i-jui, during which he passed on messages received via Teichman from General Liu seeking authority to represent China at the proposed Chamdo conference. The Prime Minister made two points. First: General Liu was really too insignificant a person to be entrusted by the Chinese Government with a task of such importance – the man for the job was Ch'en Hsia-ling, the Frontier Commissioner, with whom, unfortunately, telegraphic contact from Peking had broken down. Second: that he was not really very interested in any Tibetan settlement at this particular moment. As Jordan noted, the Chinese "evidently feel that time is in their favour and that they can let the Tibetan question take its course until they have regained control of Szechuen".[132]

Meanwhile Jordan had entered into "tentative and informal" discussions with members of the Wai-chiao-pu directly concerned with Tibetan affairs, notably one Mr. Tyau, a Cambridge graduate with a good command of English but no great interest in things Tibetan, and Mr. Shih (Shih Ch'ing-yang), who had once served as Chinese Trade Agent at Gyantse in the days before the fall of the Manchus, Jordan himself being assisted by E.C. Wilton, a man with considerable experience of Tibetan affairs (he had been on Younghusband's staff in 1904, and had helped the Government of India in both the 1905 negotiations with China over the Lhasa Convention and the negotiations leading to the 1908 Trade Regulations), and S. Barton, the Chinese Secretary. Out of these relatively low level discussions, which continued right up to May 1919, was to emerge some kind of a draft substitute for the abortive Simla Convention of 1914. One of the topics discussed was the suitability of the Yangtze as the boundary between China and autonomous Tibet, a proposal consistently advanced by Teichman as the basis for any lasting solution of the Tibetan question.[133]

Indeed, by this time Teichman in Chamdo was working out an complete draft for a new tripartite treaty, in which the following were the principal elements:

(1) autonomous Tibet was to be under the joint protection of China and Great Britain, with some "face saving" reference to Chinese "suzerainty";

(2) the Yangtze would form the Sino-Tibetan border and the concept of the division of Tibet into "Inner" and "Outer" zones would be abandoned;

(3) if a Chinese Resident were ever to return to Lhasa, a British Resident would also be stationed there;

(4) there would be a British official permanently stationed on the Sino-Tibetan border, either at Chamdo or Batang;

(5) the telegraph line from India to Gyantse should be extended to Chamdo by way of Lhasa.[134]

Teichman had discussed these proposals with the Kalon Lama, who had accepted them after, apparently, reference to Lhasa; and, had a properly accreditied Chinese representative turned up in place of General Liu, they might indeed have become the basis for a new Tripartite Conference following on that held at Simla. Diplomatically, Teichman was playing for very high stakes, as Jordan certainly appreciated. The Government of India would have been pleased enough to see some new conference of this kind with such an agenda; but Jordan was worried about the effect that discussions along these lines might have on the Chinese Central Government. Far from approving what was going on, their resolve to resist any Tibetan settlement so manifestly not in their favour would be strengthened. Jordan's main point was that British influence with the Chinese Central Government, which had been the major restraining factor on Chinese policy in Tibet since 1914 at least, would be seriously weakened by any attempt to find a definitive solution through local action by local agents inadequately accredited.[135]

All this being so, Jordan thought that it was about time that Teichman ceased wandering about along the frontier and returned to his proper place, Tachienlu, the headquarters of the relevant Chinese authority, the Frontier Commissioner Ch'en Hsia-ling. The Government of India were quite happy for Teichman to go on hand in hand, as it were, with the Kalon Lama; but Jordan decided to call a halt once the Chamdo Agreement had been signed. By September 1918, when Teichman was already on his way to Rongbatsa, Jordan, worried about the possibility of a Chinese revival of strength in the Marches following a rapprochement between Szechuan and Yunnan, informed the Foreign Office in London that Teichman would now have to return to Tachienlu and let the Chamdo Agreement stand or fall as fate dictated. At the Foreign Office the very experienced diplomatist Sir Eyre Crowe agreed that it was high time Teichman came home.[136]

Teichman, warned by way of India that his recall was under contemplation in Peking, was able to devise an answer, at least for the record.[137] He said that he had given his personal guarantee for General Liu's safety; and it was a guarantee which was only valid so long as Teichman was on the spot. He could not break his word by abandoning General Liu to the Kalon Lama's tender mercies. At this moment, Teichman reported, Liu wanted to go home to Batang but the Kalon Lama was "detaining" him at Chamdo.[138] Jordan, when this news reached him almost a month later, could only agree that Teichman, as a good English gentleman, *must* stay in the neighbourhood of General Liu (whom he had in fact left behind at Chamdo when he decided to go on to Rongbatsa); and he urged that the Government of India try to persuade the Kalon Lama to release the Chinese General.[139] Thus Teichman was permitted to stay on for the

Rongbatsa Supplementary Agreement (though, of course, instructions did not reach him in time to affect his movements one way or another).

If, as the Government of India thought, the Chamdo Agreement was "unduly" favourable to Tibet, then Rongbatsa was probably rather "tilted" towards the Chinese in its bilateral nature even if, at least in the Rongbatsa area, it conceded slightly more territory to the Tibetans.[140] Between them, the two Agreements provided a foundation for future negotiation; and the introduction of a time limit of one year in the Rongbatsa Agreement would guarantee to the British Legation in Peking the opportunity to raise the Tibetan question again with the Chinese Government during the course of 1919 should they so wish. Rongbatsa, indeed, might even persuade the Chinese to open talks on this matter of their own accord.

While the Teichman intervention was in progress both the India Office and the Foreign Office were surprisingly silent. Gone were those repeated expressions of anxiety concerning possible Russian reactions that would have been uttered only a year earlier. The Foreign Office had complete confidence in Sir John Jordan, who had been in Peking since 1906 and was now the Grand Old Man of Anglo-Chinese diplomacy; and it shared his suspicion that the trouble in Eastern Tibet was as much the fault of the Lhasa Government as it was of the Chinese. Its major anxiety, expressed to the India Office, was lest the Government of India did something drastic, like supplying heavy weapons for example, to help the Tibetans "to continue their recent policy of aggression".[141] The India Office, while it retained a measure of its traditional suspicion that in Peking the interests of India would not of necessity take priority over other British interests, was certainly not going to challenge the views of Sir John Jordan.

On the frontier itself the two Teichman inspired Agreements were for the time being effective. The Kalon Lama clearly intended to abide by both their letter and their spirit. Outstanding matters like the fate of General Liu and the repatriation of Chinese prisoners of war were sorted out. Liu went back to Batang in late November 1918. The only real problems confronting Teichman were to explain all that he had done so that it would not appear in the record to have in any significant way conflicted with his instructions and his authority, and to persuade the Frontier Commissioner Ch'en Hsia-ling back in Tachienlu that he had no alternative but to accept the Agreements with good grace.

Teichman's explanation to Jordan was made in a despatch from Chamdo of 25 November 1918, by which time most of the relevant correspondence had caught up with him. He declared that "I gather . . . that you regard my activities here as having been a mistake". His defence was that "Chiamdo is a long way from Peking and Chengtu".

The stopping of the Tibetan advance would have been impossible from Tachienlu. Only by being on the spot, both at Chamdo and then at Rongbatsa, was Teichman able to bring stability to a situation on the frontier which could have had very serious implications for British policy. While the ideal arrangement would have been to have brought the Kalon Lama and the Frontier Commissioner together, this in practice proved impossible. He achieved the next best thing. Even if the Chinese were still not too happy about the Chamdo Agreement, there was a difference between Ch'en Hsia-ling challenging the validity of an agreement and his ordering Chinese troops to attack Tibetan positions in the Marches. Even without the Chamdo Agreement, Teichman pointed out that "the Rongbatsa agreement gives us at any rate a year's breathing space". Now that the Great War was over at last, "would it not be possible to call another conference" on the Simla model in a year's time? Teichman thought that Chamdo would make the perfect venue for such a gathering as here "both sides are so near to the actualities of the situation that they are less likely to suffer from those exaggerated views as regards territorial claims which have been such a feature of previous negotiations".[142]

Jordan evidently accepted Teichman's explanations which, if our original hypothesis is correct, were merely required for essentially cosmetic reasons, Teichman having, in fact, achieved just about what was intended from the outset. When he left the Tachienlu post in late April or early May 1919 (to be replaced by Louis King), Teichman returned to the Chinese Secretariat of the Peking Legation with his reputation much enhanced. From now onwards he was *the* Legation's Tibetan expert, and, when he became Chinese Secretary in 1924 his position in this respect was beyond challenge.

Teichman's only failure, it may be argued, was that he was unable to persuade the Szechuan authorities to accept the Chamdo Agreement as binding. The Chamdo Agreement was far more detailed than the subsequent Rongbatsa Agreement: it specified precise geographical limits for Chinese and Tibetan authority in the Marches.[143] However, for all practical purposes it would be enforced for at least a year from October 1918 by virtue of Rongbatsa. Teichman thought that

> it seems to me that General Chen Hsia-ling is largely responsible for the refusal of the Chinese Government to accept the provisional peace arranged at Chiamdo. For while he was on the one hand engaged in begging me to make peace, he was at the same time reporting to his Government that I had stirred up the trouble and was to blame for all his misfortunes. Chen is a rough and ready sort of individual of rather low origin, Hunanese of the type who did much of the Empire building for China in the old days (for instance conquest of Turkistan by Tso Tsung-tang), and he has his good points; being courageous, strong

> minded and comparatively just and honest in his administration. But his double faced conduct last summer in an important matter affecting the relations between China and Great Britain would appear to indicate that he is not a suitable man for his present high post; and I have the honour to suggest that the Chinese Government ought to remove him if they exercise the necessary authority to enable them to do so.[144]

Teichman's last word on the Tibetan situation was that it was not he who had embarrassed British policy but rather whatever branch of the British establishment it was which had deemed it fit to provide the Tibetans with British rifles and ammunition (in their characteristic boxes). The Tibetan possession of these weapons was widely known in Szechuan. British rifles had been captured by the Chinese during the fighting around Rongbatsa and Kantze and specimens had been sent back not only to Chengtu but also to Peking. All levels of Chinese Government, therefore, were convinced that the British were assisting the Tibetans in aggression against China. In that these weapons had been in action round Kantze, which Teichman thought was a region where the Chinese case was strong and the Tibetan weak, he considered that the Tibetans had in a way misused this British Indian aid. The conclusion which Teichman drew from this was rather unexpected in view of the trouble he had gone to in explaining to the Chinese just how these rifles got where they had (unofficially, he had said, through a kind of black market where one could also obtain Russian and Japanese weapons, and, after all, in not very large numbers, so there was really nothing to complain about). As he put it: "anyhow the murder is now, so to speak, out, and there is therefore no objection from a local point of view for a further supply of these rifles being granted to the Dalai Lama should it be considered desirable to do so".[145]

85. After 1912 the Chinese had at first established themselves along the east bank of the Salween; but in 1915 or 1916 they had withdrawn their outposts to the eastern side of the main Salween-Mekong watershed in the Enta-Riwoche region.

86. Oliver Robert Coales was born in 1880 and entered the China Consular Service as a Student Interpreter in 1901. His account of the destruction of Chamdo monastery in 1912 is very interesting. Far from being an act of deliberate vandalism on the part of General P'eng Jih-sheng, it was apparently the result of a fire which was an unanticipated incidental result of the fighting.

87. Teichman had been to Sining and the great Labrang monastery, but not to Kumbum, during a journey to Kansu and Shensi made shortly after the fall of the Manchus. See: E. Teichman, *Travels of a Consular Officer in North-West China*, Cambridge 1921.

88. L/P&S/10/714, Teichman to Jordan, 31 December 1917.
The Teichman family was of German origin. Eric Teichman, who changed his named from Erik Teichmann by deed poll in 1906, was born in 1884 in England where his father had settled as a merchant in the fur trade. The Teichmann family was descended from a line of chief foresters to the German court of Ansbach.
Eric Teichman was educated at Charterhouse and Cambridge. He entered the China Consular Service in 1907 as a Student Interpreter. After his return from Tachienlu in 1919 he joined the Chinese Secretariat of the Peking Legation, being appointed its head, Chinese Secretary, in 1924. He was made KCMG in 1933 and GCMG in 1944. He effectively retired from the China Consular Service in 1936; but in 1942 he was asked to return to China, with Counsellor rank at the British Embassy in Chungking, to advise on negotiations relating to the ending of extraterritoriality in China. In 1944 he retired finally to Honingham Hall, Norfolk, where on 3 December 1944 he was shot dead by an American serviceman who was trespassing, presumably for purposes of poaching, on his land.

89. L/P&S/10/436, Teichman to Jordan, 25 November 1918.

90. An odd feature of the whole Teichman episode is the fact that Teichman was permitted, while still a serving member of the China Consular Service, to make public his detailed account, *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet*, which was published by the Cambridge University Press in 1922. This should be contrasted with the opposition in Whitehall in 1923 to the publication of Sir Charles Bell's book after Bell had, in fact, retired.
The point about Teichman,s book, according to L.D. Wakely of the India Office, was that it "dealt only very briefly with recent political events, and gave the British Government only the colourless character of middlemen". What it did not touch upon, and what Bell's book did in its original version, was how much the Tibetans had been helped by the British. The revelation of the extent of this support, small though it was, noted Victor Wellesley of the Foreign Office, "would provide much material for anti-British agitation in China, upon which the Japanese as well as the Chinese press would not be slow to seize: the result would certainly be embarrassing to our Legation in Peking. Nor would it be of any service to Tibet, whose cause is championed by Sir Charles Bell, to revive Chinese aspirations in that direction". See: L/P&S/12/3982, Wellesley to Wakely, 26 October 1923, and Wakely to Bell, 27 October 1923.
Teichman's introductory chapter, covering the historical background to the situation in Eastern Tibet in 1918, was designed to make the British case by the adroit use of history. See: L/P&S/11/211, P. 919.

91. Chala had been to all intents and purposes independent of direct Chinese control until 1903 when it was attacked from the direction of Nyarong (Chantui) by troops loyal to the Dalai Lama. The Chinese authorities in Tachienliu were preparing to send military aid to Chala when the Younghusband Expedition put an end to Tibetan military activity. See: E.H. Wilson, *A Naturalist in Western China with Vasculum, Camera and Gun;being some account of eleven years' travel, exploration, and observation in the more remote parts of the Flowery Kingdom*, 2 vols., London 1913, vol.1, pp. 210-211.

92. J.H. Edgar of the China Inland Mission at Batang, with an admirable command of Tibetan and Chinese, both written and spoken, was a good example of the well informed missionary. Edgar had been extremely helpful in advising F. M. Bailey during his journey from China to India via Eastern Tibet in 1911. See: F.M. Bailey, *China – Tibet – Assam. A Journey, 1911*, London 1945, p. 64. Edgar was a New Zealander, married to a Moravian lady. He does not appear, unfortunately, to have been in Eastern Tibet in the Teichman era; but he was back in Tachienlu in 1922.

Bailey thought Edgar the model of what a missionary ought to be. J.H. Edgar was the author of *The Marches of the Mantze*, London 1908.

93. For Shelton's life, see: Flora B. Shelton, *Shelton of Tibet*, New York 1923.

94. See, for example: A. Guibaut, *Tibetan Venture in the Country of the Ngolo-Setas*, London 1947, pp.5-27. Guibaut was in Tachienlu in 1940. See also: A. Migot, *Tibetan Marches*, London 1955, p.98. Migot travelled in Chinese controlled Eastern Tibet in 1947.
A.E. Pratt, who visited Tachienlu in 1887, reckoned that the population of the town was half Tibetan and half Chinese. See: A.E. Pratt, *To The Snows of Tibet through China*, London 1892.

95. For an account of the trade of Tachienlu at this period, see: O.R. Coales, "Economic Notes on Eastern Tibet", *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. LIV, 1919.
The Sino-Tibetan trade followed very complex patterns, with links between Tibet and Kansu and Yunnan which did not pass through Tachienlu. Likiang in Yunnan had long enjoyed a special position in this commerce as had Sining. However, by far the greater part of the goods to and from Tibet, both by value and volume, passed through Tachienlu.
Tibetan traders often penetrated China far beyond the Szechuanese border. When Sir Lionel Lamb was in Chengtu in 1925-26 it was generally acknowledged that the digging of wells was a Tibetan monopoly. Tibetan traders would earn money in this way which they then invested in Szechuanese tea destined for Tibetan markets. There were doubtless other customary arrangements of this kind of mutual financial benefit to the Chinese and the Tibetans, not least involving the commercial activities of Tibetan monasteries.

96. L/P&S/10/714, Teichman to Jordan, 31 December 1917. An interesting point about this despatch is that it was written in language that implied that there had been no alteration in the frontier established since 1912-13 at the very moment when that frontier was in the process of being changed radically. It seems unlikely that news of the fighting in the Riwoche region which had broken out in August-September 1917, and the subsequent Tibetan advances, had not reached Tachienlu by late December 1917.

97. The papers covering this period are all in: L/P&S/10/714. See, for example: Viceroy to Secretary of State, 1 December 1917, which explains the situation. The supply of ammunition, on the advice of Bell, was to be followed up by proposals to the Tibetans that they accept a new version of the Simla Convention very much along the lines of the 1916 Peking Legation *Memorandum* suitably modified to meet major Indian objections; but this never happened. See: Bell to India, 14 September 1917.
It would appear, though the records are not entirely clear on this point, that the ammunition was actually delivered during the first half of January 1918.

98. Teichman's version is to be found in: Teichman, *Travels*, *op. cit.*; and King's in: King, *China in Turmoil*, *op. cit.* The main difference between the two narratives lies in the degree to which blame for the renewal of fighting is attributed to General P'eng Jih-sheng. King treats P'eng with far more sympathy; and he presents the whole affair as something of a chapter of errors on both sides rather than as an example of ruthless Chinese aggression.
In his first detailed report of the affair, dated 21 January 1918, Teichman wrote that "the recent fighting . . [at Leiwuch'i or Riwoche] . . was provoked by a quarrel between Chinese and Tibetan soldiers over their respective grass cutting rights and was not the result of premeditated aggression on either side". P'eng, Teichman continued, was still anxious to renew negotiations with the Tibetans. In *Travels*, however, Teichman slightly modified this version to create a rather

different impression. He wrote: "a pretext for resuming hostilities was easily found in an incident which occurred . . . beyond Riwoche" by General P'eng, who, it was implied, wanted hostilities all along. See: Teichman, *Travels*, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

If the hypothesis concerning Teichman's real purpose in Tachienlu is correct, then Teichman had a vested interest in presenting the Chinese as the aggressors: this provided useful argument in rebuttal to any Chinese protest either in Peking or Chengtu about his involvement. It could always be said that had the Chinese not broken the truce, then there would have been no cause for Teichman to do anything other than remain in Tachienlu and observe. In fact, Jordan privately felt that the real aggressors were the Tibetans acting on the orders of the Dalai Lama.

King was writing some years after the event. He had married a Tibetan and had a far better insight into the Tibetan side of the question than did Teichman while, like Teichman, fully appreciating the Chinese position.

Most accounts take Teichman's version as gospel; and King's *China in Turmoil* is very little known.

For King's version, see also: L/P&S/10/883, King to Jordan, 13 February 1920.

99. Mora-Geka, according to King, was definitely on the Chinese side of the *de facto* line of control. The Chinese had come there in 1915. In 1916 they had pushed a little further over the Mora pass leading out of the valley into Tibetan held territory, and then had been obliged to withdraw; but they had collected grass at Mora-Geka. On their 1917 visit the Tibetans, learning of the Chinese presence, despatched two soldiers as envoys to find out what was intended. It was these two whom Captain Yü, perhaps because of an inability to communicate with them, arrested and sent back to Riwoche.

    Riwoche, according to King, was a state, presided over by an Incarnation, which had in the past been to all intents and purposes independent; but by 1917 had come to owe allegiance about equally to the Chinese and Lhasa, though, of course, the Chinese were now in effective occupation. When the Kalon Lama captured Riwoche, King reported, he treated the Incarnation with great harshness on the grounds that he had been too friendly to the Chinese.

100. The failed Tibetan attack on Riwoche, which was in fact the first true military operation in this revival of war in the Marches, seems to have taken place somewhere between 28 August and 1 September 1917. The chronology of the whole affair is far from clear; and some of the reports reaching the British confused Tibetan attacks with those of the Chinese. See, for example: L/P&S/10/714, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 1 December 1917.

101. See: Teichman, *Travels*, *op. cit.*, p. 53; van Walt, *Status of Tibet*, *op. cit.*, p. 233 n.13. There may, of course, have been earlier letters in similar vein.

102. The Tibetan offensive, which was announced to the Government of India by the Kashag as a purely defensive measure in response to Chinese attack, started some time in late January or early February 1918, possibly after the Tibetans had received, or knew they were about to receive, the extra 500,000 rounds of .303 ammunition from the British. It may well be that this reinforcement contributed to the Chinese coolness towards the British which Teichman detected in Tachienlu on about 20 February 1918 and which he reported to Jordan on 22 February 1918.

     From Teichman's account interpreted in the light of the British records it rather looks as if the Tibetan offensive was not in reaction to any Chinese attack but, rather, the Tibetan reply to General P'eng's letter. Teichman's published account is very carefully arranged so as, with a measure of economy with the truth, to make it look as if the Chinese were the aggressors and the Tibetans only defending themselves against the unprovoked attack of a greater power. One reason for this

approach, of course, was the need to minimise the impact of, if not actually justify, the British decision to supply the Tibetans with further ammunition.

103. By whom he was treated with considerable kindness, which rather suggests that the Kalon Lama, at least, did not consider him the evil destroyer of Chamdo monastery.

104. There cannot have been many Tibetan regular troops (of which the Lhasa army only had about 5,000) who came this far; though bands of Khampa auxiliaries may have made forays deep into the Marches.

105. Chung Ying, having lost hold of Central Tibet, unwisely returned to China; and President Yüan Shih-k'ai had him put to death in 1915.

The Kalon Lama's Chinese prisoners of war were repatriated through India and Burma to Yunnan by way of Tengyueh (Tengchung).

In 1923 General P'eng, with his family and eleven Chinese former soldiers as retainers, was reported to be living at Towa Dzong due south of Lhasa near the Bhutanese border. He was occupying a substantial house with a good garden, and was in receipt of an allowance from the Tibetan Government. See: L/P&S/10/1088, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 28 March 1923.

106. Teichman made this point very clearly when, on 22 February 1918, he wrote to Jordan that:

> the authorities here . . [in Tachienlu] . . are most unhappy about the position, and there is much talk of the great improvement noticeable in the equipment and training of the Tibetan forces. The latter are represented to me as being no longer a disorganised rabble, but a trained force armed with modern rifles and led by officers in khaki uniforms. All kinds of rumours, which I do my best to discredit, about foreign assistance are current, and at a feast given by the Chala Chief a day or two ago, at which all the leading officials of Tachienlu were present, Colonel Chu, one of Ch'en Hisia-ling's regimental commanders and the most important military officer remaining here, who is usually extremely friendly to me, asked me abruptly and in an aggrieved manner how it was that the Government of India provided the Dalai Lama with British rifles with which to attack the soldiers of China, a Power now allied to Great Britain in the European War.

See: L/P&S/10/714, Teichman to Jordan, 22 February 1918.

107. L/P&S/10/436, Teichman to Jordan, 22 February 1918.

108. L/P&S/10/436, Teichman to Jordan, 3 March 1918.

109. It has often been said that Teichman was *asked* by the Chinese to mediate at this juncture and that he was *deputed* to the border for that purpose. Such a misinterpretation of the facts probably arises from the ambiguities in Teichman's own published narrative which begins, in journal form, as from 6 March 1918, and is not too specific about the exact chronology of events before this date. See, for example: van Walt, *Status of Tibet*, *op. cit.*, p. 62: F. Spencer Chapman, *Lhasa the Holy City*, London 1940, p. 143. Chapman's version probably represents the prevailing official British recollection of the Teichman episode in 1936 when Chapman accompanied the Gould mission to Lhasa. "In 1917", he wrote, "the Chinese again put themselves in the wrong: a Chinese General broke the truce and made a sudden attack while the Tibetans were celebrating one of their many religious festivities. The Tibetans, however, soon rallied and drove the Chinese practically back to Tachienlu and thus recovered the greater part of Eastern Tibet. At this stage the British Consular Agent at Tachienlu was called in to mediate and the truce was re-established in 1918, with a provisional boundary through Batang, and one therefore much more favourable to the Tibetans". Or, again: G.N. Patterson, *Tibet in Revolt*, London 1960, p. 47. "By the middle of 1918 the Tibetans had recovered all of East Tibet from the Chinese garrisons, and were ready to

reclaim all their former territory up to and including Tachienlu. At this juncture, however, the Chinese invoked the mediation of the British Consular Officer stationed in West China, and on his intervention the Tibetans were persuaded to stop fighting".

110. L/P&S/10/436, Teichman to Jordan, 5 March 1918.

111. Liu was a native of Chihli Province, and at this time was about 35 years old. He had originally served under Chao Erh-feng and his brother, Chao Erh-hsün. General Liu (or Lu) was well known to Dr. Shelton of the Foreign Christian Missionary Society of Cincinnati. See: Flora B. Shelton, *Shelton of Tibet*, New York 1923, facing p. 144, for a photograph of General Liu with two of his three (at least) wives, one Tibetan and the other Chinese.

112. This episode is described in Shelton, *op. cit.* Dr. Shelton had been in Batang since 1908 where he established a medical mission station; and he remained there, apart from periods of leave in the United Sates, until his murder by bandits in 1922. His biography by his widow, who was there with him and who gave birth to two daughters in Eastern Tibet, is a most interesting eye-witness account of this period from a completely different point of view to that of Teichman. Shelton, and missionaries like him, were extremely well disposed towards the Tibetans; but they depended for their very presence in land inhabited by Tibetans upon the permission granted by the Chinese. Dr. Shelton met his death outside Batang after an abortive attempt to travel westwards into Tibetan held territory with Lhasa as the ultimate objective. The Kalon Lama appears to have been willing to let him pass; but Lhasa, using British opposition as an excuse, ordered otherwise.

Mrs. Shelton was very critical of some aspects of Chinese rule in Tibet; but she felt that, in the end, they would mend their ways and become quite acceptable to the Tibetans. She thought that the Tibetans, at least in her experience, respected Chao Erh-feng because, though brutal, he was also fair, punishing both Chinese and Tibetan malefactors with equal severity. In that her views reflect those of her husband, who was very well known in the United Sates where he gave many lectures during his three periods of leave, they suggest that there must have emerged by 1918 an influential body of American opinion sympathetic to Chinese aspirations, if not current methods, in Tibet. Only through Chinese help could the Tibetan Buddhists be brought into the Christian fold.

Mrs. Shelton was convinced that British influence in Lhasa in the Teichman era was very much stronger than it actually was. Indeed, she thought that one aim of the Simla Convention had been to put Outer Tibet under "English suzerainty". Her comments on the political situation from 1908 to 1919 probably reflect what Chinese officials in the Marches thought; and, as such, they are of great interest.

Mrs. Shelton, like Louis King in his *China in Turmoil*, described the death of the Chala "King" in 1922 when he had been arrested for a number of crimes, including corruption, and imprisoned by Ch'en Hsia-ling. He met his end during an attempted escape from his Tachienlu prison on 2 July 1922. See also: L/P&S/10/884, King to Peking Legation, 26 August 1922.

For another account of Dr. Shelton's death, see: J.W. Gregory and C.J. Gregory, *To the Alps of Chinese Tibet. An account of a journey of exploration up to and among the snow-clad mountains of the Tibetan frontier*, London 1923, pp.208-209.

113. Derge had been subjected to fratricidal war for many years before Chao Erh-feng took this action. After trying to rule through the leader of one of the Derge factions, in 1910 the Chinese deposed their own candidate (who was exiled to Batang and granted a pension) and placed the country under direct Chinese rule, dividing it up into five *hsien* (magistrate's districts). At one time Derge had been the largest and most powerful of the Kham states; but it had never come under the direct theocratic influence of the Gelugpa (Yellow) Sect and the Dalai Lama:

its monasteries were of either the Bön or Nyingma Sects. See Coales, "Eastern Tibet", *loc. cit.*

114. Ignorance of the Tibetan language was a characteristic of Chinese officials in Tibet much commented upon not only at this period but subsequently. At the time of writing (1988) the Peoples' Republic of China is making a great fuss about its intention to oblige all its officials in Tibet to learn the local language.

115. Teichman, *Travels, op. cit.*, p. 149.

116. L/P&S/10/714, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 31 August 1918.

117. In July the Chengtu press published the text of a telegram from Ch'en Hsia-ling at Tachienlu to the Szechuan Government quoting a letter from Teichman in which a cease-fire is sought. Ch'en is here said to have replied that there could be no talks with the Tibetans until Chamdo had been handed back and the Tibetan "rebels" had ceased interfering with the Chinese in their legitimate duties in Eastern Tibet. This was fairly typical of the kind of response produced by Teichman's overtures to senior Chinese officials in Szechuan.
    See, for example: L/P&S/10/714, Jordan to FO, 12 July 1918.

118. L/P&S/10/436, PO Sikkim to India, 10 May 1918.

119. The text of the Chamdo Agreement is printed in a number of places. See, for example: van Walt, *Status of Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 330-333; Mehra, *The North-Eastern Frontier, op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 5-9. I have used here the text in L/P&S/10/715, B 300 *Tibet.* The version printed by Mehra contains a misprint (the omission of a crucial part of a sentence) which seriously distorts the meaning of the document.

120. There is an implication that the British Government had "consented to mediate" only after having been asked to do so: one would be hard put to make the facts fit this interpretation. General Liu certainly possessed no proper authority to act on behalf of China, however one might choose to define that term. Teichman's authority to represent Great Britain was really no more than that which he might decide to assume on his own initiative. Even the Kalon Lama's authority to accept the terms actually agreed upon is open to question, given the wishes of the Dalai Lama that he drive on to Tachienlu, and the indications that he had been told to make no concessions whatsoever to the Chinese in respect of Derge and Nyarong. On this last point, see: L/P&S/10/714, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 15 August 1918.

121. Teichman claimed that, just before the signing of the Chamdo Agreement, the Frontier Commissioner "reaffirmed" his approval of both the truce negotiations and of General Liu's presence as his representative. General Ch'en Hsia-ling said many different things to many people, Chinese can be an extremely ambiguous language, and anything which was transmitted by the Chala "King" was almost certainly much distorted by that process. Ch'en's approval of the Chamdo truce, it may be significant, is not referred to in the text of the Rongbatsa Supplementary Agreement which, indeed, could be interpreted as implying General Ch'en's repudiation of certain features of the Chamdo Agreement such as its status as a tripartite agreement between properly accredited national representatives. See: L/P&S/10/714, Teichman to Jordan, 14 August 1918. On 20 September 1918 the Wai-chiao-pu told Jordan that the Peking Government had conferred no negotiating powers whatsoever upon General Liu.

122. See: van Walt, *Status of Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 62, where the Chamdo Agreement in this respect is confused with the subsequent supplementary agreement made at Rongbatsa. There was no specified duration at Chamdo, while at Rongbatsa it was clearly stated that the supplementary agreement would last for one year.

123. General Liu did not long retain his command at Batang. However, he reappears in the story of Sino-Tibetan relations in the early 1930s, as will be related in a later Chapter.

124. Teichman, *Travels*, *op. cit.*, p. 165.
The Tibetans in later years always maintained that they had lost a chance here to settle the Sino-Tibetan border problem once and for all. See, for example: R. Ford, *Captured in Tibet*, London 1957,p.89. Ford quotes a Tibetan official as saying: "We could have liberated the whole of Tibet then . . . Lord Teichman stopped us from going on". Ford goes on to point out more realistically: Teichman "as British Consular Agent in Western China . . . was asked to mediate by the Chinese, and he urged restraint on the Tibetans for their own good. In another month they could have reached the border between Sikang and the province of Szechwan, but the Chinese were not likely to let them stay there for long. Single-handed Teichman stopped the war, and the Tibetans withdrew to a line running through Batang". Ford's account is interesting in a number of respects, not least because of the way in which it differs from the account given in this book. Presumably Ford is reflecting the view of the Teichman episode held by British circles in Lhasa.

125. The text of this has been printed in various places. See, for example: van Walt, *Status of Tibet*, *op. cit.*, pp. 333-334; Mehra, *North-Eastern Frontier*, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10; L/P&S/10/714, Teichman to Jordan, 11 October 1918.

126. The question of Dargye and Beri will be considered in detail in a later Chapter.

127. L/P&S/10/714, Teichman to India, 12 October 1918, informing the Government of India of the terms of the Rongbatsa Agreement.

128. L/P&S/10/714, Jordan to FO, 19 February 1918.

129. L/P&S/10/714, Jordan to FO, 20 April 1918.

130. L/P&S/10/714, FO to IO, 25 April 1918.

131. L/P&S/10/714, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 May 1918.

132. L/P&S/10/714, Jordan to FO, 6 July 1918.

133. L/P&S/10/714, Jordan to Balfour, 6 July 1918.

134. L/P&S/10/714, Teichman to Jordan, 25 July 1918.

135. L/P&S/10/714, Jordan to FO, 26 August 1918.

136. L/P&S/10/714, FO to IO, 4 September 1918.

137. See, for example: L/P&S/10/714, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 21 August 1918.

138. L/P&S/10/714, Teichman to Jordan, 26 August 1918.

139. L/P&S/10/714, Jordan to FO, 24 September 1918.

140. L/P&S/10/714, FO to Jordan, 28 September 1918.

141. L/P&S/10/714, V. Wellesley to IO, 30 September 1918.

142. L/P&S/10/436, Teichman to Jordan, 25 November 1918.

143. The Szechuan authorities never did accept the Chamdo Agreement as having any force since General Liu was not empowered to sign anything. This meant that Ch'en had not committed himself in the Rongbatsa Agreement to the boundary implications of the Chamdo Agreement.

144. Needless to say, Teichman did not bring about the downfall of Ch'en Hsia-ling, who remained in office until 1924. Ch'en was succeeded by General Liu Yu-chiu, with the title "Cultivating Commissioner". See: L/P&S/10/884.

145. L/P&S/10/436, Teichman to Jordan, 19 February 1919.

IV

EASTERN TIBET AND ANGLO-CHINESE NEGOTIATIONS, 1919-1920

During Teichman's Odyssey in Eastern Tibet in 1918-19 he was exploring the possibility of creating a new instrument to replace the abortive Simla Convention. He had no specific orders to this effect; but the need for something along these lines was clear enough. In Peking, Simla and London it was evident that it would be extremely dangerous to leave the situation in the Marches in a state, legally speaking, of suspended animation. There were two obvious possibilities, either a set of bilateral discussions between the British and Chinese in Peking, or a full blown tripartite Conference along the lines of that held at Simla and with Tibetan participation with a status more or less equal to that of China and Britain.

There were, of course, other approaches which, if only in theory, merited investigation. It might be possible, for example, to bring Chinese and Tibetan plenipotentiaries together to draw up without direct British participation a comprehensive and lasting settlement of the question not only of the Sino-Tibetan border but also of the status of Tibet. The problem here from the British point of view was that there could be no guarantee, lacking at least an active British observer, as to what kind of agreement would result. It was always possible that the Tibetans might make so many concessions to the Chinese as to in effect restore the situation of the Chao Erh-feng era when Chinese troops were actually threatening an extremely vulnerable British border in the Assam Himalayas.

The Chinese Minister in London, Alfred Sze (Sze Sao-ke), came up in September 1918 with yet another approach which was certainly new to the British both in India and China. He thought that the only possible way to achieve a settlement of the whole Tibetan question without undue sacrifice of Chinese interests was to submit it to arbitration by the Government of the United States of America. The Government of India, who discovered Sze's thoughts by intercepting his telegrams (the cable from London to China passing through Indian territory and, evidently, being carefully monitored), thought that this was not at all a bad idea.[146] Jordan, however, was appalled.

He immediately telegraphed the Foreign Office that

> Chinese Government would probably be glad to submit Tibetan question to arbitration by America but I earnestly hope that such a revolutionary proposal will not be entertained without carefully weighing far-reaching result it would have on our relations with China and Far East generally. It would virtually place British policy in China in hand of the United States as China would naturally find it convenient to extend principle to every difficulty that occurred and we should be reduced to inaction until a settlement was found in arbitration. In practice this would mean that questions which are now arranged in a week would take months or years to settle . . . I feel convinced that British communities in China are not prepared to accept a principle which would tend to delegate charge of their interests to any third power however friendly . . . Nor is the Tibetan question a particularly suitable one for arbitration. As Teichman points out, General Liu has been living for some months among cases of British ammunition and Tibetan soldiers armed with British rifles.

Jordan concluded that

> Tibetan question has been precipitated by Teichman's negotiations and Chinese pride has been hurt but I see no reason why we should despair of an eventual settlement. In the meantime I venture respectfully to suggest Tibetans should be definitely refused further assistance and that Dalai Lama who is an arch-intriguer and a most unscrupulous and dangerous person should be warned to drop his ambitious schemes of conquest on the Chinese frontier.[147]

The prospect of other Powers meddling in the Tibetan question was indeed alarming. With the Great War over in November, China, one of the victorious Allies, would be represented at the Peace Conference; and when this opened, as it did in Paris on 18 January 1919, who could tell what subjects would come up for discussion? In the event, the Tibetan question never did, the Chinese being distracted from all other issues by the Japanese claims to former German rights in Shantung. The possibility, however, remained. Jordan, at any rate, saw no harm in keeping direct Anglo-Chinese discussions over Tibet alive in Peking.

On 6 December 1918 he called on the Wai-chiao-pu to explain the significance of the Rongbatsa Agreement (about which the Chinese claimed to know nothing) and to urge that a fresh attempt be made to settle the Tibetan question.[148] The Acting Foreign Minister, Ch'en Lu, tried to blame all the difficulties recently experienced in the Marches on the activities of Teichman, which Jordan strongly denied, and then went on to point out that until China itself was more settled it was pointless to try to solve the problem of Tibet. Enough was said, however, at this meeting and others early in 1919 to convince Jordan that the Chinese probably would come to an agreement about Tibet provided some "face saving" phrases were introduced giving them a

special status there. Teichman had been arguing that the Chinese "should be induced to regard Tibet as a self-governing Dominion, to whom they can cede territory without loss of face. For instance, supposing Newfoundland joined the Dominion of Canada, none would consider it a loss of British territory".[149] So it ought to be when a bit of Tibet was transferred from direct Chinese rule to that of the Government in Lhasa. Jordan evidently felt that reasoning of this kind might bear fruit even though the Wai-chiao-pu still maintained that nothing could be done until a united China emerged from the present conflict of factions and cliques. Jordan, therefore, persisted. On 1 February 1919 he reported that the Wai-chiao-pu was now admittedly in possession of the texts of both the Chamdo and Rongbatsa Agreements; and, he added, "I have some hope that the way may shortly be opened for serious discussions".[150]

During the months that followed Jordan continued to discuss the Tibetan question with the Wai-chiao-pu, notably on 19 May 1919 when he pointed out to Ch'en Lu that the Rongbatsa Agreement would be expiring shortly and, unless it were replaced, the result would surely be a fresh outbreak of fighting in the Marches. Ch'en Lu, who had been much involved in the various negotiations between Russia and China over Mongolia, and who had, indeed, served at one time as Chinese Resident at Urga, the Mongolian capital, thought that something like the corpus of agreements about Mongolia might serve as the model for a fresh arrangement regarding Tibet.[151] What Ch'en Lu was getting at, it soon transpired, was a British agreement to abandon entirely the old Simla Convention as the basis for further discussions; but Jordan pointed out that any radical departure from the Simla document would certainly necessitate a new tripartite conference with full Tibetan representation. As it stood, however, all that was really at issue was a definition of the alignment of the Sino-Tibetan border in the Marches, where the Chinese Government in 1914 had at the last moment refused to accept the line on the map initialled by their representative Chen I-fan. Perhaps it might be possible in the light of all that had been happening of late in Eastern Tibet to find a fresh frontier arrangement within the general parameters of the Simla Conference. If so, the implication was clear, a new tripartite conference could be avoided. To this Ch'en Lu replied that he had no doubt that, once the basis for a new settlement was agreed upon, there would be no difficulty in arranging the continuation of the armistice in the Marches.

On 30 May 1919 Jordan was invited by Ch'en Lu to call on the Wai-chiao-pu. He was accompanied on this occasion by S. Barton, Chinese Secretary to the Legation who had been present at earlier discussions on Tibet, H. Harding of the Chinese Secretariat, and Eric Teichman, just returned from Tachienlu. Ch'en Lu had with him Shih Ch'ing-yang, the Tibetan expert who had been involved in talks with the

British Legation since at least July 1918 (and who would in later years become Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission under the Kuomintang).[152] Ch'en Lu began by reading to Jordan a statement (in Chinese) which contained some comprehensive proposals on Tibet, opening with these words:

> for many different reasons the Tibetan question has been held up for some years, and it is much to be regretted that it has not been possible to effect a settlement long ago. Your Excellency . . [Jordan] . . has now repeatedly asked verbally for the opening of negotiations, and you have requested us to lay on the table a statement of the ultimate articles on which we could effect a settlement. The Chinese Government earnestly hope for a settlement of this matter and they are moved by the same feelings as your Excellency in this respect, but, in view of the popular feeling with regard to this question throughout the whole of China, it is necessary to approach it with due care and consideration.
>
> In the past the Chinese Government have treated Mongolia and Tibet in the same manner. Outer Mongolia having already been permitted to enjoy autonomy, it follows that no opposition will be placed in the way of Tibetan autonomy.
>
> Apart from the question of boundaries, Great Britain and China were in general agreement as to the remaining articles of the draft Simla Convention of 1914.[153]

All this, of course, had been pointed out to the British in 1914, and again in 1915 by Wellington Koo (Ku Wei-chün) to Jordan when a quite detailed set of proposals were advanced by the Chinese. The Wai-chiao-pu now put on the table what amounted to a modified version of the 1915 plan in the light of recent events in Eastern Tibet.

(1) There were to be changes in the Inner-Outer Tibet boundary. The Outer Tibet-Kokonor divide would be pulled southwards to the Tangla Range. Thus Jyekundo (Yushu), shown in 1914 on both Simla Convention maps, that which Chen initialled in April and that which the Tibetans and British declared binding in July, as just inside Outer Tibet, was now moved well inside Inner Tibet. Removed entirely from Tibet was the country east of the general line of the Yalung, so that Kantze was now undoubtedly in Szechuan Province. Also removed from Inner Tibet to Szechuan were the Batang (Paan) and Litang (Lihwa) districts. On the other hand, Chamdo, the Riwoche region and Gyade (the district of the 39 Banners), were all now accepted as being part of Outer Tibet. Derge and Nyarong would remain in Inner Tibet. All this, in fact, represented no more than an endeavour to make the best of the current situation in Eastern Tibet after Teichman.

(2) There would be a declaration in the body of the agreement, rather than in appended notes, that "Tibet forms part of Chinese territory".

(3) Chinese Commissioners would be stationed at the Trade Marts in Outer Tibet.

(4) There would be a clause in the body of the new treaty to the effect that Tibet recognised Chinese suzerainty.

Jordan observed that "these proposals are perhaps not China's last word; even if they are, I am strongly of the opinion that a settlement on these lines would fully safeguard our interests and those of autonomous Tibet". There were, of course, a number of problems with the proposals as they now stood which should be looked into. Would the Tibetans really accept the loss, for that is what it really meant, of Derge and Nyarong by permitting these districts to be included in Inner Tibet? Probably; and Teichman's work in the Marches had gone a long way towards preparing the Kalon Lama at least to accept this outcome. The statements about Tibet being part of Chinese territory and accepting Chinese suzerainty seemed harmless enough to Jordan. The presence of the Chinese Commissioners at the Trade Marts did not worry him unduly: perhaps the Chinese might drop this provision during the anticipated negotiations, or it might be exploited to obtain as a counter-concession the presence of a permanent British representative in Lhasa.

Jordan, after this interview, evidently thought that what was now in store was an intense bout of negotiations during which the original Chinese proposals would be discussed not only with the Wai-chiao-pu but also with the Government of India and the authorities in Lhasa. As far as the Chinese were concerned, he considered that he could take at least one of three possible courses. First: he could try to get more of Inner (Chinese) Tibet placed in Outer (autonomous) Tibet. Second: he could seek a clearer definition of the Chinese position in Inner Tibet so as "to render it thus a really useful buffer region". Third: he could work for a larger autonomous Tibet, including, perhaps, the southern part of the Kokonor territory and a portion, if not all, of Derge, in exchange for the abandonment altogether of the concept of Inner Tibet: in other words, all of Inner Tibet could now be allowed to be incorporated into the provincial structure of metropolitan China. In practice the abandonment of the concept of Inner Tibet was of little political significance. What was important was to obtain a precisely defined Sino-Tibetan boundary and an unambiguous Chinese acceptance of Tibetan autonomy. Neither Jordan nor Teichman, whose hand can be seen clearly in Jordan's deliberations on the Chinese proposals, was particularly enthusiastic about the Inner Tibet concept which served no obvious purpose in practice and was, despite the Mongolian analogies, disliked by the Chinese.

Jordan's advice, endorsed by Teichman, was that Inner Tibet should be abandoned in bilateral Anglo-Chinese negotiations in

Peking without any Tibetan representation. The result might appear at first sight to be a revision of the 1914 Convention but, effectively, it would be a new agreement about which the Tibetans would be informed but during the negotiation of which they should not be given any opportunity to put forward "all sorts of absurd claims in their usual manner". The Sino-Tibetan boundary should be indicated in the first instance by means of a clear verbal description. Later, should disputes arise, there was always the possibility of tripartite demarcation on the ground. Crucial to the new agreement would be, "provided the objections connected with Russia as regards this point no longer hold good", a permanent British representative in Lhasa equal in status to that of China. As Jordan observed,

> the Tibetans now look on us exclusively for guidance, support and protection, and I feel sure that the position in this respect would be gravely endangered if we allowed a Chinese representative to return to Lhasa while the British representative continued to be a comparatively subordinate official at Gyantse. The Chinese will probably make every effort when they get back to Lhasa to insinuate themselves once more between us and the Tibetans ... The precedent of the Mongolia agreements . . [providing for Russian representation at Urga] . . should be of great assistance ... The smaller the escorts for the British and Chinese representatives the better; since their purport would be merely to save Chinese face, and every additional Chinese soldier in Lhasa would be objectionable.[154]

Jordan was very anxious that the Tibetans should not be directly involved in any negotiations which might arise from these proposals. Their presence could only cause delay; and delay might be fatal. There were already pressures on the Peking Government from Japan and arising out of the Shantung issue which might defeat the negotiations before they even had a chance to begin.[155] Tibetan procrastination, Jordan clearly felt, or the kind of Tibetan territorial arguments such as were raised at Simla in 1913-14 (when the Tibetan delegation began by claiming Lhasa authority over any territory with Tibetan inhabitants all the way to Tachienlu), would guarantee failure. While the British role would remain in theory that of middlemen in what was essentially a Sino-Tibetan dispute, it would be prudent to keep the Tibetans as far away from the actual negotiating table as possible. They would simply be presented with a *fait accompli*.

The Government of India under Lord Chelmsford agreed to leave matters in Jordan's capable hands. Their major reservation was over the proposal to permit Chinese representatives at the Trade Marts, which they considered a formula for endless trouble if not actual disaster. They thought that the Tibetan Government in Lhasa should be consulted before any firm decisions were made as to terms; but they did accept that the Tibetans ought to allow themselves to be

represented by the British Legation in Peking in bilateral Anglo-Chinese discussions in China on matters of great importance to them.[156]

The whole question was most carefully considered by the India Office in London. In a long memorandum dated 14 July 1919, J.E. Shuckburgh, Secretary to the Political Department, explored the Chinese proposals in great detail. Those dealing with the boundary seemed quite acceptable, some of them, indeed, rather more favourable to the Tibetans than were those of 1914. On the autonomous Tibet-Kokonor boundary the important thing was for the Tibetans to retain control of the passes in the Tangla mountains. On the question of Chinese Trade Agents, Shuckburgh agreed with the Government of India that these should be confined to a new Mart at Chamdo and that there should be no such official permitted at places so close to the British Indian border as Yatung or so deep into autonomous Tibet as Gartok in Western Tibet. It would be as well, Shuckburgh argued, to obtain Chinese agreement not only for the occasional visits to Lhasa by the British Gyantse Trade Agent but also for the establishment, should the need arise, of a permanent British mission – there was a passing reference here to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, for what it might be worth, since it had been formally denounced by the Bolsheviks. He agreed with the Government of India that it would be as well if at all possible to obtain Tibetan consent before Jordan went ahead; but anything causing delay would be unwise. Jordan should start negotiations as soon as possible on the basis of the Chinese proposals, always bearing in mind the objections to Chinese Trade Agents and the desirability of a permanent British representative in Lhasa; and all this could well be explained to the Tibetans concurrently with the opening of discussions in Peking.[157]

The Tibetans, by way of the Political Officer in Sikkim, were duly consulted as Shuckburgh had recommended. Their reply was, as Jordan anticipated, not conducive to fruitful negotiations. They were not prepared to go beyond the wording of Article II of the 1914 Convention. The idea of actually inserting a statement that Tibet was Chinese territory into the body of any agreement was anathema to them: they evidently thought (as the Wai-chiao-pu must have appreciated) that points embodied in appended notes represented no more than ideas or aspirations, and could be ignored, unlike terms set out in the treaty proper. The Tibetans were also very strongly opposed to the appointment of any Chinese officials to the Trade Marts. In the territorial matters they were not prepared to move far from the final proposals of 1914. They still insisted that extensive tracts of what the Chinese saw as non-Tibetan Kokonor territory be retained in Outer Tibet and Litang and Batang left in Inner Tibet; and they claimed special rights in Nyarong. The great Tibetan

monasteries, it appeared, were convinced that Tibet was now so powerful that it needed to make no concessions at all to China; and in the face of their views, which constituted the crucial element in Tibetan public opinion, the Dalai Lama and his Ministers were unlikely to compromise.[158]

It took some time to obtain these first Tibetan reactions; but before they were to hand it had become apparent that there existed an even greater obstacle to progress on the Tibetan question than that presented by monks in Lhasa. The Chinese Foreign Minister had, in effect, withdrawn the Chinese proposals.

On 13 August 1919 Jordan and the Minister, Ch'en Lu, opened the Tibetan negotiations.[159] Jordan, having decided upon his line of approach, proposed that the concept of the division of Tibet into Inner and Outer zones be discarded (as Teichman had been recommending since December 1917 at least). Instead, the Jyekundo region, that is to say southern Kokonor (or Amdo) and Chantui (Nyarong) would be located in China proper while the remaining Inner Tibetan tracts, effectively Derge, would be in autonomous Tibet.

The Chinese side seemed reluctant to abandon the two Tibetan zones, Inner and Outer, established at the Simla discussions of 1913-14. One may presume that in some ways this device could appear to strengthen the theoretical Chinese position in Outer Tibet: the demonstrable Chinese position in Inner Tibet would reinforce Chinese claims to an analogous position in Outer Tibet. It is probable that the Chinese wish to have the statements that Tibet was part of Chinese territory and that it acknowledged Chinese suzerainty incorporated in the body of the treaty had a similar objective, to define by the back door, as it were, suzerainty in terms of Chinese territorial possession. Keeping to the concept of Inner and Outer Tibet, the Chinese side requested the inclusion of all southern Kokonor, including, of course, Jyekundo and, one presumes, Gyade or the 39 Banners, in Inner Tibet in exchange for Chantui (Nyarong) and Derge in Outer Tibet. These discussions seemed perfectly amicable; and Jordan and Ch'en Lu promised to meet again soon for further discussions on the two sets of proposals.

The Wai-chiao-pu, however, suddenly became extremely elusive. Jordan found it very difficult to arrange a date for further discussions. Eventually the Chinese agreed most reluctantly that a meeting would take place on 27 August. The day before, however, Jordan heard from the Wai-chiao-pu that it had been decided to postpone the meeting until a more stable Chinese Central Government had been established and Lu Cheng-hsiang (the Foreign Minister for whom Ch'en Lu was merely acting for much of the time, though for a while in the summer of 1919 he had been made full Foreign Minister) returned from the Peace Conference in France.

Jordan insisted that the next day's meeting went ahead as planned. On 27 August he duly called on Ch'en Lu who told him that the Cabinet, on reflection, had decided that the time was not favourable for negotiations on Tibet, which would only arouse the hostility of both Parliament and the Chinese people generally. Jordan thought this all quite unconvincing. When pressed further, Ch'en Lu privately told Jordan that the Minister of "a certain power had received instructions from his Government to make enquiries about Sino-British negotiations": it was because of these "enquiries" that Ch'en Lu, with great personal regret, felt himself obliged to call the talks off. It soon transpired that "a certain power" was Japan.

Jordan was furious. In a Very Urgent and Clear the Line telegram, he told the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, that

> I regard incident as a direct challenge by Japan to our whole position in Asia and I venture to hope that the challenge will be accepted. For months past Japan has carried on a bitter campaign against these negotiations which has been engineered by the Japanese Legation . . [in Peking] . . Example of Persia has been held up to Chinese as warning of what Tibet will become under British guidance and every conceivable weapon even my impending retirement has been used to induce Chinese to abandon negotiations . . . Issue now appears to be one between His Majesty's Government and Japanese and I hope that the latter will be asked to explain their reasons for intervening in a question which purely concerns foreign relations of Great Britain and China.[160]

The Japanese, of course, were duly protested to and, not surprisingly, denied that they had anything to do with the matter. When the Japanese Ambassador in London, Viscount Chinda, called on Lord Curzon on 1 September 1919, the Foreign Secretary took the opportunity to ask Chinda what all this Tibetan business was about. Chinda said that he did not believe that the Japanese Minister in China had intervened in the way reported, leaving Curzon with no choice but "to accept his explanation with much satisfaction".[161]

Jordan did not give up easily. On 29 August 1919, for example, he called upon the Acting Prime Minister, Kung Hsin-chang, to ask him to explain the abrupt change in Chinese policy over Tibet; and on 4 September he called on the President, Hsü Shih-ch'ang, to ask the same question.[162] He raised the Tibetan question with the Wai-chiao-pu on several occasions in October, and again in November.[163] There were no satisfactory answers forthcoming; and Jordan remained convinced that the Japanese were behind it all.

On 3 December 1919 he had yet another interview on this matter with Ch'en Lu, once more Acting Foreign Minister, who explained that China's relations with Tibet were an internal matter for China to settle in her own way. Ch'en Lu then went on to complain about the manner in which China's communications with Tibet had been interrupted by the British decision to deny to China any access to

Tibet by way of India (a prohibition which had been in force, indeed, since the days of the Simla Conference). When Jordan asked whether China would be prepared to send a mission to Lhasa via India to open genuine negotiations, Ch'en Lu said the idea was worth considering if "Great Britain would genuinely lend her good offices in effecting a settlement", the accent being on "genuinely". He concluded by observing that some settlement of the Tibetan problem might be arrived at "on the basis of a treaty signed by China and Tibet as principals and approved and witnessed by Great Britain", in other words, a kind of super Rongbatsa.

On 4 December 1919 Jordan called on the real military power behind the present Peking Government, Tuan Ch'i-jui, and the Governor of Shantung, a very close friend of Tuan's. Tuan was apologetic, but had nothing constructive to say. The recent agitation over the Shantung questions, the transfer of German rights in that Province to Japan at the Peace Conference, had not helped matters; and Chinese policy had been seriously hampered by the Japanese who had not only interfered in the Tibetan negotiations but forced the Peking Government to cancel the grant of autonomy to Mongolia.[164] Jordan concluded that:

> my impression is that China has now definitely decided to wait until Thibetans grow weary of the situation and of our failure to obtain a settlement and then endeavour to win them back to Chinese allegiance by assurances of autonomy and a favourable treatment. . . . But China realises that she is deeply committed to us by her notes of 1914 accepting Simla Treaty in principle with the exception of boundary clauses and above all by her memorandum of 30th May last. She knows that she is morally in the wrong in going back on her written offers and this has been rubbed in so persistently at every interview that I do not believe there is any danger of her again making a forward movement against Thibetans.[165]

Jordan had failed to move the Chinese in Peking. Lord Curzon, now as Foreign Secretary once more involved with Tibet after an interval of one and a half decades since the days of the Younghusband Expedition, was no more successful in his approaches to the Chinese Legation in London. His veiled threats that, unless the Chinese were more co-operative over Tibet, the British might be less supportive to China over Shantung, had no affect at all.[166] Both Jordan and Curzon were agreed, in fact, that this particular line of negotiation had reached an absolute dead end.

Why had the Wai-chiao-pu advanced these proposals only to withdraw them again so promptly? Was the change of mind entirely due to Japanese pressure? There are no certain answers: one can only speculate. The major force in the Peking Government of this time was generally known as the Anfu Clique (or club), that is to say dominated by an association of warlords from Anhwei and Fukien

Provinces headed by Tuan Ch'i-jui. There were many challengers to its authority; and its writ certainly did not run in either Szechuan or Yunnan. Its title as the legitimate, as opposed to effective, government of China was contested by the followers of Sun Yat-sen in Kwangsi and Kwangtung with their capital at Canton. While the establishment of legitimacy did not in itself solve all the practical problems confronting the Anfu regime in Peking, some kind of reconciliation with the Sun Yat-sen rump in Canton would do no harm to its prestige. This, in turn, could help in deciding which way the allegiance of individual warlords would go in the increasingly turbulent state of Chinese politics.

During the course of 1919 negotiations took place in Shanghai between the Peking Government and representatives of the Southern Government which still enjoyed the aura of association with the name of Sun Yat-sen, the father figure of the Chinese Revolution. Among the Southern representatives in these talks was T'ang Shao-yi. Since his involvement in the Anglo-Chinese negotiations over the 1904 Lhasa Convention during 1905-6, first in Calcutta and then in Peking, which culminated in his signing, along with Sir Ernest Satow, the Anglo-Chinese Convention respecting Tibet of 27 April 1906, T'ang had become a leading figure in early Republican China. He had joined Sun Yat-sen in 1917. Until the North-South talks finally broke down in October 1919, T'ang's opinions undoubtedly carried weight. He was, after all, uniquely experienced in the Tibetan question and aware of the implications for future Chinese policy of the kind of proposals which the Northern Government had put before Sir John Jordan in May 1919. It is extremely unlikely that T'ang would have been in favour of such a settlement; and it may well be that his opinion was a factor in the Peking Government's decision to abandon its Tibetan plan.[167]

Why then had the Peking Government advanced the 30 May proposals in the first place? There had been continued pressure from Jordan ever since the Teichman truces for the Chinese to come up with something more permanent; and the Rongbatsa Agreement would expire before 1919 was out. By itself, however, this would certainly have produced no positive Chinese action. The most likely explanation is connected with the Shantung issue. On 30 April 1919 at the last meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers at the Paris Peace Conference the former German rights in Shantung were transferred to Japan. The head of the Chinese delegation in Paris, the Foreign Minister of the Peking Government, Lu Cheng-hsiang (for whom Ch'eng Lu had been acting in Peking), was somewhat compromised in his dealing with Japan: he had, after all, signed the Chinese surrender to the Twenty-one Demands in 1915. His handling of the Chinese case for Shantung left a great deal to be desired. It is unlikely, however, that Lu Cheng-hsiang or any other

member of the Peking regime anticipated the public outcry in China (the so-called May Fourth Movement) that followed publication of the Shantung decision. It is possible that Peking was holding out the prospect of a Tibetan settlement as a *quid pro quo* for British support for the reversal of the Shantung settlement. If so, then the Peking Government found itself in grave difficulties. Without a reversal of Shantung, a Tibetan agreement of the kind under discussion would only add to an unpopularity which had already resulted in highly disturbing public demonstrations in Peking by students, a new phenomenon in Chinese political life. Any attempt to reverse Shantung, however, was bound to produce Japanese opposition; and Tuan Ch'i-jui's Anfu Clique depended very largely for its survival upon Japanese support.

In the end Peking instructed its delegation in Paris not to sign the Treaty of Versailles.[168] It also appears to have resolved to abandon its 30 May proposals on Tibet. Even if the Japanese had not been directly involved in this last decision, their very presence in Chinese politics had created the situation which brought it about.

Even without Shantung it is highly probable that the Peking Government would have tried to extricate itself from the negotiations arising from Ch'en Lu's 30 May proposals. The gist of these, with their implications, was explained by Peking in the late summer and autumn of 1919 by means of telegrams to the various Provincial Governments concerned, Szechuan, Yunnan and Kansu. It was pointed out that no more was involved than that which had already been placed on the negotiating table by Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1915. Provincial views were sought. When the answers started to come in during October, they were vitriolic in their hostility. T'ang Ch'i-yao, Governor of Yunnan, protested that Peking was proposing to surrender title to extensive tracts of Chinese territory. The Agreements of 1918, Chamdo and Rongbatsa, were in no way binding. "If settlement is come to on the basis proposed Yunnan and Szechuan swear never to recognise it". Ch'en Hsia-ling from Tachienliu, who was also consulted, declared that "the provisional treaties made by me and General Liu with the Tibetans were temporary engagements and should not be recognised". The Szechuan Provincial Assembly announced that Szechuan frontier territory extended eastwards all the way to Giamda (the limit of Chao Erh-feng's Sikang Province and the border originally claimed by Chen I-fan at Simla); and only on the basis of such a frontier should negotiations be undertaken with the British Legation.[169] Soon the views of the Mahommedan General at Sining, Ma Ch'i, were added to this chorus. He was horrified at the vast extent of Kokonor territory which it was now proposed by the Peking Government to hand over in one form or another to the Tibetans: "if a settlement were arrived at on such a basis more than half of the Kokonor Territory would be lost". He declared that the

trouble was that Yuan Shih-k'ai, when he made his 1915 proposals to the British Legation, neither bothered to consult Sining nor, even,. looked carefully at a map.[170] It seemed probable that none of the Chinese Provincial authorities adjacent to Tibet, those in Yunnan, Szechuan and the Kokonor Territory of Kansu, would comply with any arrangements on the Tibetan border which might be reached in Peking.

While Szechuan, Yunnan and the Mahommedan General at Sining were by no means crucial factors in the struggle for power in which the Anfu Clique was then engaged, yet their views would certainly be exploited by other Provincial cliques nearer to home, and they would be seized upon by all the varied voices of Chinese public opinion which since the May Fourth incident had turned out to be such a powerful force in the Chinese political equation for all to see. The disadvantages in following up the 30 May proposals by now outweighed any possible benefit from British good will over the Shantung question, in which it is unlikely that the Peking Government in any case had much faith.

One further factor probably contributed to the demise of the 30 May initiative. Since the beginning of 1919 the Peking Government through its High Commissioner at Urga in Outer Mongolia, Ch'en I, had been discussing with the leading figures in Mongolian traditional politics, the Urga Hutukhtu (the Buddhist Incarnation ranking only after the Dalai and Panchen Lamas in sanctity and the effective Mongol Head of State) and various Mongol princes, the possibility of replacing the 1915 Kiachta Treaty with a new arrangement in which Mongol autonomy was renounced in exchange for a guarantee of Chinese protection against the dangers which appeared to threaten from Revolutionary Russia to the north.

What might have turned into an amicable relationship was rapidly transformed into brutal Chinese military occupation by the arrival of General Hsü Shu-tseng, a close associate of the Anfu warlord Tuan Ch'i-jui. General Hsü reached Urga in late October 1919 and effectively repudiated the terms which Ch'en I had been discussing. In November, backed by General Hsü's troops, ostensibly in response to a Mongol "petition", the Peking Government cancelled Outer Mongolian autonomy; and for the moment the whole of Outer Mongolia, which since the Chinese Revolution had seemed to have slipped away from China, was once more to all intents and purposes under the direct control of Peking. In December, Ch'en I was recalled and his place taken by General Hsü. The result was disastrous for the Chinese. Hsü rapidly alienated Mongol opinion and stirred up resistance to the Chinese to such a degree that in July 1920 he was dismissed by Peking. A month later Ch'en I returned to Urga; but by this time it was too late. The Chinese never recovered Outer Mongolia which, by the middle of 1921, after a short but bloody struggle with

traditionalist Mongol forces aided by White Russians, had fallen under Soviet influence from which it has yet to escape.[171]

In the latter part of 1919, however, it still looked in Peking as if China did indeed have the strength and ability to take control of that great Manchu tributary, Mongolia. What could be achieved in Mongolia might equally well be achieved in Tibet. Why permit China's hands to be tied by the kind of agreement with the British over Tibet which the Wai-chiao-pu had set out on 30 May? Here, again, the public opinion factor was of crucial importance. The apparent Mongolian success added enormously to the prestige of Tuan Ch'i-jui and the Anfu Clique, just as General Hsü's failures in the summer of 1920 were to contribute towards the defeat of the Anfu Clique by the rival Chihli Clique. The lesson, which remained firmly in the minds of Chinese political leaders from then onwards, was that they could not afford to be seen to surrender any territory at all which was perceived by Chinese opinion to belong by right to China. Tibet was one such territory.

With the opening of 1920 it was clear to the British Legation in Peking that the 30 May 1919 initiative had run its course. Perhaps the final serious attempt by the British Legation to keep the discussions alive was the memorandum which Jordan sent to the Wai-chiao-pu on 19 January 1920 which, among other matters, suggested as an alternative to the current bilateral Anglo-Chinese talks a tripartite conference to be held in Lhasa, an idea first advanced by Jordan on 3 December 1919. This proposal, of course, must be interpreted against the background of a new attempt by China to open direct talks with the Tibetans, the so called Kansu Mission, which came to British notice in the latter part of 1919. The Chinese reply, though its language was polite enough, left no room for doubt that there would be no fruitful discussion in Peking. "In view, however, of the many internal issues involved . . . the time is not yet ripe", the Wai-chiao-pu wrote, for any Tibetan settlement. As for talks in Lhasa, the Chinese pointed out to Jordan that all that had been proposed had been negotiations there between the Tibetans and the Chinese, "Great Britain playing the part of middleman only, and not proceeding to signature". There was a hint that the Wai-chiao-pu might not be entirely hostile to such an idea; but, on the other hand, it was certainly not prepared to admit in so many words that the Chinese Government were ready for negotiations along even these lines.[172]

By February 1920 the history of the Tibetan problem was clearly entering a new phase. The attempts to bring China to some binding agreement which would protect those features of Tibetan autonomy so desirable to the security of British India without, at the same time, abandoning Chinese claims to some kind of special position in Tibet and thus alienating Chinese opinion, had failed. What now?

From a diplomatic point of view the course henceforth lay through waters to a great extent uncharted. Since at least 1876 and the Separate Article of the Chefoo Convention the British in their treaty relations with or concerning Tibet had been obliged to include the Chinese, either explicitly or as a kind of silent partner. Where certain British officials had not done so, as Younghusband in Lhasa in 1904 and McMahon at Simla in the Declaration of 3 July 1914, the result had been something of a diplomatic nightmare with most unwelcome difficulties raised by the Chinese and the Russians. Now it seemed that the Chinese must be left to their own devices; and Russia had by its Revolution removed itself for the time being from this particular theatre. In these new circumstances Eric Teichman, by now well established as the leading Foreign Office authority on all matters Tibetan, produced his memorandum of 29 February 1920 in which he concentrated his considerable intellect on what possible courses of action lay open to the British.

There was no doubt in Teichman's mind that the current unco-operative attitude of the Wai-chiao-pu was a product of its feeling let down by Great Britain over Shantung: should Shantung ever be settled in China's favour (that is to say by the former German rights being transferred from Japan back to China), then doubtless the Wai-chiao-pu would work sincerely towards a Tibetan settlement. The Wai-chiao-pu, however, was not the only factor in Chinese politics. Far from it. There were powerful members of the Chinese Central Government, and, of course, the Governments of the Provinces as well, who thought that Tibet, like Mongolia, could and should be re-incorporated into China. Eventually some military leader would arise in Yunnan, Szechuan or Kansu who would try, quite probably successfully, to launch a raid on Lhasa.

In all this the British Legation was powerless. As Teichman wrote, it "cannot make bricks without straw". What it could do, however, was to advocate that course of British policy towards Tibet which would most alarm the Chinese authorities and thus goad them in to taking seriously British views concerning Tibet; and this Teichman proceeded to spell out. The British could change their attitude towards the whole Tibetan question by "entering openly into closer relations with Tibet" while "continuing to offer China a settlement on the basis of her own offer, or, as an alternative, international arbitration". To date British policy had essentially been to "sterilize" Tibet by maintaining major constraints on Tibetan external relations and internal development. This policy was now completely out of date. Teichman observed that

> we shall have to throw the country open sooner or later, and it would be much better to do so now. It is immoral to continue a policy which has for its object the checking of all progress in Tibet, when the Tibetans themselves are waking up and looking to us for assistance in their

> development. Owing to the great advantages which we enjoy through the geographical situation of Central Tibet, which looks out on India and turns its back on China, it can be guaranteed that we can safely throw Tibet open to all comers. We should be in a position to control all traffic with the country, and once the novelty of the thing had worn off none would want to go there but Indian traders and wool buyers.

In due course, therefore, the Chinese should be sent a note to the effect that, Anglo-Chinese negotiations having reached an impasse, the British Government had no alternative but to enter into closer relations with Lhasa, sending a representative there and giving the Tibetan Government such assistance as they might require for the economic development of their country. The Chinese, of course, would always have the option of either returning to genuine tripartite negotiations or submitting their case *vis à vis* Tibet to arbitration by the League of Nations or the United States of America.

Having gone so far, however, Teichman then started to argue that the Chinese must be left with something in Tibet, if only to save face. Thus full Tibetan independence, fully acknowledged, was definitely not advocated. The Tibetans, in Teichman's view, should not be asked to become members of the League of Nations. Their "Dominion" status within the Chinese "Commonwealth" should be reiterated. It was a concept which could possibly on the one hand satisfy Chinese statesmen and, on the other, confer upon Tibet sufficient freedom of action as to sign the Arms Convention of September 1919 (which would remove one of the major diplomatic obstacles to the British provision of military stores to that country, and of which more in the next Chapter) and other international arrangements to which it might be convenient for the British to secure Tibetan adhesion.

In a very real sense this would mean placing Tibet under British protection, even though cosmetic treatment of that situation might make it palatable to China. But, Teichman concluded

> we are already (though of course the public do not know it) very deeply committed to the Tibetans by the assurances given to them by the British Plenipotentiary in 1914 . .[Sir Henry McMahon]. . , which amounted to a guarantee of their autonomy.[173] We would now only be placing ourselves in a position to carry out our commitments. If the Chinese raid Lhasa now, we should either have to break faith with Tibet or declare war on China. After a British representative has been installed at Lhasa, and the country developed and thrown open to foreign enterprise, the danger of Chinese aggression would be a thing of the past. We should never be called upon to send a single soldier into Tibet: for the Tibetans, with free access to India to get whatever they required, and their economic resources developed with our assistance, would easily stand on their own legs and have nothing to fear from China or anyone else.

Teichman presumed that, presented with the possibility of such a

Tibet, China would come to terms quickly enough: and if she did not, then the situation was by no means intolerable from the British point of view.[174]

In a very real sense what Teichman was advocating, in the absence of Chinese co-operation, was the modernisation of Tibet along lines – though not with the same ideology – analogous to those that the Soviets began to apply to Outer Mongolia from 1921 onwards. The result, of course, would have been a social revolution accompanied by major economic change. The power of the monasteries, so opposed to such enterprises as mining, could hardly have withstood the kind of pressures which a full blown British backed opening of a Tibet, to all intents and purposes independent, would have brought to bear. The great Tibetan families might have flourished in this new environment. The Tibetan theocracy, however, most probably would not, as it realised only too well.

Teichman, of course, saw Tibet from the point of view of Kham, where he had travelled more widely than any other European official. Kham was still very largely the domain of a multiplicity of lay rulers not unlike the traditional chiefs of the Mongolia with whom Teichman was also familiar. In India, however, Tibet was seen from a very different vantage point. The British Political Officer in Sikkim, and other British officials like the Gyantse Trade Agent, had to deal with the Government of the Dalai Lama which was fundamentally theocratic. If that Government had to choose between economic, political or military progress on the one hand and placating the monks and their leaders on the other, it would in the end side with the monks. The 13th Dalai Lama did, indeed, make some tentative steps in the early 1920s away from the theocratic approach (and he seemed to be trying again in the final years of his life, 1932-33); but monastic opposition soon forced him to change tack.

Indian officials, well aware of this state of affairs, were extremely conservative in their approach to the idea of change in Tibet. Sir John Jordan might describe the Dalai Lama as an "arch-intriguer" and "a most unscrupulous and dangerous person"; but men like Charles Bell saw him as the bulwark of Tibet, and therefore of the entire northern border of India, against Chinese intrigue if not actual aggression, with all that it implied for the cost of Indian defence and the stability of the Himalayan States, Nepal in particular. The complete implementation of the kind of policy implied in Teichman's memorandum would lead either to Chinese reconquest of a divided Tibet or to the opening of Tibet to all sorts of undesirable foreign influences beyond India's control.

While the final stages of the Peking negotiations over the Chinese proposals of 30 May 1919 were taking place, the Chamdo and Rongbatsa truces in the Marches expired. Would there now be a fresh round of fighting between General Ch'en Hsia-ling and the Kalon

Lama? Louis King, who had arrived back in Tachienlu by October 1919 to take up the post vacated by Teichman, was asked to investigate and report. This was the situation which he found.[175]

Ch'en Hsia-ling, the Frontier Commissioner, was as bellicose as ever; but he was short of supplies and, above all, money. Because of the disturbed state of China the only route by which aid could reach him from the Central Government in Peking (and Peking, alone, seems to have had much practical interest at that time in keeping a Chinese army in the field in the Marches) was by way of Kansu to Sining and thence across the Kokonor territory to Jyekundo. As Teichman had noticed during his wanderings in 1918, Jyekundo had remained curiously isolated from the Sino-Tibetan war. Trade, which had virtually disappeared in the greater part of the Marches adjacent to Szechuan, still flourished there and its market abounded with all sorts of luxuries quite unobtainable elsewhere. Throughout it had remained firmly under the control of the Mahommedan General, like all Mahommedan Generals called Ma (Ma Ch'i), at Sining; and the Jyekundo garrison was commanded by one of General Ma's close relatives. By October 1919 the arrival at Jyekundo for Ch'en Hsia-ling of some 60,000 Chinese silver dollars and 1,000 rifles was expected daily. Ch'en's main problem, assuming that the arms and money did in fact get through and were not diverted on the way to some other Chinese General, was to get all this wealth in bullion and weapons carried intact across the salient of Tibetan-held territory between Jyekundo and his front line near Kantze. He had, therefore, despatched the Chala "King" and Han Kuang-chun (the two signatories on the Chinese side of the Rongbatsa Agreement) to the Kalon Lama to request a safe passage for a convoy. The Kalon Lama refused, rather to Ch'en Hsia-ling's surprise. Ch'en asked King if he would look into the situation and see if, like his predecessor Teichman, he could find a peaceful solution. King, unlike Teichman, seems to have retained a most friendly relationship with Ch'en.

King accordingly set out on a tour of inspection of the front line in the Marches, visiting Jyekundo and Chamdo. The Chinese Mahommedans at Jyekundo, he reported in late December 1919, were now very impressed by Tibetan strength and frightened lest their Tibetan subjects should rise against them. The Jyekundo garrison, therefore had been much reinforced. It seemed unlikely, however, that it would take an active part alongside Ch'en in any operations involving the possibility of conflict with the Kalon Lama.

From the Kalon Lama, whom King met for the first time at Chamdo in early January 1920, the British Consular Officer learnt that only a few days ago a mission from the Chinese authorities in Kansu had been allowed on the orders of Lhasa to pass through the Tibetan lines on its way to the Dalai Lama. King had previously written to advise the Kalon Lama to hold up the mission at Jyekundo, the nearest

Chinese town to the effective Sino-Tibetan frontier. The Kansu Mission will be considered in more detail in the next Chapter. It was one of the inspirations for a new British approach to the Tibetan problem which was soon to take the place of the policy of negotiation in Peking.

As far as the supplies for Ch'en Hsia-ling were concerned, the Kalon Lama thought they could stay in Jyekundo until the end of time for all he cared (though, in fact, they had yet to reach the Kokonor territory). When they did arrive, perhaps in February 1920, Ch'en showed every sign of trying to bring them through Tibetan territory by force of arms; and the Kalon Lama was in no doubt that this would precipitate a fresh Sino-Tibetan war in the Marches. Ch'en, anxious to avoid a direct confrontation with the Tibetans, then decided to send his convoy by a roundabout route which avoided territory held by the Kalon Lama's own troops, though passing through land used by nomad Golok tribesmen who were notorious robbers but, perhaps, easier to fend off than the main Tibetan army.[176] The Kalon Lama was now faced with a dilemma. He could easily send out a column to intercept the Chinese convoy, and in the process in all probability restart the war: or he could do nothing, thus appearing to his enemies in Lhasa (who were indeed numerous, particularly in Sera and Ganden monasteries) to be secretly supporting the Chinese. He decided to seek King's advice. King, in the belief that if war again broke out the Yunnan Government would, unlike 1917-18, actively support Ch'en Hsia-ling, recommended that Ch'en's convoy be allowed to pass.[177] Should the Goloks attack it, the Kalon Lama could hardly be blamed; but regular Tibetan troops should be kept out of the affair. The Kalon Lama took this advice; and, when asked to explain to Lhasa the circumstances in which the hated Chinese had been reinforced, blamed it all on King's interference. Ch'en eventually got his money and supplies, the convoy from Jyekundo reaching Tachienlu on 27 June 1920.[178] In a way all this was as great a contribution to peace keeping in the Marches as that made by Teichman, though it received scant recognition; and it helped maintain the truce more or less along the line established in 1918 at Chamdo and Rongbatsa for another decade.

The cash and weapons sent to Ch'en Hsia-ling were most probably intended to be employed not in the Marches but in China. In June 1920 Ch'en told King that he had been instructed to withdraw troops from the Marches to use in Szechuan in the struggle against the influence of the Yunnanese faction. As Beilby Alston, who had just taken over from Jordan at the British Legation in Peking, put it: "in the circumstances Tibetan affairs recede into the background".[179]

When Louis King left Tachienlu in late 1922 to be Acting Consul-General at Chengtu, he was not, for reasons which will be examined in the next Chapter, replaced; and from then onwards the British

lacked a permanent Consular observer at that crucial point where China and Tibet met. Of the three holders of this post of British Consular Officer at Tachienlu, King, Coales and Teichman, King had by far the longest tenure, some five and a half years; and the evidence was, and not only from the fact that he married a Tibetan lady, Rinchen Lhamo, that he had the greater sympathy for Tibetans and understanding of them. He also, it is clear, enjoyed very good relations with the local Chinese officials, notably Ch'en Hsia-ling; and his insight into the Chinese official mind is revealed in his character sketches in *China in Turmoil*, a book quite as informative on the inner history of this period as is Eric Teichman's *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet*, and a great deal easier to read. What were his real feelings about the rights and wrongs of the two sides of the Sino-Tibetan argument which he watched for so long in the Marches? In a despatch from Chamdo of 16 January 1919 he probably summed them up in the following observations:

> the people last year, groaning under Chinese oppression, welcomed the Tibetan advance . . . [but] . . . the Tibetan administration is today worse than the former Chinese rule. The usual abuses such as the extortion of money, sale of offices, bribery in lawsuits, retaliation against former office-holders under the Chinese, forced labour, non-payment of *ula* . . [compulsory porterage or other forms of transport] . . and kindred services, brutality of soldiers, abuse of women, etc., are rampant, and have turned the population in favour of China, whose rule, bad as it was, was yet better than the Tibetans . . . The truth of the matter is that neither the Chinese nor the Tibetans are fit to govern a subject people but that the Chinese are less unfit than the Tibetans.

King concluded that "the Tibetans do not appear in my opinion to deserve Great Britain's efforts, at considerable diplomatic expense to herself, to secure them a wider frontier".[180]

Some of the consequences of King's views on the relative merits of Lhasa versus China, which were not calculated to win him the love of Outer Tibetophiles in India like Charles Bell, nor for that matter the Tibetan expert in the Peking Legation, Eric Teichman, will be considered again in the next Chapter. His opinions contributed both to the termination of King's career on the borders of Kham and the ending of the stationing of a British observer at Tachienliu, events which played a hitherto unremarked, but for all that significant, part in the subsequent course of Sino-Tibetan relations. King was a brilliant man and an acute observer; but in the great game of bureaucratic survival and self-promotion he was as a suckling babe compared to some of his contemporaries both in the China Consular Service and the Indian Civil Service. On his return to Tachienlu to replace Teichman, after his service in France, his despatches become rather odd even for an organisation like the British China Consular Service which prided itself in being able to tolerate its share of

eccentrics: perhaps, as for so many others, the War was just too much for him. As we shall see, in some ways he was a rather tragic figure.

146. L/P&S/10/714, Viceroy to IO, 10 September 1918.

147. L/P&S/10/714, Jordan to FO, 13 September 1918.
Jordan had met the Dalai Lama in Peking on 20 October 1908.

148. L/P&S/10/714, Jordan to FO, 6 December 1918.

149. L/P&S/10/714, Teichman to Jordan, 21 August 1918.

150. L/P&S/10/714, Jordan to FO, 1 February 1919.

151. Ch'en Lu (1876-1939) had negotiated with the Russians the Kiachta Treaty of 1915, and had then served as Chinese Commissioner at Urga (the "Chinese Dignitary" provided for in the Treaty) until 1917. He was Acting Foreign Minister during the absence of the Foreign Minister, Lu Cheng-hsiang, at the Peace Conference in Paris. In May, following the Shantung decision, Lu was dismissed and Ch'en Lu became full Foreign Minister. However, Lu was restored in September and Ch'en Lu reverted to his Acting rank. From 1920-1927 Ch'en Lu was Chinese Minister in Paris.
At first sight the Kiachta Treaty resembled very closely the draft Simla Convention. In practice, however, it was something very different. It provided, for example, for extensive Chinese administrative and judicial rights in Outer Mongolia of a kind which were not specified in the Simla Convention and which the Government of India were very anxious to avoid. In 1915 its main object, in Mongol eyes at least, was to limit Chinese influence in a Mongolia which had declared its autonomy. After the Russian Revolutions of 1917, however, there were many elements in Mongolian politics who saw China as a safeguard against a possible Russian threat; and in 1919 the Chinese very nearly re-established themselves in Outer Mongolia more or less within the framework of the Treaty. They were defeated as much by their own ineptitude as by any other factor.
The text of the Kiachta Treaty is printed in: Lamb, *McMahon Line*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, Appendix XVIII.

152. See: Li, *Tibet*, *op. cit.*, p.291.

153. There was an element of hypocrisy in this statement about Mongolian autonomy. Already in February 1919 the Chinese Government had been planning to bring about a cancellation of that Outer Mongolian autonomy accepted by China in 1913 and defined in great detail in the Kiachta Treaty of 1915, as Ch'en Lu was certainly aware. As one of the negotiators of Kiachta, and with considerable experience in Mongolian affairs, it is probable that Ch'en Lu saw the proposed Tibetan discussions in a Mongolian context. If the Chinese could demonstrate that they were reasonable about Tibet, it would certainly help them in their projected negotiations with the Mongols. After the Shantung disaster at the Peace Conference in France, some Chinese success in Mongolia must have seemed all the more desirable; and anything that might facilitate it was worth trying.

154. For the Chinese proposals and Jordan's reaction to them, see: L/P&S/10/715, Jordan to FO, 31 May 1919; MSS Eur F112/303, Jordan to Curzon, 1 June 1919.

155. L/P&S/10/715, Jordan to FO, 1 July 1919.

156. L/P&S/10/715, Viceroy to IO, 27 June 1919.

157. L/P&S/10/716, Tibet, The Proposed Negotiations, J.E.S., Political Department, India Office, 14 July 1919.

158. L/P&S/10/715, Viceroy to IO, 29 August 1919.

159. L/P&S/10/715, Jordan to Curzon, 30 August 1919.

160. L/P&S/10/715, Jordan to FO, 27 August 1919.

161. L/P&S/10/715, Curzon to Alston, 1 September 1919.

162. L/P&S/10/715, Jordan to FO, 9 September 1919.

163. L/P&S/10/715, Jordan to FO, 4 October 1919; Jordan to FO, 17 October 1919; Jordan to FO, 20 November 1919.

164. It is true that General Hsü Shu-tseng, a close friend of Tuan's, who was implementing the cancellation of Outer Mongolian autonomy at this moment, was intimately connected with Japanese interests, notably the Sino-Japanese Exchange Bank. It was disingenuous in the extreme, however, to maintain that China's Mongolian project of 1919 was undertaken solely because of Japanese pressure.

165. L/P&S/10/715, Jordan to FO, 4 December 1919; Alfred Sze to Curzon, 6 December 1919. Sze's letter amounted to a formal withdrawal of the 30 May proposals on the instructions of the Wai-chiao-pu.
Jordan, perhaps, read more into the Chinese participation in the Simla Conference than any Chinese statesman then, or since, would have accepted.

166. L/P&S/10/715, Curzon to Jordan, 4 November 1919.

167. T'ang Shao-yi was born in 1860. He was Cantonese, and American educated. (It has sometimes been said, including by the present author in *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, vol. 1, that T'ang went to Yale. This does not seem to have been the case. He studied at Columbia and New York University and never graduated. Soon after the breakdown of the North-South talks in October 1919 he retired from active Chinese politics and settled in Shanghai. In 1938 he was assassinated for reasons which are still not clear by four men wielding axes.

168. For the Shantung issue, see: Clubb, *China, op. cit.*, pp. 81-88.

169. L/P&S/10/715, collection of telegrams handed to Jordan by Ch'en Lu on 15 October 1919.

170. L/P&S/10/716, extract from *Tung Fang Jih-pao*, 15 November 1919.

171. For the history of Mongolia at this time, see: G.M. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and its International Position*, London 1951, pp. 183-193; Tang, *Mongolia, op. cit.* pp. 359-370; C.R. Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia*, London 1968, pp. 187-237.

172. L/P&S/10/716, Jordan to Wai-chiao-pu, 19 January 1920; Memo from Wai-chiao-pu, 26 February 1920.

173. This is a slightly puzzling phrase. Had Teichman seen the detailed minutes of the conversations between the Lönchen Shatra and McMahon and his colleagues at Simla which this author, for one, has failed to find in the archives preserved in the India Office Library and Records and the PRO?

174. L/P&S/10/716, Memorandum by E. Teichman, 29 February 1920.

175. The narrative of King's visit to the Marches, which lasted from October 1919 to the middle of 1920, and which not only covered the old ground already familiar from Teichman but, particularly in the south near the Yunnan border, explored much terrain hitherto unknown, is to be found in his despatches sent on by the Foreign Office to the India Office and now filed in L/P&S/10/716.

176. Ethnographically speaking, the Goloks (Ngoloks or Golokpa) occupy a niche somewhere between Tibetans and Mongols, as do so many of the peoples of the Amdo-Kham border region. The Goloks were fiercely independent and owed allegiance neither to the Lhasa Government nor to the Mahommedan General at Sining. They certainly did not obey the writ of Ch'en Hsia-ling. Golok country occupied a belt of extremely rugged terrain in what was just, technically, on the Chinese side of the *de facto* post-Teichman border. The name Golok means "Rebel" according to Lattimore, who notes that the Goloks were able to maintain their independence in part because of their traditional alliance with the Salar Moslems of Kansu. See: Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, New York 1951, p. 212. See also generally: R.B. Ekvall, *Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border*, Chicago 1939. There is an interesting description of the Goloks by Paul Sherap, who never actually travelled in their country, in: G.A. Combe, *A Tibetan on Tibet. Being the Travels and Observations of Mr. Paul Sherap (Dorje Zödba) of Tachienlu: with an Introductory Chapter on the Devil Dance*, London 1926. See also: L. Clark, *The Marching Wind*, New York 1954, which contains much information on Golok (or Ngolok) society in the final years of the Kuomintang; J.F. Rock, *The Amnye Ma-Chhen Range and Adjacent Regions. A Monographic Study*, Rome 1956, pp.126-129.

177. L/P&S/10/716, King to Jordan, 15 January 1920.

178. See: King, *China in Turmoil*, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-208.

179. L/P&S/10/716, Alston to FO, 14 June 1920.

180. L/P&S/10/716, King to Jordan, 16 January 1920.

V

THE KANSU AND BELL MISSIONS TO LHASA AND ARMS FOR TIBET, 1919-1922

Towards the end of 1919 the Chinese authorities in Kansu, probably on the initiative of the Mahommedan General at Sining, Ma Ch'i, decided to make some kind of direct approach to the 13th Dalai Lama. Presumably they had watched the Anglo-Chinese negotiations then in progress in Peking and resolved to establish their own presence in Tibet in case their interests should be ignored by the Chinese Central Government. The Mahommedan General, it has already been noted, managed to maintain quite friendly relations with the Kalon Lama and other Tibetan leaders throughout the crisis of 1917-18; and no doubt he thought it prudent now to build upon this base. The Kansu project involved the despatch of a Mission to Lhasa headed by one Li Chung-lien, ostensibly to bring gifts to the Dalai Lama but in reality to open some kind of negotiation over matters of boundaries and political relationships. Apart from Li, the mission was to consist of another Chinese official, Chu Hsiu, two Red Sect Lama Incarnations from Kansu and some thirty followers.

News of the impending Mission, which was reported in both the Chinese and English language press in China at the time and so could have been no secret to the Peking Government, formally reached Lhasa from the Kalon Lama in late November 1919. Louis King, who was then travelling in the Marches, urged the Kalon Lama to hold the Mission up when it finally arrived at the Tibetan border; but the Dalai Lama decided otherwise, ordering the Kalon Lama to let the members of the Mission through, so King was told, "on the ground that they were mere present bearers and in no sense diplomatic officials or negotiators". The Mission, accordingly, was allowed to proceed on about 1 January 1920; and it entered Lhasa towards the end of that month. Louis King thought the whole affair most unfortunate. The Tibetans should be persuaded to order the Mission back to China at once, and a British official should be sent to Lhasa immediately to

> counteract any harm done. Such an official should be one conversant with the present state of affairs in China. As I am within a few week's

> journey from Lhasa I have the honour to request that instructions may be sent me, *via* Chengtu and *via* India, whether or not to proceed thereto forthwith.[181]

Meanwhile the Dalai Lama had written to the Political Officer in Sikkim, Major W.L. Campbell (Bell having just retired), to inform him of the Mission.[182] The Chinese, he said, evidently intended negotiations and "it is quite impossible to undertake such negotiations without the mediation of the British Government who are the hope and protector of Tibet". He requested, therefore, that the Viceroy would "depute an able officer to represent the British Government" in Lhasa because "unless this is done and a very early reply received the Chinese deputies, if they have been nominated by the Chinese President, may assume a bold attitude and injure the prestige of Great Britain and Tibet". Campbell thought the Indian Government should accede to the Dalai Lama's request; but that it might also be useful from the British Indian point of view to exploit this opportunity and make sure that the Chinese Mission turned into something more than a mere delegation from Sining or the Kansu Provincial Capital, Lanchow. If the Peking Central Government could be persuaded to confer upon the Mission some national official status, and perhaps add to its membership the Chinese agent in Calcutta, Lu Hsing-chi, then some kind of Sino-Tibetan conference with a measure of British participation could come into being in Lhasa at the very moment when direct negotiations between the British Legation in Peking and the Wai-chiao-pu had ground to a halt. If, however, Peking recognition in this sense would not be forthcoming, then Campbell considered it "undesirable to negotiate and the Tibetan Government might be so informed and advised to require the Chinese officials to return to China".

The Viceroy, Lord Chelmsford, was not particularly alarmed by the news of the Mission from Kansu since "our information is so-called Mission is merely from Local Government of Chinese border province to prolong armistice". What Chelmsford found unpalatable was the idea that the British should send a representative to Lhasa to do no more than monitor the Mission's activities. The Government of India needed full tripartite negotiations on the Simla model. "From our point of view", Chelmsford concluded, "negotiations other than tripartite would be undesirable as reputation of China on our Northern frontier would be increased thereby and effect on Bhutan and Nepal would possibly be bad".[183] The Foreign Office in London disagreed: it could see no objection to such Sino-Tibetan talks in Lhasa, provided the representative of the Government of India, even if present only as an observer, was given the same status in protocol as those of China and Tibet.

This Chinese Tibetan venture, which we will refer to henceforth as the Kansu Mission, introduced a new dimension into the Tibetan

situation at a crucial moment. The deputation of a British official to Lhasa was not only the obvious counter to the Kansu Mission but it followed logically enough from the fresh approach to the Tibetan question which the Peking Legation had been considering in the light of the negative Chinese reaction to any British attempts to reopen discussions on the Chinese 30 May 1919 proposals. While the Chinese Central Government denied that it had anything to do with the Kansu Mission, yet it was clearly an event which could not be ignored.[184] Teichman certainly had it in mind when he advised in his Memorandum of 29 February 1920 that a British officer be sent to Lhasa; and Miles Lampson, temporarily in charge of the Peking Legation, agreed, in early April, that

> immediate despatch of officer of Government of India is very desirable with a view to lending Tibet moral support and showing Chinese that we are in earnest and I suggest that I might be authorized to inform Chinese Government that this is being done in response to Kansu Mission and China's continued refusal to resume tripartite negotiations.[185]

Who then to send to Lhasa? King, as we have already seen, wanted to go; and had every qualification, a knowledge not only of the situation in the Marches but also of the Tibetan and Chinese languages. Teichman might have been a good choice, a fairly senior British official who had earned great prestige, if not affection, among the Tibetans and Chinese in Kham and along the Szechuan border. The leading candidate however, as he himself had pointed out on more than one occasion, was undoubtedly Charles Bell, until recently Political Officer in Sikkim and since 1910 a firm friend of the 13th Dalai Lama. The issue was more than one of personalities and ambitions. If a China Consular Service Officer were sent, then whatever resulted would remain under the auspices of the British Legation in Peking, whose views, as expressed in memoranda such as that of Teichman of 29 February 1920 and in the course of negotiations with the Wai-chiao-pu over the years, were not entirely to the taste of the Government of India. If Bell or some other Indian official went, however, the outcome could be exactly what India wanted, no more and no less. Indeed, it would seem that Bell, who had retired in March 1919, had in fact been recalled to active service by the Government of India so as to be available as a counter to the Kansu Mission (and perhaps also as a counter to the possible deputation to Lhasa of a Foreign Office man of King's experience or Teichman's stature); and from January 1920 onwards Bell was once more at his old post at Gangtok, the residence of the Political Officer in Sikkim, waiting in the wings for the order to go to the Tibetan capital.

No sooner back in harness than Bell had been invited yet again by the Dalai Lama to visit Lhasa in order, he declared, to have a British

representative present at the negotiations which the Kansu Mission was about to initiate. The Dalai Lama pointed out that the Kansu Mission could lead to one of two quite different results. If its outcome was merely an exchange of Sino-Tibetan courtesies, then the Peking Government would surely say that there was nothing here beyond a ceremonial visit by some gentlemen from Kansu. If, on the other hand, any settlement favourable to China should emerge, the Chinese Central Government would no doubt ratify it to produce a bilateral Sino-Tibetan agreement without any British participation whatsoever. Bell urged the Government of India to allow him, this time, to accept the invitation.[186] As for the possibility of sending King or Teichman, Bell declared that he was agreeable provided that any such Consular Officer went as Bell's Assistant just as Consular Officers (like Wilton and Rose) had assisted the Government of India in their past dealings with Tibet.[187]

The Kansu Mission, once established in Lhasa, certainly entered into discussions with the Tibetan authorities of an extremely political nature. It also made contact with the Government of Nepal. By the end of April its task had been completed and it had set out on its return to China. What it had achieved was not clear to the British. The Nepalese reported that in secret Sino-Tibetan talks the question of convening a fresh tripartite conference with British, Tibetan and Chinese representatives to discuss the unsettled frontier in the east had been explored and possible sites for such a meeting, Lhasa, Chamdo or Calcutta, considered.[188] From other sources Bell heard quite a different story. The Kansu Mission had urged the Tibetans, who its leaders said were really cousins to the Chinese rather than foreigners, to send a properly accredited representative to Peking with the Mission when it went back to China, and it promised to pay all the expenses of such a Tibetan deputation. One of the Incarnations with the mission, the Kulang Ts'ang (a Red Sect lama), maintained that he was acting on behalf of the Chinese President rather than the Kansu Government: he carried with him a general letter of introduction (in English) to this effect from a China Inland Mission member, H. French Ridley of Lanchow.[189]

The Dalai Lama wrote to Bell to assure him that the Kansu Mission had been in practice denied anything but ceremonial activities, the exchange of presents and compliments, and had then been urged to go home. It had, so the Dalai Lama reported, left Lhasa on 27 April 1920 en route for Kansu via Jyekundo. Once more, the Dalai Lama asked Bell to persuade the Government of India "to arrange quickly for the settlement of the Sino-Tibetan question".[190]

By April 1920 all parties in the British diplomatic establishment had agreed that the deputation of a British officer to Lhasa was theoretically in order. Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, summed it all up when he noted that it was now quite pointless to try to reopen

negotiations in Peking over Tibet, what with the new Chinese aggressiveness demonstrated in Mongolia and their preoccupation with the Shantung issue. So, faced with the Kansu Mission,

> Lord Curzon does not feel that the agreement with Russia of 1907 can be considered as any longer binding as regards either Tibet or Persia and in the event of this Mission . . [the Kansu Mission] . . having the character predicated, His Lordship would raise no objection to an official being despatched to Lhasa by the Government of India on a special and temporary mission to watch proceedings, should the Government of India consider this desirable.[191]

The real problem about British missions to Lhasa at this moment was not that they would conflict with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 but that they would present the British with considerable dilemmas as to the correct course of policy both to pursue themselves and to advocate to the Tibetans. There were two basic issues here.

First: was Tibet to be encouraged to turn itself into a fully independent state, free of all ties with China? There was a certain logic in such an outcome; but it would conflict violently with Chinese sentiment, not to mention a long history of Anglo-Chinese diplomacy in which the Chinese position in Tibet, albeit rather imprecise, had been confirmed. The Chinese, were the British to push for such an outcome, would certainly receive American diplomatic support which might be inconvenient. Moreover, was it really a good idea for Tibet to be allowed to enter the community of sovereign states? Who knows what mischief the Tibetan Government might get up to? Far better, the Government of India certainly felt, to leave the actual status of Tibet rather vague while at the same time deal directly with the Lhasa authorities in whatever way might best suit British Indian frontier policy. So as not to prejudice future flexibility of policy, the Government of India were opposed at this stage to anything like a permanent British representative in Lhasa such as was being considered by the Peking Legation.[192] The main objective was not an envoy stationed in the Tibetan capital but a Tibet in a position to resist any future Chinese attempt at reconquest. This raised the second issue. Tibet must be armed properly and its troops given adequate training in modern warfare. Was this either practicable or, even, desirable?

The question of providing arms for the Tibetans had been under British consideration since 1914; and, as we have already seen, a small quantity of rifles and ammunition had indeed been supplied, along with some military training on a modest scale, but sufficient all the same to assist substantially the Tibetan military successes of 1917-18. To resist a concerted Chinese attack, however, the Tibetans would have to possess something more than 5,000 ageing Lee-Enfields (or Lee-Metfords). Louis King, writing from Eastern Tibet in early 1920 (and on the basis of his own experiences on the Western Front in

France in 1918), thought that they would require at least 100 machine guns and 20 pieces of mountain artillery, as well as a great many more rifles, if they were to stand any realistic prospect of defending themselves against the forces which China, sooner or later, would throw against them.[193] Bell, at about the same time, assessed the immediate Tibetan needs more conservatively, two machine guns with 50,000 rounds and a further 1,250,000 rounds for the existing Lee-Enfields.[194]

Bell now argued that it would be pointless for a British official to go up to Lhasa without having it within his power to offer the Government of the Dalai Lama such arms, ammunition and military assistance as might seem necessary to keep the Chinese at bay. Failing this authority, the British mission would be but an empty gesture. The Tibetans appreciated full well the potential Chinese military threat. Without British aid of this sort they would be sorely tempted to make some kind of deal with the Chinese when the balance of power was still relatively in their favour rather than face on their own in the future the onslaught of a united China. With authority to grant military aid, however, the very presence of a British official in Lhasa would induce the Chinese to open negotiations on reasonable terms; and it might, indeed, be possible (so the implication was) to reach a Sino-Tibetan settlement without, in the end, having to arm the Tibetans at all.[195]

The decision whether or not to send a British officer to Lhasa now came to depend upon a solution of the arms dilemma. At first sight it might seem to have been a simple enough matter to decide whether to give the Tibetans a few more rifles and some machine guns and field pieces: after the 1914-18 War these were hardly in short supply. The reality was more complex. There were local issues like the reaction of Nepal, that key Himalayan state in British policy and invaluable supplier of Gurkha soldiers for the Indian Army. There was a wider international dimension in that the British, as signatories to the Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition of 1919 (Arms Control Convention for short), had agreed to restrict arms supplies to authorised recipients only, into which category it was arguable Tibet did not fall. There was the impact of a step of this kind, the supplying of arms to what the Chinese regarded as one of their dependencies without reference to Peking, on the general pattern of Anglo-Chinese diplomacy.

The Arms Control Convention question seemed incapable of an easy answer. If Tibet were really a "Dominion" of China, as Teichman had been arguing, then she might have the same right to sign the Arms Traffic Convention as did, say, Canada or Australia. Why not simply get Lhasa to adhere to the Convention; and then all international objections to arming Tibet would disappear?[196] Of course, permitting Tibet to participate in such a multinational

Convention in her own right was tantamount to admitting that in the conduct of her foreign relations Tibet had escaped entirely from Chinese supervision. Was this what the British wanted?[197]

The truth of the matter was that at this moment there existed no clear British policy as to Tibet, merely a number of conflicting opinions. The Government of India wanted to get their man to Lhasa and to see Tibet supplied with arms even if it involved Tibetan adhesion to the Arms Control Convention and the risk of arousing irritating Nepalese objections. The India Office were not particularly attracted to the idea of a British representative in Lhasa, and positively disliked the proposal that Tibet sign any international agreement; yet they felt that Tibet should be supplied with arms quite soon, or the Chinese would be able to return to Central Tibet and once more cause trouble along the northern borders of India. Sir John Jordan, now retired from his long term as British Minister in Peking, thought that the best policy at present was one of patience: eventually, once Shantung was out of the way and a number of other Chinese problems solved, there would always be the chance of a revival of something like the 30 May 1919 proposals. Jordan believed firmly that too much pressure on China over Tibet was counter-productive: it would only inflame Chinese public opinion and provide opportunities for Japanese mischief. Neither Jordan nor his successor, Beilby Alston, believed that there was any great danger in the immediate future of a fresh Chinese forward move into Eastern Tibet. Alston, unlike Jordan, was not so vehemently opposed to the idea of some kind of arbitration of the Tibetan question, either by the League of Nations or the United States of America.[198] On balance, the Indian side were inclined towards giving arms to Tibet, while the Foreign Office were not enthusiastic about the prospect.

In an attempt to resolve these various views a conference was held at the Foreign Office on 22 July 1920, attended by Sir John Jordan, now home from Peking, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, with long experience of Indian foreign policy, L.D. Wakely of the India Office Political Committee, and Victor Wellesley and C.H. Bentinck of the Foreign Office.[199] The discussion was singularly inconclusive and the summary drawn up by C.H. Bentinck hardly contained the basis for a coherent Tibetan policy. It was decided to seek assurances in writing from the Chinese that they would not attack Tibet, provided that the Government of India thought that such assurances would convince the Tibetans of the security of their current situation to the same degree as would the provision of arms. Should these assurances be considered useful, and should it be possible to obtain them from the Chinese Government, then they could be conveyed to Lhasa either through Bell or Louis King (but this could be decided at a later stage). Also at a later stage could be explored Sir John Jordan's suggestion that the Chinese be informed that if they transgressed the Sino-

Tibetan frontier they had themselves proposed on 30 May 1919, then the British would feel free to arm the Tibetans and help them resist. Such inflammatory declarations were best kept in reserve until an actual act of aggression had taken place.

The Government of India's reaction to all this prevarication was to argue that a British mission to Lhasa, given the background of the Kansu Mission, was absolutely essential. Bell now felt that the arms question could be deferred for the time being. All that mattered was that he get to Lhasa before the Dalai Lama's faith in the value of British friendship withered away and he withdrew his invitation (and, of course, before either the Foreign Office or the British Legation in Peking changed their minds and decided that the proposed mission would be intolerably harmful to British interests in China). He lost no opportunity in drawing the Government of India's attention to the anxiety felt in Lhasa concerning what would happen after he had retired for the second, and final, time. The 13th Dalai Lama and his principal Ministers all knew Bell, some of them from 1910 when the Dalai Lama had been obliged to seek refuge in India from the Chinese; and they regarded him as being in some significant way the personification of British good will towards Tibet. If he were to leave the scene, or worse, if something were to happen to the 13th Dalai Lama, then there remained a very real possibility of the Tibetans making some arrangement with China despite apparent Chinese weakness at the moment. Bell reported that the Kalon Lama "is in favour of coming to terms with the Chinese as he is now weary of the situation". The lesson of the Kansu Mission was that there existed in Lhasa an undeniable propensity for direct Sino-Tibetan discussions which the Government of India should do everything in its power to discourage.[200]

In October 1920 Bell was at last instructed to prepare his Lhasa visit, during which he would be accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel R.S. Kennedy of the Indian Medical Service (envoys to Lhasa from this time onwards were always provided with medical support). His brief was to establish as friendly a relationship as possible with the Dalai Lama and his Ministers. He was to try and find out exactly what the Kansu Mission had been up to. On the arms question, however, his position was unequivocal: "you should make it plain that you have no authority to promise arms and ammunition". The news of the forthcoming Mission would not be published and the Chinese not informed until "a fortnight after Bell's departure, so as to confront them with *fait accompli*".[201]

On 1 November 1920 Bell set out from Yatung for Lhasa which he reached on 17 November. He was welcomed by the leader of the substantial community of Ladakhi Moslem traders (British subjects who were resident in the Tibetan capital), by the Bhutanese representative, by a guard of honour provided by the Nepalese

representative, and, of course, by high Tibetan officials both monastic and lay. A suitable residence near the Dalai Lama's country palace (Norbu Lingka) was allocated to the Mission.[202] Two days later at a time and date approved by the geomancers Bell had his first of many interviews with the Dalai Lama. The Bell Mission was to remain in Lhasa for almost a year, finally setting out for India on 19 October 1921.[203] While in Lhasa, for official and diplomatic purposes Bell was granted the extremely high Tibetan rank of Lönchen (Chief Minister), an honour which was later also accorded to Basil Gould. Throughout his time in Tibet Bell placed much confidence in the advice of Pa-lhe-se (Sonam Wangyal), an estranged member of one of the great Lhasa families, the Pa-lhe, who had for some years been a clerk in the office of the Political Officer in Sikkim at Gangtok.[204] He also had with him a few months after his arrival in Lhasa the very experienced Sikkimese policeman Laden La who had been involved in the conduct of Anglo-Tibetan relations for many years.[205]

There were several relatively minor diplomatic issues involved in the Bell Mission, such as the obtaining of Tibetan permission for a British expedition to Mount Everest (granted almost immediately to initiate the first phase of British Everest attempts from 1921 to 1924) and mediation between Nepal and Tibet whose relations, always subject to stress, were currently going through a more than usually unhappy phase. There were also a number of what might be called intelligence objectives which Bell could attain. What was the extent of post-Revolutionary Russian influence in Lhasa? What had the Chinese been up to in the Kansu Mission; and had there been other missions like it hitherto unknown to the British? The crucial issues of Anglo-Tibetan relations, the nature of British involvement in the Sino-Tibetan argument and the preparedness of the British to give Tibet military aid, were not capable of solution when Bell reached Lhasa because the British Government had not yet decided what its policy on these matters was. To a great extent the story of the Bell Mission was that of an envoy who was filling in time while waiting for instructions.

By the end of February 1921 the Tibetan Government had specified its chief requirements from the British. Bell urged that these requests be taken very seriously. The political situation in Tibet was far from stable. With the death of the Lönchen Shatra there was no powerful minister with a pro-British outlook to advise the Dalai Lama. The Chief Minister at the time of Bell's visit was the Lönchen Sholkhang who was growing old and whose main task was to prepare the Dalai Lama's young nephew, Silon Langdun, to take over his position. The Dalai Lama himself was not in the best of health (so Bell reported) and had aged considerably of late; if he were to die, no one could predict the subsequent course of Tibetan politics. There was a strong, and growing, pro-Chinese faction in the Tsongdu (National Assembly) which, Bell thought, but for the affection for the British

held by the Dalai Lama would have long ago forced the Tibetan Government to come to some kind of arrangement with the Chinese. Tsarong Shape, the Commander in Chief of the Tibetan army, was much impressed by the Japanese, at least as military models; and he was urging the purchase of Japanese rifles by way of Mongolia where such weapons were available in large numbers and cheaply.[206] The Russians had retained a presence in Lhasa, despite the Revolution, in the person of an agent of Dorjiev's, a Buriat monk currently residing in Drepung. The Chinese Province of Sinkiang, which shared a very long common border with Tibet, was also represented in Lhasa by a high official (whom Bell described, perhaps incorrectly, as the Amban or Governor of Ili), who had been received on several occasions by the Dalai Lama.[207] The Kansu Mission had indeed been political in its objectives; and it had returned to China, so Bell had been informed, with some kind of formal agreement (which it intended to transmit to the Central Government in Peking) to the effect that Tibet and China should depute representatives to make peace, with, hopefully, the assistance of a British official, along the general lines of the Simla proposals of 1914, and meanwhile both sides should maintain the cease-fire along their common frontier. Whether Bell believed that these were in fact the terms agreed to or not he did not say; but, whatever the terms, the implication was unmistakable that the Tibetans were prepared in certain circumstances to negotiate with Chinese delegations.

Bell thought that it was the height of folly not to come openly to the aid of the Tibetans. The idea that written Chinese assurances would satisfy the Lhasa authorities was absurd. They knew that sooner or later there would be a fresh Chinese advance towards Central Tibet which they would have to deal with in one way or another. As he asked rhetorically:

> what will be the result if we continue our present policy of aloofness? . . . They . . [the Tibetans] . . will find us useless and in despair will turn to China. Sir John Jordan . . . has noted that this is what the Chinese are waiting for . . . Japan and China combined will gain power in Tibet . . . The northern frontier of India will fall under Japanese, as well as Chinese, influence. Will the new India, autonomous or semi-autonomous, be able to protect adequately fifteen hundred miles of such a frontier? Surely not. She will be weaker, rather than stronger, as regards external defence. In any case she will no longer have what is perhaps the best land frontier in the world, the lofty plateau of Northern Tibet . . . Instead of this barrier India will have a frontier band of narrow Mongolian States, greatly liable to fall under the influence of Japan and China, the two chief Mongolian nations. For Bhutan and Sikkim especially the temptation will be very great. Even Nepal, with its preponderating Mongolian population, will in time find difficulty in holding aloof. And in Burma, also a Mongolian country, the Chinese will in all probability intrigue and stir up trouble increasingly.[208]

Hence, Bell concluded,

> we should wait no longer for a China that does not intend to negotiate, until she finds it definitely in her interest to do so. We should recognise that Tibet, a well-governed country, does not wish her internal administration should come again under the misgovernment and oppression of China. We should recognise that she has for ten years maintained troops at great sacrifice on her eastern frontier to keep out the Chinese invaders. Finally, we should recognise India's vital interests in this problem and the dangers that threaten her in our present policy of inaction.

All this being so, Bell urged that the main Tibetan requests be granted without delay. The British should permit Tibet to import arms and ammunition upon payment from British India (rather than from Mongolia or Japan) up to certain specified maximum quantities, 10 mountain artillery pieces, 20 machine guns, 10,000 Lee-Enfield rifles and up to 1,000,000 rounds of .303 ammunition each year and a reasonable number of shells for the mountain guns.[209] This should suffice for an army of 10,000 regular troops such as the Tibetans were then contemplating. In addition, the British should, as they had already done in 1915, provide instructors to go up to Gyantse, which would become the main Tibetan training base; and the Tibetans should be allowed to recruit a handful of British technicians to teach them how to manufacture ammunition and rifles.[210] Finally, the Lhasa Government should be lent British mining experts (the only Tibetan at all qualified in this field was Mundo, one of the four Tibetan boys educated at Rugby).[211] The development of Tibetan mines (and it was believed that Tibet was particularly rich in gold as well as abundantly supplied with several other useful minerals) would provide the revenue for the arms and everything else; so the main Tibetan requests which Bell was supporting would not cost the British Government a single penny.[212]

To the British Legation in Peking the presence of Bell in Lhasa was at first seen less as a diplomatic venture in its own right than as a means of putting pressure on the Chinese to return to the negotiating table to discuss their own proposals of 30 May 1919. The longer Bell stayed on in Tibet the more worried the Chinese would become.[213] By April 1921 it seemed increasingly unlikely that this stratagem would work. The Peking Legation was now advising the Foreign Office that the wisest step would be to do no more than remind the Wai-chiao-pu that the Tibetan question was still unresolved and express hopes (unlikely to be fulfilled) for an early settlement.[214]

The Government of India were by this time more or less convinced that the Chinese would never return to discussions on Tibet unless they were subjected to far greater pressure than they had so far experienced. The best policy would be to inform them that if they did not come to terms very soon, then the British would proceed

unilaterally to recognise Tibetan autonomy and supply Lhasa with such arms as might be requested. Sir Arthur Hirtzel at the India Office agreed. If the British did not help Tibet, then she would turn either to Bolshevik Russia or to Japan. Was there, he wondered, "any sense in liberating Tibet from China only to let it fall under the influence of one or other of the two Powers irreconcilably hostile to Gt. Britain's position in Asia, & can we afford to do so"?[215] There were, of course, differences of emphasis. Hirtzel was apparently prepared to see a fully independent Tibet with all that such a status implied in freedom of foreign policy: British aid and proximity to British territory would guarantee that Lhasa was not seduced by Moscow or Tokyo. The Government of India were not so sure that full independence was desirable. What they wanted was a Tibet isolated from all other Powers and dependent upon British India for that military and diplomatic strength sufficient to keep the Chinese at bay but not enough to turn Tibet into a power of any significance in her own right, in other words what some British observers of the Tibetan situation described as a "sterilized" Tibet.

This somewhat restrained enthusiasm for full Tibetan independence was apparent in the structure of the Bell Mission from the outset. It was made quite clear to Bell, who initially hoped otherwise, that his visit to Lhasa was not intended to lay the foundations for a permanent British representation at the Tibetan capital. The European component of the mission was resolutely restricted to Bell and his Medical Officer. David Macdonald, Trade Agent at Gyantse, visited Lhasa, where he had many friends and where his knowledge of Tibet and the Tibetans would have been particularly useful to Bell at that particular time, in late December 1920: but the moment the news of his unauthorised presence in the Tibetan capital reached the Government of India in January 1921 they ordered him back to his post in Gyantse.[216] Later on in 1921 Bell's wife and another female relative were prevented by the Government of India from going to Lhasa, though they were allowed (as indeed the Trade Regulations could be construed to permit) to visit Gyantse.[217] These gestures were deliberately intended to demonstrate that Bell's Lhasa mission was not the prelude to throwing open Tibet to all and sundry travellers, explorers, adventurers and tourists.

By April 1921 Bell had also concluded that a general opening of Tibet if it involved a permanent British representative in Lhasa might be rather dangerous. News of proposals by the Tibetan Government to enlarge the army had been one of several factors causing much disquiet in the great monasteries of the Lhasa region who interpreted this as being among the plethora of threats to their power arising from the general framework of the Bell Mission. It was with great difficulty that the monks were calmed down during the 1921 Monlam (New Year) celebrations.[218] Monastic outbreaks had been a frequent

feature of Tibetan politics; and exposure to one such potential incident convinced Bell that a permanent British representative in Lhasa could well at times be at considerable risk from the more than 20,000 monks in and around Lhasa. Only if the Chinese had their own Amban or his equivalent permanently back in Lhasa should the Government of India consider (because of the overriding need that would then arise to keep up with the Chinese) anything beyond the despatch to the Tibetan capital from time to time of a British representative to deal with specific questions.[219] Bell had deliberately reminded the Government of India of the Cavagnari syndrome, the fear that a British envoy to a remote spot beyond the Imperial frontier would get himself murdered and thus necessitate for reasons of prestige an expensive punitive campaign.[220]

After considerable discussion between London, Peking and India, by June 1921 some lines of British policy had been decided upon. The Chinese should be asked to reopen discussions of their 20 May 1919 proposals. If they declined they should then be informed that the Tibetans would receive arms and ammunition from the British. However, all this was to be done in the mildest possible way. Sir Beilby Alston in Peking felt that the Chinese, having just lost the gains they had made in Outer Mongolia in 1919-20 and still resentful about the Shantung question, might not respond too well to anything that sounded like a British ultimatum. Moreover, too brusque an approach by the British would both arouse pro-Chinese sentiments in the United States and provide the Japanese with the raw material for a propaganda campaign which might give rise to Chinese boycotts of British goods and other undesirable manifestations of Chinese public opinion. Lord Curzon at the Foreign Office agreed.[221]

What was now proposed was that the Wai-chiao-pu should be reminded politely by Sir Beilby Alston that it had been a long time since talks over the 30 May 1919 proposals had ended. If the Chinese did not wish to discuss any further their own offer, then the British Government would feel free to revert to the position at the end of the Simla Conference in 1914 when, failing Chinese signature, the British declared that they were at liberty to treat Tibet as autonomous. If the Chinese did want to negotiate, then the British Government would do its best to persuade the Tibetans to accept some tripartite settlement which incorporated the terms of the Chinese proposals of 30 May 1919. If, within a reasonable time, say one month, it was evident that the Chinese would not reopen the subject, then the Tibetans should be allowed to have a supply of arms and ammunition, under the strict written guarantee that they would be used for self-defence only. The Chinese would, of course, be given no details as to either the nature or the quantity of the arms under consideration. While the Chinese reply to this approach was being awaited, Bell should stay on in Lhasa.[222]

Alston was agreeable to these proposals which went somewhat further than those he had advocated a few weeks earlier when he had advised against anything that might look like an ultimatum to the Chinese Government. He did warn, however, that there were risks. The Chinese might be so stirred up as to raise the Tibetan problem at the Pacific Conference which President Harding had just summoned to be held in Washington later in the year.[223] They should be told quite firmly that the British Government would oppose the use of the Washington Conference for such a purpose. Perhaps, as a douceur it might be hinted to the Chinese that once Tibet was settled the Indian Government would look favourably upon the appointment of a Chinese Consul in Calcutta. As Alston said, a Chinese Consul could hardly cause more trouble than had the Russian Consul in the old Tsarist days; and the presence of proper Chinese representation in India might counteract China's dependence for information upon highly unreliable secret agents (like Lu Hsing-chi, no doubt).

The main question outstanding was whether the message to the Chinese should be delivered in Peking or in London.[224] Lord Curzon decided that it would be best to deliver a Memorandum to the Chinese Legation in London, with a more or less simultaneous communication of its contents to the Wai-chiao-pu in Peking.[225] The original Memorandum was handed by Lord Curzon to the Chinese Minister in London, now Wellington Koo, on 26 August 1921. Curzon told Dr. Koo that he had decided to give the Chinese a month to reply. If no answer were forthcoming in that time, then

> we should regard ourselves at liberty to deal with Tibet, if necessary, without again referring to China; to enter into closer relations with the Tibetans; to send an officer to Tibet from time to time to consult the Tibetan Government; to open up increased trading intercourse between India and Tibet; and to give the Tibetans any reasonable assistance they might require in the development and protection of their country.

Curzon explained that the length of the time limit had been fixed because Bell could not stay on for ever in Lhasa; and, before he left he had to know the outcome of the present initiative. Curzon refused to give any weight to Wellington Koo's argument that nothing could be done until after the Washington Conference: the Tibetan question had nothing to do with the Washington Conference and it was futile to try to link the two together. He believed that at the end of this interview the Chinese Minister realised that "His Majesty's Government were in earnest and that the game of shilly-shally could no longer be pursued".[226] Alston was instructed to address the Wai-chiao-pu in the same language so that in Peking, too, it would be seen that the era of "shilly-shally" was over.[227]

The London Memorandum of 26 August 1921 is an extremely important document in that it effectively marks the end of a process

of Anglo-Chinese negotiation over Tibet which began in 1912 (though a faint spark still glowed as will be discussed below). Lord Curzon pointed out to Wellington Koo that:

> two years having now elapsed since the interruption of the negotiations of 1919, which it was explained at the time by the Chinese Government, were only temporarily postponed, His Majesty's Government now invite the Chinese Government to resume these negotiations either in London or Peking without further delay.
>
> In view of the commitments of His Majesty's Government to the Tibetan Government arising out of the tripartite negotiations of 1914, and in view of the fact that the Chinese Government accepted, with the exception of the boundary clause, the draft convention of 1914, providing for Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty, and formally re-affirmed their attitude in this respect in their offer of 1919, His Majesty's Government do not feel justified, failing a resumption of negotiations in the immediate future, in withholding any longer their recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China, and intend dealing on this basis with Tibet in the future.
>
> At the same time His Majesty's Government, who remain as heretofore most willing to do all in their power to promote an equitable tripartite settlement, would view with great regret the continued inability of the Chinese Government to co-operate with them in this matter, and in the event of a resumption of negotiations would be prepared to make every effort to induce the Tibetan Government to accept a settlement satisfactory to China on the basis of the draft convention of 1914 modified in accordance with China's wishes as expressed in her offer of 1919.

Alston had discussions with the Wai-chiao-pu on 31 August and 7 September 1921 during the course of which it became apparent that the Chinese Government were not prepared in the foreseeable future to reopen negotiations over the 30 May 1919 proposals.[228] On 10 September the Wai-chiao-pu made its formal reply to the British Memorandum; and two days later the Chinese Legation in London informed the Foreign Office of the Chinese reaction in an *aide mémoire*. The Chinese would be delighted to take up Lord Curzon's offer of continued discussions on Tibet were it not for two considerations. First: the state of China, far more unsettled than in either 1915 or 1919, was such as to preclude negotiations over a subject as complex as that of Tibet. Second: with the Pacific Conference in Washington coming up, Dr. Wellington Koo would be too busy to give his full attention to the matter. The view of the Chinese Government was that "as soon as matters concerning the Pacific Conference have been finished with, measures should be taken without fail at the earliest possible moment to open negotiations".[229] There was the implication, of course, that "the earliest possible moment" would never be "possible".

For the time being at least, this seemed to be the end of the line. Lord Curzon was convinced that there could be no further progress until after the Washington Conference, which would be well into 1922, if then. With some reluctance he agreed to authorise Bell to go ahead and promise the Tibetans such military assistance as he considered the situation called for.

On 11 October 1921 Bell had an interview with the Dalai Lama in which he reported that the Government of India were prepared to supply Tibet on payment with the quantity of arms and ammunition which Bell had recommended in February, namely 10 pieces of mountain artillery with adequate ammunition, 20 machine guns, 10,000 Lee-Enfield rifles and an initial supply of 1,000,000 rounds, with the possibility of like amounts of ammunition each year in future. This offer was subject to certain conditions. The arms and ammunition were only to be used "for self-defence and for internal police work"; and the Dalai Lama was to give an assurance in writing to this effect (which duly reached the Political Officer in Sikkim, now F.M. Bailey, in May 1922).[230] The Tibetans were not to disturb the peace of the frontier in Kham where they would do no more than maintain the *status quo* until after the Washington Conference when, perhaps, fresh negotiations with the Chinese might result in some more formal settlement.[231]

Just over a week later Bell left Lhasa, on 19 October 1921. On his return to India he retired for a second, and final, time from Government service (though he remained in touch with the 13th Dalai Lama until the latter's death in 1933, sometimes to the considerable annoyance of the Government of India).

Despite occasional rumour and speculation concerning the Tibetan discovery of alternative and non-British sources of supply of arms and ammunition, most British officials, Bell included, were convinced that at this time it was only from British India that the Lhasa Government could acquire sufficient munitions to provide a credible answer to the Chinese threat. In fact there is evidence that already in 1921 the Japanese, unknown to the Government of India, had agreed to supply the Dalai Lama with at least as many rifles, pieces of artillery, machine guns and ammunition as were being considered by Bell. No doubt, had Bell not in the end been authorised to make his offer of military stores this Japanese alternative would have been more intensely exploited.[232]

Bell brought back with him from Lhasa no formal bilateral Anglo-Tibetan Agreement (though there were various written understandings as to the Tibetan use of the weapons supplied them, the right of the Political Officer in Sikkim to visit Lhasa from time to time and other matters). His mission did not, in British eyes, significantly alter the status of Tibet. As the Memorandum to the Chinese of 26 August 1921 had declared, formal British policy remained the

securing of Chinese adhesion to the draft Simla Convention as modified in the light of the Chinese proposals of 30 May 1919. Tibet was still under Chinese suzerainty; and, if the Chinese did decide to go ahead along the lines of their 1919 offer, then there could still be a very significant Chinese presence in Tibet. Meanwhile, the Dalai Lama's Government would receive such British support as was called for to maintain itself against Provincial Chinese offensives from Szechuan, and no more; and the British would not go out of their way to bring Tibet into the community of nations.

There was, however, latent in the Bell mission the potential for great changes in all aspects of Tibetan life. The agreement to provide arms and military instruction, even on the fairly modest scale which Bell had indicated, could have created within Tibet a modern drilled army which might have turned itself into a political force to counter the conservatism of the monasteries.[233] The deputation of Laden La to Lhasa after the Bell Mission to assist in the establishment of a police force along contemporary British Indian lines could well have added physical strength to the Dalai Lama in defending his policies against internal disruption. The extension of the telegraph from Gyantse to Lhasa, which was completed in 1922, brought the Tibetan capital potentially into direct (and rapid) contact with the world outside, even if through a British Indian filter.[234] The Dalai Lama's agreement to permit a British party to approach Mt. Everest from the Tibetan side created a precedent for the freer penetration of Tibet by Europeans which, had it been accompanied by projects for widespread exploration and imaginative economic exploitation, might have had revolutionary consequences. There were revolutionary implications, too, in the agreement for British assistance in the establishment of an English school at Gyantse where the Tibetan elite at least could have been exposed to modern political and technological ideas.[235] The report in *The Times* of 31 October 1921, with the headline "Tibet Tired of Seclusion. Ready to Open Country", probably reflected what many British observers of Central Asian politics must have concluded would follow on Bell's Mission.

Before 1914 Bell had been an advocate of the extension of something very like a British protectorate over Tibet the better to defend the northern frontiers of India. By the time that he undertook his Lhasa Mission, however, he had come to the conclusion that the British were probably not going to be much longer in a position to intervene directly in Tibetan affairs. The logical development of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms meant that one day India would become self-governing and there was no guarantee that such a new India would be able, or willing, to provide even the modest degree of protection to traditional Tibet that the British Government was offering in 1921. Tibet would have to learn to rely on its own resources for its survival.[236]

Charles Bell has been in many ways an underestimated character. His successor as Political Officer in Sikkim, the remarkable explorer and man of action F. M. Bailey, for some reason did not have a particularly high opinion of him.[237] Bell's literary style gives an impression of a rather naïve approach to life to which the achievements of his professional career certainly provide a contradiction. Given the opportunities which were his for the taking in 1920-21, Bell did not turn his Lhasa Mission into a permanent Lhasa Residency; and he so refrained for two main reason which show a profound understanding of what was to turn out to be the future fate of Tibet.

First: he appreciated that the power of the 13th Dalai Lama, which appeared to many at the time to be absolute, was in fact subject to severe constraints which could, in certain circumstances, prove fatal. The problem of the monastic domination of Lhasa life and population has already been noted. What Bell seems to have played down in his despatches to India from Lhasa was that following the Monlam (New Year) tensions there developed a serious conspiracy against the 13th Dalai Lama centred upon Drepung Monastery and with its leadership concentrated in Loseling College of that institution. The cause of opposition to the Dalai Lama lay in the whole process of modernisation and change implied in the measures, few though they in fact were, that the Lama had been discussing with Bell.[238] Drepung did its best to enlist the support of the other two great monasteries, Sera and Ganden. It failed to do so; but in August 1921 a crisis seemed to be coming to a head. Bell prudently removed himself from the immediate scene, thus avoiding the unenviable task of mediator; and the Dalai Lama, with the aid of some 3,000 troops hastily assembled in Lhasa, managed on his own to keep the loyalty of Sera and Ganden. By September 1921 the crisis was over; but its lesson remained.[239] Conflict between Lhasa factions had a tendency to turn into conflict between parties supporting, or supported by, China (widely thought to have played a major part in stirring up Drepung) on the one hand and British India on the other. Bell wisely saw the undesirability, bearing in mind the fundamentals of British frontier policy, of being drawn into such a contest.

Second: Bell was well aware, as we have already noted (and which was by no means the norm for British Indian officials of his generation), that the British Raj would not last for ever. Indeed, he seems to have suspected that it might endure for a rather shorter time even than most of his more observant colleagues anticipated. In these circumstances it would be indeed rash to commit the British Government to obligations beyond the Himalayas which they would find themselves unable to fulfil. A permanent British Residency in Lhasa could all too easily turn into a British protectorate over Tibet (however the term Tibet might be defined) which the British would not be able to maintain. The simplicity of Bell's literary style

concealed here, as in many other matters, a very shrewd brain indeed.

Some of the consequences of the Bell mission have already been mentioned. A number of further results, both successes and failures, some direct and some oblique, need to be touched upon to round out the story.

Bell's advice that there should be some geological surveying in Tibet was indeed followed up in 1922 with the rather limited work of the eminent Himalayan geologist Sir Henry Hayden; but no significant mining enterprises resulted.[240]

The Government of India saw nothing in Bell's achievements to convince it of the need to relax its policy of obstructing unofficial European travel and exploration in Tibet: its anger in 1923 over the visit to Lhasa from Gyantse of Dr. McGovern, disguised as a Sikkimese monk, is a good enough illustration of how it looked on this question.[241]

Bell failed to convince the Government of India that, having followed up the invitation to visit the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, he ought to go on and take up the invitation by the Panchen Lama to call in at Tashilhunpo on his way back to India. He was clearly distressed by this refusal which, though he was too loyal to say so in public, he probably felt was, as a major disregard for Tibetan protocol, one contributing cause of the disastrous break between the two Incarnations in 1923, of which more in the next Chapter.[242] Bell had met the Panchen Lama in India in 1905 and had visited him in Tibet in 1906. Had he been able to maintain the same kind of relationship with the 9th Panchen Lama that he had established after 1910 with the 13th Dalai Lama he might have done something to bridge the gulf of bitterness between these two Incarnations which was to bedevil Tibetan politics for so much of the 20th century.

Two other results of the Bell Mission had, in their various ways, most profound consequences for the future history of relations between British India and Tibet, but so far have tended to be overlooked in the literature.

The first emerged from the fact that the Chinese became convinced that Bell had brought back from Lhasa an Anglo-Tibetan treaty which replaced the old Simla Convention, for all its faults a symbol of the potential Chinese right to be party to any Tibetan excursion into international relations, by an instrument which dispensed with China altogether. There was, of course, nothing resembling such a document other than the correspondence relating to the supply of arms and the operation of the telegraph link with India, important but of limited scope. The Chinese, however, were not reassured by the circumstances of Bell's return from Tibet.

Bell was met at Phari on his way back from Lhasa to Sikkim by Lord Ronaldshay, the Governor of Bengal, and Major Bailey (later Lt.-Colonel), the former Trade Agent at Gyantse who was now to take

over in Gangtok. This was announced in *The Times* of 31 October 1921 with the observation that "it is reported that Mr. Bell has outlined the terms of a possible treaty which would satisfy the aspirations of the Tibetans for a wider intercourse with India and allay their fears as to Bolshevist aggression".

These words were immediately spotted by the Chinese Legation in London which lost no time in asking what was meant by "possible treaty", which did sound rather like an embryonic repeat of Younghusband's 1904 Lhasa Convention.[243] The Foreign Office never really convinced the Chinese that there had been no such treaty.[244] In the early 1930s the Chinese Legation in London was again asking the Foreign Office for a copy of this document.[245] The suspicions in the minds of the Chinese which were, if not created, at least greatly strengthened by the circumstances attending Bell's return were never entirely dispelled throughout the remaining 26 years of the history of direct British territorial contact with Tibet.

The second consequence was, in practice, far more serious than the fostering of suspicions which were, in any case, always latent within the Chinese official mind. Bell was in great measure responsible both for the end of the career of Louis King and for the downgrading of the British observation post at Tachienlu. Established in 1913 at the time of the Simla Conference, this position had been manned in turn by three experienced and extremely capable (in their different ways) British Consular Officers, of whom Teichman was the most famous, who, as has already been described above in some detail, were able not only to provide the British with detailed and accurate information about what was going on in that sensitive region where Tibet marched with the Chinese Provinces of Kansu, Szechuan and Yunnan, but also on occasion to intervene effectively to influence the course of its history. Thanks largely to Bell this state of affairs came to an end. King, on being removed from Tachienlu, albeit indirectly and politely, was not replaced. The post itself was abolished; but, almost by chance, a vestige of it survived under the command of its Tibetan interpreter, Paul Sherap, who remained there until the late 1930s to provide a steady flow of extremely useful data.[246] It would, however, have been better if he had been working under someone with the stature of full membership of H.B.M. China Consular Service.

The Bell-King relationship makes an interesting story in human incompatibility. Both Bell, with his many years of association with Sikkim, Bhutan and Central Tibet and his friendship with the Dalai Lama, and King with over half a decade in Tachienlu and marriage to a Tibetan lady, felt that he was *the* leading Tibetan expert within the British establishment (as also, of course, did Teichman). At the time of the Bell Mission King had tried first to be the man sent to Lhasa and then to ensure that diplomacy in Lhasa came through him under the supervision of the British Legation in Peking as part of the

general pattern of Anglo-Chinese relations. Bell, on the other hand, had insisted that the British Consular Officer at Tachienlu in general, and King in particular, ought to be subordinate to the Political Officer in Sikkim in all things relating to Tibet. Bell thought (or at least declared) that in the current state of Sino-Tibetan relations all fault lay on the Chinese side. King, while by no means blind to Chinese defects, argued that the Tibetans were not perfect either, indeed, all things considered, were probably marginally less perfect than the Chinese. The following is a good example of King's reflections on this theme:

> Chinese rule glows in fact merely in comparison with Tibetan; as a candle to a firefly . . . I venture to hope that I have said enough to show that, on whatever other basis the Tibetans may be pleased to found a claim to these tribal regions . . [in Kham] . . they cannot base it on the will of the people nor the good of the people. The tribes prefer Chinese rule and Chinese rule affords them greater freedom and greater justice.[247]

These were hardly the kind of words calculated to bring joy to Bell's heart.

During the course of the Bell Mission the King problem became acute. Bell could hardly ignore King because copies of all King's despatches from Tachienlu were sent to India by way of Lhasa and Sikkim; and they were naturally perused *en passant* by Bell.[248] Thus Bell was only too aware that King was being very critical of the Tibetan stance in Kham at the precise moment when Bell was trying to persuade the Government of India to sanction the supply of arms to Tibet. At the same time, King had become personally involved during 1921 with the situation in the Marches when, as we have already seen, he acted as an intermediary between Ch'en Hsia-ling and the Kalon Lama in the matter of the passage of the Chinese convoy from Jyekundo through Golok country to Tachienlu. The Kalon Lama in order to protect himself from the criticisms of his enemies in Lhasa had blamed the safe passage of these crucial supplies of cash and arms to the Chinese on the meddling of King. The impression in Lhasa, therefore, was that King was actively pro-Chinese; and it would not be an excess of speculation to suggest that Bell did nothing to discourage this view. Indeed, it is more than probable that he indicated to his Tibetan friends that it would do no harm to protest about King to the Government of India and request his removal. It would be better, of course, if such a protest came after Bell had actually completed his Mission. This duly took place in the shape of a petition from the Tsongdu, the Tibetan National Assembly, to Bell dated 31 October 1921 (just under a fortnight after Bell's departure from Lhasa).[249]

This was the beginning of a virtual bombardment of anti-King documents from the Tibetan authorities alleging King's unwarranted

interference on behalf of the Chinese (the Jyekundo-Tachienlu convoy in particular) and his abuse of *ula*, the imposition of forced porterage and the requisitioning of baggage animals during King's travels in Eastern Tibet (one of the standard Tibetan complaints raised against European travellers, sometimes with justice and sometimes not – it was subsequently to be applied, for example, to F. Kingdon Ward). Also it was claimed that King's Tibetan interpreter, one Kesang, had acted in an illegal and high handed manner.[250] But the real point was clear enough in the Tsongdu's letter. "Mr. King listens to whatever the Chinese say". The Tsongdu, therefore, begged that "Mr. King may be withdrawn from Tachienlu and another learned and peaceable British Officer, who would uphold the interests of the Anglo-Tibetan relationship, appointed in his place early".

This request, and similar documents which followed it, presented the British authorities with a dilemma. The Government of India, and a number of officials in the India Office as well, were very anxious to see King removed. His continued presence in Tachienlu, if Bell were to be believed, would only damage the present highly satisfactory state of Anglo-Tibetan relations. However, it was obvious that the great British Empire could not be seen to be removing British Consular Officers whenever some organisation as bizarre, and as uninfluential on the world stage, as the Tibetan Tsongdu so requested. As the Foreign Office put it:

> an immediate transfer . . [of King from Tachienlu] . . would now seem undesirable but Lord Balfour . . [the Foreign Secretary] . . is of the opinion that it would be desirable to effect it as soon as it can be done without giving the impression that it had been carried out as a result of the Tibetan complaints.[251]

In the end a good British compromise was decided upon. The Tibetans were told that their complaints against King had been investigated and found to be groundless.[252] At the same time, it was resolved to remove King from Tachienlu after a suitably decent interval. In the autumn of 1922 he was made Acting Consul General in Chengtu, a post which he occupied for a very short while; and on 1 January 1924 he retired from the China Consular Service on what was, given his relative youth (he was only 39), a meagre pension.[253] It was further decided not to replace him at Tachienlu, which instead would be visited from time to time by one of the Consular Officers from the British Consulate-General in Chengtu.

By 1926 the Foreign Office were having serious doubts whether it was worth keeping any presence at Tachienlu at all, since even without a permanent Consular Officer there it was necessary to maintain a house with door keeper, Chinese clerk and Tibetan interpreter, costing in all some £200 annually. After all, the

real beneficiaries of all this were the Government of India; and they showed no great enthusiasm for footing the bill. Indeed, in November 1926 India had approved the abolition of the whole Tachienlu establishment.[254] However, the Consul-General at Chengtu at this time, J.B. Affleck, who rather liked the prospect of excursions to the Tibetan border, produced effective arguments for keeping it in being so that it could be visited periodically from Chengtu, a journey which he said would soon be getting easier because of the progress in the construction of a motor road between the two places.[255] The crucial consideration in the mind of the Foreign Secretary responsible for the decision to keep something at Tachienlu, Sir Austen Chamberlain, was not so much Tibet as the need to maintain as many observation posts as possible from which to monitor the progress of Russian Bolshevism in Sinkiang and Kansu.[256]

In 1927 or 1928 responsibility for Tachienlu was transferred from Chengtu, where the Consulate-General was closed down (temporarily it was then thought), to the more distant Consulate-General in Chungking. Thus a window of sorts was kept open on to Eastern Tibet, a fact which was to prove to be of the greatest importance to our understanding of the next crisis in Sino-Tibetan relations here which erupted in 1930 with the breakdown of the Teichman truces of 1918. Without the reports from Tachienlu of the Tibetan interpreter Paul Sherap (supplemented by information from missionaries, notably R. Cunningham of the China Inland Mission) the events of the early 1930s would have been indeed mysterious to historians relying on the British archives. With someone like King, Coales or Teichman in residence at Tachienlu and capable of some measure of active intervention as in the days of Chamdo and Rongbatsa, however, that crisis might have had a very different outcome.

A long term consequence of King's removal, which can well be considered as one of Charles Bell's less creditable achievements, was that the direct management of relations between British India and Tibet soon became the effective monopoly of officials of the Government of India, with the Political Officer in Sikkim serving either directly or through subordinates as the *de facto* British envoy to the Government of Tibet. The role of the British Legation (Embassy from 1935) in Peking, which had been so active in the Teichman era and earlier, was now largely that of postman and supplier of intelligence on Chinese attitudes. This is something that the Government of India had wanted ever since the days of the Younghusband Expedition.

To bring this Chapter to an end, and as a kind of appendix to it, we ought to comment on the consequences for the Tibetan question of the Washington Conference and its immediate aftermath. Tibet was not formally raised during any of the sessions of the Conference,

during the course of which Alfred Sze did manage to obtain a renegotiation of the Shantung question more favourable to the Chinese. Both the Government of India and the Foreign Office must have been much relieved at this outcome. Bell had argued with all his considerable authority that "it seems essential that Tibet should be invited to send representative to Washington Conference if Tibetan question is to be raised there. In absence of such representative she is very unlikely to accept settlement arrived at".[257] After all, "it will no doubt also be borne in mind that for the last nine years Tibet has been independent of China, and is at least entitled to be consulted when her own fate is decided".[258] The Foreign Office could well do without Tibetan delegates in Washington.

Early in the Conference, however, in a rather oblique conversation between Arthur Balfour, the leader of the British delegation, and Wellington Koo, it had been implied that British support for China over Shantung would be in some unspecified way linked to the Chinese being prepared to talk once more about the Tibetan question when the Conference was over, as they had already indicated they would.[259] Hence, at a meeting at the Foreign Office on 14 February 1922, presided over by Victor Wellesley, advised by Eric Teichman, and with Wakely and Bell (now in the process of retiring) as India Office representatives, it was decided to ask the Peking Legation "to take the first favourable opportunity of pressing the Chinese Government to resume negotiations for a settlement of the Tibetan question", the Washington Conference having ended.[260]

The problem, of course, was what exactly to negotiate about; and here a considerable difference of opinion emerged between Bell, who thought that the only possibility was to return to the Simla Convention of 1914 as the basis for discussion, and the Foreign Office who argued that a great deal of water had passed under the bridge since then and the Chinese were unlikely to agree to anything so retrograde. In the Foreign Office view the Chinese could not be expected to be particularly enthusiastic now about the concept of a division of Tibet into Inner and Outer zones as defined in 1914. Bell pointed out, however, that the Tibetans still felt that both Tibetan zones, Inner as well as Outer, were really theirs, and that it would not be easy to stop them trying to extend the boundaries of "autonomous" Tibet into Inner Tibet whatever might be marked on maps in London, India or Peking: they would certainly resist the abandonment of any of Inner Tibet, even if in theory only, to China.[261]

The Government of India, as usual when Tibet was being discussed by British officials outside its jurisdiction, began to feel anxious lest its true interests be ignored. The reopening of talks on Tibet with China was fraught with difficulties. They had reason the believe that the Tibetans had come to look upon the text of the 3 July 1914 Simla Convention as holy writ, and that it would not be easy to induce them

to depart from a single letter. The Chinese had made their May 1919 proposals: but would they still abide by them? While not convinced that any good would come of it, the Government of India were "prepared to make every effort to induce Tibet to accept a settlement satisfactory to China, on the basis of the Draft Convention of 1914, modified in accordance with China's wishes as expressed in her offer(s) of 1919".

Nevertheless, the Government of India feared that what might actually happen on this basis was, as it were, the mirror image of 1914, a tripartite agreement accepted by Britain and China and repudiated by Tibet. They were now suggesting they were also prepared to explore the possibility of something rather different, bipartite Anglo-Chinese talks either in Simla or London, preferably the former, in which the Tibetan interests would be represented by Sir Charles Bell. Perhaps the Chinese would object to talks in Lhasa; and there was no way in which the Tibetans would agree to Peking as the venue. The Government of India, however, would undoubtedly be happier to leave things in their present state of legal uncertainty but practical convenience for Indian interests.[262]

Lord Peel, the Secretary of State for India, agreed with the Government of India. The *status quo*, which appeared to leave the Tibetans in possession of Derge (on the west of the Rongbatsa line) was surely preferable in the eyes of the Lhasa Government to the line proposed by the Chinese in 1919 as the Inner-Outer Tibet frontier. Lord Peel, therefore, suggested that it might be worth trying to persuade the Chinese to turn the 1918 Teichman line of Chamdo and Rongbatsa into the accepted permanent Sino-Tibetan border, if only as an opening move.[263]

On 13 September 1922 Sir Beilby Alston, the British Minister in Peking, once more raised Tibet with the Wai-chiao-pu where Wellington Koo was now in charge. He reminded Dr. Koo that it was just over a year ago that the Wai-chiao-pu had said that, once the Washington Conference was out of the way, it could focus its full attention on the Tibetan problem and continue the talks which had been broken off so abruptly in 1919. Alston noted that

> the matter was really very simple. Both Chinese and Tibetans had agreed to the Tripartite Convention of 1914, except for the boundary clause, which China had been unable to accept. In 1919, however, the Chinese had put forward boundary proposals which His Majesty's Government had undertaken to submit to, and recommend for the acceptance of, the Tibetans. It was at this point that the conversations had been broken off. Was His Excellency . . [Dr. Wellington Koo] . . now prepared to resume them in accordance with the assurance given a year ago?

The short answer from Dr. Koo was "no". He pointed out that the 1919 negotiations on the question of Tibet had aroused a great deal

of public concern in China. In the circumstances he did not feel he could say anything useful without first sounding the views of the Chinese Parliament which was, unfortunately, not at that moment in session. When asked whether the present Parliament were "really capable of dealing with such a question", Dr. Koo said that perhaps it could not do so "officially" but, all the same, "it was necessary to have an exchange of views and come to an agreement with the leading elements". Meanwhile, Dr. Koo would not forget about Tibet.[264]

Alston was in no doubt as to what this meant. Dr. Koo was just possibly himself in favour of coming to a settlement over Tibet; but Chinese opinion was not propitious and the present Chinese Government's position was precarious in the extreme. Should negotiations on Tibet ever be resumed, Alston was strongly opposed to anything like another Tripartite Conference in Peking, Lhasa, Delhi or London, which would only attract the maximum of publicity and needlessly arouse hostile reactions from the Chinese people at large. The best thing would be to act as if the only outstanding matter left unsettled in 1914 was the boundary (between Inner and Outer Tibet), and that China had made proposals on this very issue in 1919 which could well be treated as if they were still on the table. The British could agree to consider such ancillary issues as Tibetan representation in the Chinese Parliament, Chinese Trade Agents at the Trade Marts, British and Chinese representatives in Lhasa, and "the inclusion in the convention that Tibet remains an (autonomous) portion of the Chinese Commonwealth". In all this, however, the British should appear merely to be offering themselves "as a medium for the offer of a modified boundary to the Tibetans"; and on no account should they seem to be pressing the Chinese to negotiate about Tibet with Great Britain. China's position as "suzerain" in Tibet should never be seen to be challenged: important matters of face were involved here. This was no longer the China of 1913 or 1914. Weak though she was, she had a new pride and "the spirit of chauvinism which has since arisen renders her more than ever difficult to deal with". As an opening negotiating gambit, Alston thought something might be made of the Tibetan objection to the possible loss of Derge; but great care would have to be taken to avoid the impression that the Tibetans had actually rejected the 1919 proposals, otherwise the Chinese would simply declare them to be withdrawn once and for all.

Alston's private opinion was unambiguous. To raise Tibet with China at this time was not only unwise but also an almost certain waste of time. No Peking Government could survive the outcry which would result from the apparent surrender of any portion, however slight, of national sovereignty; so Tibetan negotiations were bound, one way or another, to fail. In any case, having gone to the trouble of arming Tibet, what was the point? The Tibetans should be able to fend off Chinese aggression for the moment. Why not just tell the Tibetans

"openly that there is for the time being no prospect of the Chinese coming to terms and to consolidate our relations with Tibet independently of China"? In these circumstances, Alston continued, what did it matter if the Chinese chose to go through the charade of having Tibetan representatives in their Parliament (one of whom, Jao Meng-jen, called on Teichman on 15 September 1922 to find out more about British policy towards Tibet)? Alston observed in conclusion that

> I consider that this question of Tibetan representation in the Chinese Parliament (which is of course mere make-believe on the part of the Chinese) while of great importance to Chinese face, is one of the minor points in the matter which we should be well advised to ignore.[265]

This was the effective end of the Simla Convention of 1914 and the Chinese 1919 proposals from the point of view of British diplomatic initiative in China. The Tibetans and the Government of India continued to be fascinated by these two might-have-beens; and in the late 1930s, under the influence very largely of Olaf Caroe, an attempt was made by the Government of India to pretend that something valid in international law really had emerged from the Simla proceedings in 1914. In fact however, in 1924, after debating the possibility of publishing the exchange of notes between the British and Chinese of August and September 1921 in the hope that this might stir the Chinese to some action, both the Foreign Office and the India Office decided to let the whole matter drop. It was deemed that the terms of Lord Curzon's ultimatum of 26 August 1921 had now come into force, and the British could consider themselves to be free to deal with the Lhasa Government as they saw fit without any reference at all to China.[266] Thus when in July 1930 the Labour Cabinet considered the proposals of the Secretary of State for India, Wedgwood Benn, to meet a developing crisis in Sino-Tibetan relations (which will be discussed in a later Chapter) by measures which involved the possible further supply of arms to the Tibetan authorities, it was decided not to reopen negotiations with China. While it was still British policy eventually to bring about a final settlement of the Sino-Tibetan problem including frontier definition, the Cabinet agreed that "no useful purpose would be served at the present time" by reviving those discussions which had started with the Simla Conference of 1913-14 and finally dried up after Alston's meeting with Wellington Koo on 13 September 1922.[267]

Oddly enough, it is possible that the Chinese themselves nearly reopened the negotiations in 1924. According to the Chinese historian Li Tieh-tseng, who made extensive use of Chinese sources both published and archival, in that year, with the coming to power of the first British Labour Government, the Wai-chiao-pu produced "a ten-point measure" for possible discussion with the British on the

Tibetan question. "But", Li wrote, "deteriorating conditions which reduced the central government in Peking to a government only in name prevented the measure from being carried out".[268]

181. L/P&S/10/716, King to Jordan, 10 January 1920.

182. L/P&S/10/716, Campbell to India, 19 December 1919.

183. L/P&S/10/716, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 23 December 1919.

184. L/P&S/10/716, Jordan to FO, 27 December 1919. Jordan discussed the Mission with Ch'en Lu on 26 December. Ch'en Lu said that it was sent by Kansu and in no way represented the Chinese Government. The Lamas with the Mission, moreover, were probably only along to collect expense money after which they would disappear. Jordan agreed: "Chinese Government would not in my opinion entrust serious negotiation to a Tibetan llama [sic] however pro-Chinese he might be".

185. L/P&S/10/716, Lampson to FO, 7 April 1920.
Miles Lampson, subsequently Sir Miles Lampson and then Lord Killearn, was Minister in Peking from 1926 to 1933.

186. L/P&S/10/716, Bell to India, 28 January 1920, enclosing Dalai Lama to Bell, 8 January 1920. On 8 January the Kansu Mission, according to the Dalai Lama, had not yet reached Lhasa.

187. L/P&S/10/716, Bell to India, 18 February 1920.

188. L/P&S/10/716, R.L. Kennion, Resident in Nepal, to India, 20 May 1920.

189. L/P&S/10/883, Bell to India, 5 March 1920.

190. L/P&S/10/716, Bell to India, 21 May 1920, enclosing Dalai Lama to Bell, 7 May 1920.

191. L/P&S/10/716, J.A.C. Tilley to E.S. Montagu, 9 April 1920. It is perhaps appropriate that Lord Curzon, whose first mission to Lhasa, that of Younghusband in 1904, had been so frustrated in its objectives by considerations of Russian sentiment which culminated in the 1907 Convention, formally brushed that Convention aside in authorising the next British Lhasa mission, that of Charles Bell.

192. L/P&S/10/716, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 May 1920.

193. L/P&S/10/716, Lampson to Curzon, 12 March 1920. King, unlike nearly all the other key figures in Anglo-Tibetan relations at this period like Teichman and Bell, had served in 1918 in France on the Western Front, where he was a Captain with the Chinese Labour Corps. His military judgement, therefore, should be treated with some respect.
Miles Lampson, then *chargé* at Peking, thought it vital that King should now get away from the Sino-Tibetan front line in the Marches as it would look increasingly as if his presence implied some kind of British protection for the Tibetans. See: L/P&S/10/716, Lampson to FO, 11 March 1919.

194. L/P&S/10/716, Bell to India, 13 March 1920.

195. L/P&S/10/716, Viceroy (Clear the Line Telegram) to Secretary of State, 23 April 1920.

196. L/P&S/10/716, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 23 April 1920.

197. The Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition was signed in Saint-Germain-en-Laye and Paris on 10 September 1919 by most of the by then large assemblage of Allies in the recent War against Germany. China was a signatory. The issue arose out of the Paris Peace Conference and related to the problem of the possible disposal of the enormous stocks of weapons, now surplus, to undesirables. The difficulty as far as Tibet was concerned was to be found in Article I which prohibited the sale of arms to any but the High Contracting Powers. Tibet, clearly, was not a High Contracting Power unless indirectly by virtue of a subordinate relationship to China (in which case, surely, the transaction should take place either through the Chinese Government or, at least, with its express consent). The Convention was to be valid for seven years.

In the end the question of the International Arms Control Convention seems to have been quietly dropped by the British. The Tibetans were supplied arms without having become signatories to any international agreement. Presumably, by supplying arms on a Government to Government basis from the British to Tibet without the approval of the Chinese Central Government there was an implication, to say the least, that the British Government regarded Tibet as in significant respects *de jure* not subject to China. For the text of the Conventions, see: T.N. Dupuy, & G.M. Hammerman, eds., *A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament*, New York 1973, pp. 96-104.

198. L/P&S/10/716, Memorandum by Mr. Bentinck on the Question of Arming the Tibetans, C.H. Bentinck, FO, 13 May 1920.

199. L/P&S/10/716, minutes of the meeting of 22 July 1922.

200. L/P&S/10/716, Bell to India, 26 August 1920.

201. L/P&S/10/716, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22 October 1920.

202. Originally the Lhalu family palace in Lhasa, where Younghusband had stayed in 1904, had been selected for Bell's residence; but in the end it was abandoned for something both nearer the Dalai Lama's favourite abode, and rather cleaner: and, of course, it was free of all unhappy memories of the British military occupation of the Tibetan capital. Thus the Dekyi Lingka house started its life as a kind of British Residency.

203. For Bell's own narrative, see: Sir C. Bell, *Tibet Past & Present*, Oxford 1924; Sir C. Bell, *Portrait of the Dalai Lama*, London 1946. The first book was evidently subject to some censorship by the India Office. The official report on the Mission, submitted by Bell on 29 November 1921, is to be found in IOR MSS Eur F112/303.

204. The Pa-lhe family had given shelter to the Indian explorer Sarat Chandra Das when he visited Lhasa in the early 1880s. When Das's visit had been discovered by the Lhasa authorities, the Pa-lhe had been most severely punished. Their main house, at Gyantse, was still deserted in 1920. Macdonald maintained that one of the achievements of Pa-lhe-se during the Bell Mission was to begin the restoration of the Pa-lhe to their former greatness. See: David Macdonald, *Twenty Years in Tibet*, *op. cit.*, pp.137-140.

205. Laden La took the place of Bell's original Sikkimese assistant Achuk Tsering, who died soon after reaching Lhasa.

Achuk Tsering died on 11 December 1920. Laden La did not reach Lhasa until the middle of March 1921. In the intervening period Bell must have depended very largely on Pa-lhe-se for advice, particularly after David Macdonald had been obliged by the Indian Government to return to Gyantse from Lhasa.

206. L/P&S/10/717, Bell to India, 24 January 1921.

207. N. Fitzmaurice at the British Consulate-General in Kashgar was sure that Bell's report of the presence in Lhasa of a senior official from Ili in Sinkiang was incorrect. Bell was certainly wrong about the status of this person; but that does not mean that the Sinkiang Provincial Government at Urumchi had not sent someone to Lhasa, perhaps a non-Chinese, if only to keep an eye on what neighbouring Kansu was up to. Kashgar was a long way from Urumchi; and British information on Urumchi politics at this period was far from perfect.
See: L/P&S/10/718, Fitzmaurice to Bailey, 10 July 1922, & Bailey to India, 5 September 1922.

208. This is very much what Bell's fellow Wykehamist, Olaf Caroe, was to argue a great deal more publicly some two decades later in his paper about "The Mongolian Fringe".

209. The guns which it was intended to supply were 2.75 inch light pieces which, when dismantled, could be carried as two mule loads. According to the Imperial War Museum these weapons were produced in large numbers in 1915 onwards; but, because of problems of stability owing to their light weight, they had not proved entirely satisfactory in service; and they were in process of being replaced by an improved design. They were no great loss to the military strength of India. Their provision, since they required some skill to use effectively, implied the training of artillery specialists. Whether Bell was aware of these technical considerations when he made up his list is not known.

210. For example, see: David Macdonald, *Twenty Years in Tibet*, *op. cit.* p.155. Macdonald probably exaggerated the numbers of Tibetans trained at Gyantse at this early period.

211. For an account of the education of the four Tibetans in England, see: Tsering Shakya, "Making of the Great Game Players. Tibetan Students in Britain Between 1913 and 1917", *Tibetan Review*, January 1986. After a period at Rugby, Mundo worked in the Grimethorpe Colliery and then took some courses at Camborne, including one on gold assaying. He was back in Tibet by the end of 1916. He visited England again in 1920; and on his way back to Tibet he spent some time at the Kolar gold mine in Mysore in India. Mundo seems to have had no perceptible effect on the economic development of Tibet. Mundo was a monk.
Mundo is often referred to as Kusho Möndrong.

212. L/P&S/10/717, Bell to India, 19 January 1921; Bell to India, 21 February 1921.

213. L/P&S/10/717, Sir B. Alston to FO, 5 January 1921.

214. L/P&S/10/717, Lampson to Montagu, 13 April 1921.

215. L/P&S/10/717, Minute by Hirtzel, 7 April 1921.

216. For example: L/P&S/10/717, India to Bell, 11 January 1921. David Macdonald had a Sikkimese mother. His knowledge of Tibet was indeed extensive and, with the death of Achuk Tsering, Bell was in sore need of expert advice.

217. L/P&S/10/717, India to Bell, 17 May 1921.

218. L/P&S/10/717, Bell to India, 5 April 1921.

219. L/P&S/10/717, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 May 1921.

220. The murder of Sir L. Cavagnari in Kabul in 1879 had precipitated the Second Afghan War.

221. L/P&S/10/717, V. Wellesley to Montagu, 24 June 1921.

222. L/P&S/10/717, FO to Alston, 9 July 1921.

223. President Harding issued a preliminary invitation in July 1921 to the major Allied Powers to attend a Conference in Washington to discuss questions relating to the future conduct of affairs in the Pacific and the Far East. It assembled on 12 November 1921 with delegations from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and China, the last being represented by Wellington Koo and Alfred Sze (Sze Sao-ke). Subsequently it was joined by representatives from Belgium, Holland and Portugal, making it a true Nine Power Conference,

The Chinese and Japanese used the occasion to negotiate, with signature on 4 February 1922, a new Shantung arrangement which went some way to redressing what the Chinese saw as the grave injustice of the original Versailles Shantung settlement; though it would be unduly optimistic to say that the Chinese were completely satisfied with the result. It was, however, better than nothing; and it served to defuse somewhat the Shantung issue in the eyes of Chinese public opinion. While there may have been informal references to Tibet in private or semi-official discussions between delegates, Tibet never became a formal item on the agenda.

The British Delegation was led by Arthur Balfour.

The Conference, of course, is mainly remembered for providing the venue for the Naval Treaty which was to have such a profound effect on British and American policy towards naval construction.

On the Washington Conference, see for example: M. Sullivan, *The Great Adventure at Washington: the story of the Conference*, New York 1922; T.F.F. Millard,*Conflict of Policies in Asia*, New York 1924.

224. L/P&S/10/717, Alston to FO, 14 July 1921.

225. L/P&S/10/717, Lampson to Montagu, 29 July 1921.

226. L/P&S/10/717, Curzon to Alston, 26 August 1921.

227. L/P&S/10/717, FO to Alston, 27 August 1921.

228. L/P&S/10/717, Alston to FO, 31 August 1921; Alston to FO, 8 September 1921.

229. L/P&S/10/717, Wai-chiao-pu to Alston, 10 September 1921; Chinese Legation, London, to FO, 12 September 1921.

230. In the present author's view the decision to provide arms, even if against payment, to Tibet, and the resulting exchange of correspondence between the Government of India and the Dalai Lama and his Kashag, constitutes one of the strongest pieces of evidence for the argument that the British had come to look upon Tibet as autonomous in the conduct of her internal affairs rather like a British self-governing Dominion. The arms transactions were on a Government to Government basis; and the British Government had bound itself by various international agreements, as has been noted, not to supply arms to improperly qualified recipients. That arms shipments continued right up to the end of British rule in India is important testimony to the British official commitment to Tibet, even though, until the very last days of the Raj, the quantities were pathetically small, as will be discussed in later Chapters. The Chinese were well aware of the implications of these arms transactions in international law, and queried them on more than one occasion.

231. L/P&S/10/717, IO to Viceroy, 4 October 1921; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 19 October 1921; L/&S/10/718, Dalai Lama to Bailey, 22 May 1922.

232. Li Tieh-tsang, *The Historical Status of Tibet*, New York 1956, p.277. Li quotes a telegram from the Japanese Consul-General in Shanghai to the Japanese Foreign Minister (doubtless intercepted by the Chinese in some manner) of 28 September 1932 which refers to a contract of 1921 by the Japanese to supply arms to Tibet and which was still not completed. Under that contract, a decade or so later, the Japanese had supplied Tibet with 4 field guns, 8 machine guns, 1,500 rifles, 1,000,000 rounds of rifle calibre ammunition, 1,000 shells and 1,000 hand grenades. This appears to have been but part of the original order. How much was actually supplied in the early 1920s is not recorded. The revival of this contract in 1931 or 1932 was certainly a consequence of the crisis in Sino-Tibetan relations in Eastern Tibet which broke out in 1930.

233. The training of young Tibetan officers at establishments in India, such as those at Quetta and Shillong, started shortly after Bell's return from Lhasa. These Indian trained officers, who usually came from the middling ranks of the upper classes, could well be seen as a potential threat to monastic power. Most of them suffered professionally during the great reaction against change which took place in 1924-25, as will be discussed in the next Chapter.

In December 1921 training of Tibetan troops at Gyantse, which had been the subject of a short experiment in 1915, was started again. A British establishment of one British Officer in charge of instruction, assisted by an Indian Officer, 4 Drill Havildars and 4 Drill Naiks, was capable of handling intakes of up to 100 men at a time (considerably less than the 250 requested by Tsarong Shape). The Tibetan Government were charged for the costs of this training. See: L/P&S/11/203, P. 4946.

234. The Tibetan Government had asked the Government of India in 1915 to extend the telegraph from Gyantse to Lhasa. At the time this proposal was seen to contain a potential conflict with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and was, accordingly, rejected. Bell told Tsarong Shape at a meeting in Gyantse that the War made telegraph extensions impracticable: the real reason, the Russian factor, was not of course mentioned.

In 1919, after reports of a Japanese company (Mitsui) being in the process of organising a wireless network in China including Tibet, the Government of India proposed to supply the Tibetans with two wireless sets, one of high power in Lhasa and a lesser powered one to be sited in Eastern Tibet, perhaps in Chamdo. There were two main objectives, to prevent the Japanese obtaining a wireless concession in Tibet and to keep an eye on events in the Marches. Diplomatic problems both with the Japanese and the Chinese, the latter at this time seeming to be prepared to reopen the question of the Sino-Tibetan border, decided the British to abandon the idea. Lord Curzon did raise the issue of a possible Japanese wireless station at Batang with the Japanese Ambassador in London: the Ambassador said that there was no question of such an installation, if only for lack of funds.

In May 1920 the Tibetan Government again asked the Government of India to arrange for the extension of the Gyantse telegraph line to Lhasa. Bell, who was at this time awaiting a decision whether he would be permitted to undertake a mission to Lhasa, argued that the need to arrange the telegraph extension was justification in itself for the Lhasa Mission. The Government of India decided that the telegraph extension ought to go ahead subject to two conditions. First: for diplomatic reasons the line between Gyantse and Lhasa would have to be the property of Tibet, for which country the British would only be acting as agents. Second: there should be a preliminary survey of the line.

The survey was entrusted to J. Fairley, Superintendent, Telegraph Engineering, Delhi Division, who was deputed to this task before the Bell Mission was

mounted. Fairley, therefore, was the first Englishman to reach Lhasa since the Younghusband Expedition in 1904. He was granted an audience with the Dalai Lama on 14 October 1920.

The Gyantse-Lhasa link of the telegraph was constructed under the supervision of W.H. King of the Bengal Telegraph Department. It was completed by the beginning of August 1922. On 7 August 1922 the Viceroy, Lord Reading, exchanged ceremonial messages with the Dalai Lama; and shortly after this a message from King George V to the Dalai Lama was despatched over the line.

Subsequent maintenance of the line was for some years the responsibility of one Mr. Rosemeyer who in the 1920s certainly visited Lhasa on more occasions than any other European, no less than seven according to Bell. Rosemeyer had previous Tibetan experience: he had been in charge of the telegraph office at Phari in early 1910 when the Dalai Lama reached that desolate spot during his flight from Lhasa to India and had arranged for the Dalai Lama to be provided with accommodation in the British governmental staging bungalow. Rosemeyer while supervising the Gyantse-Lhasa line was an employee of the Tibetan Government.

W.H. King, after completing construction of the Gyantse-Lhasa line, set up a telephone system in Lhasa linking the Norbu Lingka Palace with the Potala and the offices of the Kashag.

Just before he left Lhasa, Bell negotiated a formal agreement with the Tibetan Government over the future conduct of the Tibetan telegraph system.

The Lhasa end of the new line was at first looked after by a Nepalese operator seconded by the Bengal Telegraph Department. The Tibetan Government put Kyipup, one of the four boys who went to Rugby and who had subsequently taken a course in telegraphy in India, in overall charge of the Tibetan telegraph system.

See: Macdonald, *Twenty Years in Tibet, op. cit.*, pp.287-288; D. Macdonald, *The Land of the Lama. A description of the country of contrasts & and of the cheerful happy-go-lucky people of a hardy nature & curious customs; their religion, ways of living, trade & social life*, London 1929, pp.61-62; W.H. King, "The telegraph to Lhasa", *The Geographical Journal*, 63, 1924; Bell, *Dalai Lama, op. cit.*, pp.83-84, 362. See also: L/P&S/11/152, File P 2647, which contains papers on this subject, notably; India to Secretary of State, 16 April 1919; minutes of FO Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs, 1 July 1919; FO to Alston, 27 September 1919; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 July 1920; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 26 July 1920; Bell to India, 12 June 1920; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 7 August 1922; Bell to India, 7 October 1921; India to Bailey, 30 August 1923.

235. The idea of setting up an English school in Tibet was first discussed between Bell and the Lönchen Shatra during the Simla Conference of 1913-1914. In June, July and August 1921 the Kashag approached Bell to remind him of this project, to be established either in Gyantse or Lhasa. Bell thought Gyantse the better site: in Lhasa the solitary English schoolmaster might get rather lonely while in Gyantse there was the staff of the British Trade Agency for company. The first (and only) headmaster, F. Ludlow, was appointed in early 1923. His salary, Rs. 600 per month rising to Rs. 1,000, was to be paid by the Tibetan Government who were to be responsible for all the expenses of the school.

236. For an excellent assessment of the achievements of Sir Charles Bell, see: C.J. Christie, "Sir Charles Bell: a Memoir", *Asian Affairs*, February 1977. Christie has made use of the Bell papers in the British Library and the India Office Library and Records.

237. Personal communication by the late F.M. Bailey to the author in 1954.

238. Loseling College had a particular financial interest in the revenues of Tawang, which territory it may have been aware the Government of India had notionally acquired from the Dalai Lama or his representative, the Lönchen Shatra, in 1914. This may have been one cause of resentment and opposition.

239. Christie, "Bell", *loc. cit.*

240. Richardson, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p.124. Bell was very critical of the way in which this geological work was executed. See: Bell, *Portrait of the Dalai Lama, op. cit.*, p. 342.
For some account of Hayden's work, see: Hayden, H.H., & Cosson, C., *Sport and Travel in the Highlands of Tibet*, London 1927; Morshead, H.T., "The topographical results of Sir H. Hayden's expedition to Tibet in 1922, compiled from the verbal narrative of the Surveyor, Gujar Singh", *Records of the Survey of India*, 18, 1924.
Hayden and Cosson made a remarkable journey to the Nam Tso and some of the other great lakes to the north of Lhasa. Their account devotes much space to the hunting of game and virtually nothing to geology. Their journey was much helped by Mundo (or Möndrong).
Hayden, having just retired from the Indian Geological Survey, in July 1921 applied for permission to travel in Tibet. He then volunteered his services to carry out a survey of the mineral resources of Tibet. His offer was accepted and the Tibetan Government agreed to pay the costs of his work, though Hayden declined to accept any fee. He was in Tibet from April to September 1922. His report, "Note by Sir Henry Hayden on the Economic Results of his visit to Tibet", is not very impressive. He found some moderately interesting gold prospects. He thought that Tibetan coal was of no value whatsoever. There was a little copper. He found one dome structure which, along with traces of asphalt (but no oil seepage), might possibly indicate the presence of petroleum. He saw nothing, however, to justify the establishment of any mining ventures. See: L/P&S/11/210, P 266.

241. See: W.M. McGovern, *To Lhasa in Disguise: an account of a secret expedition through mysterious Tibet*, London 1924.

242. See, for example: Bell, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp.258-259.

243. The various British press comments on Bell's return are in L/P&S/10/717. This report was subsequently corrected. Thus *The Times* of 9 December 1921 stated that "it is emphatically denied that Mr. Bell brought back with him a draft Anglo-Tibetan Treaty"; but the Chinese certainly remained unconvinced.

244. The Chinese, of course, were less worried about specific treaties than the wider implications of the British supplies of arms to Tibet in that they reflected generally upon Tibet's international status.
For the British denial, see: L/P&S/10/717, Victor Wellesley to Chu Chao-hsin, 15 December 1921.

245. See, for example, L/P&S/12/4194, f.392.

246. Paul Sherap, too, has found his place in the literature. See: G.A. Combe, *A Tibetan on Tibet. Being the Travels and Observations of Mr. Paul Sherap (Dorje Zödba) of Tachienlu: with an Introductory Chapter on the Devil Dance*, London 1926.
G.A. Combe was in charge of the Chengtu Consulate-General in 1924 and part of 1925, handing over to J.B. Affleck. He met Sherap on his first visit to Tachienlu in 1924 and, it seems, recruited him into the British service.
Sherap was born in 1887 at Rongbatsa. His father was actually a Mongol; but his mother was Tibetan and it was in the Tibetan culture that he was brought up. He travelled widely from the time of his childhood. While living in Darjeeling he both learnt English and became a Christian (Protestant) taking Paul as his baptismal name.
When Combe first met Sherap in Tachienlu he was making his living as a merchant in the Szechuan-Tibet trade, an occupation which he no doubt continued when he undertook his work for the British. He was a close friend of the Rev. R. Cunningham of the China Inland Mission at Tachienlu (who was

another very useful source of information to the British Consulate-General, first in Chengtu and then in Chungking). Combe thought very highly indeed of Sherap.

247. L/P&S/10/883, King to India, 28 April 1921.

248. It is not impossible, though we have no direct evidence on this point, that some of King's despatches, or extracts from them, were actually shown to Tibetan officials.

249. L/P&S/10/884, Tsongdu to Bell, 31 October 1921.

250. For the Tibetan complaints concerning King, see: L/P&S/11/204, File P 5360/1921.

251. L/P&S/10/884, Foreign Office to India Office, 29 June 1922.

252. L/P&S/10/884, India to Bailey, 1 August 1922.

253. L/P&S/10/884, Foreign Office to India Office, 2 October 1922.

254. L/P&S/10/884, India to IO, 30 November 1926.

255. L/P&S/10/884, Affleck to Macleay, 30 November 1926. When completed, the road would, Affleck said, reduce the journey from Chengtu to Tachienlu to no more than three days. The road, however, was not to be opened fully for many years to come.

256. L/P&S/10/884, Foreign Office to India Office, 10 March 1927.

257. L/P&S/10/717, Bell to India, 20 August 1921.

258. L/P&S/10/717, Bell to India, 22 August 1921.

259. L/P&S/10/717, Balfour to FO, 18 November 1921.

260. L/P&S/10/717, FO to IO, 21 February 1922.

261. L/P&S/10/718, IO minute, 1 March 1922.

262. L/P&S/10/718, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 24 April 1922.

263. L/P&S/10/718, IO minute, approved Political Committee 1 June 1922.

264. L/P&S/10/718, Minute of Wai-chiao-pu interview, 13 September 1922.

265. L/P&S/10/718, Alston to Curzon, 18 September 1922.

266. L/P&S/10/718, Minute by H.A.F. Rumbold, 11 June 1930.

267. L/P&S/10/718, Cabinet Paper 280(30), July 1930. See also: Mehra, *North-Eastern Frontier*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p.41.

268. Li, *Tibet*, *op. cit.*, pp.146-147. Li evidently was at one time connected with the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission; and he made abundant use of its records which, of course, very much represent the Chinese point of view; but they are extremely useful to those who have no direct access to other Chinese sources. Unfortunately, these sources by no means cover all aspects of Sino-Tibetan relations.

VI

BAILEY AS POLITICAL OFFICER IN SIKKIM, 1921-1928

For a few years following Bell's return from Lhasa in 1921 it seemed to many Western observers that Tibet was really entering the 20th century under British guidance. Brigadier-General Bruce contributed a long article to *The Times* in 1924, on the eve of the 3rd Everest expedition, in which he spoke of Tibet as now to all intents and purposes a country totally independent of China; and other press reports of this era noted the beginnings of a programme of modernisation, what might almost be described as the "electrification" of Tibet because of the initiation of minor hydroelectric schemes in the Lhasa region and the Chumbi Valley.[269] From the point of view of British policy these apparent changes in Tibetan attitudes were of the greatest importance as indications of the likelihood of Tibet's continued survival as a satisfactory buffer to British India's northern borders.

Tibet was still an anachronism, a regime which would not have seemed out of place in the days of the great 18th century Manchu Emperors K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung. Indeed, many of the features of its administration which so amazed modern visitors *had* actually been imposed or confirmed by one or other of those two great Emperors.[270] In the 20th century, particularly after the fall of the Manchus in 1911, Tibet was a very odd regime indeed.[271] It was a theocracy which would have aroused the envy of Pope Julius II. While it was dominated by a "feudal" nobility whose powers would have greatly impressed any European magnate in the later Middle Ages, its politicians could not afford to ignore for a moment the importance of the monasteries, and it had more monks per capita than any other country in the world past and present, perhaps a quarter of the total male population. Its prevailing ideology was a variety of Buddhism which, on the face of it, eschewed violence in all its forms; yet the actual workings of its politics were both violent and brutal. Monks could go on the rampage and defy such forces of law and order as there were. Politicians who had lost power could be charged with sorcery, blinded and cast into dungeons with a lack of due process

which might have shocked a post-Renaissance European Absolute Despot, even in Russia. A large proportion of the common people were subjected to many of those features of serfdom which the Tsars had abolished in 1861. There were some leading Tibetans, notably the 13th Dalai Lama (though he was capable of autocratic cruelty when he was so moved), who came to see that some form of social reform was urgently called for; but they found it virtually impossible to swim against the tide. The lower orders in Tibet did not of necessity enjoy this state of affairs; but they possessed in remarkable degree the ability to tolerate suffering, and they believed that there was some profound religious significance behind it all of which they were convinced and which they were very reluctant to undermine.

Despite their feelings of racial superiority over the Tibetans, the Chinese (or at least the more enlightened of them of which there were a significant number) were determined to bring about some reform to this polity. In the areas of ethnic Tibetan population which they controlled in Kham and Amdo there were some (though by no means all) Chinese officials who initiated sincere programmes to bring about major social change. The intention was there, even if the methods of implementation often left a great deal to be desired (but the critics of Chinese policy at this period should for purposes of comparison always keep in mind the horrors of the "Cultural Revolution" still far in the future – and perhaps Chao Erh-feng at his most ruthless never imagined anything quite like *that*). It was this phenomenon of the presence, even if rare and ineffectual, of a genuine interest in progress to which Louis King was alluding in his various comments on the marginal benefits of Chinese rule in Eastern Tibet which so disturbed Charles Bell. Not that Bell, in his private thoughts, did not perceive that there was something in what King was saying.

The essential point, however, which Bell understood was that in order to maintain the Tibetan buffer so important to British Indian frontier policy, to push too hard for change was to threaten to bring down the entire traditional edifice as had happened in Outer Mongolia after the Revolution of 1921. What then would replace the old Tibet? The Dalai Lama's Government could be nudged very gently towards initiating reforms; and in the last months of his life the 13th Dalai came to appreciate that something must be done very rapidly indeed in this direction. His death in 1933 frustrated this initiative, if that is what it was. The result was that the old Tibet, with most of its defects either intact or very slightly ameliorated, survived until the arrival of the Chinese "liberators" in 1950-51.

Many of the problems confronting the Tibetan Government arose from its theocratic nature. Theocracies have not been greatly studied by political scientists – they are now, after all, a very rare species; and so we do not have a widely disseminated general theory of theocratic society such as exists for other polities. There are a number

of fairly obvious features present in 20th century Tibet which could also be detected in the history of the medieval Papacy, even though this particular analogy can be in some respects highly misleading; and it should be employed with caution.

Theocracies usually contain a supranational element. Politically the Dalai Lama might claim certain powers in Tibet, however that term might be defined; theologically he possessed authority over a far wider area in China, Mongolia, Manchuria and Russia where he was a spiritual leader to many peoples but where he could in practice exercise no temporal power. Theocrats, however, all too often tend in their minds to blur the distinction between temporal and spiritual powers, between what, to take again the classic example, the Pope could do in the Papal States and what he could do in England or France. The Dalai Lama of Tibet was no exception to this tendency. While he never claimed temporal power in, say Mongolia, where, indeed, there was well established until the 1921 Revolution another Incarnate theocrat, he did so in many parts of the world inhabited by linguistic and cultural Tibetans, as well as a few adjacent Mongols around Lake Kokonor and the Tsaidam swamp, where the inhabitants in fact did not accept that authority. The great arguments about the boundary between China and Inner and Outer Tibet, which were a major factor in the failure of the Simla Convention of 1914, were mainly concerned with this issue, what correlation could there be made between the Dalai Lama's spiritual and temporal powers to the east and north-east of Lhasa.

Theocracies may claim some form of paramountcy over the entire administrative structure of the religion to which they belong. The Dalai Lama, for example, maintained that he had authority over religious establishments outside Ü and Tsang which belonged to other sects, Nyingma and Sakya for example, as well as to his own Gelugpa sect. Some observers, like O.R. Coales, looking at the Tibetan scene from the eastern (Chinese) side, were inclined to doubt the validity of the Dalai Lama's pretensions in this respect. Others, like Charles Bell for instance, with a Central Tibetan viewpoint, supported the case presented by the Dalai Lama. The Dargye-Beri crisis which broke out in 1930 (which will be discussed in the next Chapter) rather suggests that sectarian conflict within the world of Tibetan Buddhism had considerable political import.[272]

The problem of the succession is an inherent weakness in theocracies. Who appoints the theocrat? Other, lesser, theocrats. The Buddhism of Tibet and Mongolia had evolved its own solution, that of succession by reincarnation. The soul of a theocratic Incarnation upon his death migrated, not of necessity at once, into the body of a child who became the successor because he *was* the same as the person he (or she, for this system was not in essence sexist, though male theocrats did not seem to reappear as women, or *vice versa*, and

female Incarnations were in any case exceedingly rare) had succeeded.[273] But, at the end of the day, members of the theocratic elite (after making due allowance for other political factors) made the decision whether the child in question really was the Incarnation (or "Living Buddha") or not. The system was, in practice, extremely complex, relying greatly on oracles and sometimes containing an element of lottery as well as the usual quest for signs of Incarnate status in the children under investigation; and it lent itself to manipulation in a number of ways, some of them devised by the Manchu Emperors of China or their representatives during the course of the 18th century.

Succession by reincarnation had one overwhelming defect from the point of view of strong Tibetan government.[274] The succession to the theocrat passed to a child.[275] The death of a theocrat, therefore, meant inevitably a long minority of the Incarnation when power would be exercised by some kind of Regency. It was always on the cards that the Incarnation might never survive to take over that power due to him. Dalai Lamas for most of the 19th century, indeed until the emergence of the great 13th Incarnation right at the end of that era, usually died at some period very close to their 18th birthdays; so, until the assumption of power of the 13th Dalai Lama in the 1890s, Lhasa was run by a succession of Regencies. This was generally thought to have been no accident; and the survival of the 13th Dalai Lama to full adulthood may well be accounted his greatest single achievement – without it there could have been no others.[276]

Had the Dalai Lama been the only Incarnation within the Tibetan Buddhist Church, the question of the persistence of Regencies might not have been so significant. In fact, of course, there were other Incarnations of varying importance, usually graded in Tibet into four ranks, the two great Incarnations of Lhasa and Tashilhunpo, then the four great Abbots of Lhasa, then some 60 or so Incarnations of particularly high status, and then, at the fourth level, the run of the mill "Living Buddhas" of which there may have been a thousand or more.[277] Many monasteries were ruled by them; and the world of Tibetan Buddhism at it is widest extent, involving not only the Dalai Lama's Gelugpa Sect but also the Nyingma, Sakya and other Sects, could have contained over six thousand monastic establishments of one kind or another (there were said to be several thousand in Tibet alone, virtually all reported to have been destroyed in recent years). Some Incarnations, such as that at Urga in Outer Mongolia, acquired temporal authority which, in its own sphere, rivalled that of the Dalai Lama; and the Dalai Lama, in his own Central Tibet (the Provinces of Ü, where Lhasa was situated, and Tsang, the site of Shigatse and Tashilhunpo), was challenged by the Panchen (or Tashi) Lama, the Incarnation from Tashilhunpo.

Panchen Lamas lived, on the whole, rather longer than Dalai

Lamas. Between 1737 and 1937 there were four Panchen Lamas, while between 1758 and 1940 there were no less than seven Dalai Lamas.[278] The great 6th Panchen Lama whom Warren Hastings' envoy Bogle met and with whom the British corresponded in the 1770s certainly enjoyed enormous prestige throughout the Buddhist world, particularly that part of it which lay within the sphere of influence of the Manchu (Ch'ing) Dynasty of China; and it may well be that his immediate successors were more important in Tibetan government during the 19th century than the regime in Lhasa of the 13th Dalai Lama cared to admit. It is reported that in 1728, under Manchu influence, the temporal power of the Panchen Lama was restricted to his own province, Tsang, with its capital at Shigatse, a decision which it is possible the 6th Panchen and his successors always had it in mind to modify. The Panchen Lama continued to exercise considerable political authority in Tsang right up to the end of 1923. Competition between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, whatever the merits of the pretensions of either might be, was undoubtedly a factor of great importance in Tibetan politics during that period when British India was in more or less direct diplomatic contact with Lhasa from 1912 until 1947; and it remains so to this day. It produced a crisis in 1923 which will be considered in greater detail below.

Incarnations could wield great power over monasteries (and their female equivalents) which acquired enormous prestige through the existence in their midst of such a figure; and monasteries could not be ignored in any decision of Tibetan government. The three great monasteries of the Lhasa region, Sera, Ganden and Drepung, contained together somewhere between 20,000 to 30,000 monks whose very presence could determine policy. The monasteries not only had monks in abundance, they also controlled estates all over Tibet and their influence permeated every facet of Tibetan society. They engaged in trade and they had their own connections with the outside world. In the Tsongdu (National Assembly), a body which in time of crisis, particularly in the absence or during the minority of a Dalai Lama, exercised decisive authority, individual monasteries were represented and the monastic voice was dominant. There were monasteries, like Drepung (the largest of them all) for example, which were far more sympathetic to the idea of closer links with China, both in Manchu times and under the Republic, than was the 13th Dalai Lama, and quite prepared to work for the implementation of their own foreign policy.

Apart from the monasteries there existed in traditional Tibet the influence of a small number of noble families who also considered that they had a right to be have their interests taken into account in all major policy decisions and whose attitude towards social reform did not of necessity coincide with that of the 13th Dalai Lama.[279] It was possible, though by no means easy, to enter or be elevated into

the great nobility: the simplest way was by membership of the family of a Dalai or Panchen Lama. Tibetan nobles were very conscious of their status; and they did not readily accept the authority of persons of lesser rank, a fact which was to prove a major obstacle to effective modernisation. The 13th Dalai Lama clearly strove to avoid too great a dependence upon the established nobility. Many of his key advisers, particularly in the post-1912 era, were men of rather different origin, like Lungshar (who was in fact of minor noble origin but certainly outside the charmed circle of the great Tibetan families), Tsarong and Kunphel La, the last the nephew it is said of the Lama's head groom. These "new men" could be introduced into the nobility. Tsarong, a simple soldier who had distinguished himself during the Dalai Lama's flight to India in 1910, was adopted into the great Tsarong family and married no less than three of the previous Tsarong Shape's daughters.[280] Lungshar married into the Shatra family, and one of his sons was adopted by the Lhalu, into which family he had also married. Yet these men, so the evidence would suggest, were never really trusted either by the old nobility or the monastic establishment.

Some great families also had their contacts outside the territory directly controlled by Lhasa. There was in addition a nobility based in what, in the terminology of the Simla Convention, was Inner (Chinese dominated) Tibet, spanning the range from the dynasties ruling major states to what in a European context might be called the petty baronage. Members of this class could be looked down on by the great families of Ü and Tsang; but they could also make their mark in Lhasa politics. A good example of this last phenomenon was perhaps provided by the Pangdatsang family (not a line of kings, but certainly of barons of some kind), whose base was at Po (Poteu) near Batang. One Pangdatsang, Yangpel, the head of the family, became in the 1920s the major economic force in Central Tibet (and remained so right up to the end of the British period in India) while other Pangda brothers either resisted Lhasa control in their home territory or even sided actively with the Chinese in Kham. In 1950, on the eve of Communist Chinese "liberation", the Pangdatsang were the most effective military focus in Tibet; and it is possible to interpret much of the tragic history of Tibet during the next decade in terms of a contest between the Tibet represented by the Pangdatsang and that which still seemed appropriate to the old Lhasa nobility.[281]

The Dalai Lama, therefore, who seemed to many foreign observers to be a theocratic autocrat of virtually unlimited power in (to use the Simla Convention terminology yet again) Outer Tibet, in fact had to steer a difficult course between a diversity of conflicting interests, the supporters of the Panchen Lama, the great monasteries, the old nobility, members of the leading Tibetan families of Kham and Amdo who for one reasons or another chose to establish themselves in

Lhasa; and there was no guarantee that he could always overcome their opposition to proposed change which seemed to threaten their various interests. He might indeed have been the "God King" of the more popular European and American accounts of Tibet; but he certainly was never absolute. The problem of where the real seat of Tibetan power lay, moreover, became more difficult to solve after the 13th Dalai Lama's death and the long minority of the 14th Dalai Lama which marked the final decade and a half of Anglo-Tibetan relations.

The small band of British specialists in Tibetan affairs in the service of the Government of India like Bell, Bailey, Weir, Williamson, Gould and, in the final years, Richardson, Ludlow and Sherriff,[282] were perfectly aware of the complexity of the structure of Tibetan politics, though (with the possible exception of Bailey who had travelled in the Marches) they tended inevitably to see it from a Central Tibetan viewpoint. Bell was under no illusion both as to the urgent need for social reform and the difficulty of achieving it; but he also felt that the 13th Dalai Lama provided British India with the best hope for stability beyond the northern borders of India and in his reports and despatches he did not go out of his way to point to difficulties which he hoped would somehow be surmounted. Bailey, less prolific in his writing, was blunter in his analysis both official and private. After his 1924 Mission to Lhasa he urged that the Dalai Lama be pressed most strongly to initiate reforms in the structure of Tibetan society and government which, as events were to show, the Dalai Lama was not then able or willing to do.[283] Indeed, the Bailey Mission was followed by a period of reaction in which many of the changes and initiatives, modest though they were, which had flowed from the Bell Mission were abandoned, reversed or simply allowed to stagnate.

It is a tragedy that Bailey did not write a book about his experiences in Central Tibet over so many years, as a member of the Younghusband Expedition right from its first stages at Khambadzong in 1903, then at various times as Trade Agent at Yatung and Gyantse, and finally, as Political Officer in Sikkim from 1921 to 1928. He was an acute observer and had a sharp analytical mind (as well as being a superb photographer and naturalist of the highest calibre).[284] He had concluded that the Tibetan situation in the early 1920s was inherently unstable and that, in some ways, it resembled that in Outer Mongolia just after the Russian Revolution (of the effect of which elsewhere in Central Asia he had considerable first hand experience).[285] He evidently believed that there were channels by which Bolshevik influence could find its way to Lhasa, just as Tsarist influence had two decades earlier, and through the personality of the same man, the Russian Buriat Aghvan Dorjiev, who apparently had thrown in his lot with the new order in Moscow. He was not prepared to dismiss out of hand the possibility that the final outcome might be something analogous to what had taken place in Mongolia in 1921

where a rather similar polity had fallen to the Communists. Failing major reform in Tibet the main protection against this eventuality lay in Tibet's relative remoteness from Soviet territory, an advantage which, of course, would disappear overnight if the Russians were to take over Sinkiang. In the 1920s Sinkiang seemed safe enough; but the danger was always there to become rather more significant a decade later.

Even if it could be kept free from external pressures, Tibet was not really secure. The Tibetan political structure might break up under the pressure of internal conflict to create the conditions in which dangerous ideologies might start to take root. The flight from Tashilhunpo towards Chinese territory of the Panchen Lama on 26 December 1923 promised just this.

The career of the 9th Panchen Lama was in some ways the mirror image of that of the 13th Dalai Lama. The two Incarnations were about the same age (the Panchen Lama only four years younger) and they lived for almost the same length of time, the Dalai Lama dying in 1933 and the Panchen Lama in 1937. While the 13th Dalai Lama was forceful and autocratic, the 9th Panchen Lama was retiring and modest to a degree which made many who met him think him timid and indecisive. In 1904, with the advance to the Tibetan capital of the Younghusband Expedition, the Dalai Lama had fled to Mongolia and China while the Panchen Lama had remained in Tibet and established excellent relations with the British, making a formal visit to British India in 1905-6. When in 1910 to escape the consequences of the Chinese lightning raid on Lhasa the Dalai Lama had sought refuge in British India, the Panchen Lama had stayed on in Tibet where he remained on reasonable terms with the Chinese who had declared that the Dalai Lama had been deposed. While the Panchen Lama during these years of Chinese domination of Central Tibet between 1910 and 1912 does not seem to have made any overt bid to replace the exiled Dalai Lama as head of the Tibetan theocracy, despite proposals to this effect from the Chinese, he did go to Lhasa at the invitation of the Chinese authorities; and there can be no doubt that the Dalai Lama was highly suspicious of his Tashilhunpo colleague's motives. After the Dalai Lama's return following the Chinese collapse in Central Tibet in 1912 relations between them were very strained.

In July 1912 under the general supervision of the British Trade Agent at Gyantse, Basil Gould, the two Incarnations met at Ralung (near Gyantse on the Lhasa road) where some kind of truce was patched up. A number of the Dalai Lama's ministers, however, never forgave the Panchen Lama for his "collaboration" with the Chinese. David Macdonald recounts that the Lönchen Sholkhang (one of the two Chief Ministers then acting jointly) asked him at that time to arrange for the publication in India of specific charges to this effect

which included a statement that by sitting while in Lhasa on a throne traditionally reserved for the Dalai Lama the Panchen Lama had at least indicated that he was considering seriously the usurpation of the Dalai Lama's place. Moreover, the Lönchen declared, the Panchen Lama owed the Lhasa Government a great deal of money.[286]

Money continued to be a cause of discord between Lhasa and Tashilhunpo. The Panchen Lama, who controlled the bulk of the revenues of Tsang but who made no contribution to the cost of general Tibetan government except in time of war, when it was said that he should pay a quarter of all expenses, showed no more inclination to contribute anything in the early 1920s than he had in the past. It could be argued that Tibet had been at war with China since at least 1912; and there was no doubt that the maintenance of an armed force in Kham, let alone the acquisition of arms and ammunition for it and for the new Tibetan army which was under contemplation following the Bell Mission, subjected Tibetan finances to a severe strain.

The Tibetan fiscal administration was in many ways as anachronistic as the theocracy. As individuals many Tibetans showed the greatest commercial acumen; but collectively they operated their national finances in a manner which would have seemed archaic even in the Tibet of the 18th century. The Tibetan silver coinage in general use was quite unsuited to large scale international purchases.[287] The Lhasa Government still failed to appreciate that the simple printing of currency notes on paper without any guarantee, let alone backing in bullion, did not result in a form of money acceptable to the outside world. The traditional methods of revenue collection did not provide the kind of wealth which could be turned easily, and above all rapidly, into negotiable bank drafts. The practices of the sale of offices and the farming of taxation were no more beneficial to the fiscal and administrative health of Tibet than they had been for that of France in the last days of the *Ancien Régime*. The implementation of the Tibetan military policy which had emerged from the Bell Mission certainly called for exceptional measures which turned out to be exceedingly difficult to implement; and it was galling to the Dalai Lama to know that the Panchen Lama was not bearing his share of the burden. By the end of 1922 the Panchen Lama was writing to Bailey, whom he had known well in earlier times, to complain about the exactions of Lhasa which was imposing on him, Rs. 6,50,000, 10,000 maunds of grain and 2,000 boxes of Chinese tea (the amount expressed in terms of goods rather than money, and the money being Indian rather than Tibetan, tells much about the financial structure of Tibetan administration); and he begged Bailey to intercede on his behalf with the Dalai Lama to get these demands reduced.[288] Bailey, not surprisingly, declined to get involved in such an obviously internal Tibetan matter.

Financial pressures exerted by Lhasa on Tashilhunpo were used by the Panchen Lama to justify his decision to leave Tibet. On 26 December 1923 with some hundred followers and a large baggage train he set out secretly for an unknown, and probably undecided, destination outside Tibet, either in Mongolia or in China. Immediately news of this reached Lhasa vain attempts were made to intercept him and bring him back. Having failed to stop the Panchen Lama, who by way of the North (Changlam) Road through Nagchuka had by July 1924 made his way to Lanchow in Kansu, the Lhasa Government lost no time in sending its own Dzongpöns to Shigatse to take over from his officials the reins of authority in Tsang. The Panchen Lama's property was seized and some of his relatives, including his nephew who was the Yabshi Kung, the head of his family, were placed under varying degrees of arrest. At times they were to be treated with great harshness. The common people were evidently much disturbed by the flight of the Panchen Lama; and rumours circulated in the bazaars that he would return with a great army of Mongols. Lhasa clearly would benefit from any demonstration that its authority had not been diminished.

Why did the Panchen Lama decide to cut and run at this moment? Was it simply because he did not want to meet the financial demands being made by Lhasa? Probably not. It is hard for an outsider to divine the motives of an Incarnation. There are, however, certain factors which cannot be ignored.

First: ever since his visit to British India in 1905-6 the Panchen Lama had feared the revenge of Lhasa. Indeed, he had only agreed to visit India under a guarantee of British protection against such an eventuality, a guarantee which was effectively repudiated by the Government of India and the India Office but to which the Panchen Lama still appeared to attach great importance. It is possible that his flight was designed in part to draw British Indian attention to his plight and to counter the comfortable relationship which had grown up between Bell and the 13th Dalai Lama.[289]

Second: it is possible that the policy of military expansion and modernisation, for which the Panchen Lama was now being asked to meet a proportion of the cost, was seen in Tashilhunpo as indicating a dangerous increase in the power of Lhasa which would threaten not only the position of the Panchen Lama but also the very fabric of traditional Tibet. Since this policy derived in the final analysis from the state of Sino-Tibetan relations of which the attitude of the 13th Dalai Lama was a vital element, the Panchen Lama may well have thought that by leaving Tibet he might be able not only to escape the danger of a too powerful Lhasa but also to bring about some kind of external diplomatic initiative leading to a lasting settlement of the Tibetan question. There were a number of possibilities, of which the most obvious was some kind of arrangement with China rather less

rigid than that which Lhasa had been prepared to consider since 1913. The Panchen Lama, however, during his long exile never seems to have ruled out entirely the chance of securing more support for Tibet from the British than the Dalai Lama had managed to do.

Third: it is also possible that the Panchen Lama was alarmed at the theological implications (as, indeed, were many other elements in Tibetan society) of the policy of modernisation, modest though it was, which emerged from the Bell Mission. He may have concluded that any settlement, even one which involved the recognition of a special Chinese position in Central Tibet, might be preferable to social changes which would undermine the very fabric of Tibetan Buddhism. It was often said that the Panchen Lamas were less important political Incarnations than the Dalai Lamas, but that they were rather more spiritual. Better Tibetan Buddhism under Chinese (or other) protection than Tibetan independence with religion diluted by the influences of external civilisation.

Finally: it may be that the Panchen Lama anticipated in the near future some *coup* from Lhasa, either on the orders of the Dalai Lama or, more likely, those of some of his favourites such as Lungshar, one of the rising stars in Tibetan politics, and simply made up his mind to run while there was still time. A deciding factor may have been the demand that he leave Tashilhunpo and live in Lhasa, where a residence was being prepared for him.[290] He may well have wondered what would happen to him if he did indeed make this move.

Whatever the motives for his flight, this sudden and unexpected action by the Panchen Lama created a situation which was to dominate Tibetan politics for the next fifteen years. As long as the 9th Panchen Lama was living in exile he was a potential challenge to the government in Lhasa, especially after the death of the 13th Dalai Lama in December 1933.

In Europe and America the Panchen Lamas have had, on the whole, a rather bad press. Most travellers to Tibet during the British period were inclined to see the Dalai Lama as the hero, be he the dynamic 13th or the delightful young 14th Incarnations. Few Western writers have had much good to say of the Panchen Lamas. Alexandra David-Neel, who visited Central Tibet both before and not long after the 9th Panchen's departure, wrote sympathetically about him.[291] He had an enthusiastic (but rather strange) American supporter in G. B. Enders.[292] Most modern Western students of Tibet, at least in the United Kingdom, have been inclined to dismiss the late 10th Panchen Lama as a Communist Chinese puppet.

The majority of Western observers, and particularly those British officials employed by the Government of India and the India and Foreign Offices who had to concern themselves with the practical implications of the dispute between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas,

were inclined to view the situation in political terms; and no doubt there were profound political issues involved. But, as the French scholar Jacques Bacot once pointed out, there was also a cosmological aspect to the problem which in the Tibetan theocracy carried enormous weight. The Panchen Lama was widely seen as the reincarnation of Amitabha (Amida), to many the holiest or most spiritual of the Bodhisattvas; while the Dalai Lama was the reincarnation of the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara, the essence of enlightenment and compassion. Both Bodhisattvas had their devotees throughout the Buddhist world and outside it as well. In Tibetan Buddhism, while a distinction could be made between the theological attributes of the two Incarnations, yet it was generally felt that the two together created a state of harmony which neither could achieve on his own. The quarrel between the two Incarnations was a quarrel of cosmic proportions comparable to the great battles of the Hindu epics; and it threatened the stability of the entire universe. Politically, therefore, it might be possible for the Dalai Lama to consider a Tibet without the Panchen Lama and, perhaps, *vice versa*; but theologically the two Incarnations needed each other.[293]

Theology apart, the flight of the Panchen Lama created a situation in Tibet which called for another British Mission to Lhasa, if only because the Political Officer in Sikkim was inevitably asked to act as a channel for mediation between the two Incarnations. There were, however, by 1924 a number of other reasons which suggested the wisdom of such a Mission.

Some fairly minor problems had arisen in connection with the three British Everest Expeditions between 1921 and 1924; and the possibility of further such ventures could well be improved by discussions in Lhasa.[294] There was the need to explain how it was that a British traveller, Dr. W.M. McGovern, had managed to elude the prohibitions of the Government of India to travel to Lhasa in disguise; and, in view of the fact that McGovern was not punished on his return to Indian territory, to convince the Tibetan authorities that he was not really a British spy.[295] There was the perennial question of Tibeto-Nepalese relations in which the Government of India had a vested interest in ensuring that oil continued to be poured on troubled waters.[296] There had long been problems arising from British Indian subjects sought by the Indian authorities who had taken refuge in Tibet and from Tibetans seeking asylum in India: these might possibly be resolved by means of some Anglo-Tibetan extradition agreement, though this was an idea with scant appeal for the Government of India.[297] The Indo-Tibetan border was not without its disputes, of which the so called Tehri or Tehri-Garhwal question (on which more in a later Chapter) had emerged in 1921 and proved to be particularly intractable.

More importantly, Bailey was evidently convinced that the

Bolsheviks had not abandoned the old Tsarist interest in Tibet: he well knew that the 13th Dalai Lama had remained in contact with Dorjiev. The Foreign Office in London also shared this anxiety; and it suspected that the Panchen Lama in his flight could well be headed for Moscow. Presumably Bailey had received reports of a Bolshevik inspired Mission to Lhasa in 1922, consisting of an Oirot (Altaic Turk) called Borisov and a Buriat, Vampilon, "a jurist", which had been sent from Russia with the advice and assistance of Dorjiev. Borisov and Vampilon had rather unproductive talks with the Dalai Lama who, so soon after the departure of the Bell Mission, was still enthusiastic about the British relationship and not in a mood to seek alternative diplomatic contacts despite the fact that the year before, presumably while Bell was still in Lhasa, he had not only sent an envoy to Moscow but empowered Dorjiev to act on his behalf in the Russian capital (a move of which the British do not seem to have been aware). It is probable that the main Russian objective in 1922 was to find out what exactly had transpired between Bell and the Tibetan Government.[298]

It was also desirable for Bailey to see how the Lhasa authorities, and the various interests there, were responding to the process of modernisation, the English school for Tibetans under construction in Gyantse with its Headmaster, Frank Ludlow, already appointed, the plans for hydroelectric installations, the Lhasa police being established by Laden La, the expansion of the Tibetan army, the proposed motor link between Gyantse and Phari. It made good sense, moreover, to explore possible further developments along these lines by direct discussion with the Kashag and the Dalai Lama.

Finally: there was the fact that after Bell's departure in 1921 the Dalai Lama continued to correspond directly with him rather than through his successor. This was, to say the least, embarrassing to Bailey. The Dalai Lama persisted in his personal relationship with Bell; and Bell refused to subject this correspondence to official scrutiny (though it was more than likely that it was clandestinely read in India by those in the Government of India who did that kind of thing). Bailey had good reason to believe that it was important, if he were to be the official British representative dealing with Tibet, that he establish in that capacity a comparable personal relationship with the Tibetan Head of State to that achieved by his immediate predecessor.[299]

The Panchen Lama situation, however, was paramount; and it was this that inspired the formal invitation for a visit which Bailey received at the beginning of March 1924 (perhaps with a bit of British prompting).[300] At this point the Government of India had already involuntarily become involved in the matter in that the Dalai Lama had formally requested them to prevent one of the Panchen Lama's officials from taking bullion from Tibet through Indian territory for

transmission to the Panchen Lama in his Chinese exile. The Indian view, on Bailey's advice, was that this would be unjustified interference in an internal Tibetan matter; but clearly some further explanation in Lhasa could do no harm.

The Foreign Office in London were not enthusiastic about the idea of a Mission and of the proposal of the Government of India that the Chinese should, as in the case of the Bell Mission, not be informed of it in advance but be presented with a *fait accompli*. They felt it could lead to Chinese protests which, in an election year in the United States, might receive American support.[301] They did not, however, overrule Sir R Macleay, the Minister in Peking, who saw no harm in the Mission on the terms indicated.[302] In the end the only caveat was provided by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary in the first (and brief) Labour Government, Ramsay MacDonald, who warned that Bailey should go easy on the Bolshevik question and in view of the recent British *de jure* recognition of the Soviet Union not turn the Mission into an anti-Russian exercise.[303]

At the last moment Bailey himself tried to postpone the Mission until 1925 because his father-in-law, Lord Cozens-Hardy, had just been killed in an accident, and Bailey wished to return to England with his wife.[304] Bailey was told the Mission must go ahead as planned. As in the case of Bell, permission was refused for his wife to accompany him to Lhasa.[305]

Bailey, accompanied by Major I.H. Hislop of the Indian Medical Service, was in Lhasa from 16 July to 16 August 1924. He followed as closely as possible the procedure devised during the Bell Mission, being accommodated in the same house near the Norbu Lingka palace.[306] He had frequent meetings with the Chief Minister, the Lönchen Sholkhang, and with the Kashag, and he had a number of interviews with the Dalai Lama. While Bailey did not replace Bell in the Lama's affections, a good working relationship seems to have been established. He had several discussions with the Nepalese representative in Lhasa, Major Balnar Singh, and he talked with the leaders of the Ladakhi community. He also met Pangdatsang, now emerging as the leading figure in Tibet's external trade; and he was introduced to several other Lhasa residents including the Russian Kalmuk Shara Sandjhieff from the Astrakhan region. He saw the arsenal at Dote, the site of the proposed hydroelectric installation near Lhasa, the bank note print works, the Lhasa mint and a textile mill. Of all the personalities whom he met he seems to have spent most time with Tsarong Shape, who was the real driving force behind the various schemes for modernisation then in progress or under contemplation. In his farewell call on the Dalai Lama he was presented with a pair of ponies and was asked to supply in return an ostrich, a request which certainly surprised him.

These are the major conclusions which Bailey derived from his Mission, starting with the more trivial.

He went into the question of Dr. McGovern's visit. He was assured that McGovern had neither met the Kashag in full session nor had a secret interview with the Dalai Lama, which he may or may not have believed, but which in his report he accepted as true.[307]

His discussions over the Gyantse English school revealed a certain hesitation on the Tibetan side. The cost was questioned. It was decided to settle on an initial intake of 30 pupils rather than the 100 originally planned. While the buildings were far from complete, F. Ludlow had already started teaching a small group of pupils English, mathematics, geography and other subjects except Tibetan, for four hours each working day. The Tibetan parents had thought this too much, and suggested that a three hour day would be preferable. Bailey concluded that the Tibetans authorities were for some reasons "luke warm" about the whole scheme, as, indeed, was soon to be demonstrated in a most concrete manner as we shall see below.

The hydroelectric projects (involving a small generating station for Lhasa and another to power a mint in the Chumbi Valley which was intended to produce a copper coinage to supplement the traditional silver tangka, minted at Lhasa) had yet to get off the ground, though the machinery, supplied by Armstrong Whitworth, was already in Kalimpong. It was agreed with Tsarong Shape, who was particularly concerned with this matter, that actual installation would await the arrival from England of Ringang, one of the old Rugby boys who had received training in this kind of engineering, before any further action was taken.

Tsarong Shape also showed great interest in the idea of a Gyantse-Phari motor route which Bailey persuaded him to leave under British Indian management; and he further proposed a motor road from Lhasa to Chushul on the Kyi Chu (flowing into the Tsangpo) on which he planned a flotilla of motor boats, the whole system being intended to supply Lhasa with agricultural produce. Tsarong Shape was fascinated by machines and had his own motor cycle (the make of which does not seem to have been recorded).

Laden La's Lhasa police force appeared to be doing well, its men decked out in smart uniforms. They had reduced considerably the Lhasa crime rate; but they had not won the universal affection of the traditional magistrates in the Tibetan capital. Bailey urged Laden La to act with caution and keep as low a profile as possible.

Military matters occupied much of Bailey's time with the Kashag who complained about the cost of maintaining a force in Kham adequate to meet the anticipated Chinese renewal of hostilities. They pointed out that next to religious expenditure the military were by far the most costly burden on the Tibetan budget.[308] They asked Bailey whether he could not, even now, secure a settled frontier in

agreement with China, if not as proposed in the 1914 Simla Convention then, perhaps, along the Teichman truce line; and, in any case, would it not be possible for the British, with their sources of information in China, to provide Tibet with advance warning of an impending attack? If so, the number of troops in the East might be reduced to 1,500 men. Bailey said, in a veiled reference to the absent Panchen Lama, that a united Tibet combined with clear evidence of a resolve to resist attack was the best guarantee against aggression; and he warned the Kashag that, with arms obtained from British India, on no account should the Tibetans attempt any offensive action of their own. It was unlikely, he pointed out, that China in its present state could come to an agreement on the Sino-Tibetan border that was worth the paper it was written on. He added that the Kashag should through better administration try to make Tibetan government more popular with the inhabitants along the eastern frontier, which did not always seem to be the case at present, since the winning of the affections of the local Tibetan population in Kham was worth a great many soldiers, guns and victorious skirmishes with the Chinese.

There were important discussions with Tsarong Shape on financial matters. Bailey explained to him some of the facts of economic life, particularly in relation to the printing of paper money; and he advised the Tibetans to establish a proper banking facility in Calcutta which they could use to pay for arms, machinery and other vital imports. Tsarong Shape by virtue of his office as master of the mint appeared to have been converted to the need to overhaul the system of Tibetan currency: he was already involved in transactions in bullion in Calcutta.[309] The Kashag jointly were less enlightened. They appeared to be ignorant as to what exactly the size of the revenue of Tibet was, though they had in mind schemes to establish various government monopolies to augment the funds at their disposal. They also proposed, with the expiry of the 1914 Trade Regulations due shortly (the Regulations would run for ten years and then, failing a specific request to the contrary by either party, be renewed automatically for a further decade), to impose some import and export duties. Bailey was not greatly impressed. He noted that

> in my opinion the reorganisation of their finances would settle many of the troubles of Tibet, but I do not think any one capable of doing this exists in the country. The only means of doing this will be for the Tibetan Government to obtain the services of a foreign expert, as Persia has done. This suggestion was not discussed, but I think if the proposal were put to the Tibetan Government it would be welcomed though the expert would find much obstruction from vested interests.

The question of the flight of the Panchen Lama, of course, was on everybody's minds. Bailey thought the Tibetan fear of the

consequences of this event was exaggerated. The Dalai Lama went to considerable pains to explain to Bailey the financial delinquency of Tashilhunpo. The Kashag were eager to see the Panchen Lama back; but if he came he should travel from China by sea and then through India and Sikkim and not overland through Amdo or Kham. Perhaps they already feared the return of the Panchen Lama at the head of a Chinese force such as was to seem a far from remote possibility in the 1930s. There were members of the Kashag who in 1924 interpreted the Panchen Lama's flight less in terms of reluctance to pay his taxes than as evidence of a pro-Chinese conspiracy by some of his advisers (though not, of course, by the Panchen Lama himself since Incarnations were above that kind of thing). Tsarong Shape, in the presence of the other three members of the Kashag, suggested that Bailey might on his way to England on leave drop in at Peking and persuade the Panchen Lama to come home, which was to be but one of many Tibetan attempts to secure British mediation to this end. Bailey politely declined, pointing out that Peking was not on his route. He did observe, however, that if left to his own devices the probability was that the Panchen Lama would become homesick and return of his own accord. The Chinese had their internal problems. They would soon get tired of the Panchen Lama and be only too pleased to see the last of him. Privately Bailey thought otherwise. He noted:

> I do not think he . . [the Panchen Lama] . . will trust any promises made direct to him by Lhasa, and I think that if the Government of India would consent to this extent to act as an intermediary, there would be a better prospect of the Tashi Lama's returning, and of removing a means of Chinese and Bolshevik intrigue in Tibet. This suggestion of mine was not discussed or even mentioned to the Tibetan Government.

The Panchen Lama's return would require more than Tibetan promises. It would call for firm guarantees from the Government of India respecting the Lama's safety and fair treatment.

During his visit Bailey had one extremely significant exchange of remarks with Tsarong Shape, who was clearly by far the most progressive of the personalities at the highest levels of Tibetan politics. What would happen if the 13th Dalai Lama should die? Tsarong Shape asked whether, in the event of his departure from this life being followed by an open conflict between the new military elements (which presumably included some of the young Tibetan officers already undergoing training at Shillong and Quetta) and the monks, the Government of India would intervene by sending in their own troops to restore order. Bailey wisely evaded the issue by pointing out that the Government of India were hardly likely to interfere to such a degree in Tibetan internal affairs. What, however, did Tsarong Shape have in mind? Was he thinking about a possible military coup directed against the more reactionary elements of the

Tibetan theocracy? Given the deplorable state of Tibetan governmental secrecy, it is probable that Tsarong Shape's questions were well known to other Lhasa politicians, a fact which may go far to explain some of the events which soon followed the departure of the Bailey Mission.

At one level Bailey's Mission report seemed optimistic. But underneath it all lay a deep pessimism concerning the Tibetan ability to bring about sustained meaningful reform given the massive vested interests involved. The problem lay in the basic nature of Tibetan government, that anachronism on which we have commented above. As Bailey put it:

> the Tibetan system of Government makes it very difficult to get things done. No one feels capable of taking any responsibility. Things of importance are referred to the *Kasha* – their cabinet of four *Shapes* – who have to submit a joint report to the Prime Minister. There may be interminable delays in this as, in the first place, it may be difficult to get the four *Shapes* together at all – when this has been accomplished they may not agree, or may put matters off for the collection of further information or for some such reasons and it may take several days for all four *Shapes* to make it convenient to meet again. Then the Prime Minister may refer the matter back to the *Kasha* causing more similar delays. Finally, when the Prime Minister has consented to submit a case to the Dalai Lama, His Holiness who is very busy with religious ceremonies may keep it a long time before giving a decision, or may refer it back to the Prime Minister and *Kasha* where it may again get caught up with further delays of the same kind. During the New Year practically no work of any kind is done for a month and at other times important religious ceremonies at which all officials have to be present prevent any work being done for several days. All high officials have to go periodically and drink tea at the Dalai Lama's residence though they do not actually see His Holiness. *All monk officials have to do this every day* [Bailey's italics].

It was in this context that Tsarong Shape's questions about the possibility of British intervention must be taken. There is an implication, albeit carefully disguised in Bailey's report, that in Tsarong Shape and the new British trained army lay the one realistic prospect for the emergence of a regime in Lhasa capable of serving as an effective buffer between British India and both the Bolsheviks and the Chinese on the long, virtually undefended, and largely undefined British Indian border in the Himalayas.[310]

Separate to Bailey's main report were his observations on the Bolshevik question. These the present author has not been able to discover in the British archives. In view of Ramsay MacDonald's declared hostility to raising the Russian bogey they may well have disappeared into some other filing system either not sent home from India or, like so many documents of security import, still closed to public inspection. One can only in the circumstances guess at Bailey's

conclusions which probably were that there did indeed exist a possibility of Soviet influence in Lhasa through Kalmuk or Buriat agents, as in the old days of the Dorjiev missions; but, if so, the danger was in 1924 latent rather than acutely present. There is no mention in Bailey's report of the 1922 Bolshevik Mission.

As far as Tibet was concerned the 1924 Mission to Lhasa was the climax of Bailey's career. For the remaining four years of his tenure of the Sikkim post Bailey had to deal with three major Tibetan problems, all of them touched upon during his Mission, but which had subsequently evolved in directions which were not favourable to British frontier policy. First: the process of modernisation of Tibet seemed to grind to a halt and then go into reverse. Second: fairly substantial evidence which could not be ignored came to light to suggest that the Bolsheviks were after all establishing some kind of dangerous bridgehead in Lhasa. Third: the struggle between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, whatever its causes or motives might have been, came no closer to resolution and constantly threatened to involve the British. All three problems were still there when Bailey handed over as Political Officer in Sikkim to Lt.-Colonel J.L.R. Weir in November 1928.

The Bailey Mission to Lhasa, rather as had that of Charles Bell, seems to have precipitated a major crisis in Tibetan politics. It gave a highly visible image to the process of modernisation which caused considerable alarm among those conservative elements of Tibetan society who were already disturbed by such signs of change as Laden La's new police force and the training abroad of young Tibetans, particularly as army officers. It did not require a university degree in political science to perceive that these changes could result in major shifts in power, let alone the disturbance of old ways of doing things to which a theological aura had become attached. With the Chinese threat for the time being in abeyance, it could be argued that the developing relationship between the Government of the Dalai Lama and the Government of India was not only no longer necessary but in itself a source of danger potentially as great as that from China. Against the background of the flight of the Panchen Lama the whole question of change was further emphasised by Bailey's visit. It seems to have polarised attitudes of the Tibetan ruling elite and centres of power, even though the Tibetan political system had not evolved to a stage which could support political parties in their generally accepted sense. Tsarong Shape, Commander in Chief of the Tibetan army and champion of the British connection, headed one faction, or, perhaps more accurately, tendency. Others, notably the leaders of the great Lhasa monasteries, found for a time at least a spokesman in Lungshar. The Dalai Lama had to strike a balance of sorts; and it evidently seemed to him that the conservatives possessed greater strength.

The arguments of the conservatives in Lhasa were greatly strengthened shortly after Bailey returned from his Mission by the affair of the Tibetan "dancers". During the course of 1924 no less than two groups of Tibetan monks, or persons purporting to be monks, turned up in England where they gave displays in public of various ritual dances of which at least some were believed to be of a religious nature.[311]

The first group, recruited from Darjeeling by a Parsee entrepreneur, appeared at the great 1924 Empire Exhibition at Wembley where they performed in association with the Indian pavilion. They were seen there by Ringang, one of the Tibetans educated at Rugby, who considered them an insult to the civilisation of his native country and to its religion. Ringang, who was probably the only person in England capable of appreciating the full significance of the performance, made his views well known both in India and Tibet. Bailey was much concerned about the impact that all this would have on opinion in Lhasa where it would be bound to be interpreted as an example of the kind of degradation which could emerge from a policy of opening up Tibet to external influences. Laden La was asked by Bailey to arrange with the enterprising Parsee, F.J. Bumgara, that any future ventures of this kind should follow a strict code of practice which rigidly excluded anything remotely blasphemous or offensive to Tibetan religious susceptibilities.

The second group of "dancers" presented Bailey with much greater problems. This was a party of seven Tibetans, said to be monks, who arrived in England in the beginning of December 1924. They had been recruited by Captain J.B. Noel of the 1924 Everest Expedition to perform traditional monastery dances in British cinemas as part of the show along with the Expedition film *The Epic of Everest*, for which Noel had been in charge of the production. Among the seven "dancers" were four genuine monks from the great Palkhor Choide monastery in Gyantse including a former Abbott. During the visit to England the "dancers" were accompanied as interpreter by John Macdonald, the son of David Macdonald who had recently retired from the post of British Trade Agent at Gyantse.

Before their arrival in England Bailey had heard nothing about the recruitment of the monks, which had been carried out in considerable secrecy, almost certainly with the active participation of David Macdonald. The Tibetan authorities had not been consulted. When news of the monks' departure became known in Tibet, which it did towards the end of 1924, the conclusion drawn by many in Lhasa was that the whole affair had been organised with the official approval of the Government of India. Noel and John Macdonald declared that the "dancers" were only going to perform secular and traditional folk dances and they would reveal no religious secrets; but no one in Tibet believed this for a moment. Nor did most Tibetans, and Bailey as well,

accept David Macdonald's denial that he knew anything about the scheme to which his son was party.

It is hard to quantify the consequences of the business of the Tibetan "dancers". There can be no doubt, however, that it did not help the cause of the modernisers in general and Tsarong Shape in particular. The Lhasa monasteries could point to these apparent acts of sacrilege as being typical of what could be expected if the process of departure from traditional ways were permitted to continue. It was certainly useful ammunition to be used against Tsarong Shape.

The attack on Tsarong Shape had begun almost immediately after Bailey's departure from Lhasa. Tsarong Shape, as has already been noted, had clearly nailed his colours to the mast of modernisation by such gestures as establishing the first of the hydroelectric projects (to be set up by Ringang) at Norbu Tsoke ten miles north of Yatung in the Chumbi Valley where electricity was to be used to power a modern mint for the production of copper coinage (this was soon to be closed down and replaced by a silver mint in Lhasa under the Dalai Lama's own control through Kunphel La). He was vocal in his enthusiasm for the establishment of motor transport in Tibet with a plan for a road from Gyantse to Lhasa by way of Shigatse to link up with the British projected Phari-Gyantse motor transport service.[312] He had made no attempt to conceal his approval of the growing British connection which had followed the Bell Mission: he devoted a great deal of time to the entertainment of two distinguished British visitors to Lhasa in 1922, Brigadier-General Pereira and Sir Henry Hayden (both of whom were much impressed by his charm and ability); and he went out of his way to meet Dr. McGovern in 1923, who had no business to be in Lhasa at all.[313]

In the latter part of 1924 Tsarong Shape embarked upon a prolonged excursion to India, in part business, in part devotional, and in part political, visiting Benares and Bodhgaya as well as Calcutta and Bombay, and calling on the Nepalese authorities in Katmandu on his way back.[314] During his absence his military office was challenged; and he wisely stepped down to be replaced as acting commander of the Tibetan army by Trumba Dzasa, a young nephew of the Dalai Lama who had no particular martial aptitude and, to boot, was reputed to be an opium smoker.

Another symptom of the times was the rapid decline of the Lhasa police force. Laden La had left Lhasa in November 1924 amidst rumours that he was involved in some scheme with Tsarong Shape and the military to seize power (most probably unfounded); and from that moment the police ceased to be a body of any weight. The force was handed over for a while to Mundo, one of the Rugby boys, who by the middle of 1925 had been reduced in rank.

Another possible symptomatic event was the reported attempt by the Tibetan Government to seek through China a source of arms

supply alternative to that from British India, a move which could well indicate a major shift in policy. There may have been a number of other endeavours in this direction which did not come to the notice of the British. What came to light towards the end of 1925 was the placing of orders for machinery for the manufacture of propellent for small arms ammunition through a Chinese Mohammedan silk merchant called Ma Chin-si. The equipment would be installed in Lhasa. Bailey believed the report to contain more than a grain of truth. He noted that the Tibetans had been trying to manufacture modern explosives in Lhasa for some time. In 1918 they had sent a young man to Dum Dum near Calcutta to acquire the necessary skills; but, unfortunately, he had been very idle and learned virtually nothing. The current report represented a fresh endeavour. There was an implication that in this instance Chinese experts would come to Lhasa to instruct in the proper operation of the new machinery.[315]

Tsarong Shape handled the deteriorating situation in Lhasa with great skill, on his return to Tibet retaining his position as a member of the Kashag (until 1930) with the polite fiction that his office as Commander in Chief was merely in temporary abeyance. Tsarong Shape was, when all is said, a great survivor: his luck eventually ran out when he died in Lhasa as a prisoner of the Chinese in 1959. Not so fortunate were some of the Indian trained Tibetan officers, of whom by the middle of 1925 six had been demoted and three dismissed (on the grounds, it was said, that they had cut their hair in the European manner). One consequence was that Tibet was deprived at a stroke of the artillery specialists trained at Quetta to handle the 2.75 inch mountain guns promised under the Bell 1921 arms package, and for which dumps of ammunition lay deteriorating either in Tibet or in Kalimpong awaiting collection. Tibet was throwing away crucial time to prepare for the eventual revival of Chinese attack, time which might never be made up.

In 1925 both Laden La and Norbu Dhondup went up to Lhasa to discover what was happening.[316] There were rumours of plots and counter-plots, many improbable and none capable of confirmation.[317] What was certain was that the combination of Lungshar and the conservative monasteries had persuaded the Dalai Lama of the need to put a brake on modernisation. Even the European press reported this development: *The Daily Telegraph* of 31 July 1925, for example, printed an excessively sensational headline "Civil War in Tibet. Modernism v. Lamaism". There was no civil war; but there had been a major change in policy. Laden La found the Lhasa police in a sorry state, shrunken from nearly 400 to just 100 men, with Mundo further degraded, deprived of his monastic status and soon to be sent off to an administrative position in Rudok in the extreme west of Tibet and about as far away from Lhasa as it was

possible to be. Norbu Dhondup saw the situation as not quite so bad as rumour indicated; but it was definite that the influence of Lungshar, who for the moment was "tilting" towards the Chinese rather than British India, was in the ascendant.

By the end of 1926 nearly all the progress and projects for Tibetan development since Bell had disappeared. The English School at Gyantse had been closed, and on 28 October 1926 Frank Ludlow, its Headmaster, took his leave of Gyantse.[318] While three Dodge trucks waited in Phari, no approval had been given to the Phari-Gyantse scheme, and probably never would: even the road for it had not been completed. The only bright sign, so to speak, was the turning on of a system of electric lighting, generated by water power and installed by Ringang, at the Dalai Lama's Norbu Lingka Palace.

In July 1927 Bailey, with a mixture of irony and realism so characteristic of much of his low key reporting, observed that

> it would not, I think, be correct to say that the attitude of the Tibetan Government is any less friendly to the Government of India than previously, but I think that the attitude has somewhat changed. I think that it would be nearer the mark to say that, having been relieved of the threat of Chinese invasion owing to the disturbed state of that country, the Tibetan Government are able to moderate the attitude of dependence on the Government of India, which they have adopted since the Dalai Lama's flight in 1910. In fact the attitude now adopted would appear to be the more normal one for Tibet which was temporarily altered by our action in 1904, and by subsequent action by the Chinese.[319]

It was if it had been decided in Lhasa that both Younghusband and Chao Erh-feng had never existed. The death in 1926 of the Lönchen Sholkhang, one of the last of the old guard from the time of the Dalai Lama's exile in India, and his replacement as Chief Minister by a nephew of the Dalai Lama, Silon Langdun, a youth of no conspicuous talents and a feeble match for Lungshar, probably confirmed this process.

It was against this background that potentially serious (from the point of view of the Government of India) Russian influence once more was detected in Lhasa.

By 1926 British observers of Chinese politics were only too well aware of the rise of Soviet influence in the Southern faction of the Kuomintang, which claimed to be the true party of Sun Yat-sen, and which was advised by a number of Soviet agents including the famous (or infamous) Borodin. Among the associates of the Kuomintang was the so called "Christian" General Feng Yü-hsiang, whose own private party, the Kuominchün, was also suspected of being increasingly infected with Marxist ideology. Feng Yü-hsiang had been receiving large quantities of arms from the Soviets. He employed several Soviet military instructors. In 1926 he had visited Outer Mongolia, by then

firmly under Soviet influence, and in May of that year he arrived in Moscow where he stayed until the middle of August, discussing arms supplies and political ideas, and also going to the dentist and to a heart specialist (who may well have meant more to him than all the thoughts of Marx and Lenin if the truth be known).

From the point of view of British watchers of Tibetan politics these apparently pro-Russian gestures by Feng Yü-hsiang were of particular significance in that the Kuominchün was at that time in control of Kansu Province which had by way of the Kokonor territory direct access, at least in theory, to Eastern Tibet. A Chinese move towards Tibet from that direction might well bring Bolshevism in its train. This remained the situation until the middle of 1927 when Feng Yü-hsiang repudiated his connections with the Soviets in order to placate the Chiang Kai-shek faction of the Kuomintang; but it was not until the beginning of 1928, given the rapidity of shifts and changes in Chinese politics at this period, that it was certain that Feng Yü-hsiang's break with Moscow was final. Thereafter Feng Yü-Hsiang's decline in power was swift. It effectively came to an end in 1930. By 1928 Kansu became much disturbed by Mahommedan rebellion followed by very serious famine.[320]

It is possible that the increase of their influence with Feng Yü-hsiang, who controlled territory which more or less marched with Eastern Tibet, persuaded the Soviet authorities that it might do no harm to obtain better information on what was happening in Central Tibet, now in the throes of a reaction against British influence. In May 1927 a party of 14 or 15 Mongols (or Kalmuks and Buriats from Soviet Territory) arrived in Lhasa with an entourage of servants, shortly followed by one more member, a Buriat called Tsepag Dorji, who was apparently the real leader of the band. The group, often known collectively as the Mongol Mission, were said to have had some special connection with Drepung monastery. They were received by the Dalai Lama, in disregard of the advice of Norbu Dhondup whom Bailey had sent up to Lhasa the moment the news of the Mission's arrival had reached him, because, the Dalai Lama declared, they were only in Lhasa on religious business. The Dalai Lama further argued that to show discourtesy to the Mongol Mission would not only risk offending Drepung monastery but would also jeopardise the 2,00,000 Rupees which he had on deposit in a bank in Urga (Ulan Bator). In fact, Norbu Dhondup reported, the Mongol Mission had brought with it as a gift for the Dalai Lama some twenty rifles and two machine guns; and it had made proposals for the extension of the telegraph line from Lhasa to Urga, thus offering Tibet an alternative channel for rapid communication with the outside world to that existing by way of British India.[321] It had, finally, suggested the exchange of diplomatic representatives between Tibet and Mongolia (the former Outer Mongolia and now a Soviet "satellite" state) and the

establishment of a Mongolian trade mart at Nagchuka, the Tibetan town north of Lhasa which lay on the most direct route between Lhasa and Urga.[322]

The Mongol Mission left Lhasa in December 1927; but one of its members soon returned to establish himself on what seemed to be a permanent basis in the Tibetan capital. This man, the "fat Mongolian" of reports reaching the British, was a Buriat variously known as Po-lo-te, Kuhi-tsi-ta, and Buriat Noyon. He was over six foot tall, and was very fond of whiskey, biscuits and tinned fish, all of which suggested a degree of European education; and it was commonly believed in Lhasa that he was "a high Mongolian official in the service of the Bolsheviks". He was said to have brought with him for the Dalai Lama messages and presents from Dorjiev; and he remained in frequent contact with the Dalai Lama. He had with him in Lhasa an assistant, a Mongol called Tsul-trim, who resided in Drepung monastery. All accounts, including those collected by Khan Sahib Faizullah, the head of the Ladakhi community in Lhasa, indicated that the "fat Mongolian" possessed an abundant supply of money. He was still in Lhasa in late 1929, by which time Lt.-Colonel Weir has succeeded Bailey as Political Officer in Sikkim.[323]

There was very little that the British could do about the situation in Lhasa which, indeed, looked alarmingly like that which had prevailed before 1904 and had provoked the Younghusband Expedition. Another Younghusband Expedition, at all events, was quite out of the question. Bailey had to content himself in the first half of 1927 with sending his Assistant Norbu Dhondup up to Lhasa (as has already been noted). Norbu Dhondup's task was not only to report on the Mongol Mission but to explore the whole gamut of problems and issues, the demotion or dismissal of the British trained army officers, the Tehri-Garwhal boundary dispute (of which more in a later Chapter), questions of extradition, and, above all, the state of relations between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas.[324]

Towards the end of Bailey's time in Gangtok news came of another development in Tibetan politics. The state of Pome (Poyul, inhabited by the Popa), situated to the east of Lhasa along the great bend of the Tsangpo where the river turns south to pass through the Himalayan mountains into India to become the main tributary of the Brahmaputra, had rebelled against the authority of Lhasa. Pome (not to be confused with the Po near Batang which was the home of the Pangdatsang family), had always enjoyed a real measure of independence. In 1910 it had been particularly determined in its resistance to the Chinese troops of the regime inspired by Chao Erh-feng; and it had been equally active in the expulsion of the Chinese in 1912. In 1925, when F. Kingdon Ward and Lord Cawdor visited it, Pome was paying some dues to Lhasa, mainly because of an arrangement as part of which its ruler had married a sister of

Tsarong Shape. In 1927 the ruler of Pome, Powo Kanam Gyalpo (who was to be known to the Government of Assam as Tebu Dendun), refused to pay further taxes to Lhasa. The Tibetan army was mobilised against him (with the rehabilitation, incidentally, of a number of officers who had suffered in 1925). Faced with the arrival of some 500 Lhasa troops the ruler fled to British India, reaching Sadiya in December 1928. We will have to consider Pome again in connection with the later history of the McMahon Line border as it exercised a key position in the relations between the Tibetan world and that of the non-Tibetan tribes of the Siang-Dihang valley. In the present context it is interesting as a symptom of a deep unrest in Tibet, in this case aggravated by the fall from grace of Tsarong Shape, the ruler of Pome's brother-in-law. The Lhasa Government could cope with Pome easily enough: it was a tiny state. What could they do if there were serious opposition to their authority in Kham and closer to the Chinese line of control?[325]

Central to the preservation of Tibetan unity British observers instinctively felt was the relationship between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. So long as the two great Incarnations remained in conflict Tibet was in great peril. The danger was twofold, internal in that it contained the possibility of civil war, and external because of the Panchen Lama's presence on Chinese soil. The British could not avoid being involved in the Panchen Lama question for two main reasons. First: one line of communication between the Panchen Lama and his supporters in Tibet lay across British territory. Second: it was impossible for British diplomats in China to ignore the Panchen Lama's activities there. They related to Tibet; and Tibet had been an issue in Anglo-Chinese relations for so long that it could not be dropped now however much successive British Ministers might have wished it to disappear. The solution which Bailey came to propose towards the end of his time in Gangtok, that the Panchen Lama should take up residence in exile in British India, would not have been opposed too strenuously by the British Legation had not the Government of India found it fraught with danger because of the possibility of direct British involvement in Tibetan internal conflict. The Panchen Lama, moreover, was unlikely to see in it at this juncture an answer to his own problems.[326] Somehow the Panchen Lama had to be persuaded to return to Tibet.

The Panchen Lama certainly wished to come home; but on his own terms. These the Lhasa Government found unpalatable; though after the 13th Dalai Lama's death in 1933 they were considered ever more seriously year by year. Had the Panchen Lama lived beyond 30 November 1937 he might well have got his way. Bailey had to cope with the initial stages of what was to turn out to be a very long struggle.

By July 1924 the Panchen Lama was in Lanchow, the capital of Kansu Province, and endeavouring to establish contact with his

sources of finance in Tibet, using a variety of intermediaries including the Chinese trading house in Calcutta, Thinyik, which provided the livelihood of China's main not so secret Chinese agent in India, Lu Hsing-chi. On 25 February 1925 the Panchen Lama reached Peking, where he arrived to an almost Imperial welcome in a special train draped in yellow silk. Lu Hsing-chi had gone to Peking from Calcutta to see him, no doubt with news from Tibet. The Panchen Lama remained in Peking, with brief excursions to other Chinese cities including Shanghai, until the very end of 1926 when he made his way to Mukden in Manchuria. Thereafter he spent the bulk of his time in a number of retreats in Chinese Inner Asia, in Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and the Kansu-Tibet borderlands; but he remained in touch with the Chinese authorities, and visited them on occasion. Out of sight was certainly not out of mind.

On his first arrival in Peking in February 1925 it was obvious that the Panchen Lama was going to present the British Legation with problems. The acting head of the Legation, C.M. Palairet, perhaps not without a touch of malice, suggested that Louis King, then still living in Peking in somewhat straightened circumstances following his premature retirement from the Consular Service in a manner which has been examined in the previous Chapter, should be retained to try to persuade the Lama to return to Tibet and, if need be, accompany him there. King, after all, had unique experience of Tibet; and he could do with some extra income.[327] The Government of India were duly distressed at the prospect of King, of whom they had hoped they had heard the last, reappearing on the Tibetan scene.[328] Palairet's suggestion, however, indicated the existence of a link between the British Legation in Peking and the affairs of the Panchen Lama that was not so easy to sever. The Panchen Lama, it became evident, would only return to Tibet if adequate guarantees could be obtained from Lhasa that he would not thereby suffer in any way and that the lands, property, rights and status to which he considered he was entitled would be restored to him.

The question of guarantees arose again in the following year when H.R.H. Prince George (Duke of Kent in 1934), then travelling in the Far East, called on the Panchen Lama (who for purposes of protocol it was decided would be referred to as His Serenity) in Peking at the latter's invitation on 7 September 1926. The Lama recalled his meeting with the Prince's father, King George V, in India in 1905 when he was still Prince of Wales, and reminded Prince George of promises of British protection offered to him on that occasion. Prince George, on the advice of the British Legation, assured the Panchen Lama of the good offices of the Government of India in his difficulties, an assurance which was confirmed subsequently by Teichman to members of the Panchen Lama's entourage.

In December 1926 the Panchen Lama left Peking for Mukden, where on 1 March 1927 he was seen by Frederick Williamson, one of the small band of Tibetan specialists in British Indian service (who would, in 1935, die tragically in Lhasa) then travelling in China on leave. The conversation was on the whole confined to generalities. It did seem to Williamson, however, that the Panchen Lama genuinely wanted to return to Tashilhunpo but was fearful of the anger of his Lhasa rival. Williamson considered that his prompt repatriation would be the most desirable outcome: otherwise there was a real danger that the Panchen Lama would find his way to Outer Mongolia and come under direct Bolshevik influence to the greater detriment of the already unhappy situation (from the British Indian point of view) then obtaining in Tibet. Miles Lampson, now British Minister in Peking, confirmed this interpretation of the Panchen Lama's wishes after a meeting with one of his officials.[329]

Shortly after the Mukden interview, Bailey at Gangtok was asked by one of the Panchen Lama's supporters, Tsa Serkang, to transmit to Lhasa messages from the Panchen Lama which were certainly intended to explore the conditions for a return. Bailey was instructed to refuse to act as a direct channel of communication between the two Incarnations in this way; but he was also told to sound out discreetly the feeling of the Dalai Lama on the prospect of patching up the quarrel with his Tashilhunpo colleague.[330] At the same time, and with the same object in mind, the Panchen Lama had written to the Maharaja of Sikkim who had excellent Lhasa contacts of his own. The Lhasa attitude, however, did not seem propitious for the Panchen Lama at this moment.[331]

Towards the end of 1927 the Panchen Lama moved on from Mukden to Inner Mongolia where he established himself in a remote monastery, though his representatives remained in Peking and continued from time to time to call on the British Legation to seek British mediation.[332] There is no evidence, however, that up to the end of April 1928 the Panchen Lama had entered into any serious discussions of a political nature with the Chinese authorities despite the great respect that they had shown him and the assistance both practical and financial that they had provided to facilitate his stay. He still hoped to go back shortly to Tibet and did not wish to compromise himself in this way.

The Government of India now at last began serious efforts to mediate with the Dalai Lama on the Panchen Lama's behalf at the Panchen Lama's request. On 5 May 1928, with instructions to take the matter a little bit further than had been authorised the year before, Bailey had written to the Dalai Lama offering British assistance in persuading the Panchen Lama to come home and suggesting that the Dalai Lama might write to his colleague "to inform the Tashi Lama that he will be well treated and that any difficulties

he has will be carefully investigated". Bailey volunteered the services of the British diplomatic establishment in China to forward any message the Dalai Lama might care send to his fellow Incarnation. The Dalai Lama, however, indicated no spirit of reconciliation. "If His Serenity returns to Tibet with a pure mind", he wrote to Bailey on 8 June 1928, "I shall do my best to help him", but, he concluded sternly, "I hope that you will remember that in accordance with the Treaty the British Government should not interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet".[333]

It is clear that the Dalai Lama at this point, the summer of 1928, would only let the Panchen Lama return on terms set by Lhasa; and these were draconian. It is likely that it was the realisation of the rigidity of this attitude which finally pushed the Panchen Lama towards political involvement with China. A single event probably did more than anything else to convince him that the Dalai Lama had nothing to offer. On 27 June 1928 the Panchen Lama's nephew, the Yabshi Kung, his mother and step father and a dozen retainers, all of whom had been kept under a form of house arrest, slipped away and ran for the British Indian border. They nearly made good their escape, only being recaptured at Khambadzong almost within sight of Sikkim.[334] Once intercepted, the Yabshi Kung was taken to Lhasa, given one hundred lashes (his servants, such was the way of the Tibetan concepts of rank and hierarchy, received two hundred lashes each) and placed in irons in a dungeon deep within the Potala. The Dalai Lama, agreeing with the advice of Lungshar, was more determined than ever not to make any concessions.[335]

It was now that Bailey proposed, as has already been noted, that the Panchen Lama might be offered asylum in India, probably anticipating both that he would otherwise in these altered circumstances become an active ally of the Chinese and that his presence on British soil might act as some kind of deterrent to the evolution of an increasingly anti-British policy on the part of the Tibetan authorities.

If Bailey did indeed believe that these events would tend to turn the Panchen Lama towards China, he was quite right. Not long after the Yabshi Kung's recapture the Panchen Lama returned from Inner Mongolia to Mukden where the warlord Chang Hsüeh-liang, whose formidable father Chang Tso-lin had just been murdered at Japanese instigation, had offered the him a subsidy of some 9,000 Chinese dollars per month (then worth about £900), which he seems to have accepted.[336] At the same time the Panchen Lama began to set up something like his own political organisation in China, establishing an office with his representative at Chengtu, the Chinese Provincial capital nearest to the Tibetan border in Kham. The Szechuan warlord Liu Wen-hui thereupon provided his own subsidy of 1,000 Chinese dollars each month towards its running expenses.[337]

These events, which were soon to become inextricably involved with a fresh crisis in Sino-Tibetan relations, took place at the moment when Bailey was handing over to Lt.-Colonel Weir as Political Officer in Sikkim. There can be no doubt that Bailey's time in Gangtok ended on a far from triumphal note as far as the story of Anglo-Tibetan relations is concerned.

269. *The Times*, 28 January 1924. This report was duly noted in Peking. The English language but Chinese owned *Peking Leader*, for example, published an extremely anti-British editorial by its American editor, Grover Clark. The British Minister in Peking, Sir R.Macleay, declared to the Foreign Office that "I trust steps may be taken to prevent appearance of further mischievous articles of this nature .. [in *The Times*] .. by General Bruce or other semi-official or privileged travellers in Tibet". See: L/P&S/10/718, Macleay to FO, 12 March 1924, and FO to IO, 24 March 1924.

   Grover Clark was the author of a most interesting account of the Tibetan problem as seen through pro-Chinese eyes at that time. See: Grover Clark, *Tibet, China and Great Britain*, Peking 1924.

270. The story of the part played by the Manchus in the reform of Tibetan administration, including the establishment of the supremacy of Lhasa over Tashilhunpo and the reduction of the power of hereditary lay rulers to the advantage of the Tibetan Buddhist hierarchy, is told in considerable detail in: L. Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early Eighteenth Century*, Leiden 1950.

271. Perhaps as good account as any of Tibetan administration as it was in the first half of the 20th century can still be found in: P. Carrasco, *Land and Polity in Tibet*, Seattle, Washington, 1959.

272. Coales and Bell disagreed quite strongly over this point, which of course was of great importance in the assessment of the validity of the Dalai Lama's claims to authority over the states of Eastern Tibet. Coales thought that much of the history of Eastern Tibet from at least the middle of the 19th century until 1917 could be explained in terms of struggle for power between the Gelugpa sect and others, notably the Nyingma (Red Sect or Red Hat Sect). Bell, who supported the Dalai Lama's claims over Kham and Amdo, disagreed: he denied that the Dalai Lama's authority was challenged within the body of Tibetan Buddhism in the way that Coales had suggested. See: L/P&S/11/126, P 3710, Coales to Alston, 19 July 1917, Bell to India, 5 December 1917.

273. The only female Incarnation generally referred to in the literature was that of Samding, Dorje Phakmo ("Thunderbolt Sow"); but it would be surprising if there were not at least one or two others throughout the great extent of the world of Tibetan Buddhism.

274. Though this might, of course, have been seen as a positive advantage by the Manchus.

275. There still remained in Tibet into the 20th century a number of religious positions of "Living Buddha" status that were transmitted by dynastic succession in a variety of ways. These were particularly associated with the Sakya Sect. They were not very many of them, however; and politically they do not compare in importance overall with the more orthodox Incarnations.
  There is an interesting account of the mechanism for the selection of a new Incarnation in: F. Maraini, *Secret Tibet*, London 1952.

276. For some reason many writers on the history of Tibet have been rather coy about this feature of 19th century Lhasa politics. It did, however, impress one very acute British observer who saw Tibet in 1936. See: Neame, *Playing with Strife, op. cit.*, p.160.

277. Carrasco, *Tibet, op. cit.*, provides some figures for Tibet. In Outer Mongolia at the end of the 19th century, according to lists carefully maintained by the Chinese, there were more than one hundred major Incarnations; and there were up to fourteen living in Peking. See: R. Bleichsteiner, *L'Eglise Jaune*, Paris 1937, p. 177.

278. See: D. Snellgrove, & H.E., Richardson, *A Cultural History of Tibet*, p. 276.
  During the 19th century the following was the chronology: the 7th Panchen, born in 1781, died just before 1854, the 8th Panchen, born in 1854, died in or just before 1882, and the 9th Panchen, who died on 30 November 1937, was born in 1882; while for the Dalai Lamas the 9th was born in 1806 (following the 8th who lived for about 48 years), the 10th Dalai Lama in 1816, the 11th in 1838, the 12th in 1856, and the 13th, who lived until 1933, in 1876. Thus during the entire century there were adult Panchen Lamas for all but some 36 years, but until the very end of the century from c.1805 the Dalai Lama was always to all intents and purposes a minor with power vested in a Regency. It has been speculated that the Lhasa Regency, perhaps in collusion with the Manchu Ambans, arranged this state of affairs. The survival of the 13th Dalai Lama to adulthood in c.1895 and his ability to take a firm grasp on the reins of power were certainly revolutionary events.
  There are disputes about the chronology of the Panchen Lamas. Richardson, for example, refers to the 9th as the 6th; but the higher numbers are more usual and are adopted here. The problem arises from when it is considered that the process of Incarnation of the Panchen Lamas began.

279. See: Prince Peter of Greece and Denmark, *The Aristocracy of Central Tibet: a Provisional List of the Names of the Noble Houses of U-Tsang*, Kalimpong 1954.

280. One of whom later wrote her autobiography, a fascinating source for Tibetan political history. See: Rinchen Dolma Taring, *Daughter of Tibet*, London 1970. The previous Tsarong Shape came down to Calcutta in 1908 to sign the Trade Regulations of that year on behalf of Tibet.

281. There is an extensive European literature on the role of the Pangdatsang in Kham from the 1930s until the eve of the great anti-Chinese Khampa rebellion of 1959. See the various writings of Bull, Ford, Patterson and Peissel listed in the Bibliography, in all of which the importance of the Pangdatsang is emphasised. Whether the Lhasa nobles would have considered the Pangdatsang their equals is an interesting question.
  From the 1930s to the end of our period there were three Pangda brothers: the head of the family, Pangdatsang (Yangpel), who resided in Lhasa; Pangda Rapga, once civil governor of Markham; and Pangda Topgye, who was also at one time civil governor of Markham and very active in the politics of Sikang, at times for and against Lhasa and for and against the Chinese Governor of Sikang Province, Liu Wen-hui.

282. Frank Ludlow, schoolmaster and botanist, presided over the British Mission in Lhasa from 1942 to 1943, to be followed by his close friend George Sherriff, soldier, diplomat and botanist, who occupied that post until he was forced to leave Tibet because of a heart condition in May 1945. See, for an outline of the careers of these two remarkable men: H. R. Fletcher, *A Quest of Flowers. The Plant Explorations of Frank Ludlow and George Sherriff told from their diaries and other occasional writings*, introduction by Sir George Taylor, FRS, Edinburgh 1976.

283. Bailey's reform proposals are touched upon in: L/P&S/10/718, minutes by J.P. Gibson of 3 December 1924 and L.D. Wakely of 4 December 1924.

284. Bailey was born in 1882 and died in 1967. He occupied the post of Political Officer in Sikkim from 1921 to 1928. He then went on to be Resident in Kashmir and then Resident in Nepal. He retired in 1938. Like Louis King, and unlike either Charles Bell or Eric Teichman, he had seen active service in the Great War. For his life, see: A. Swinson, *Beyond the Frontiers, the biography of Colonel F.M. Bailey explorer and special agent*, London 1971.

285. For Bailey's adventures in Tashkent in 1918 and 1919, see: Hopkirk, *Setting the East Ablaze, op. cit.*; F.M. Bailey, *Mission to Tashkent*, London 1946.

286. Macdonald, *Twenty Years, op. cit.*, pp.100-102.

287. Until 1792 the Tibetans did not mint their own coinage, relying on coins made from silver bullion provided by them to Nepal to be minted there. Disputes over the circulation of Nepalese minted currency in Tibet were a major factor in the crisis in Tibeto-Nepalese relations at the end of the 18th century which provoked Nepalese invasion and the despatch of a Manchu army to the aid of the Tibetans. The Manchus then obliged the Lhasa Government to mint its own coin, the silver tangka (or tamka and other spellings), bearing inscriptions in both Chinese and Tibetan; and this continued to be the only significant Tibetan coin up to modern times. The tangka was subdivided by being cut into pieces rather like the slices of a pie. Apart from his short lived production of copper coins, Tsarong Shape also experimented with a gold coin which was produced in minuscule quantities and was promptly swallowed up in gold hoards either in Tibet or India.

The question of the history of Tibetan currency is far from simple; and the brief account here may well have omitted points of great interest to numismatists.

See: S.Camman, *Trade Through the Himalayas. The Early British Attempts to Open Tibet*, Princeton 1951, p. 132; W.W. Rockhill, *Notes on the Ethnology of Tibet, based on the collections in the U.S. National Museum*, Washington, DC, 1895, p.718; E.H.C. Walsh, "The Coinage of Tibet", *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 2, 1907; L. Boulnois, *Poudre d'Or et Monnaies d'Argent au Tibet (principalement au XVIIIe siècle)*, Paris 1983; N. Rhodes, "The development of currency in Tibet", in Aris & Aung San Suu Kyi, *Tibetan Studies, op. cit.*

At the time of the Bailey Mission, Tsarong Shape was in charge of the Lhasa mint where the silver tangkas were produced. He appreciated the need for a copper coinage of smaller denominations to meet the requirements of minor commercial transactions.

The silver tangka was estimated by Rockhill in the 1890s to be worth 19 cents U.S., and by Combe, relying on Sherap, to be the equivalent in 1924 of 3d. Rhodes gives other values. By the end of the British period Tibetan tangkas had a face value less than their bullion content and were finding their way to India to be melted down.

288. L/P&S/12/4174, Bailey to India, 12 December 1922.

This demand was, in fact, part of a special tax, over and above the usual revenue arrangements, imposed by Lhasa throughout Tibet to meet the cost of the military expenditure incurred in the defence of the eastern frontier against the Chinese.

289. Bell, along with J.C. White, W.F. O'Connor and F.M. Bailey, had been involved in this immediate post-Younghusband Expedition cultivation of the Panchen Lama. Perhaps Bell's failure to respond to the invitation to visit Shigatse after Lhasa in 1921 helped to convince the Panchen Lama that the British promises of this era were now about to be forgotten, and that some dramatic gesture was called for.
For an account of the British contacts with the Panchen Lama from 1904 to 1906 see: Lamb, *McMahon Line*, *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, Chapter II.

290. This was the opinion of Alexandra David-Neeel who was in Tibet shortly after the Panchen Lama's departure and saw the partially completed residence being prepared for him in Lhasa. See: Alexandra David-Neel, *My Journey to Lhasa*, London 1927, p. 245.

291. See: David-Neel, *Journey to Lhasa*, *op. cit.*, She had travelled in 1916 without British permission from India to Shigatse, where she came to know and admire the 9th Panchen Lama. At this time grave tensions between Tashilhunpo and Lhasa were already only too apparent. See also: *A l'Ouest Barbare de la Vaste Chine*, Paris 1947, p. 42.

292. See, for example: G.B. Enders, *Nowhere else in the World*, London 1936. Enders' writing about the 9th Panchen Lama, however, often verges on the improbable. Did the Panchen Lama really, by his spiritual powers, manage to delay the Japanese attack on China? Was he seriously proposing to establish an air service to Tibet to export the output of a projected gold mining industry? On the face of it this was not a bad idea; and Tibet in the 1920s and 1930s could well have benefited from the exploitation of air communications. Tibetan Incarnations, however, did not like the idea of machines flying over Tibetan territory on religious grounds, a fact which almost certainly guaranteed Williamson's death in Lhasa in 1935.
See also: G.B. Enders, *Foreign Devil: an American Kim in Modern Asia*, London 1945, London 1945.
The Panchen Lama denied that he had anything to do with Enders. The view in the India Office was that Enders' writings were pure fantasy and humbug. See: L/P&S/12/4317, for example; Vernay to Harcourt Butler, 19 May 1936; Cowan (Peking Embassy) to India, 19 May 1936.

293. See: J. Bacot, *Introduction à l'Histoire du Tibet*, Paris 1962, p. 57 and generally.

294. See, for a detailed discussion of the Everest question: Swinson, *Beyond the Frontiers*, *op. cit.*,pp.204-220.
The Dalai Lama had right at the beginning of the Bell Mission given permission for the first Everest Expedition of 1921. There had been a few misunderstandings about what some of its members were up to: geologists were suspected of illegal digging for precious stones, for example.

295. McGovern, who had at one time been a Lecturer at the School of Oriental Studies of the University of London, was part of a British Buddhist mission that had not been permitted to go into Tibet beyond Gyantse. McGovern had slipped back to Sikkim and then in disguise, variously described as Sikkimese monk or Tibetan porter, had returned to Tibet and reached Lhasa were he had remained for about a month during which period he met Tsarong Shape and, so he claimed, the Tibetan Kashag and the Dalai Lama. He became very ill in Lhasa and was allowed to return to British India unmolested.
See: L/P&S/10/1013, File 3971(3)/1921; W.M. McGovern, *To Lhasa in Disguise: an account of a secret mission through mysterious Tibet*, London 1924; G.E.O. Knight, *Intimate Glimpses of Mysterious Tibet and Neighbouring Countries*, London 1930. Knight was another member of the Buddhist mission; but he did not go beyond Gyantse.

296. In 1924 the main issue related to the status of those of mixed Tibeto-Nepalese blood. Exactly who was entitled to the protection of the Nepalese Residency in Lhasa and to the advantages of extraterritoriality which the Nepalese had won for their subjects during the course of the 19th century?

These people, with Nepalese fathers and Tibetan mothers, were known as the *Khachchara*. They had presented problems in Tibeto-Nepalese relations since the middle of the 19th century; but in 1924 the Lhasa Government expressed in strong terms to the Nepalese Government its concern at the way that they had been behaving in Tibet. It was not disputed that the *Khachchara* were Nepalese subjects; but did Nepalese protection extend to their relations on the maternal side? Also it was not clear who exactly was a *Khachchara* and how many of this category, scattered all over Tibet, there were. The Nepalese Government was asked to maintain a register of those entitled to this status. They were also asked to surrender to the Tibetan authorities some 33 persons whom they were protecting as *Khachchara* despite their Nepalese connection being only indirect through relationship to Tibetan women married to Nepalese. Further, the Nepalese were requested to arrange that the *Khachchara*, in the taxes they paid to Nepal, should do so through the Tibetan Government. Finally, the Tibetans asked that a generation limit be placed upon *Khachchara* status so that the class did not proliferate. The *Khachchara* question was the main political motive behind Tsarong Shape's visit to Katmandu in 1925, when he proposed that *Khachchara* status should be limited to two generations only. The Nepalese refused to make any concessions. After 1925 the Tibetan Government began to treat *Khachchara* more and more as if they were Tibetan subjects, to the great increase in Tibeto-Nepalese tensions. For an admirable exposition of this question, based on the Nepalese archives, see: Prem R. Uprety, *Nepal-Tibet Relations 1850-1930. Years of Hopes, Challenges and Frustrations*, Katmandu 1980, pp. 145-148.

297. The Tibetan authorities were constantly requesting the Government of India to send back to Tibet Tibetan subjects resident not only in India but also in Bhutan and Sikkim. In 1927, for example, Bailey reported a Tibetan wish that all Tibetan subjects who had emigrated to Ladakh be repatriated. See: L/P&S/10/1088, Bailey to India, 6 July 1927.

The Government of India were extremely reluctant to do anything like this; and no satisfactory solution to the extradition problem was arrived at during the British period. A formal Anglo-Tibetan extradition treaty, of course, would have involved yet another step towards British recognition of full Tibetan *de jure* independence.

298. For the 1922 Bolshevik Mission, see: N.N. Poppe, "The Destruction of Buddhism in the USSR" (in Russian), *Bulletin, Institute for the Study of the USSR*, Munich 1960. I am greatly indebted to John Snelling for most generously supplying me with this reference. For the FO view of the possible destination of the Panchen Lama, see: L/P&S/12/4174, FO to IO, 21 January 1924.

John Snelling has had access to an exhaustive search through the Russian sources relating to Dorjiev. He informs me that Dorjiev remained a figure of influence in Soviet Russia, and not only among the Buriat community, up to 1934 when he began to suffer at Stalin's hands. He died in 1938, almost certainly executed. To all intents and purposes, therefore, his influence in Russia came to an end at just about the time of the death of the 13th Dalai Lama.

He was a great man by any accounting; and it is not surprising that the 13th Dalai Lama cherished his friendship and had on occasion followed his advice. He was, however, apart from being a devout Buddhist, also a Russian patriot.

299. See, for example: L/P&S/10/718, Bell to India, 6 April 1923.

300. L/P&S/10/1113, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 6 March 1924.

301. L/P&S/10/1113, FO to Peking, 26 April 1924.

302. L/P&S/10/1113, Macleay to FO, 2 May 1924.

303. L/P&S/10/1113, FO to IO, 8 May 1924.

304. L/P&S/10/1113, Bailey to India, 27 May 1924.

305. L/P&S/10/1113, India to Bailey, 27 May 1924.

306. Known as the Dekyi Lingka. This had become more or less a British rest house, being used by both Brigadier-General Pereira and Sir Henry Hayden when they were in Lhasa in 1922.

307. The present author finds McGovern's account convincing, that he did see these Tibetan leaders who were naturally interested to find out what he was up to.

308. L/P&S/10/718, Kashag to Bailey, 7 August 1924, contains a clear exposition of the Tibetan argument.

309. Tsarong Shape was a great trader on his own account. There is a superb account of Tsarong Shape in Taring, *Daughter of Tibet, op. cit.*

310. L/P&S/10/1113, Bailey's report of his Lhasa Mission, 28 October 1924.

311. See: L/P&S/11/244, P. 1198, for papers on the Tibetan "dancers".

312. L/P&S/10/1088, Williamson, Trade Agent at Gyantse, to India, 25 October 1924.

313. The McGovern visit was exploited by Lungshar and the anti-British and pro-Chinese elements in Lhasa politics as evidence of some underhand British scheme, so Bailey heard.

314. During part of his Indian visit Tsarong Shape was accompanied by F.M. and Mrs. Bailey. The visit is described in Taring, *Daughter of Tibet, op. cit.*

315. Papers on this report are in: L/&S/11/266, P 780.

316. Norbu Dhondup was a Tibetan born in Kalimpong. In 1904, at the age of 16 while at school in Darjeeling, he was selected by W.F. O'Connor to accompany the Younghusband Expedition as an interpreter. He was first attached to L.A. Waddell. He then served as a transport clerk during the later stages of the Expedition. He acted as interpreter for O'Connor during the Panchen Lama's visit to India in 1905. He was Confidential Clerk to Basil Gould when the latter was Gyantse Trade Agent in 1912-1913. He was awarded by the Government of India the rank of Rai Bahadur; and in c. 1932 the Tibetans conferred on him the very high rank of Dzasa. See, for example: F. Spencer Chapman, *Lhasa the Holy City*, London 1940, pp. 45-46; Neame, *Playing with Strife, op. cit.*, pp. 172-173.

317. L/P&S/10/1088, Williamson to India, 27 August 1926, reports some of these rumours as to what lay behind these events, including a Laden La-Tsarong Shape conspiracy for which there is not a vestige of evidence in the British records preserved in the India Office Library and Records in London.

318. L/P&S/11/208, P 4835, Bailey to India, 27 December 1927, enclosing Ludlow's report on the Gyantse school.

319. L/P&S/10/1088, Bailey to India, 6 July 1927.

320. For the career of Feng Yü-hsiang, see: J.E. Sheridan, *Chinese Warlord. The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang*, Stanford, California, 1966.

Anxieties concerning the activities of Feng Yü-hsiang persisted in India for some time after all danger had passed, probably because of reports of bands of leaderless Kuominchün troops wandering into the region of the Kokonor-Tibet border.

321. A proposal which would have been logical enough if a Soviet-influenced Feng Yü-hsiang controlled the territory between Eastern Tibet and Outer Mongolia, as still seemed possible in the first half of 1927.

322. L/P&S/10/1088, Bailey to India, 13 April 1928.

323. The various reports of the Mongol Mission were summarised in a long paper by H.A.F. (later Sir Algernon) Rumbold, P 1148/30, (undated), in L/P&S/10/1113. See also: L/P&S/11/277, P 2305/1927.

Khan Sahib Faizullah managed to lay his hands on a photgraph of some of the members of the Mongol Mission including Po-lo-te. The names of the members of the Mission, according to reports reaching Weir, were as follows: Gombo Yishay, Tsepag Dorji, Amgolang, Samtengen, Tumaseluhula, Mophensin, Tsenamsaka, Lachen, Phenkuila, Tentupota, Takarholing, Shertipohuyi, Yatsenmina, Shadrigtomasi, Jinshimayu.

324. L/P&S/10/1113, minute by Rumbold, 11 March 1929, summarises the 1927 Norbu Dondhup mission to Lhasa.

325. The Pome question does not seem to have generated a file in its own right in the India Office in London: it is referred to in passing in reports from or through Gangtok. It is evidently discussed at some length in the Government of Assam records quoted by Sir Robert Reid. See: Sir R. Reid, *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam from 1883-1941*, Shillong 1941, p.257.

326. L/P&S/12/4174, Bailey to India, 10 July 1928.

327. L/P&S/12/4174, Palairet to FO, 25 February 1925. The original idea seems to have been King's. See also: Macleay to FO, 16 February 1925.

328. L/P&S/12/4174, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 3 March 1925.

329. L/P&S/12/4174, Williamson, 21 March 1927, and Lampson to FO, 25 March 1927.

330. Bailey may have, in fact, already been approached indirectly by the Dalai Lama to act as mediator. So, at least, Pa-lhe-se suggested when he passed through Sikkim in April 1926 on his way to England to join his old friend Charles Bell. See: L/P&S/10/1088, Bailey to India, 17 April 1926. Bailey did not hold Pa-lhe-se in particularly high regard.

331. L/P&S/12/4174, Bailey to India, 28 May 1927.

332. L/P&S/12/4174, Lampson to FO, 15 April 1928.

333. L/P&S/12/4174, "Note on the Tashi Lama", 20 January 1930.

334. Thus raising the question as to what would happen if Tibetan forces crossed the Sikkim border in hot pursuit. Bailey's instructions were that this should on no account be allowed to happen.

335. See, for example: L/P&S/12/4174, Bailey to India, 10 July 1928.

336. L/P&S/12/4174, Sir Miles Lampson to FO, 25 October 1928.

337. L/P&S/12/4174, Stark Toller (Consul-General at Chungking which was now the nearest British Consulate-General to the Szechuan-Kham border) to Peking, 28 November 1928.

VII

THE WEIR MISSIONS, AND THE CRISIS IN EASTERN TIBET, 1928-1933

When Lt.-Colonel Leslie Weir took over from Bailey as Political Officer in Sikkim at the end of 1928 a fundamental change was occurring in the political situation in China. The Northern Expedition of the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek was well on its way to establishing something like a truly national Chinese Government with the capital moved from Peking to Nanking and from which Soviet influence had been expelled. In October 1928 a new provisional Chinese Constitution was adopted which was to result in the creation of a special department of state devoted to Inner Asian Affairs, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, a body which was soon to show that it intended to pursue a consistent and sustained policy towards Tibet such as had not been seen since the last days of the Manchu Dynasty.[338] Warlords there still remained, though they were generally given some title and status within the new order even if they disregarded its instructions or, all too often, engaged in armed conflict with it. The Communists went into opposition to set up their own areas of control; and they were to persist as a force which eventually, in 1949, was to replace the Kuomintang as the ruler of China with an authority not seen since the great days of the Manchus. There was intense Japanese opposition to these new Chinese developments leading to the Japanese occupation of Manchuria in 1931 and sustained invasion of China in 1937. All the same, there was now a Chinese Central Government which clearly meant to do something about Outer Tibet sooner or later and was not going to abandon the Provinces of Sikang and Ch'inghai to the ambiguities of what, in the language of the Simla Convention, was Inner Tibet.[339]

The significance of the emergence of the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek was soon appreciated by the Dalai Lama's Government in Lhasa. Here was a Chinese authority with whom at last the Tibetan autonomy provided for in the Simla Convention might realistically be negotiated, with or without British participation; and here was a power in China which was well worth talking to if only

because it might, failing any communication from or with Lhasa, throw its full weight behind the Panchen Lama. The Dalai Lama could approach the Kuomintang easily enough through his representatives in China, where Yellow Sect temples and monasteries were far from rare. There were other forces in Lhasa politics, moreover, such as Drepung monastery and, in 1929 at least, Lungshar (while at the same time toying with a closer Russian connection), who were not averse to the opening of a Sino-Tibetan dialogue without reference to the Political Officer in Sikkim.

Already in 1927, according to Shakabpa, Kunchok Jungnas, Abbot of the Yungon monastery in Peking (usually referred to in British sources as Yungon Dzasa), had been instrumental in transmitting letters between the Kuomintang and the Dalai Lama in which the return of the Panchen Lama was offered in exchange for Tibetan acceptance of its place within the Chinese community.[340] The Dalai Lama did not then consider seriously the Chinese proposals; but a dialogue was established which was to continue between Lhasa and Nanking (and later Chungking) for years to come which the British were unable to interrupt. A limiting factor in such talks at this time from the Tibetan point of view was the relative weakness of the Kuomintang in Szechuan Province where warlords (even though their forces were notionally incorporated into the national Chinese Army) contended with great energy, notably Liu Wen-hui and his nephew Liu Hsiang.[341]

Weir inherited from Bailey a diplomatic situation in Tibet which could only be described as depressing. The suspected Russian representative, the "fat Mongolian" was still believed to be in Lhasa until February or March 1930.[342] The Russian threat had not gone away. There were, moreover, developments in the state of Tibeto-Nepalese relations which, in that they threatened to result in something like war, provided possible opportunities for active Russian, as well as Chinese, meddling in Tibetan affairs.

Apart from a number of Tibeto-Nepalese border issues which defied solution, and the growing stresses arising from the increasingly hard attitude of the Tibetan authorities towards the Tibeto-Nepalese half-breeds (with Nepalese fathers and Tibetan mothers) known as the *Khachchara*, there took place in Lhasa in January 1928 an event which had the potential of turning into a *casus belli*. A trader called Sherpa Gyalpo was arrested by the Tibetans on charges of smuggling cigarettes and tobacco, minting counterfeit Tibetan copper coins and espionage (in that he was supplying the Nepalese representative in Lhasa with secrets of Tibetan official affairs). The Nepalese representative protested in vain that Sherpa Gyalpo was a Nepalese subject. The Tibetans said he was Tibetan and refused to heed any arguments to the contrary. Sherpa Gyalpo after several months in prison in the Tibetan capital managed to escape from Tibetan

custody and sought shelter in the Nepalese Residency in early August 1929. The Nepalese representative granted him asylum. The Tibetans thereupon demanded his surrender. The Nepalese representative refused to do so until the question of Sherpa Gyalpo's national status, which was indeed complex, had been settled. On 25 August 1929 a body of some 80 Tibetan police, many carrying pistols, entered the courtyard of the Nepalese Residency and the building was surrounded by over 300 regular Tibetan troops, with modern rifles, as well as a mob of monks and laymen, some of them also armed. A number of the troops actually climbed on to the Residency roof. The Tibetan police, despite the protests of the Nepalese representative, managed to grab Sherpa Gyalpo within the Residency precincts and take him away with them. Whatever Sherpa Gyalpo's national status might have been, here was a flagrant violation of the 1856 Treaty in particular and the general code of international behaviour in general. The reaction of the Nepalese Prime Minister, Chandra Shumsher, to this outrage was to order a mobilisation in preparation for war against Tibet.[343]

This was but the culmination of growing tensions of which the Government of India was well aware. By the beginning of 1929 it was clear that some event would soon precipitate a crisis. The incident of 25 August 1929, therefore, came as no surprise. A Tibeto-Nepalese conflict was not something which the Government of India could ignore because of its inevitable repercussions all along the Himalayan border. The particular way in which it arose, moreover, was indicative of the increasingly erratic (at least as seen through British Indian eyes) state of politics in Lhasa which had been evolving since shortly after the Bailey Mission in 1924, and of which there were many other manifestations.

Nearly all projects for Tibetan modernisation had come to a standstill. The leading pro-British politician, Tsarong Shape, was in the political wilderness though alive, free, and, indeed, still just hanging on as a member of the Kashag – he was deprived of his status as Shape in 1930 and reverted to the title of Dzasa. His mint in the Chumbi valley for production of copper coinage had been closed down. Lungshar formally in 1929 took his place as Commander in Chief of the Tibetan army. The Dalai Lama had in mind a project (in flagrant disregard of the 1914 Trade Regulations) for the conferring of a monopoly of the export of Tibetan wool (this formally came to light in early 1930) on Pangdatsang, ostensibly to earn revenue to be used to build up stocks of silver bullion to meet the cost of arms purchases from the British; but there seemed no eagerness to acquire the full quota of weapons, particularly the 2.75 inch mountain guns, which had been arranged at the end of the Bell Mission in 1921.[344] Such a dilatory attitude towards matters of defence was particularly alarming in that the reports reaching Weir

all indicated that in Kham the inhabitants were not entirely averse to the idea of Chinese rule: they found Tibetan administration corrupt, inefficient and oppressive.[345] In a renewal of Chinese attacks this might prove greatly to the disadvantage of the Lhasa Government.

Nothing, not even the Tibeto-Nepalese crisis, was perhaps of greater importance to the structure of British policy towards Tibet than the fact that the Dalai and Panchen Lamas were no nearer to making up their quarrel: indeed, after the harsh treatment of the Panchen Lama's family in 1928, the latter's residence in China was rapidly acquiring a new, and more disturbing, political complexion. The Panchen Lama, according to his representative Tsa Serkang (an official of the 4th rank) who discussed the question with Weir, was seeking arms in order to start an insurrection in Tibet against the Lhasa regime.[346] The possibility of an imminent Tibetan civil war, in which even in the centres of power in Lhasa there would be some sympathy for the cause of the Panchen Lama, could not be ruled out. Weir noted in late 1928, for example, that Drepung monastery was very much a supporter of the cause of the Panchen Lama. The majority of its monks were said to come from Mongolia and Kham and had no great affection for either the regime in Lhasa or its leading figures. The potential crisis of 1921, when Drepung threatened revolt during the Bell Mission, had been overcome in part by the use of a small number of Tibetan troops whose leaders had been trained by the British in 1915. Could the loyalty of the army be guaranteed now?[347]

Reliable political information from Lhasa was at a premium. Both Norbu Dhondup and Laden La were able to visit the Tibetan capital apparently more or less at will. Neither man, however, had the formal status to carry on really serious diplomacy. Moreover, it was never clear quite how much either of them had become personally involved not only in Tibetan trade but also in Tibetan politics. There had been, after all, rumours of a Laden La-Tsarong Shape conspiracy in 1924-25. It is possible that Weir might have had his own secret doubts about whether their reports were transmitting the whole truth. By the beginning of 1929, at all events, he certainly felt that it was high time that he made a visit to Lhasa and renewed his acquaintance with the Dalai Lama which had been made during the latter's Indian exile after 1910.

The Government of India showed a certain reluctance to authorise a Weir Mission, which it felt might only draw needlessly the attention of the rising power of the Kuomintang to Tibetan affairs.[348] When Weir persisted in his proposal, Sir Miles Lampson in Peking was asked about the possible Chinese reaction. Lampson saw no particular objection to the plan, and no need to inform the Chinese of it in advance; but, he added, "I presume there will be ostensible invitation from the Tibetan government".[349]

Here, however, lay a problem. Weir could not guarantee an "ostensible" invitation from the Dalai Lama: to seek it was to invite rebuff which, if nothing else, would damage British prestige and make further overtures more difficult.[350] Lampson had emphasised that this invitation was crucial. He had suggested that perhaps the Government of India might exert pressure on Lhasa to secure it by floating the possibility (and threat) that the Panchen Lama could, in certain circumstances, be offered asylum in British India, an idea which found no favour in New Delhi or Simla.[351] In the end Norbu Dhondup was sent up to Lhasa to see what he could arrange. His report in July was not encouraging.[352] The Dalai Lama would not welcome a visit at this moment. It was feared that the presence of a British official in Lhasa would only result in the return, this time with a military escort, of the Bolshevik Mission of 1927, a prospect emphasised by news (probably by now out of date and referring to the activities of Feng Yü-hsiang) of pro-Communist troops not only in Kansu proper but also at Jyekundo which was almost on the Tibetan front line in the east.[353] Norbu's conclusions were confirmed by a letter to Weir from the Dalai Lama himself, dated 20 July 1929, which declared that 1929 was not a good year for seeing Lhasa.[354]

The Government of India, faced with this attitude, decided to postpone the Weir Mission for the time being. Weir himself was not convinced about the wisdom of such lack of resolution, and he doubted whether a formal Tibetan invitation was really necessary. As he remarked:

> it is conceivable that had I proceeded directly to Lhasa my visit would not have been unwelcome to the Tibetan Government. They could have disclaimed all responsibility if awkward questions had been raised by their Russian or Chinese neighbours. It is to this inherent disinclination of the Tibetan Government ever to assume responsibility that their requests for the postponement of my visit may be attributed.[355]

With the opening of 1930, however, it became increasingly obvious to the Government of India that it would be unwise to leave Lhasa unvisited for much longer by the Political Officer in Sikkim. Not only were the implications of the proposed conferring of a monopoly of the Tibetan wool trade on Pangdatsang in violation of the 1914 Regulations becoming clearer, but also there were alarming developments in the progress of direct Sino-Tibetan relations. A deputation from the Dalai Lama was reported to be in Nanking. At about the same time (January 1930) Yungon Dzasa, who for at least the last three years had been acting as the Dalai Lama's agent in Peking, had arrived in Lhasa bearing a letter from the Nanking Government which it was said offered the Tibetans Chinese support against Bolshevik aggression.[356] He was followed, on 11 February 1930, by someone who purported to be a diplomatic representative of the Chinese Central Government.

There had, indeed, been nothing quite like this since the days of the Kansu Mission a decade earlier. Laden La, who was then in Lhasa, told Weir about this new arrival, a young lady of mixed Chinese and Tibetan parentage named Liu Man-ch'ing. She claimed to have been born in Lhasa at about the time of the Younghusband Expedition.[357] Her father was a Chinese who according to some accounts had once been in the service of the Dalai Lama. She was said to be a graduate of some Chinese institution of further or higher education and spoke not only Chinese and Tibetan but also English (though not very well). She had travelled overland through Chamdo and been given official status by the Tibetans on the way. She carried with her letters from the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the Nanking Government. On 16 March 1930 Liu Man-ch'ing had a formal interview with the Dalai Lama when, wearing Tibetan dress, she presented valuable gifts of jade, silk and gold and was treated with great respect. She remained in Lhasa until the end of May, during which time she appeared to have established close relations with Lungshar. She had a farewell interview with the Dalai Lama on 25 May.[358] On 2 June she reached Gyantse on her way back to China via Calcutta; and by 29 July she was on British Indian soil at Kalimpong, where her arrival was widely reported both in the Indian and the British press.[359] Just as the Kansu Mission had made the Bell Mission a virtual inevitability, so the exploits of Miss Liu Man-ch'ing guaranteed that Lt.-Colonel Weir would soon make his call on the Dalai Lama in Lhasa.

Miss Liu's Lhasa stay was carefully watched by Laden La who had been in the Tibetan capital throughout the first half of 1930. He had been able to find out a great deal about the various contacts between Tibet and the Nanking Government then in progress. The Chinese letter brought by Yungon Dzasa, which had been treated with considerable honour by the Tibetans, had contained no specific proposals; but it had urged the Dalai Lama to establish friendly relations with China and pointed out the wisdom of Tibet taking up its rightful place as one of the Five Races which constituted the population of the Chinese Republic.[360] On what Miss Liu had to say to the Dalai Lama Laden La was not so well informed (despite a four hour interview with the Dalai Lama on 21 February); but one idea that seemed to be current around this time, and may have been on her agenda, was the possibility of Chinese troops coming to the aid of Tibet against the Nepalese (but the urgency in this particular issue had gone by March 1930, when the Nepalese accepted a Tibetan apology for the violation of their diplomatic rights).[361] Laden La further reported that Miss Liu Man-ch'ing was accompanied on her Lhasa visit by one Gyalchok Chophel (Kesang Tsering), who was the second son of the Tibetan Chief (or *t'ussu*) of Batang and was evidently working for the Chinese.[362] More on Miss Liu Man-ch'ing's

links with the affairs of Batang came to light shortly and will be considered below.

Enough was apparent by May 1930 to indicate that some quite serious Sino-Tibetan discussions were now in progress which surely required British attention. The Nanking Government were treating the Tibetans with a new measure of courtesy and consideration which was evidently appreciated in Lhasa; and the Tibetans had concluded that if they did not do something to improve their relations with the Chinese the latter might well take some positive steps to bring the Panchen Lama (living at this moment in Mukden) back home. The Dalai Lama, however, was not prepared to abandon entirely his old relationship with the British. On 1 May 1930, while Miss Liu Man-ch'ing was still in Lhasa, through Laden La he told Weir that his presence in the Tibetan capital would now be most welcome. Moreover, perhaps to counter some of the impact of Miss Liu Man-ch'ing's femininity, the Tibetans would be delighted to allow Mrs. Weir to accompany her husband.[363]

Apart from the Chinese question, a major issue which required Weir's attention was the proposed wool monopoly granted to Pangdatsang in collaboration with Kunphel La. The Dalai Lama's intention was to so concentrate this key Tibetan export trade that a large proportion of its profits should flow directly to him to be devoted to the purchase of silver bullion in India which, in turn, would be made into Tibetan coins at the new Dote Mint in Lhasa which had opened in early 1929. Tsarong Shape, who had opposed this project, a clear violation of Article VI of the 1914 Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations, had suffered further loss of influence and position in consequence.[364]

The presence of the "fat Mongolian", a probable Bolshevik agent, was no longer a problem: he had gone. There were, however, two more Mongolians residing in Drepung who were not above suspicion. The Russian threat could still not be ignored.

All in all Weir considered that

> the political situation in Tibet is one of precarious equilibrium. The concentration by the Dalai Lama of all power in his own hands is a potential danger. He is growing old and places much reliance on his favourites, Lungshar and Kunpen La, who are viewed with jealousy by Tibetan officials and with hatred by those from whom they have extracted money. On the death of the Dalai Lama a revolution in Lhasa is inevitable and the first victims will be the two favourites. Power will in all probability be seized by Tsarong . . . and after bloodshed a Government will be evolved which will take over the temporal power. . . . The recent assurances of friendship of the Government of India have created a favourable atmosphere in Lhasa. We must be prepared to substantiate these assurances with a handsome gift preferably a grant as in 1921 of arms and ammunition which would be tangible evidence of our sincerity.[365]

This was a most interesting expression of a potential development of British policy towards Tibet. A Tsarong regime was, in fact, the only remotely possible prospect for a sustained programme of Tibetan modernisation and the creation of anything like a satisfactorily durable Tibetan buffer between British India and either Soviet Russia or Kuomintang China. As events were to prove, it was not to be. Weir's remarks, however, do provide an insight into how one experienced Tibetan specialist in British service imagined the Tibetan situation might turn out to the advantage of India. It depended in the final analysis, as Weir made clear, on the continued British support for the creation of an effective Tibetan army.

The provision of British arms for Tibet, as had been the case in 1921, involved wider issues than those within the exclusive sphere of the Government of India. There was latent the risk of the British finding themselves drawn into a conflict with China; and before any decision could be made the nature of Anglo-Chinese relations and its importance to the wider British Imperial and National interests had to be taken into account, a task for the Cabinet in London (which, in any case, had reserved for itself the final say on the supply of any British arms to foreign regimes). In late July 1930 the Cabinet duly considered the matter. The Secretary of State for India, Wedgwood Benn, after consultation with the Foreign Secretary, Arthur Henderson, persuaded Ramsay MacDonald's second Labour Ministry to go along with the idea of supplying the Tibetans with more arms (in unspecified quantities) "provided that the Tibetan Government give an assurance in writing that *such munitions will be used solely for self-defence and for internal police work*" (Benn's italics).

Benn took this occasion to place before Cabinet a general statement of British policy towards Tibet. Since such statements from this elevated level of British administration are rather rare in the record of Anglo-Tibetan relations, it deserves quotation. He declared that

> in submitting this recommendation to my colleagues I would emphasise (and my views are accepted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs) that His Majesty's Government have not only incurred certain obligations towards Tibet in the matter of her relations with China but that it is definitely to their interest that the present territorial *status quo* on the Sino-Tibetan frontier should be maintained until such time as a formal settlement of the frontier can be reached. In these circumstances, and having regard to the undertakings to be required from the Tibetans as to the use to be made of the arms in question, I have no hesitation in recommending the present proposal. I would only add that, while it is impossible at this stage to form any idea as to the scale of a possible Tibetan demand, it is, in my judgement, likely to be relatively small. The Tibetan Government have not yet exhausted certain limited facilities for the purchase of arms granted them in 1921 by His Majesty's Government; their country is a poor one, and the extent to which they are likely

> to want or be able to pay for supplies (and supplies are to be granted only on payment) will probably be very limited indeed.

This statement remained in essence a basis for British policy towards Tibet right up to the end of the Indian Empire in 1947. While in the long run it did little to guarantee the sanctity of the Sino-Tibetan frontier in the East, it did serve to accentuate one feature of British Indian reporting on Tibetan affairs to London – and of Tibetan reporting to British India. The Tibetans, whatever might be the truth of the matter, could not be permitted to be seen to be in any way the aggressors in any conflict with China. Within a year of Benn's presentation to Cabinet, this consequence was already making its mark on the record to add to the historian's difficulties.[366]

While the Cabinet was deliberating the question of the supply of further arms to Tibet, Lt.-Colonel Weir was already on his way from Gyantse to Lhasa, accompanied by his wife and, as his official staff, Lt. M.R. Sinclair, I.M.S., Dr. Bo Tsering, Sub-Assistant Surgeon from the Gyantse Trade Agency, and both Laden La and Norbu Dhondup. He reached the Tibetan capital on 4 August and remained there until 1 October.[367] The Mission followed the procedures established by Bell and Bailey, being housed in the Dekyi Lingka (meaning according to Weir "the garden of happiness") and meeting the major Tibetan officials and leading Lhasa residents such as the Nepalese and Bhutanese representatives and the head of the Moslem Ladakhi community. There were interviews with the Kashag and with Lungshar now Commander in Chief of the Tibetan army. Weir saw the Dalai Lama a number of times; and on 17 August 1930, in what certainly was something novel in Anglo-Tibetan relations, the Dalai Lama received Mrs. Weir on an occasion of high good humour with much laughing and many jokes exchanged "to the bewildered consternation of his immediate entourage".

Tsarong, and several lesser personalities of similar outlook, wrote or sent verbal messages to Weir explaining that it would be as well if there were the absolute minimum of contact between them and the British envoy.[368] Tsarong appreciated fully that his pro-British outlook had contributed to his fall from grace. It would have been the height of folly to emphasise his closeness to the Government of India at this juncture.

There were a number of what might be called technical matters which Weir was able to discuss, if not always to solve, relating to the better conduct of relations between Lhasa and British India. The Tehri-Garhwal boundary dispute (which will be examined in a later Chapter) was no nearer settlement than before (and, indeed, was not destined to be solved when the British left India in 1947). The question of the wool monopoly was considered at length; and it was decided that it would be permitted to continue until April 1933 despite its conflict with the 1914 Trade Regulations. The Government

of India would assist Tibetan schemes for currency reform by selling silver to the Tibetan Government at a specially low rate, though only against immediate cash payment. Various points relating to customs duties and the taxation of traders were agreed to without any great difficulty. It was resolved to postpone for the time being discussion of a British proposal for the opening of a fresh Trade Mart at Taklakot (Taklakar) in Western Tibet near the border between India and Nepal: the Tibetans thought that one Mart in Western Tibet, at Gartok, was sufficient. Weir promised the Dalai Lama every assistance in further hydroelectric schemes of a modest nature.

As far as the supply of arms for Tibet was concerned the Dalai Lama seemed to show no great interest in increasing his arsenal. The weapons and ammunition of the Bell package so far received had yet to be paid for in full; and it was understood that the balance of the material would be supplied in due course on as easy terms as possible. The Dalai Lama evidently felt that Tibetan military reorganisation had proceeded far enough for the time being to meet the anticipated dangers, an opinion which was to change drastically not long after Weir had left Lhasa. Weir certainly did not find the current state of the Tibetan army under Lungshar's command particularly impressive; and the Lhasa police force which Laden La had helped establish could now only be described as pathetic.

Relations between Tibet and Nepal were still tense. The crisis of 1929 had been surmounted only to be followed by another of very similar nature.[369] However, the situation was being handled far more calmly this time; and there did not appear to be a serious risk of Tibeto-Nepalese armed conflict. These arguments between the Lhasa Government and its largest Himalayan neighbour were always tricky from the British point of view in that there was inevitably a suspicion in Lhasa that Katmandu enjoyed the support of the Government of India.

The Weir Mission, apart from all these questions, was concerned with three major issues, the nature of Sino-Tibetan relations, the possibility of Bolshevik penetration of Tibet and the steps that needed to be taken to bring the Panchen Lama back to Tashilhunpo.

On China Weir felt he had to be extremely cautious. He could not ask the Dalai Lama exactly what had gone on with Miss Liu Man-ch'ing and what was contained in the correspondence brought to Lhasa from Nanking by Yungon Dzasa; and the Dalai Lama vouchsafed nothing on any of all this to the British envoy. Weir's impression, based on little more than instinct, was that

> there is without doubt a strong undercurrent of feeling among several officials that Tibet will not be able to retain her independence of China indefinitely and that steps should soon be taken to make friendly overtures to China. If such overtures are made, they anticipate that a semi-independence at least will be achieved for Tibet which would be

> preferable to complete absorbtion by China. The kaleidoscopic changes in the Chinese political situation are watched with interest and I was asked on several occasions for the latest news.

The Dalai Lama, while silent on China, was prepared to talk about Russia. He observed that when he had travelled in Outer Mongolia, immediately after his flight from Lhasa ahead of the Younghusband Expedition of 1904, he visited no less than 43 Buddhist monasteries there which he knew had since "turned Red". Weir told him that the "Red" menace was now spreading to Manchuria, a land where not only were there Buddhist establishments as in Mongolia but also the Panchen Lama was at present living. A Bolshevik revolution was by no means impossible in Manchuria; and in this the Panchen Lama might find himself involved which, in turn, could bring the Communist menace into the heart of Tibetan politics.[370] The Dalai Lama seemed impressed by such argument; but he did point out that he had been at pains not to receive the Bolshevik envoy recently in Lhasa (the "fat Mongolian") and he gave Weir no indication that he was himself at all interested in closer relations with the Soviets.[371]

From another source, a Mongolian monk in Drepung Monastery, Weir derived the following account of what had been involved in the Mongolian (which Weir had no hesitation in calling"Bolshevik") Mission to Lhasa of 1927:

> it appears that when the Dalai Lama fled to Urga in 1904 (rather than meet the Younghusband Mission), he met with high Russian officials to whom he gave a paper agreeing to accept a Russian representative permanently in Lhasa. In return he received various valuable presents. The leader of the Bolshevik Mission of 1927 brought this paper to the Dalai Lama, and asked him to fulfil his previous promise. The Dalai Lama retained the paper which he said had been given to the Czarist Government now non-existent. The promise was no longer binding on him and if the Bolshevik leader chose to take back the presents they were ready for him with seals unbroken. The Bolshevik leader was non-plussed but took back the presents with him to Soviet Mongolia where he reported to his superiors his lack of success. He was promptly shot for his diplomatic blunders.[372]

Probably from the same source Weir was informed that the Bolshevik agent recently in Lhasa, "the fat Mongolian", was a Buriat holding high military rank under the Soviets. His task, apart from carrying out a general survey of the Tibetan political scene, had been to examine the possibility of using motor transport to invade Tibet from the north (that is to say through Sinkiang from Russia or Kansu from Outer Mongolia). On the whole, Weir was inclined to believe that Bolshevik ideas met with no sympathy in Lhasa. A Communist regime in Tibet was "I think, remote and need not at present be feared".

On the question of the Panchen Lama the Dalai Lama was only too willing to talk with Weir. The Dalai Lama had corresponded with his

fellow Incarnation and asked him to return: as far as he, the Dalai Lama, was concerned, there were no obstacles in the way. The Panchen Lama, however, "being misled by his entourage", showed no signs of coming back. Weir told the Dalai Lama that the quarrel seemed him to be "one between father and son". The Dalai Lama in the role of father should show forgiveness. It would indeed be a tragedy if the Panchen Lama were to die on foreign soil. Many Buddhists outside Tibet, Weir observed, were weakening in their allegiance to the Dalai Lama because of this quarrel; and he advised the Dalai Lama to think very seriously indeed about the whole problem. The Dalai Lama asked Weir what he thought ought to be done in view of the Panchen Lama's obstinacy. Weir had no solution to offer; and there the matter rested.

From Weir's report of his Lhasa Mission and remarks in his previous correspondence with the Government of India a line of policy of sorts emerged which was not spelled out in detail.[373] Both the Chinese and Bolshevik problems could be resolved by a reversion to something like the old Simla Convention with Chinese ratification. If a Chinese Resident (Weir still used the term Amban) were again established in Lhasa with the permitted escort of 300 men, counter-balanced by a British Residency there (with equivalent escort), then the Bolsheviks could be resisted more effectively and Chinese aspirations towards Tibet satisfied. In the matter of the dispute between the two great Incarnations some kind of British mediation would probably be called for. The Dalai Lama, fearing a rebuff which could severely damage his prestige, was reluctant on his own initiative to make realistic concessions or offer acceptable terms to the Panchen Lama.

On his way back from Lhasa to Gyantse, with special permission from the Dalai Lama after consultation with the Tsongdu (National Assembly), Weir visited Shigatse and Tashilhunpo Monastery, then, of course, under the control of officials appointed by Lhasa. He was, he noted, the first British official to see that part of Tibet since Charles Bell more than two decades earlier. It was a depressing experience. Shigatse seemed dead and "an air of apathy hung over it". Weir felt that its "inhabitants sullenly resent the sterner rule of the central Government and are longing for the return of the Tashi Lama to his home".[374]

The report of the Weir Mission contains a definite suggestion of a pro-Chinese "tilt" in the general trend of Tibetan foreign policy. To some degree this impression was probably correct. The Dalai Lama had concluded that it might be possible to come to some arrangement with the Kuomintang in which effective Tibetan autonomy could be guaranteed in exchange for some formal gestures towards a general association of Tibet with China of an essentially symbolic nature. The Kuomintang was confronted with daunting internal problems and

might well settle for a face-saving nominal paramountcy over those parts of Tibet under the effective control of the Lhasa Government.

In practical terms, however, there is some evidence that the 13th Dalai Lama was also now experimenting with a more ambitious, and sophisticated, approach to Tibet's relations with the outside world than that implied by some kind of Dominion status within a Chinese Commonwealth. In late 1927 and early 1928 Pa-lhe-se, who had been visiting Charles Bell in England, and no doubt with Bell's advice, explored the possibility of Tibet becoming a member of the League of Nations. It is more than probable that the Dalai Lama was aware of this initiative.[375] The opening approaches were naïve and ineffectual; but had Bell been able to visit Lhasa again, which he would have done but for the Dalai Lama's death at the very end of 1933, something more might have been tried in this direction.[376] The Bolshevik Mission to Lhasa in 1927 and its aftermath, moreover, may well have involved more than the Dalai Lama was prepared to admit to Weir or any other British Indian official. He would have been indeed foolish to dismiss out of hand the possibilities of a Soviet connection which his old friend Dorjiev, whom he seems to have trusted more than any other non-Tibetan adviser when all is said and done, was advocating.

The great Tibetan difficulty in this respect was lack of knowledge of the outside world beyond China and British India. Lungshar was one of the very few Tibetans of influence who had travelled in Europe; but this was some time ago, before the Great War when he had accompanied the four Tibetan boys to England to begin their education there. The three surviving boys, after their time at Rugby and other British educational institutions, were still around in Tibet: their social status and political position, however, was such as to preclude them from exercising any major influence over policy; and, with the possible exception of Ringang, they did not possess the personality for success at the very highest levels of Tibetan administration.

In a deliberate policy of limiting Tibetan opportunities for acquiring knowledge about, and contacts in, the outside world, the Government of India did their best to exclude persons who might be in any way representatives of major Powers from reaching Lhasa; though there was no way that Russian Buriats and other Mongols could be excluded, and Japanese agents from time to time were able to make their way to the Tibetan capital. When a suitable Westerner did turn up, the Tibetans were not slow to try to make use of him. Such, at least, was the experience of the American traveller Suydam Cutting.

Cutting first impinged upon the Tibetan world in 1928 when he accompanied Theodore and Kermit Roosevelt, sons of the former President of the United States of America, in an expedition to

Western China, which included Tachienlu and neighbouring districts in the Marches.[377] In 1930 Cutting visited Khambadzong where, on the very edge of Central Tibet, he made some contact with Tibetan officialdom (through Pangdatsang) and began a correspondence with the Dalai Lama himself. In 1931 the Dalai Lama was writing to him to establish some channel of communication with the United States Government, specifically to find an alterative source of silver bullion to that provided by British India; and in 1932 he asked him to find American buyers for Tibetan wool, of the sale of which Pangdatsang had been given the monopoly.[378] No doubt had other opportunities presented themselves the Dalai Lama would have taken them.[379]

Shortly after Weir had left Lhasa, however, events in Eastern Tibet were to convince the Dalai Lama of the truth of two fundamental considerations of foreign policy. First: it would not be so easy to come to an acceptable accommodation with the Chinese. Second: presented with a renewed threat of armed attack from the Chinese in the east, the British were his only realistic source of help. He may in 1930 have been exploring in his mind the possibility of an expanded sphere of Tibetan diplomatic activity; but by August 1932 he was ready, so Weir reported, to sign a treaty with the Government of India in which he would place the entire conduct of Tibetan foreign relations in British hands, perhaps even as firmly as had Bhutan by the Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty of 1910.[380]

The crisis which produced this dramatic change in attitude was the consequence of the breakdown of the Teichman truces of 1918 on the Sino-Tibetan frontier in Eastern Tibet which was already developing as Weir prepared for his Lhasa Mission in July 1930, though he appears to have been quite unaware of the impending dangers. It was to lead to a second Weir Mission to Lhasa in 1932. For a while it looked as if Chinese troops might once more, as they had in 1910, appear on India's undefined and undefended Himalayan borders. The crisis was the product of two main factors, the rift between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas from which virtually no aspect of Tibetan political life could be entirely isolated, and the unstable nature of the original Teichman settlement of 1918 which had to a great extent been masked by internal Chinese conflict.

After 1928, as has already been noted, the Panchen Lama became increasingly allied to Chinese factions and showed himself willing in his struggle with his Lhasa rival to take part in co-operative ventures with the Nanking authorities with fairly long term objectives. In late 1929, for example, with the help of Lu Hsing-chi and the Thinyik Company in Calcutta, some 40 Tibetan boys, believed to be from the families of supporters of the Panchen Lama, left Tibet via Darjeeling and Calcutta to be educated in China; and it was reported that 19 more were on their way.[381] There were by this time at least 100 youths from both Central and Eastern Tibet studying in China. It

looked as if the Panchen Lama's faction were planning ahead to create a cadre of trained Tibetans to work on its behalf, with Chinese support, should it prevail over the current Lhasa regime. It may also have been significant in this context that towards the end of 1929 the Panchen Lama set up an office in Tachienlu (in the palace once occupied by the Chala "King") from which his influence could the better expand in Sikang and Ch'inghai (Kham and Amdo) where in fact the majority of the Tibetan people lived under varying degrees of Chinese control.[382]

In Ch'inghai (which simply means "Blue Lake" and is a sinification of Kokonor), with its capital at Sining and firmly under Mahommedan control, there had been no real possibility of a pro-Lhasa rebellion against the existing regime. With a mixed population of Chinese Moslems, Mongols, Tibetans and nomadic peoples like the Goloks who defied classification, the Tibetans were in a minority and the writ of Dalai Lama, even in spiritual matters among Buddhists, was not universally accepted.[383] Both the older Buddhist Red Sect (Nyingma) and the even older Bön sects were well represented.[384] Here is one reason why Ch'inghai (then still generally referred to in British sources as the Kokonor territory, and to the Tibetans as Amdo) was not involved in the hostilities which resulted in the Teichman truces of 1918. Sikang, however, where there could be no question that ethnic Tibetans were in the majority (and, indeed, there were more of them than in all of Outer Tibet under Lhasa rule), was a different matter.

Sikang, which the Chinese had first tried to turn into a new Chinese Province in the Chao Erh-feng era, and which the Kuomintang listed as part of metropolitan China, possessed a long and complex history of separate political existence from Lhasa. It consisted of over 30 states of varying size which until the early 20th century had been subject to Chinese political influence through a system of indirect rule exercised mainly from Szechuan. In the early 18th century a reasonably clear boundary had been drawn up between this region and that of Ü and Tsang, the sphere of direct temporal control of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. In the 1860s Lhasa influence was acknowledged deep within this tract of the Tibetan Marches in Nyarong (Chantui); and there were a number of Eastern Tibetan states, or at least their rulers and some of their religious institutions, which came to prefer Lhasa to the Chinese. However, as more than one British official had cause to note, it could not be said that throughout the area there was overwhelming eagerness to replace Chinese influence, often extremely remote and ineffectual, with that of the Government represented by the frequently rapacious officials of the Dalai Lama. In 1903, for example, on the eve of the Younghusband Expedition, when the 13th Dalai Lama threatened by force to bring the state of Chala (the most easterly of the Tibetan

polities with its capital at Tachienlu) under his control he was strenuously resisted by the Chala *t'ussu* ("King") with active support from the Chinese authorities in Szechuan: this event, perhaps, throws some light on the background to the close Chala-Szechuan relationship at the time of the Teichman truces of 1918.[385]

One of the main causes for the violent rebellion against the Chinese which erupted in Eastern Tibet in 1905, and which was to provide the opportunity for the ruthless re-establishment of Chinese control by Chao Erh-feng, only to be frustrated by the Chinese Revolution of 1911, arose from the facilities which the Chinese (obliged to do so by the treaties with the Powers) provided there for Christian missionary activity, particularly that of the French Catholics who were a special object of Tibetan hatred at this time.[386] Many Catholic fathers were killed. It is interesting, however, that the worst of the revolt was confined to the south-eastern corner of Eastern Tibet adjacent to Yunnan; and there were large tracts which were totally unaffected. Where the rising was most ferocious, moreover, it was directed against the importation of undesirable foreign influences rather than inspired by a wish to see Chinese rule replaced by that of Lhasa.

We possess no detailed history of Eastern Tibet; but enough is known to make it possible to establish certain of its main features. It was subject to a number of influences from the 16th century at least, the ambitions of leaders of various clans in Mongolia, the expansion of Chinese power along the trade routes from Kansu, Szechuan and Yunnan, endeavours of the Yellow (Gelugpa) sect of the Dalai Lamas of Lhasa, particularly under the energetic 5th Dalai Lama in the latter part of the 17th century, to establish monastic strongholds in a region where other sects such as the Nyingma, the Sakya and the Bön were well entrenched. It was a region, moreover, deeply involved in trade with China (particularly in tea upon which much of the local economy, not least in the monasteries regardless of sect, to a considerable extent depended). It was a frontier tract between several power foci, the Chinese in Yunnan, Szechuan and Sining on the one hand and Lhasa on the other; and different places possessed different loyalties and attitudes. The Hor States, generally considered to be of Mongol origin, with their centre at Kantze, while strongly attached to their self government, definitely were on the Chinese side of the divide, so to speak.[387] The adjacent Tibetan state of Derge, one of the largest and most prosperous in the region, while nominally under Chinese supervision in the late 19th century, seems to have had closer relations with Lhasa even though it was no stronghold of the Yellow Sect, its principal monasteries being all of the Red Sect.

What was clear to all the indigenous states in Eastern Tibet was that the potential increase in Chinese power following the rise of Kuomintang implied both social and political change. Any develop-

ment which promised to minimise such change without increasing at the same time the power of Lhasa, in some ways as alien as that of China, was not without its attractions. This need not imply the disappearance of all Chinese influence. History had demonstrated that a dilute Chinese presence, in contrast to the vigour of an equivalent to Chao Erh-feng (which, in the end, the Chinese Communists were to provide), was eventually absorbed into the general Tibetan way of life.

For over two thousand years the Chinese had expanded their Empire as much by cultural as political or military imperialism. The Tibetans were among the very few border peoples of the Middle Kingdom who could, given a chance, score cultural victories over the Chinese. Most European and American travellers in the region from the middle of the 19th century until 1949 commented upon the manner in which Chinese here, be they merchants, soldiers or officials, tended to become absorbed into the Tibetan way of life. The Manchus had tried to prohibit their officials from marrying Tibetans; but there is no evidence that they were particularly successful in preventing the establishment of Sino-Tibetan sexual liaisons of one kind or another. The process of Tibetanisation was all the more likely to continue if the Chinese were moderated, as it were, by a powerful Buddhist voice; and many saw such in the 9th Panchen Lama. He represented the highest spiritual values, while, unlike his Lhasa colleague, he was not associated with a form of political adminstration which those who had experienced it in Eastern Tibet frequently found more oppressive than anything offered by China.

To what extent the influence of the Panchen Lama was involved in the precipitation of the immediate crisis of 1930 we shall never know. What matters, however, is that it was widely believed both in Eastern Tibet and in Lhasa that he was more than a mere spectator. The Dalai Lama in his correspondence with Nanking had no hesitation in attributing the outbreak of conflict in Eastern Tibet to the machinations of the Panchen Lama's supporters.

A crisis developed in 1930 in the relations between two monasteries in Eastern Tibet, the Yellow Sect (Gelugpa) monastery at Dargye (Ta-chieh) and an establishment of the Red Sect (Nyingma) in the Hor state of Beri (Pei-li).[388] Both monasteries were situated a few miles from Kantze in the Rongbatsa region near the west bank of the Yalung. Dargye and Beri had been mentioned by name in the two Teichman instruments of 1918, the truces of Chamdo and Rongbatsa. Special provision has been made for the good treatment of the Dargye monks in the Chamdo document; and at Rongbatsa in a Separate Article the Chinese right to garrison Beri had been specified. Taking the Chamdo truce together with that of Rongbatsa, it was clear that the Teichman truce line actually ran between Dargye and Beri, which were but some six miles apart. Any hostilities

between these two places, therefore, could only involve a major disturbance of the 1918 arrangements which had been made with British participation.

Dargye was the most important monastery in the Hor State of Drango, the first of thirteen founded in the Hor States by a follower of the 5th Dalai Lama in the late 17th century. It housed some 2,000 monks. When the American traveller Rockhill passed by it in 1889 he was warned to move circumspectly as the Dargye monks had earned a reputation for violence and aggressive behaviour towards strangers which was shared by some of the other Hor State monastic establishments of that time, notably the great monastery at Kantze.[389] Beri, apart from its monastery, smaller and less prestigious than Dargye and belonging to the Red Sect, was the capital of one of the Hor States which had retained close links with the Chinese authorities in Tachienlu. Both Dargye and Beri monasteries were involved in the Tibet-Szechuan tea trade and possessed financial ties with Chinese merchants.

Had there still been a British Consular Official stationed in Tachienlu we would no doubt be in possession of ample information concerning the dispute between the two monasteries, news of which, in that it had an immediate effect on the tea trade, was soon received in that town. In the event great reliance must be placed on the reports of Paul Sherap which, through the British Consul-General in Chungking, W. Stark Toller, eventually found their way to Peking, London and India. Li Tieh-tseng, using the records of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, also comments on the incident; and what he has to say does not conflict in essentials with the account given by Paul Sherap. In addition we have the narrative of the American missionary Duncan, who was at Batang at the time of the crisis and who visited the Dargye-Beri area in 1935. Duncan adds some details, but he does not differ fundamentally from either Sherap or Li.[390] Versions of these events, particularly their causes, which reached British India by way of Tibet are certainly highly coloured by the Tibetan resolve to attribute all blame to the Chinese side; and they are far from reliable,

The original crisis broke out in the summer of 1930 before Weir had set out for his Lhasa Mission. An Incarnation resident in Beri monastery, who had received his training in Dargye, seems to have advocated the merger of the two institutions under the rule of Dargye. There are suggestions, inherently probable, that the majority of the Beri monks (in that they belonged to the Red Sect and not the Yellow Sect of the Dalai Lama) as well as the people of Beri state were strongly opposed to this proposal for the subordination of a Red Sect (Nyingma) institution to one of the Yellow Sect (Gelugpa). The Incarnation who was the immediate cause of all the trouble (Li calls him the Yala Abbot) was obliged to flee to Dargye where the monks

lost no time in preparing to rush forth to restore him to Beri. The Dargye monks sought help from the local Tibetan commander who, it later transpired, provided them with arms (probably rifles of British origin).[391] Beri, apparently supported by another monastery in the district, the Sakya establishment of Nyara, appealed to the Chinese who hastened to send up troops from Tachienlu to reinforce the weak garrison at Rongbatsa, their nearest outpost to the scene of the disturbances. The Dargye monks were joined by other Tibetans, either part of the regular army or, more likely, local Kham auxiliaries. To begin with, the Beri-Chinese forces were greatly outnumbered; and (as had been the case with the Chinese in the 1917-1918 crisis) they were initially obliged to retreat. The Dargye attack on Beri (and observers from the Tachienlu side were unanimous that Dargye was the aggressor, whatever the rights and wrongs behind its action) evidently took place in or before June 1930. The veteran missionary J.H. Edgar was writing about it from Tachienlu on 4 July 1930.[392] This, of course, was before Weir had set out on his Lhasa Mission; but Weir's first report of the incident, of which he had received news by way of Tibetan sources, was in September.[393] By this time a virtual horde of Tibetan monks, some of them armed with rifles which it may be presumed were acquired from the more orthodox Tibetan military, were on the rampage over a wide stretch of country; and to counter them some 400 Chinese troops had been sent from Tachienlu to reinforce the outposts in the Kantze region. At first, both in India and at the British Legation in Peking it was thought that the two monasteries were on the Chinese side of the Teichman 1918 truce line and the problem could safely be ignored by the British for the time being.[394] In November it looked as if some kind of truce had been patched up, or at least negotiations to this end had been initiated. Sporadic fighting, however, continued.

The Dalai Lama from the outset blamed the whole affair on the influence of the Panchen Lama and the support given to him by the Nanking Government. Liu Wen-hui, who had effective responsibility for the peace of the Marches, protested that the Lhasa Government had actively helped the Dargye monks and thus turned a theological issue into a war.[395] From Duncan's account it is hard to see quite how the Panchen Lama was directly involved in this particular event which seems to have started with a clash between Sects, unless the Panchen Lama was obtaining in Eastern Tibet the support of the Nyingma and the Sakya (the latter with its most important establishment in his Province of Tsang) against the pretensions of the Gelugpa encouraged by the Dalai Lama.

The immediate Nanking Government reaction was to send their own observers to report and, if possible, mediate. They placed no reliance upon either the good faith or the discretion of Liu Wen-hui; and, in view of the relationship which they had been trying to

establish with Lhasa since at least the beginning of the year, they must have found the whole episode extremely annoying. Their representatives, T'ang Ko-san and Liu Tsan-ting from the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, were despatched from Nanking at the end of January 1931 and eventually reached Tachienlu in the second week of June. T'ang Ko-san remained for a time in Tachienlu, no doubt the keep in touch with Liu Wen-hui's headquarters, while Liu Tsan-tsin made his way at once towards the line of fighting. Liu Tsan-tsin, of course, was an old hand at this particular exercise. He had been one the signatories of the Teichman inspired truce of Chamdo in 1918; and he well understood the problems involved.[396]

By the time that T'ang Ko-san and Liu Tsan-ting reached Tachienlu the situation on the Sino-Tibetan border had altered considerably to the Tibetan advantage. The troops available to Liu Wen-hui, who had other enemies in Szechuan whom he could not afford to ignore for one moment, were inadequate to hold back the Tibetans. When, in February 1931, serious fighting once more broke out, the Tibetans pushed forward rapidly, capturing Rongbatsa and, in March, taking the important Chinese position at Kantze and pushing deep into Nyarong. Advance elements, so Sherap reported, came within a few miles of Tachienlu itself.

It all looked very much like a repetition of 1918; and, as in 1918, the Dalai Lama began to cherish dreams of some major change in the balance of power in Eastern Tibet. Regular Tibetan troops had joined the Dargye monks (who were hardly the material upon which to base a sustained and disciplined offensive). The immediate aim, however, may well have been less permanent occupation of territory than the exertion of pressure upon the Nanking Government to abandon the Panchen Lama. In early 1931 Paul Sherap came across a most interesting public notice, put up in a suitable place in Tachienlu by supporters of the 13th Dalai Lama, which purported to outline the Lhasa objectives.[397] If the Nanking Government terminated their support for the Panchen Lama, the notice stated, then a settlement of the fighting would soon be reached and, moreover, the Dalai Lama would accept a status, albeit nominal, within the Chinese community of peoples and would even give up Chamdo. Otherwise Tibetan forces would advance to the limits of Eastern Tibet.[398] The implications of this notice were reinforced by information reaching Gangtok through Tibetan sources that while the Dalai Lama had on the one hand declared to the Kuomintang that he was both the temporal and spiritual ruler of all of Kham, yet he had not ruled out the possibility of Tibetan delegates attending the "People's Conference" which the Nanking Government was in the process of summoning. The cause of all the trouble, the Dalai Lama said, in the final analysis lay with the machinations of the Panchen Lama's clique.[399]

The Panchen Lama, of course, was not slow in putting his own gloss on the situation. He was reported to have despatched a Memorial to the Nanking Government in which he condemned the Dalai Lama on no less than ten major counts as a disturber of the harmony of Sino-Tibetan relations. Among other acts, he had been responsible after the 1911 Revolution for the expulsion of the Chinese Amban from Lhasa. He had entered into secret treaties with the British. He had sold mining rights in Tibet to foreign enterprises (perhaps a reference to the geological work of Sir Henry Hayden). He had suppressed monasteries which favoured relationships with China. Finally, he had launched military attacks on both Sikang and the Kokonor territory "for his own aggrandisement".[400]

From the British point of view the situation was embarrassing in that it was widely believed in China, and above all in Szechuan, that the Tibetans were receiving active British support. Once more British rifles (and, now, machine guns and, even, mountain artillery, as well), and the characteristic wooden boxes of WD .303 ammunition with their rope handles and stencil markings in English which littered the battle field (and upon which Teichman had remarked thirteen years earlier), created an impression which no amount of diplomatic denial could remove. The British Legation could not ignore the situation even though there was not much it could do about it.

By April 1931 the fighting in the Rongbatsa-Kantze-Nyarong sector had died down; but a new Tibetan thrust was developing further south in the direction of Batang and Litang along the main South (Gyalam) Road from Chamdo to Tachienlu. In July this too came to a temporary halt while the Tibetan side waited to see what the negotiators from the Nanking Government, T'ang Ko-san and Liu Tsan-ting, had to offer. There were arguments about the venue for talks, Chamdo being preferred by the Tibetans and Kantze or Rongbatsa by the Chinese. Eventually Kantze was selected where Liu Tsan-ting by November 1931 had come to a settlement with the Tibetan commander in Kham, Kalon Ngabo.[401] This has often been referred to as the Agreement of Eight Articles (though the final version of it contained, in fact, nine): the Kantze Truce would probably be a better name.[402]

The key provisions of the truce were:

(1) the Tibetans would remain in control of both Kantze and Nyarong (Chantui);

(2) the Chinese would withdraw in the Kantze region eastwards to the She Chu tributary of the Yalung where their advance posts would be Drango and Dawu (T'aofu);

(3) both sides would restrict their forces here to some 200 to 300 troops, sufficient to maintain order within their respective spheres but not enough for a resumed offensive;

(4) the Tibetans would release all Chinese prisoners and would be

paid by the Chinese for the cost of their maintenance while captive;

(5) Dargye monastery would pay the debts it owed for tea acquired from merchants in Tachienlu;

(6) the dispute between Dargye and Beri would be settled by Tibetan justice;

(7) normal trade along the North (Changlam) Road would be allowed to resume;

(8) finally, there were various provisions for communication between the Tibetans and the local Chinese commander, Brigadier-General Ma Su, including exchanges of compliments.

Brigadier-General Ma Su, who was based in Tachienlu, told Sherap that he thought the truce might hold for a while, given the Japanese threat then confronting the Nanking Government; but that sooner or later the Chinese Central Government would repudiate it and seek to regain the lost territory.[403] The more immediate question was whether Liu Wen-hui would acknowledge a settlement negotiated by agents of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in Nanking rather than by his own representatives. At first Liu Wen-hui denied responsibility for the Agreement; but by January 1932 he had publicly, albeit grudgingly, accepted it with the addition of a special provision guaranteeing the fair treatment of the Beri monks by Lhasa.[404]

The Kantze Truce was inherently unstable. While Liu Wen-hui may have welcomed it as giving him a breathing space, he can hardly have been happy about the intervention of the Kuomintang regime in what he considered his private preserve. It involved serious loss of face. Already in February 1932 a fresh crisis was brewing. The local Chinese commander who had been so decisively repulsed by the Tibetans, Brigadier-General Ma Su, was killed during a mutiny of his own troops.[405] Liu Wen-hui promptly replaced him by Brigadier-General Yü Sung-ling, a soldier of greater energy (Ma Su had the reputation of being overfond of strong drink). The Nanking Government on reflection decided both that the terms of the Kantze Truce had been too favourable to the Tibetans and that it would be unwise to deny Liu Wen-hui an opportunity to redeem himself by undertaking some kind of counter offensive; and it ordered the recall of T'ang Ko-san and Liu Tsan-ting. At the same time, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, apparently without consulting Liu Wen-hui, had appointed as its representative in Batang that Ko-sang-tse-jen (Kesang Tsering) who had accompanied Liu Man-ch'ing to Lhasa in 1930 and was probably her husband. This action precipitated yet another crisis.[406]

Kesang Tsering evidently concluded from the Kantze Truce that Liu Wen-hui's power in Chinese controlled Eastern Tibet, Sikang, was broken. His loyalties were divided, on the one hand he was the agent of the Kuomintang and on the other, as the son of the Batang *t'ussu*,

he was a chiefly figure in his own right and a player in the game of Tibetan as well as Chinese politics. His family appear to have in 1931 thrown in their lot with the cause of the Panchen Lama as they saw it. At all events, by early April 1932 Kesang Tsering had staged a coup in Batang, taking over command of such local forces both Chinese and Tibetan as were prepared to transfer their loyalty to him from Liu Wen-hui. He declared on 24 April 1932 at a review of his troops that he was now the commander of Sikang Province under the Nanking Government. This move not only provoked the anger of Liu Wen-hui but soon involved Kesang Tsering in open conflict with his main Tibetan ally, the Gongkar Lama from the monastery of Dzongong on the Mekong River about 60 miles as the crow flies to the south of Batang.

The forces of the Gongkar Lama, armed with rifles loaned by Kesang Tsering, had proceeded to take over the salt wells around Yakalo, the tax revenue from which had long been a subject of Sino-Tibetan contest and were until this moment being gathered by Liu Wen-hui's men.[407] The Gongkar Lama, however, refused either to make over to Kesang Tsering the salt tax money or return the borrowed rifles. Fighting broke out between troops loyal to Kesang Tsering and those of the Gongkar Lama who, under pressure, first tried in vain to obtain help from Liu Wen-hui, and then changed sides and joined up with the Tibetan garrison at Markham Gartok.[408] By 22 May 1932 this combined Tibetan army had started to besiege Batang, where Kesang Tsering's men put up a stout resistance. The Protestant mission buildings, which were outside the Batang perimeter, had to be abandoned to the Tibetans. Batang itself came under fire from a mountain gun, presumably one of the 2.75 inch pieces supplied by the British.[409] Kesang Tsering at this juncture deemed it prudent to reaffirm his loyalty to Liu Wen-hui, one of whose officials had managed to make his way into the town through the Tibetan lines. On 1 August a column commanded by one of Liu Wen-hui's officers, Ma Chen-lung, fought its way into Batang; and Kesang Tsering, after handing over the conduct of the defence to Ma, prudently escaped from the beleaguered town on 4 August. The Tibetans lifted the siege four days later, on 8 August, having run out of ammunition.[410]

By this time Liu Wen-hui had finally made up his mind to repudiate the Kantze Truce and send his new commander, Brigadier-General Yü Sung-ling, into battle, the main thrust being directed towards Kantze. On 9 July 1932 Yü had captured Dargye monastery and restored Chinese control over all the Hor States including Kantze. Soon he had reoccupied Rongbatsa (which held out until 3 August) and penetrated deep into Derge.

In July 1932 the Mahommedan General in the Kokonor territory (by now generally referred to as Ch'inghai though its formal

Provincial status was not confirmed by the Nanking Government until 1938), Ma Pu-fang, son of the old Mahommedan General Ma Ch'i, decided to take a hand and advanced south into Lhasa controlled territory from his southernmost base in Jyekundo, which the Tibetans in early 1932 had been unwise enough to penetrate for a brief period. The Tibetan forces were soon obliged to pull back to within two days march of Chamdo.[411]

By August 1932, therefore, two new military factors had to be considered in the Chinese equation. First: ought the advance, either from Jyekundo or Batang, continue to Chamdo? Liu Wen-hui's commander in the field, Brigadier-General Yü, thought not. To do so, he argued, would be to invite active British intervention on behalf of the hard pressed Lhasa forces.[412] Second: what would be the outcome of this unprecedented collaboration between Szechuan and Ch'inghai? Was it now possible to mount a combined offensive against the Tibetans? In fact, all Ma Pu-fang wanted was to improve the security of his frontier with the Tibetans by moving them further away from the key town of Jyekundo which was the major centre in the extreme south of his vast territory ruled from Sining far to the north; and he certainly had no wish to involve himself in the affairs of Liu Wen-hui with whom he had absolutely nothing in common other than a reluctance to surrender too much of his independence to the Koumintang.[413] It is unlikely that a tranquil relationship between the two men would have long continued had not the course of events eliminated its necessity.

In October 1932 war, which had been threatening for some time, broke out between Liu Wen-hui and his nephew and fellow Szechuan militarist Liu Hsiang, the latter supported by Yang Seng and Teng Hsi-hou. The "War of the Two Lius" (as well as a threat from Chinese Communist forces) made it impossible for Liu Wen-hui to devote any of his troops to his Tibetan flank. He lost no time in negotiating an armistice with the Tibetans which was signed at Gönchen in Derge on 10 October 1932.[414] The effective Tibet-Sikang frontier was taken to be the upper reach of the Yangtze; and the Tibetan loss of the greater part of Derge as well as the Rongbatsa region, which they had gained in 1918, was confirmed. This was, interestingly enough, the boundary which Teichman had personally favoured in 1917-18 as corresponding most closely to historical realities. The Tibetans retained Chamdo, which they would certainly have lost had the war continued and the advice of Brigadier General Yü been ignored. The Tibetans wisely refrained from exploiting Liu Wen-hui's difficulties (his war with his nephew and allies did not go at all well for him) and did not try to renew their offensive towards Szechuan.[415] Retribution might have been delayed; but when it came it would certainly have been brutal.

Ma Pu-fang remained in the field for a while longer. He was even

reported to have declared that alone he would carry the war all the way to Lhasa.[416] In reality, however, like his predecessors in the Kokonor territory, Ma had rather limited objectives. Once he was sure that Tibetan attacks on Jyekundo could be prevented in future, he had done all that he wanted. In due course after prolonged negotiations, on 15 June 1933 his representative signed an agreement with the local Tibetan commander which provided for a buffer zone between his territory and that held by Lhasa and for an exchange of prisoners.[417] The agreement was replete with expressions of regret on both sides that conflict had broken out at all. The traditional policy of the Mahommedan General was not to involve himself in squabbles between Lhasa and the Szechuan authorities; and to this Ma Pu-fang now returned, though the problem of the Panchen Lama was shortly to embroil him once again in Tibetan politics.

In all this the Lhasa side could content itself with one small gain. The district of Yakalo (Yerkalo, Yentsing or Yenching) on the Mekong, part of the state of Muli, which had for centuries been the subject of periodic Sino-Tibetan conflict, had been taken by the Tibetans during their operations towards Batang; and this they held. The region, it has already been noted, was important as a major source of salt which was exported to Szechuan and Yunnan as well as consumed in Tibet. Salt, incidentally, was also a key commodity in Tibetan relations with the non-Tibetan peoples along the northern edge of the Assam Himalayas through which ran the McMahon Line boundary, destined shortly to become once more an object of intense British preoccupation. The Lhasa possession of Yakalo was challenged from time to time both by the local *t'ussu* and by the Chinese authorities in either Szechuan or Yunnan; but Tibetan control seems to have been maintained right up to 1950.

The outbreak of the crisis in 1930, all the evidence would suggest, took the Dalai Lama's Government by surprise; though they were quite prepared to exploit such advantages as might arise from it. One result was a certain lack of consistency in Tibetan policy. Opportunities for alteration in the extent of Tibetan control in the east could not be ignored; yet there was a reluctance to abandon that dialogue with the Nanking Government which had begun around the time of the Liu Man-ch'ing Mission. In assessing the nature of the crisis, Lhasa was well aware of the fact that Nanking and Liu Wen-hui, let alone Ma Pu-fang, did not of necessity see eye to eye; and, of course, the problem of the Panchen Lama remained. When, moreover, the balance of advantage started to shift away from the Tibetans during the course of 1932, the British connection became once more of great importance, a point which was certainly emphasised by Tsarong who by the middle of 1931 was again rising in the Dalai Lama's favour at the expense of Lungshar.

As far as relations with the British were concerned there were two

main issues. First: once serious fighting had broken out the Tibetan army would require further supplies of arms and ammunition. Second: British mediation by way of its diplomatic representation in China might yet bring about some resolution of the problem of the Panchen Lama, which could, *en passant*, also result in some settlement of the Sino-Tibetan border in the east.

In May 1932 the Dalai Lama requested a further supply of arms from the British, 6 mountain guns, 1,500 rounds of shrapnel and a like ammount of normal HE shells, 4 Lewis guns with 5,000,000 rounds of suitable ammunition, 4 Maxim guns, and 3,500 "bombs" (whether this meant hand grenades or mortar rounds for weapons which had not come from British India is not clear).[418] This was at a point when it was evident that the fighting on both the Tibetan and Chinese sides was coming to a standstill owing to the exhaustion of ammunition. As Weir noted: "whichever side first receives supplies must gain the upper hand".[419] The Government of India were dubious about the "bombs"; but they did agree, after reference to the India Office, to provide some material on payment, 4 Maxims and 4 Lewis guns plus 1,500 rifles with 1,500,000 rounds of .303 ammunition as well as 4 mountain guns with 2,000 shells. All this was to be correlated with the unfilled part of the original Bell package of 1921,[420] These munitions had been sent on their way to Tibet by the end of July or early August 1932, too late to have any impact, for example, on the Tibetan siege of Batang. In response to further Tibetan requests in 1933 the Government of India agreed to provide an additional 4,000 Lee-Enfield rifles (of modern pattern), almost 3,000 shells and 3,000,000 rounds of .303 ammunition, delivery to start in July; and in September 1933 it was arranged for the Tibetan Government to receive a loan at 5% to pay for all this material.[421]

This ended British arms supplies to Tibet until 1936, when Brigadier Neame arranged for a significant replenishment of the Tibetan armoury. While the quantities were small, they inevitably gave rise to Chinese protests both in China and through the Chinese Legation in London starting in July 1932 when the Wai-chiao-pu asked the British Legation in Peking to put an end to what the Chinese clearly felt was an unfriendly act.[422] The British Legation was not entirely happy about what the Government of India were doing. Even if the arms were intended solely for Tibetan self defence, it was not quite clear who was defending and who attacking in Eastern Tibet at this time. As E.M.B. Ingram, who had to handle this matter in the absence of Sir Miles Lampson, put it in August 1932:

> in advancing beyond the Tei . . [Teichman, 1918] . . line Tibetans appear to have been the original aggressors . . . Chinese appear to have been responsible for reopening hostilities this year but they appear to have been forced to anticipate Tibetan attacks.[423]

This conclusion was doubly embarrassing in that it not only implied a disregard for the Cabinet decision of 1930 that arms to Tibet should be used for self defence only but also because it undoubtedly complicated the problem of negotiation with Nanking over the position of the Panchen Lama and his possible return to Tibet, a task which had inevitably fallen on to the shoulders of the by no means enthusiastic British diplomats in China. British arming of Tibet was not the ideal way to secure Chinese good will. The Chinese simply did not believe either the small scale of this support or the restrictions under which it had been granted to the Dalai Lama. It would not be easy to persuade the Chinese of the India Office view of what had been happening in Tibet as merely the "act of bandits and irresponsible elements in the local military forces".[424]

Having sought British arms, the Dalai Lama evidently concluded that it would be as well to have personal consultation with the Political Officer in Sikkim, his principal channel of communication with the British both in India and in China. Accordingly, on 10 August 1932 he telegraphed a request that Weir should come up to Lhasa to discuss with him the problems of Sino-Tibetan relations and the position of the Panchen Lama. Weir was given to understand that this time the Dalai Lama truly felt himself out of his depth. Experience had taught him after the events of 1918 that initial Tibetan victories in Eastern Tibet did not lead inevitably to a victorious march to Tachienlu. He was getting old and he probably knew that his time was running out. He may have suspected that one of his main advisers of recent years, Lungshar, was not as wise as he once thought. He badly needed counsel. Weir believed on very good evidence (perhaps some secret and private communication from Lhasa), as has already been noted, that the Dalai Lama in the conduct of foreign policy was now prepared to put himself in a treaty relationship with British India very similar to that established with Bhutan some two decades earlier which had apparently done the traditional Bhutanese way of life no damage. What had particularly perturbed the Dalai Lama, Weir noted, was the fact that of late alarmingly large numbers of Tibetan troops in the east had deserted, either just melting away into the mountains or in some instances actively joining the Chinese, apparently because of their sympathies for the cause of the Panchen Lama.

Weir did not himself favour any Anglo-Tibetan treaty of this kind because "apart from obvious impossibilities, world opinion and our commitments in China debar any Secret Treaty with Tibet against her . . [Chinese] . . suzerainty". The Government of India agreed. Any such treaty would involve the British in a serious military commitment in Tibet which for reasons both financial (this was the lowest point of the Great Depression, after all) and diplomatic (the valuable British trade with China would be put at risk) was quite out of the question.

What the British could do was to try to use their representation in China to bring about some settlement on the Sino-Tibetan border, and, given that Weir was correct in his belief that now (as might not always have been the case in the past) the Dalai Lama really did want the Panchen Lama back in Tibet on reasonable terms, the British might act, albeit with extreme caution, as middlemen between the two Incarnations.[425] The Tibetan Government had demonstrated their new spirit of good will towards the British by indicating that they would once more grant permission for a new Everest expedition (which duly took place in 1933). Possibly most significant of all, the Dalai Lama had at last embarked upon what looked like a serious programme of social and economic reform. He had decided to start the construction of a major hydroelectric plant which would supply the whole of Lhasa, and not just a handful of elite residences, with electricity. He was going to ban the practice of *ula*, forced labour and provision of pack animals for officials and important persons on their travels in Tibet (which foreign moralists had long found objectionable), and he proposed to set about improving the lot of the ordinary Tibetan in a variety of other ways.[426] Perhaps Tibet, even without drawing the British deeply into her internal and external affairs, was at last going to show sufficient initiative on her own so as to make full use of the limited help that the British could provide (and thus retain her value as a buffer between British India and China without any active British participation).

The second Weir Mission to Lhasa was approved. Should the Chinese be told about it at once? The Foreign Office thought they should. They would learn about it anyway, and, if the British were frank and open about their plans, Nanking might not regard the new Mission as such significant evidence of British anti-Chinese activity. As it was, there were all sorts of rumours current in China, not least that the British were sending Lawrence of Arabia to Lhasa to raise the Tibetans against Chinese suzerainty as he had earlier raised the Arabs against that of the Ottomans.[427] In the end the Peking Legation, when presented with the opportunity, shrank from telling the Wai-chiao-pu about the Weir Mission which the Chinese were obliged to discover through other channels. As Ingram, reporting a somewhat chilly meeting between Adrian Holman and the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Hsü Mo in Nanking on 31 August 1932, put it:

> I trust we may be brought into the picture as little as possible as every point bristles with difficulties and there is little scope for any discussion on such a delicate subject with Chinese Government without possibility of being drawn into deep water.[428]

Thus this fourth post-Younghusband Expedition Mission to Lhasa set out, just like its predecessors, without prior notice to the Chinese Government.

Weir reached Lhasa at the very beginning of September 1932 and stayed there until early December, occupying, as had become the accepted practice, the Dekyi Lingka residence.[429] He was accompanied by Captain Sinclair, I.M.S., Dr. Bo Tsering, Norbu Dhondup and Tsering Wangdi from the Gyantse Trade Agency. Not only did Mrs. Thyra Weir go with him this time but also his daughter, Joan Mary. His Mission followed the usual protocol by now well established.

It had been planned originally for Weir to stay in Lhasa for no more than six weeks; but circumstances caused this time to be doubled. Weir's proceedings in Lhasa became inextricably involved with negotiations in China which were being carried on in parallel. Unlike 1930, when the Tibetan attitude to the British had been distinctly cool, in 1932 Weir was welcomed with great friendliness on all sides.

The truth was that when Weir arrived there was an atmosphere of panic in Lhasa. Reports of great Chinese victories in the east circulated among the people. It was widely believed that Chamdo had fallen and that the Chinese would be in Lhasa in a couple of weeks. The wealthier Tibetans were secretly sending their more valuable and portable possessions to remote monasteries or villages where they might escape the rapacious hands of the Chinese when they turned up. The appearance at this juncture of the British party undoubtedly had a calming effect. Weir reported, however, that

> there was certainly good reason for anxiety. The Tibetan troops were faring badly at the hands of the Chinese. Not only were they being defeated and driven back but many were surrendering. The reason given for the surrender was that they believed that the Tashi Lama was helping their opponents.[430]

It was fortunate indeed that at this moment all Soviet Russian influence in Central Tibet had disappeared: any offer of foreign help no matter what the source might have received a warm welcome in Lhasa at such a critical period.

In his discussions with Dalai Lama, as well as with the Chief Minister Silon Langdun and the Kashag, Weir did not mince his words. "I pointed out to them that they were at fault in their invasion of admittedly Chinese territory", and that there was scant prospect of peace unless the Tibetan Government adopted a different attitude towards the maintenance of the Teichman truces in the East. He was not impressed by the Dalai Lama's explanation of the origins of the crisis, namely that there had been a quarrel of theological import between Dargye and Beri monasteries, the Tibetans had sent a mediator to sort things out, and the Chinese in a fit of unprovoked aggression had attacked the mediator.[431] "After some very straight talks both with the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government", orders were despatched to the Tibetan forces on the frontier instructing

them on no account to cross the Yangtze and not to initiate any further fighting with the Chinese.[432]

As has been described above, the worst of the crisis soon passed. Calm gradually returned to Lhasa. Weir, however, was convinced that the situation had only been saved by the outbreak of the war between Liu Wen-hui and Liu Hsiang, without which the Chinese would have pressed on with their objective of compelling Tibet "to return to her former state of subservience to China"; and the implication was obviously that, given the opportunity, they would try again.

The Tibetans now appreciated that it was essential that every effort be made to persuade China to agree to the signing of the Simla Convention even as modified by the Chinese proposals of 1919. They were no longer pressing claims to Tachienlu, Batang and the like. They would probably even accept as permanent the kind of essentially Yangtze boundary that was to emerge shortly from the truce agreements with Liu Wen-hui and Ma Pu-fang.[433] What they wanted was British mediation because they had no confidence in the good faith of the Chinese. Weir believed that it was very much in the British interest to help the Tibetans now despite their past behaviour because "the frontier between India and Tibet is 1,800 miles long" and "it should never be forgotten that a peaceful and contented Tibet is the cheapest and most efficient safeguard to India's North-East Frontier".

What, in practice, could the British do? One possibility, which to judge from Holman's experience with Hsü Mo in August did not, to put it mildly, seem very promising, was for the British Legation to open discussions with the Nanking Government in which some proposals for a settlement of the line of the Sino-Tibetan border could be arrived at. Weir had obtained from the Dalai Lama and his Ministers a good impression of the kind of boundary with which they would be acquiescent if not content. Perhaps the British Legation might act as a mediator in putting proposals of this nature before the Chinese? Ingram in Peking was very reluctant to plunge into these troubled waters. The Foreign Office were also doubtful; but, largely because of pressure from the Government of India through the India Office, they continued to request the Peking Legation to go on raising the issue with the Chinese. After a number of fruitless attempts during September, on 5 October 1932, Ingram was instructed to make one more effort to

> make immediate representations to the Chinese Government ... reminding them that we were interested in the maintenance of the integrity and autonomy of Outer Tibet and of an effective Tibetan Government able to maintain peace and order in the neighbourhood of the frontiers of India and adjoining States, and giving them to understand that if China should challenge the autonomy of Outer Tibet or appear to threaten the integrity of the country by an advance on

Chiamdo or otherwise, His Majesty's Government would be bound to take a most serious view of the matter. I was to add that the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government were sincerely desirous of peace and for a permanent settlement of this question and that His Majesty's Government were prepared to employ their good offices to bring about a meeting of representatives of the Chinese and Tibetan Governments for negotiations to this end.

Ingram went to Nanking on 6 October and immediately called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Lo Wen-kan (rather than the less amiable Vice Minister Hsü Mo). He said that Weir was at present in Lhasa (the first communication on this subject from the British side) looking into the situation now existing between China and Tibet, begged Dr. Lo to do all he could to bring about an armistice on the border, and offered the good offices of the British Government in any Sino-Tibetan negotiation which might possibly result. Dr. Lo confessed that he knew little about Tibet, having been preoccupied with the Japanese menace following their occupation of Manchuria; but he would seek the advice of the Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission about it. There followed a series of meetings between Ingram and various Chinese officials concluding with a final interview with the Minister, Dr. Lo, on 26 October.[434]

The Chinese message, though expressed with varying degrees of cordiality by different individuals, was clear. Orders, on the Chinese initiative alone and in no way because of British representations, had been issued for fighting to stop along the Tibetan border: these had been confirmed by Chiang Kai-shek himself. When it was certain that the fighting had finally come to an end, the Chinese Government through the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission would send a representative to meet with all the parties directly concerned and try to secure a permanent settlement. A special committee in which were represented the Chinese Provincial authorities in Szechuan, Yunnan, Sikang, Kokonor (Ch'inghai), Kansu, and Shensi, and the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs along with the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, had been set up in August 1932 to devise ways in which this could be brought about. In that it was appreciated that the quarrel between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas lay at the root of the problem, the Chinese would do their best to reconcile the two Incarnations. In any case, the "Sino-Tibetan boundary question was a question of internal Chinese politics" and, as such, no direct concern of the British. There was no escaping Ingram's conclusion that further attempts at British mediation by way of Nanking were not going to be productive. Moreover, the very fact that the British appeared to be so interested in the subject was providing valuable material for both Chinese and Japanese anti-British propaganda.[435]

While Anglo-Chinese discussions (negotiations would be a too

forceful term) were going on in China through September and October 1932, Weir in Lhasa was exploring possible solutions to the problem of Sino-Tibetan relations in a still anxious atmosphere in which it was not certain if the Chinese advance would halt despite Liu Wen-hui's problems with his nephew Liu Hsiang and the Sino-Tibetan truce which had resulted. The truce might not hold and the forces of Ma Pu-fang were still active. Weir devised a number of possible boundary lines in Eastern Tibet of varying degrees of probability; and he explored other approaches to the wider Sino-Tibetan problem such as the idea, apparently advanced by the Dalai Lama, that the whole question be referred to the League of Nations (a thought which aroused no enthusiasm either in India or in London).[436] Both Weir and the Government of India still hoped for a major conference between Tibetan and Chinese delegates, preferably with British representation, but, if need be, without. This should take place somewhere on the border in Eastern Tibet and not in Delhi as some Indian officials had optimistically suggested.[437]

Weir was extremely disturbed to learn of Ingram's conclusion after 26 October that there was nothing more to be gained from approaches to the Chinese Government in Nanking. He declared that

> if we accept Chinese contention that the present Chinese-Tibetan dispute is purely domestic issue of China, we accept Chinese diplomatic victory with far reaching consequences for the future. Our acquiescence in Chinese view would *ipso facto* debar us from professing assistance in any further dispute between the two countries. It is not difficult to visualise Chinese domination again in Tibet similar to that in existence prior to 1912. Frontier of India would be threatened and good results of our policy of last 20 years would be nullified.[438]

The Government of India shared this view. If there were to emerge a real prospect of Chinese advances far to the west of the 1917-18 position then they would surely be obliged to take some action, if not through the British Legation in Peking then on their own, by hastening extra supplies to the Tibetan forces. By the beginning of October, when Ingram started his abortive talks in Nanking with the Wai-chiao-pu, Ma Pu-fang's men were already getting close to Riwoche (where the 1917 crisis had started) and Chamdo seemed to be under threat.[439] After Ingram's disappointing conclusion of 26 October that further discussion with the Chinese would be futile, Weir was instructed to stay on in Lhasa until he was sure that fighting had indeed stopped in the Marches as Chiang Kai-shek had ordered.[440]

Even if British representations in China were rebuffed, there was still one card left in the British hand. Another effort could be made to mediate in the dispute between the Dalai and Panchen Lamas and to bring about the Panchen Lama's return to Tibet. This had been discussed at great length by Weir with the Dalai Lama. The Dalai

Lama had been persuaded with some difficulty to release the Yabshi Kung and other supporters of the Panchen Lama from their harsh imprisonment in Lhasa; and he also agreed to Weir's suggestion that he write a letter to the Panchen Lama, using conciliatory language, which should be handed over to the Panchen Lama by the British Legation in Peking. The Foreign Office agreed to this step, and Ingram was instructed accordingly.

The Dalai Lama's letter was moderately worded, but it made it clear that the Dalai Lama considered that his relationship with the Panchen Lama was that of father to son which had of late been disturbed by a "conspiracy" of "servants". There were no specific guarantees for the future safety of the Panchen Lama after his return and no indication that his position in Tibetan politics would be any different from that which had obtained prior to his flight in 1923.[441] The essentials of the English text of the letter were telegraphed to Ingram for communication to the Panchen Lama as soon as possible while the original text of the letter in Tibetan with appropriate phraseology, signature and seals was despatched by sea.

The Panchen Lama was now in Peking where he had arrived from Inner Mongolia early in October (ostensibly for purely religious reasons) when he had lost no time in getting in touch with the British Legation; and in Peking at the South Lake Palace Ingram, just back from Nanking, accompanied by A.D. Blackburn and L.H. Lamb, called on him on 2 November 1932 to hand over the gist of the Dalai Lama's message. On 10 November the Panchen Lama returned Ingram's call. During these two meetings he welcomed the words of the Dalai Lama, upon which he said he would make proper comment when he had received the full Tibetan text and had time to study it. Ingram was struck by the Panchen Lama's sincerity in wishing to come to terms with his Lhasa colleague; but there was nothing said beyond generalities. The Panchen Lama denied that there was any personal animosity between the Dalai Lama and himself. The estrangement between them was due to the "machinations of subordinates".[442] It was evident, however, that he was not going to rush home on the basis of the vague expressions of good will so far on offer. He then left Peking for Nanking where on 20 January 1933 the full Tibetan text of the Dalai Lama's letter was handed to him by A.D. Blackburn at an interview held in Chiang Kai-shek's "Garden House". A fortnight later he set out again for Inner Mongolia without indicating to the British what his future plans might be.

Ingram was not convinced that it was altogether wise to bring about too rapidly the Panchen Lama's return to Tibet, where he might "become a tool in Chinese hands" and undermine the Lhasa Government from within or, if ill treated, provide justification for further Chinese pressure on the Tibetans.[443] He was not, therefore, unduly perturbed by the Panchen

Lama's failure to respond positively to the Dalai Lama's overtures.

The Government of India had considered instructing Weir to stay on in Lhasa until the Panchen Lama's reply was received. From Ingram's reports it was evident that this might not happen for some considerable time. Unless Weir was to establish himself in Lhasa on a more or less permanent basis there seemed little point in his hanging on much longer. By the end of November it was clear that the fighting on the Sino-Tibetan border really was coming to an end with a cease-fire line more or less along the Yangtze which posed no immediate threat to the Indian border. Weir's services were required elsewhere: he had been appointed Resident in Baroda. He was, accordingly, instructed to leave Lhasa in the first week of December.[444]

During the final weeks of the Weir Mission the Dalai Lama, evidently concluding that the British were not on their own going to bring about a new Simla Conference, entered into telegraphic communication with the Kuomintang leadership as well as maintaining his contacts with the Nanking Government through the Yungon Dzasa who was in touch with the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission.[445] In early November the Dalai Lama telegraphed directly to Chiang Kai-shek (whom he trusted, he said, alone among Chinese officials) to suggest that the best solution to the future conduct of Sino-Tibetan relations still lay in the Chinese adhesion to something very like the Simla Convention of 1914 to all of which the Chinese had agreed except the precise definition of the Sino-Tibetan border. On 26 November 1932 Chiang Kai-shek replied as follows:

> keeping in mind the friendly and brotherly relations between Tibet and China every perplexity should be dealt with in a straightforward manner without entertaining any suspicions, and all matters should be settled between ourselves without the intervention of an outsider. Therefore, to agree to the request for the treaty, with the British Government as an intermediary Power, to be resumed and concluded would be absolutely impossible as it would be like agreeing to one's own body being dismembered.[446]

The message also reported that the Kokonor troops of Ma Pu-fang had been ordered to withdraw: hence, with Liu Wen-hui (for whose actions Chiang Kai-shek implicitly denied any responsibility) already out of action, the war was for the time being to all and intents and purposes over. The Dalai Lama, the moment this telegram reached him, summoned Weir for advice. What he wanted, he told Weir, was a peace conference with China with Weir acting as intermediary on behalf of the British. This was now apparently out of the question. What should he do? There was really nothing Weir could advise except wait and see and hope that something came out of the approach to the Panchen Lama.[447]

The Indian Government, too, had little to suggest. They were aware that Ingram had during the course of November addressed further queries to the Wai-chiao-pu concerning the disturbed state of the Sino-Tibetan border and received replies, albeit polite, which in effect pointed out that the matter was none of his business just as Dr. Lo Wen-kan had done on 26 October. They concluded that more of the same was only going to produce the same result. Perhaps the best thing was to see what the Chinese did next and keep open the Indian option of supplying more arms to the Tibetans should the situation so require. As we have already noted, some further arms were in fact sent to Tibet on very favourable terms in 1933. As a long term solution, however, this approach was not very promising without diplomatic support. Perhaps, the Government of India thought, some capital might be made out of the disturbed situation in Szechuan to justify a more direct British intervention such as the despatch of a British official to the eastern border of Tibet in the Teichman manner.

1932, however, was not 1918. Ingram by the end of December had decided that he wished to make no further approach to the Wai-chiao-pu on Tibet until his Minister, Sir Miles Lampson, got back to China. He conclusion was

> that we shall find the Chinese Government willing to meet us in a conciliatory spirit as long as we keep our representations on the plane of a friendly interest in the peace and order of a neighbouring country, but that we shall obtain no satisfaction whatever . . . by harping on the integrity and independence of Tibet – or by continually citing the Simla Convention, which . . . the Chinese have never really accepted and no National Government of China could now be induced to recognise. I feel, too, that we are chasing a will-o'-the-wisp in trying to induce the Chinese to accept our co-operation or even mediation in the settlement of the frontier dispute. The Chinese would, I believe, far sooner it were never settled than they would admit our claim to intervene. In this connection I would point out that the only two occasions on which we have intervened were in the Simla negotiations of 1913-14 and in Mr. (now Sir Eric) Teichman's negotiations of 1917-18. In both cases the negotiations were accepted with the greatest reluctance by the Central Government of the day, and in neither case was the frontier settlement ratified, in spite of considerable pressure by His Majesty's Government. Since then the Government of China has fallen into the hands of the Kuomintang, nationalist feeling has intensified and public opinion is a factor which the Government, as well as the foreigner, has to take into account to an increasing extent.[448]

Sir Miles Lampson on 7 February 1933 soon after his return to China and resumption of his duties as Minister took Ingram's assessment of the situation to its logical conclusion. He agreed that China would never accept British mediation and the Dalai Lama should no longer be encouraged to consider such a possibility.

Providing the British did not occupy Tibet as the Japanese had Manchuria there was no reason why the present Chinese Government should really care what happened there or on the frontier so long as rights claimed by China, albeit theoretical, were not called into question. Therefore

> I submit that we should face the above facts and encourage, not discourage, Dalai Lama to come to terms with China by direct negotiation if he can; trusting to geographical propinquity of India to Lhassa to maintain our influence by promotion of free economic relations . . . across our frontier.
>
> I know the arguments in favour of policy we have pursued for the past twenty years but frankly I cannot see that it is going to lead us anywhere except into eventual loss of face with China when latter is in a position to impose her will on Thibet.
>
> Above views do not rule out representations and warnings to Chinese Government in the event of Chinese aggression on the frontier as happened last summer; and the line I would take in such a case is that we are directly concerned in maintenance of internal peace in Thibet and strongly object to armed Chinese incursions which can only lead to endless trouble and disturbance of peace of neighbourhood of Indian frontier possibly calling for action on our part. But it would be unwise for Thibetans to trust to such representations always being successful. I would advise them to come to terms with Chinese Government if they reasonably can.[449]

The Government of India, of course, were horrified.[450] The British Legation in Peking had finally deserted them. British diplomats in China had never seemed to British Indian officials to have been particularly sympathetic towards the Indian approach to Tibet; but they had usually in the past been willing to help the Government of India. Now Sir Miles Lampson was in effect saying that further help would be a waste of time which he would not countenance; and this at the very moment when Chiang Kai-shek was proposing to send his own representative to Tibet to endeavour to settle the shape of Sino-Tibetan relations without the presence of any foreign (i.e. British) representative which would be "most inappropriate".[451] It was on this unhappy note that the new Political Officer in Sikkim, Frederick Williamson, took over from Lt.-Colonel Weir.

The India Office and the Government of India did not quite understand what Sir Miles Lampson was getting at in the perforce condensed language of his telegram of 7 February 1933. Lampson subsequently clarified his views in a long letter to Sir Victor Wellesley of the Foreign Office. "There was", he said, "no suggestion . . . that we should *discontinue our official relations with the Tibetan Government* (Lampson's italics)", and he failed to see how anyone got such an impression. He advocated the "promotion of free economic relations and official intercourse" across the Indo-Tibetan border as the best means to maintain British influence in Lhasa. However,

> what I do deprecate . . . is our trusting to artificial barriers of our own creation for keeping the Chinese and Tibetans apart. These barriers will break down one day – the traditional bonds between China and Tibet are too strong and too longstanding – and if at that time we are still found to be trying to prop the barriers up, the results will be a loss of face in Lhasa and a hostile China in Tibet. . . . You need have no fear of my advocating a policy of scuttle in Tibet, the more so as Teichman, my principal adviser on the question, has always been, and remains, a particular friend of the Tibetans and their country. It is as much in the interests of the Tibetans and the maintenance of our position in Tibet, as in those of our good relations with China, that I urged the futility of encouraging the Dalai Lama to think that we can coerce the Chinese Government into accepting our mediation. It is, I presume, a cardinal point in our Tibetan policy that we are not prepared to intervene in that country by force; and, as we know by abundant experience, there are limits to what can be accomplished by diplomatic pressure in China.[452]

It is unlikely that this explanation convinced those in the Government of India concerned with Himalayan affairs that "a policy of scuttle" was not in fact on offer; and they remained firmly attached to their faith in the value of the erection of what Lampson considered to be "artificial barriers". This last point was to become increasingly apparent during the final years of British rule in the Indian Subcontinent.

338. The new Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission immediately started producing publications of various kinds including "Tibet-Mongolia Weekly News" which, in its Tibetan language version, was soon available in Kalimpong where Lt.-Colonel Weir was not able to prevent its distribution. See: L/P&S/12/1228, Weir to India, 16 November 1929.

    The constitution of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (or Committee) was defined in considerable detail by a Revised Organic Law promulgated on 25 July 1932. Its powers were far from insignificant. Of particular interest, perhaps, was the provision which entitled it to apply to the National Government through the Executive Yuan to set up offices in Mongolia or Tibet. See: L/P&S/12/4169, Ingram to Sir John Simon, 5 November 1932, enclosing text of Revised Organic Law.

339. Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China, op. cit.*, provides as good an account as any of these developments.

340. Tsepon W.D. Shapkabpa, *Tibet. A Political History*, New Haven 1967, p. 266.

341. In the years immediately after 1927 Szechuan Province was dominated by no less than six "warlords", Teng Hsi-hou, T'ien Sung-yao, Liu Ts'un-hou, Yang Seng, Liu Hsiang and Liu Wen-hui. Until 1932, with the outbreak of the war of the "two Lius", the relationship between these military figures, if not always

harmonious, at least functioned at a level below that of sustained warfare. Their presence, however, gave Szechuan the unenviable reputation of being China's worst governed Province. Liu Wen-hui was generally considered to possess great ability and equal lack of scruple. His power base was the south western corner of the Province including the Szechuan-Sikang border over which into Sikang he eventually withdrew after the war with his nephew Liu Hsiang. By the end of 1935 Szechuan was, following a major Communist incursion, increasingly under the control of Chiang Kai-shek who moved his capital there, to Chungking, in 1937 in the face of Japanese invasion.

For an admirable account of the relations between these personalities, see: R.A. Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic, op. cit.*, Chapter 3.

Liu Wen-hui in 1949 defected (or rallied) to the victorious Communists and, which was something of a rarity among warlords, was in 1959 rewarded with a minor Ministry, that of Forestry.

342. He was believed to have left Lhasa for British India by way of Sikkim in March 1930 (though his final destination was not known). In May 1930, when Laden La was in Lhasa, no sign of him could be detected; and we have no evidence that he ever returned to Tibet.

343. The whole Sherpa Gyalpo affair is described in detail in: Prem R. Uprety, *Nepal-Tibet Relations 1850-1930. Years of Hopes, Challenges and Frustrations*, Katmandu 1980, pp. 141-145.

By the end of 1929 the crisis was passed, in part because of the death of the Nepalese Prime Minister Chandra Shumsher and in part because the cause of it all, Sherpa Gyalpo, failed to survive the rigours of life in a Tibetan prison.

According to Richardson, the entire Sherpa Gyalpo affair was Lungshar's fault. See: Richardson, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 133.

344. By the end of 1928 only five out of the ten 2.75 inch mountain guns had been delivered to the Tibetans. The Tibetan authorities, moreover, far from building up their stocks of rifle ammunition had been selling significant quantities from their arsenal to the Bhutanese.

345. L/P&S/10/1088, Weir to India, 13 August 1929.

346. Sir Miles Lampson thought that the best answer to the Panchen Lama, if he really was the inspiration for such military projects, was to grant him asylum in India as had been considered by both the Government of India and the India Office in 1928. Ceylon was an obvious alternative to India. See: L/P&S/12/4174, minute by H.A.F. Rumbold, 21 January 1930 on "Note on the Tashi Lama".

347. L/P&S/10/1088, Weir to India 22 November 1928.

348. L/P&S/10/1113, India to Weir, 7 February 1929.

349. L/P&S/10/1113, Lampson to FO, 20 April 1929.

350. L/P&S/10/1113, Weir to India, 30 May 1929.

351. L/P&S/10/1113, Lampson to FO, 24 April 1929.

352. For a full account of Norbu Dhondup's mission, see: L/P&S/10/1113, Norbu Dhondup to Weir, 12 August 1929.

353. Weir thought that these Chinese troops could only be the disbanded remnants of Feng Yü-hsiang's army and no major threat. See: L/P&S/10/718, Weir to India, 2 November 1929.

In April 1929 Feng Yü-hsiang had indirectly approached the British Legation in Peking with a view to obtaining permission to travel from China to British India across Tibet, on his way to Canada. His normal exit from North-Western China by way of Shanghai was blocked by his enemies. Lampson was very helpful; but the Government of India did not want Feng Yü-hsiang in Tibet. Nothing came of the proposal. See: L/P&S/11/300, P 4234.

354. L/P&S/10/1113, Dalai Lama to Weir, 20 July 1929; Weir to India, 22 July 1929; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 26 July 1929.

355. L/P&S/10/1113, Weir to India, 13 August 1929. The Political Committee of the India Office were inclined to agree with Weir.

356. Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 152-155 gives the Chinese version of the correspondence carried by Yungon Dzasa (known to the Chinese as Kung-chüeh-chung-ni)
Li says that Yungon Dzasa had been in Peking since 1922. There was also correspondence in 1930 between Lu Hsing-chi in Calcutta and a number of leading Tibetans including Lungshar.
The gist of these exchanges, according to Li, was that the Kuomintang was asking Tibet to take its proper place among the Five Races which made up the Chinese Republic, while the Tibetan side was seeking clarification as to the nature of that place and the respective roles of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas in it. Meanwhile the Tibetans were seeking arms from China; and the Dalai Lama was proposing to set up offices in Peking, Nanking and somewhere in Sikang.
There is nothing in Li's account which conflicts fundamentally with the information to be derived from British sources.

357. For an account of the Liu Man-ch'ing mission from the Chinese side, see: Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 150-153. Li says that Liu Man-ch'ing was born in 1906. She joined the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in 1928 as an interpreter.

358. According to Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 151.
Li, quoting Chinese sources, says that she explained to the Dalai Lama the ideas of Chiang Kai-shek as to Tibet's place in the family of the Five Races. The Dalai Lama, Li goes on, told her that "what I expect most from China is real unity and peace"; and that "the British, indeed, have a mind to draw me to their side. Nevertheless, I know the importance of guarding national sovereignty and I have never surrendered a bit of it in spite of the necessity of having to deal with them, their character and customs being so different from ours".

359. *The Daily Mail*, 30 July 1930, for example. There was also much attention in the Chinese press, both Chinese and English language. *The China Weekly Review*, of 6 September 1930, published in Nanking, produced a long article on Liu Man-ch'ing by one C.Y.W. Mong. See: L/P&S/10/1088.

360. L/P&S/10/1088, Weir to India, 4 April 1930.

361. L/P&S/10/1088, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 7 May 1930; Weir to India, 5 May 1930. The Tibeto-Nepalese settlement seems to have been achieved on 21 March 1930. See also: Uprety, *Nepal-Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 145.

362. L/P&S/10/1088, Weir to India 27 May 1930.
Liu Man-ch'ing's companion was either her brother-in-law or her husband, almost certainly the latter. He was referred to by Alexandra David-Neel as Késang Tséring and in British sources (via Chungking) as Ko-sang-tse-jen or Ko Wei-yuan. He was one of the two sons of the Chief (*t'ussu*) of Batang. A group photograph of both brothers and their wives, including Liu Man-ch'ing, is reproduced in: David-Neel, *A l'Ouest Barbare de la Vaste Chine, op. cit.*, p. 48.

Liu Man-ch'ing wrote an account of her adventures in Tibet and Sikang which is used by Li, *Tibet., op. cit.* who refers to it as: Liu Man-ch'ing, *K'ang Tsang yao chêng* ("My Mission to Tibet and Sikang"), Shanghai 1933.

363. L/P&S/10/1088, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 7 May 1930.

364. L/P&S/10/1088, Weir to India, 21 July 1930.
It may have been this issue which resulted in Tsarong's removal from the Kashag.

365. L/P&S/10/1088, Weir to India, 25 May 1930.

366. The papers relating to Tibet considered by Cabinet in July 1930 are to be found in: L/P&S/10/718.
The balance of the 1921 arms package yet to be taken up by the Tibetans was reckoned to be 5 mountain guns, 5,000 shells, over 1,000,000 rounds of .303 ammunition and 500 rifles. These had, perforce, to come from Government of India stocks; and Cabinet had decided in 1929 that without reference to it no arms from British Government stocks could be supplied to foreign powers. There was no way, therefore, that the question of arms to Tibet could be kept from consideration at the highest levels in London.

367. For Weir's report of the 1930 Lhasa Mission, see: L/P&S/10/1113, Weir to India, 18 November 1930.

368. Rinchen Dolma (Mary) Taring, Tsarong's former wife, was originally going to accompany Mrs. Weir to guide her through the intricacies of female etiquette in Lhasa, something concerning which the Indian Political Service possessed no experience. However, it was decided not to include her in the Mission party because of her close relationship to Tsarong. See: Taring, *Daughter of Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 106-107.

369. One Sherpa Dhundui, who was accused of being involved in a murder case, had been arrested by the Tibetan police and tortured to obtain a confession despite his claim to be of *Khachchara* status and, hence, a Nepalese subject. See: Uprety, *Nepal-Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 148.

370. This, of course, was before the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

371. Weir had hitherto believed that the Dalai Lama *had* in fact received the "fat Mongolian", a man over six foot tall and "proportionately broad" who was well known in Lhasa as Buriat Noyon and whose movements it would have been hard to conceal.

372. The complete accuracy of this account cannot be guaranteed.

373. See, for example: L/P&S/10/1113, minute by H.A.F. Rumbold, 27 April 1929.

374. L/P&S/10/1113, Weir to India, 18 November 1930.

375. See: Tsering Shakya, "Tibet and the League of Nations with reference to letters found in The India Office Library, under Sir Charles Bell's Collections", *The Tibetan Journal*, X, 3, 1985. I am grateful to Tsering Shakya for giving me a typescript copy of this most interesting paper.

376. Bell was in Kalimpong, waiting for the early summer of 1934 and the opening of the passes into Tibet, when the news of the Dalai Lama's death reached him. The question of Tibet joining the League of Nations had evidently been discussed by Bell and the Dalai Lama in 1920-21, when the Dalai Lama was opposed to the idea; but in the light of subsequent events he may well have changed his mind.

377. For accounts of this venture, see: Theodore & Kermit Roosevelt, ***Trailing the Giant Panda***, New York 1929; H. Stevens, ***Through Deep Defiles to Tibetan Uplands. The Travels of a Naturalist from the Irrawaddy to the Yangtse***, London 1934.

378. Suydam Cutting, *The Fire Ox and Other Years*, London 1947, pp.105, 175-179. Cutting was born in 1889 and died in 1972. He was possessed of considerable inherited wealth. In 1925 he had accompanied Kermit and Theodore Roosevelt on a zoological expedition to Ladakh and Sinkiang.

Cutting brought this 1931 correspondence to the notice of the State Department, which responded by sending to the Dalai Lama via Cutting an autographed photograph of President Herbert Hoover. Cutting had his own channel of communication with Lhasa by way of Pangdatsang and, perhaps, David Macdonald at Kalimpong. Cutting did in fact manage to find American buyers for Tibetan wool which they continued to purchase by way of agents in Kalimpong right up to the end of the British period in India. Indeed, American purchases of Tibetan wool came to be by far the most important earner of hard currency in the Tibetan economy.

When the 13th Dalai Lama died, Kunphel La personally wrote to Cutting to inform him of the fact. After the death of the Dalai Lama Cutting kept in touch with the Kashag who would seem to have conferred upon him some official status. Thus, when Theodore Roosevelt Jr. wrote to Lord Willingdon in 1934 he said that "Suydam Cutting has been in touch with Lhasa for some years and has been designated as Tibetan representative in the United States". See: L/P&S/12/4305, Roosevelt to Willingdon, 15 January 1934. In 1935, as will be mentioned again in the next Chapter, he visited Shigatse and Lhasa, and Lhasa again two years later, on this last occasion accompanied by his wife. In 1948 he played a major part in bringing the Tibetan Trade Mission to the United States.

The Cutting-Dalai Lama correspondence is particularly interesting in that the two men never met. It is clear evidence that when it started in 1930 the Dalai Lama was seeking fresh avenues of communication with the leaders of the outside world. This was a far cry from the days some 30 years earlier when he had refused to accept a letter from the Viceroy of India.

379. When Americans did manage to get to Tibet they were treated with great distinction provided that they possessed some status in their own right. The American Theos Bernard, who visited Lhasa from June to September in 1937, was given a kind of welcome not always received by travellers in Tibet. He had come from Sikkim to Gyantse on an ordinary trade-route pass; but in Gyantse he had managed by the judicious expenditure of cash to procure on his own from the Tibetan authorities permission to visit Lhasa. Here he was a guest of Tsarong; and he had access to all the major figures in Tibetan politics from the Regent down. He rejected an offer by Hugh Richardson of accommodation at Dekyi Lingka. His activities somewhat puzzled British observers who considered that he was some kind of fraud and noted that he was careful to get away from Lhasa before the arrival there of another American traveller, Suydam Cutting.

The OSS Officers Ilya Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan, as we shall see in a later Chapter, were also given exceptional facilities by the Tibetan authorities in 1942-1943.

For Bernard's Tibetan adventures, see: Theos Bernard, *Penthouse of the Gods: a pilgrimage into the heart of Tibet and the sacred city of Lhasa*, New York 1939, published in London in 1940 under the title *Land of a Thousand Buddhas*). See also: L/P&S/12/4203, for papers on Bernard and comments on his book, which was considered to have a high humbug content. Bernard's claim to have been accepted as a Tibetan Lama was clearly rubbish. What is equally clear is that Bernard had plenty of money.

380. L/P&S/12/4174, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 August 1932; Weir to India, 9 August 1932.

381. L/P&S/12/4174, Weir to India, 14 December 1929.

382. L/P&S/10/1228, Chungking Consulate-General to Peking, 27 November 1929.

383. A Chinese census dating from c. 1945, which was certainly not accurate but which probably reflected the various ethnic proportions as reliably as can be expected, put the Ch'inghai population as 390,279 Chinese, 118,822 Mahommedans, 181,475 Tibetans, 113,835 Mongols plus small numbers of Manchus, Kazaks and various people listed as "aboriginal" such as the Goloks. See: David-Neel, *A l'Ouest Barbare de la Vaste Chine, op. cit.*, p. 101.

384. The Bön religion appears to have had its roots in pre-Buddhist Mongol shamanism, which was more apparent among the followers of the Black than the White Bön. The subject which lies outside the scope of the present book, is discussed in, for example: G. Tucci, *The Religions of Tibet*, London 1980.

385. See: E.H. Wilson, *A Naturalist in Western China with Vasculum, Camera and Gun; being some account of eleven years' travel, exploration, and observation in the more remote parts of the Flowery Kingdom*, 2 vols., London 1913, Vol. 1, p. 211.

Wilson was in Tachienlu at the time in 1903 and 1904. It was the Chala crisis, Wilson thought, which first drew Chinese attention to the need to strengthen their position in eastern Tibet; and this was some time before Younghusband reached Lhasa. When Wilson was in Tachienlu in 1903 there was much concern at the aggressive attitude of the Dalai Lama and a certain relief in 1904 when the British brought about his downfall. What the Younghusband Expedition did do, of course, was to demonstrate to the Chinese quite how weak the Tibetans were militarily.

386. For a most interesting account of the revolt in Eastern Tibet by a European who travelled there shortly after the crisis, see: J. Bacot, *Dans les Marches Tibétaines autour du Dokerla*, Paris 1909. See also: J. Dessirier, *A Travers les Marches Révoltées. Ouest-Chinois Yun Nan-Se-Tchouen-Marches Thibétaines*, Paris 1923.

French Catholic missionaries established themselves in Eastern Tibet during the second half of the 19th century; and they aroused the hostility of the local Tibetan Buddhist establishment with the result that there were frequent outbreaks against their presence and several missionaries were killed. The main area of French Catholic missionary activity was along the line between Tachienlu and Batang and southwards towards the Yunnan border. The anti-missionary attacks by the Tibetans in this area in 1905 were nothing new; and they can hardly be attributed solely to the effects of the Younghusband Expedition of 1904.

On the founding of the French Catholic missions in Chinese controlled Eastern Tibet, see: C.H. Desgodins, *Le Thibet d'après la correspondence des missionaires*, Paris 1885; A. Launay, *Histoire de la Mission du Thibét*, 2 vols., Paris 1903.

387. This was a centre of Chinese administration here, though not notable for its effectiveness, as the American traveller Rockhill observed when he visited the Hor States in 1889. See: W.W. Rockhill, *Land of the Lamas. Notes on a Journey through China, Mongolia and Tibet*, London 1891.

388. M.H.Duncan, *The Yangtze and the Yak: adventurous trails in and out of Tibet*, Alexandria, Virginia, 1952, p.231. Duncan calls the Red Sect monastery in Beri by the name Guluh (presumably the same word as Li's Yala). In the 1930 conflict, Duncan, an American Protestant missionary who visited the Kantze region in 1935, says the issue was between the Yellow Sect Dargye (Dajueh in Duncan's version) on the one hand and the Red Sect Guluh assisted by the neighbouring

Sakyapa monastery of Nyara on the other, with the support of the *t'ussu* of Beri (Bero according to Duncan) and Rongbatsa. When Duncan was there he saw the burnt ruins of both Dargye monastery and the Beri *t'ussu*'s palace, casualties of the 1930-32 fighting.

389. Rockhill, *Land of the Lamas, op. cit.*, p. 237. Rockhill was told that the monks of Dargye (which he called Dajé) "were the worst lot in all K'amdo, a horde of two thousand rascals from every part of Tibet". Susie Rijnhart, travelling in 1898 or 1899, carefully avoided Kantze monastery "on account of the predilection of these lamas to quarrel". See: S.C. Rijnhart, *With the Tibetans in Tent and Temple*, London 1901, p. 373.

390. Duncan, *Yangtze and Yak, op. cit.*, p. 231. Duncan's narrative is based on his diary, though published many years later.

391. L/P&S/12/4182, Consul-General, Chungking, to Peking, 7 January 1939. In 1938 the Dargye monks agreed to surrender all the rifles still in their possession to the Chinese Magistrate at Kantze, out of which 30 would be available to the monks for self protection in times of crisis but, otherwise, would be held in the Magistrate's office.

392. L/P&S/10/1228, J.H. Edgar, 4 July 1930; Stark Toller, Consul-General at Chungking, to Peking, 17 July 1930.

393. L/P&S/10/1228, Weir to India, 21 September 1930.

394. L/P&S/10/1228, Lampson to FO, 14 October 1930.
The only reasonable map of the region to hand was that in Teichman, *Travels, op. cit.*, on which it requires some effort to work out exactly where the two monasteries were. Other travellers, like Rockhill, used variant spellings which did not serve to clarify matters. It was all too easy, moreover, to confuse Dargye with Derge. Both monasteries were seen by Coales in 1916 and their location is clearly marked on his map. See: O.R. Coales, "Economic Notes on Eastern Tibet", *The Geographical Journal*, LIV, 1919.

395. Li, *Tibet, op, cit.*, p. 157, refers to this correspondence. The Dalai Lama was already in touch with Nanking in October 1930.

396. Apart from the reports of Paul Sherap at Tachienlu, sent on to Peking via Stark Toller in Chungking, which are in L/P&S/10/1228, the account in Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 157-159, is valuable and agrees very closely with British sources. Once again Li indicates access to the records of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. See also the biography of Liu Wen-hui in: H.L. Boorman, & R.C. Howard, *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, 4 vols., New York and London 1967-71.

397. The notice could, of course, have been put up by others, the Chinese or the supporters of the Panchen Lama, to discredit the Dalai Lama or some such motive. Sherap, however, considered the notice to be genuine; and he was the man on the spot whose opinions have generally proved to be remarkably sound.

398. L/P&S/10/1228, Stark Toller to Peking, 11 February 1931.

399. L/P&S/10/1228, Williamson to India, 14 May 1931.
Yungon Dzasa and three monk officials left Calcutta for China in February 1931 to serve, if it be decided by the Dalai Lama that they should, as Tibetan delegates at the Koumintang "People's Conference". See: L/P&S/10/1228, Williamson to India, 19 June 1931.

400. In Tibet the genuineness of this Memorial was disputed; but Ingram reports it as a matter of fact. There were some grains of truth in the Panchen Lama's allegations. See: L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to Sir John Simon, 1 August 1932.

401. T'ang does not seem to have been a signatory, though he is referred to in the text as a party to the negotiations.

402. The text of this agreement, from Sherap and various sources in Szechuan, is in: L/P&S/10/1228, Toller to Peking, 30 November 1931; Toller to Peking, 25 January 1932. The Tibetan version, also with nine articles, is in L/P&S/12/4169, Weir to India, 6 October 1932. The Chinese and Tibetan versions agree in all essentials. What seems likely to have happened is that a draft was signed by Liu and Ngabo and then referred back to Tachienlu (and, perhaps, Lhasa) to be replaced by a definitive text. The draft contained eight articles, the final text nine.

403. L/P&S/10/1228, Stark Toller to Peking, 23 December 1931.

404. L/P&S/10/1228, Stark Toller to Peking, 25 January 1932.

405. L/P&S/10/1228, Stark Toller to Peking, 11 March 1932.

406. See, for example: L/P&S/10/1228, Stark Toller to Peking, 13 April 1932.
The reports emanating from Sherap in Tachienlu as well as from the Consulates-General in Chungking and Yunnan contain some confusion about this particular family. According to Alexandra David-Neel, who knew them and photographed them, this was the situation. Kesang Tsering had a brother whom she called Késang Yéchés. It was Kesang Tsering who was married to Liu Man-ch'ing. Other sources report that Liu Man-ch'ing had a sister, Liu Man-yun who is described as the wife of Kesang Tsering.
Kesang Tsering had been a pupil at the school in Batang run by the American Protestant missionaries, so he must have had some understanding of English. He left Batang in c. 1927 to go to Nanking where he came to the personal notice of Chiang Kai-shek. He was clearly a youth of both enterprise and ability.

407. On the salt of Yakalo (Ya-k'a-lo, Yentsing or Yenching), see: David-Neel, *A l'Ouest Barbare de la Vaste Chine, op. cit.*, pp.37-8. The salt wells there were noted by the English traveller H.R. Davies in 1894, when they were in Chinese territory though worked by Tibetans. See: H.R. Davies, *Yün-nan. The Link between India and the Yangtze*, Cambridge 1909, p. 263.
Yakalo was awkwardly situated. It was on the Mekong just on the western (Tibetan) side of the Bum La frontier point between Lhasa and Szechuan controlled territory established in 1727 by the Manchus, and it was also very close to a tongue of Yunnan running along the Mekong to the north of Atuntze (Tehtsin). Since the middle of the 19th century, however, the Chinese-Lhasa border south of the Bum La ran along the east bank of the Mekong rather than the Mekong-Yangtze watershed. After they had been driven away from the Tibetan side of this line, where they had founded their first Tibetan mission at Bonga on the Salween, the French Catholics established themselves in the middle 1860s in a number of towns just on the Chinese side from Batang down to the Yunnan border, including Yakalo. See: A. Launay, *Histoire de la Mission du Thibét*, 2 vols., Paris 1903, vol. 2, for references to French Catholic activity at Yakalo in the second half of the 19th century.

408. These events were witnessed by French Catholic missionaries at Yakalo. See: F. Goré, *Trente Ans aux Portes du Thibet Interdit 1908-1938*, Hong Kong 1939, pp. 325-327.

409. Since Batang was clearly on the Chinese side of the Simla Convention divide between Inner and Outer Tibet, and had been accepted by the British as being within the Chinese sphere in all subsequent Anglo-Chinese discussions, the Tibetan siege of Batang was almost certainly a violation of the terms upon which the British had supplied Lhasa with arms since 1921. It would indeed be difficult to argue that the Tibetan siege of Batang was an act of self defence.

410. L/P&S/10/1228, Stark Toller to Peking, 13 April 1932, throws some light on this complex situation.

An eyewitness account of the siege of Batang by the Tibetans, which lasted over 50 days in all, is in: Duncan, *Yangtze and Yak, op. cit.*, pp.139-162.

One result of this crisis was the decision to close the Batang mission station, which removed yet another Western observation post in Eastern Tibet.

Duncan records that shortly before the siege he had occasion to visit Markham Gartok, where he met a member of the Tibetan army who had previously served in the British Indian Army. One wonders how many such ex-British servicemen (perhaps from Gurkha units) there were in the Tibetan forces.

Richardson suggests that the Gongkar Lama at some stage actually occupied Batang. Other sources do not confirm this and indicate that the Tibetans never broke through the Batang defences. See: Richardson, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 135.

411. For a summary of the course of events from the original Dargye-Beri confrontation in 1930 up to August 1932, based on sources available to the British Legation in Peking, see: L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to Sir John Simon, 1 August 1932.

Whether the Tibetans were the aggressors here, reacting to the defeats at the hand of Liu Wen-hui's forces by opening up another front, or were merely reacting defensively by means of a pre-emptive strike to reports that Ma Pu-fang had been ordered by Nanking to intervene in the conflict, was not clear to Ingram.

412. L/P&S/12/4169, Stark Toller to Peking, 16 August 1932.

In fact, of course, nothing of the sort would have happened. If this story is true, however, it well illustrates the Chinese vision of the extent of British influence in Tibet and of British support for the Tibetan military.

413. In the end Ma Pu-fang remained loyal to the Kuomintang; and after their retreat to Taiwan he represented the Chinese Nationalists in Egypt where he subsequently retired in a congenial Moslem environment.

414. Li, *Tibet, op, cit.*, p. 164.

415. Rumours of projected Tibetan renewal of the offensive, however, persisted through much of 1933.

Liu Wen-hui lost most of his area of control in south west Szechuan to Liu Hsiang. He was, however, permitted to retain Yachow (Yaan) on the Chengtu-Tachienlu road and the main centre where tea bricks destined for the Tibetan market were prepared. His interest from then onwards tended to be focussed westwards towards Sikang where he remained the dominant Chinese military figure until the fall of the Kuomintang in 1949. There was a period when Yachow was actually transferred from Szechuan to Sikang for which it served as Chinese administrative capital.

416. L/P&S/12/4169, Stark Toller to Peking, 17 December 1932.

417. Fighting had probably stopped by the end of January 1933 at the latest and truce negotiations begun in February. See: L/P&S/12/4169, Stark Toller, 28 February 1933. See also: Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 164; Shakabpa, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 269-70. Shakabpa took part in these negotiations with representatives of Ma Pu-fang.

418. L/P&S/12/2175, Dalai Lama to Weir, 25 May 1932.

419. L/P&S/12/2175, Weir to India, 5 June 1932.

420. L/P&S/12/2175, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 17 June 1932.
The records show a certain confusion as to exactly what was to be provided, the problem being the number of weapons and ammunition specified in the original offer of 1921 which had never been collected. Various lists differ slightly, for this reason; but they do not alter significantly the overall picture of the degree of British military support. For those with experience of the war on the Western Front in 1914-18 these figures must have seemed ludicrously small. It is difficult to believe that in the fighting in Eastern Tibet the Tibetan side depended entirely upon British arms and ammunition. Apart from stores captured from the Chinese there must surely have been some Japanese equipment and, possibly, Russian as well. Lacking a Teichman or King to observe, we will never know.

421. L/P&S/12/2175. This file is devoted to the statistics of British arms supply to Tibet. For the loan, see: India to Williamson, 9 September 1933.

422. L/P&S/12/2175, Ingram to FO, 24 August 1932; Chinese Legation to FO, 4 October 1932.
The British could hardly deny that British arms were finding their way into Tibetan hands: during the fighting in the first half of 1932 the Chinese captured several machine guns of British manufacture. See: L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to Sir John Simon, 1 August 1932.

423. L/P&S/12/2175, Ingram to FO, 24 August 1932.

424. L/P&S/12/4170, IO to FO, 3 June 1932.

425. L/P&S/12/4170, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 August 1932; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12 August 1932.

426. L/P&S/12/4170, Weir to India, 31 July 1932.

427. L/P&S/12/4170, FO to IO, 13 August 1932; C.W. Orde to J.C. Walton, 18 August 1932.

428. L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to FO, 6 September. See also: L/P&S/12/4169, Ingram to Sir John Simon, 24 September 1932, enclosing the full text of the minute of Holman's meeting with Hsü Mo.
The records of the British representation in China at this period are sometimes a trifle confusing in that the Kuomintang capital was at Nanking while the Foreign Legations maintained their headquarters in Peking with a diplomatic representative in Nanking. Discussions in Nanking were often reported first to Peking and then, under covering despatch of the Minister or Chargé, sent on to London. From time to time, however, the Minister (Ambassador from 1935 onwards) visited Nanking and reported directly from there.
Ingram had from the outset been opposed to the idea of telling the Chinese anything about the Weir Mission in advance, as he told the FO on 16 August 1932. He was, none the less, instructed to inform the Chinese in Nanking that Weir was on his way to Lhasa (FO to Ingram 19 August 1932). In the end Ingram could not get down to Nanking to see the Wai-chiao-pu himself and delegated to Holman, who, as noted, did not mention the Lhasa Mission. Holman, however, had not received copies of the FO instructions, Ingram reported, and should not therefore be blamed for this omission. See a summary of the whole correspondence in: L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to Sir John Simon, 9 January 1933.

429. The final report of the 2nd Weir Mission to Lhasa is in: L/P&S/12/4170, Weir to India, 1 March 1933.

430. L/P&S/12/4170, Weir to India, 1 March 1933.

431. L/P&S/12/4170, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 13 September 1932.

432. L/P&S/12/4170, Weir to India, 1 March 1933.

433. Trimon Shape, a very experienced member of the Kashag, called on Weir on 19 September 1932 and in the course of discussion stated that the Tibetans would be prepared to accept the line of the Kantze Truce of November 1931 as the permanent frontier in Eastern Tibet; but, in the light of the subsequent Chinese military successes this could only be considered to be an opening gambit in negotiations with the Chinese. See: L/P&S/12/4169, Weir to India, 22 September 1932.

434. L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to FO, 26 October 1932.

435. L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to Sir John Simon, 9 January 1933.

436. L/P&S/12/4170, IO to FO, 1 October 1932.
Do we see here a trace of the influence of Sir Charles Bell?

437. L/P&S/12/4170, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 26 September 1932.

438. L/P&S/12/4170, Weir to India, 1 November 1932.

439. L/P&S/12/4170, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 28 September 1932; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 19 October 1932.

440. L/P&S/12/4170, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 3 November 1932.

441. L/P&S/12/4170, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 27 October 1932; FO to Ingram, 31 October 1932.

442. L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to FO, 3 November 1932.
The author's father, L.H. (later Sir Lionel) Lamb, well remembers this meeting with the Panchen Lama. His lasting impression was how very little the Lama in fact said.

443. L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to FO, 16 November 1932.
Ingram thought that the Panchen Lama had now been for so long in China, flattered by the Chinese and subjected to other Chinese influences, that he might have in fact become their man who would, once back in Tibet, only spread Kuomintang ideology to the embarrassment of the Government of India. On the other hand, it was true that the Chinese Government at times regarded him as rather a nuisance and did not consult him "seriously" in matters concerning Tibet. This, however, would not of course prevent their making the best use of him if he did return to Tashilhunpo. It is all too often forgotten that the Kuomintang movement, particularly in its earlier years, contained a powerful anti-colonial and anti-imperial ideological element.
The India Office did not share this view: they were very anxious to see the Panchen Lama back in Tibet; and neither they nor the Government of India were particularly interested in Chinese ideologies.

444. L/P&S/12/4170, IO to FO, 24 November 1932.

445. Telegrams from Lhasa, of course, passed through British India; and any official messages to and from the Tibetan Government were routinely intercepted by the British, as no doubt the Tibetans were well aware.

446. L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to Sir John Simon, 9 January 1933.

447. L/P&S/12/4170, Weir to India, 29 November 1932.

448. L/P&S/12/4170, Ingram to Sir John Simon, 9 January 1933.

449. L/P&S/12/4170, Lampson to FO, 7 February 1933.

450. L/P&S/12/4170, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 14 February 1933.

451. L/P&S/12/4170, Dalai Lama to Williamson, 8 January 1933.

452. L/P&S/12/4170, Lampson to Wellesley, 2 June 1933.

VIII

THE DEATHS OF THE 13TH DALAI LAMA AND THE 9TH PANCHEN LAMA AND THE RETURN OF A CHINESE PRESENCE IN LHASA, 1933-1937

1933, which was turn out to be the last year in the life of the 13th Dalai Lama, opened with the appointment of a new Political Officer in Sikkim, Frederick Williamson.[453] Almost immediately after he had taken over at Gangtok, Williamson composed a long and closely argued attack on all that was implied in Sir Miles Lampson's proposal to give up "trusting to artificial barriers of our own creation for keeping the Tibetans and Chinese apart".[454] It would

> undoubtedly be regarded by Tibet as a breach of faith and . . . I would respectfully urge that we should not lay ourselves open to such a charge. At present we are trusted friends of Tibet and no enemy is so bitterly hated as a former friend who is considered a betrayer. It would not be enough to warn the Chinese Government after aggression has occurred. It is necessary to be on the watch, as far as we are able, to ensure that it does not occur.

Williamson insisted he was not suggesting that the British should go to such extremes as stationing a permanent representative in Lhasa, though he did emphasise that it was the Dalai Lama's declared opinion that should the Chinese establish anything like such a representative, then the British ought to do likewise to maintain at least a balance.

The Government of India, while fully sympathetic to Williamson's line of reasoning, could only counsel caution. The Dalai Lama should be informed that while the British were doing their best to secure from China a permanent settlement of the Sino-Tibetan border, the times were out of joint. Faced with the Japanese menace, anything that the Chinese Government might be persuaded to agree to now would be considered in Nanking as secured under duress and would be ignored the moment the Chinese were in a position to resume their pressure from Sikang and Ch'inghai. The Dalai Lama should be advised to do absolutely nothing at present which might disturb the

current fragile peace of the frontier, however great the provocation or tempting the opportunity. To act otherwise would be to invite eventual Chinese military action which the Tibetans might well be unable to resist.[455]

In practical terms there were only three steps that the Government of India could take.

The first was to go on encouraging a dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama. In February 1933 Williamson had received a letter from the Panchen Lama seeking his mediation to facilitate his return. Williamson thought that he was quite sincere in this request. In April a group of representatives of the Panchen Lama arrived at Kalimpong en route for Lhasa to try once more to negotiate terms, part of a mission headed by Tsa Serkang (who were joined towards the end of the year by Ngagchen – or Anch'in – Rimpoche and Trungyik Chempo – or Wang Lo-chieh); and the Dalai Lama had arranged special facilities for their onward journey from the Indian border to the Tibetan capital.[456] It was possible, perhaps with a bit of British encouragement, that they might this time achieve something.[457] The Panchen Lama by now had left Nanking for a retreat in Inner Mongolia and for the time being was removed from the direct influence of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang.[458] A settlement between the two Incarnations could only have a stabilising effect.

The second step, of course, was to supply yet more arms for the Tibetan forces. As we have already noted, in June 1933 the Government of India agreed to what was a large arms shipment (in the Tibetan context), including no less than 4,000 modern rifles and considerable quantities of ammunition; and in September a loan was granted the Tibetans to cover the cost. This was done as if it were really but a continuation of the arms supply agreed to the previous year; and the Cabinet in London were apparently not consulted about it. Perhaps it would suffice to enable the Tibetan army to hold off any Chinese forays in the Marches.

The third step was the old and tried one of permitting another formal visit to Lhasa by the Political Officer in Sikkim to explain the situation in person to the Dalai Lama and his Ministers and, by his presence, to demonstrate the reality of British good will and support. Williamson had in fact been invited to Lhasa by the Dalai Lama shortly after he took up his appointment at Gangtok.[459] In the early summer of 1933 he felt obliged to make a prolonged visit to Bhutan, another of his responsibilities, which also served as his honeymoon since he had just married Margaret Marshall, so it was not until the very end of July that he was in a position to set out for Lhasa (directly from Bhutanese territory) which he reached on 14 August.[460]

Williamson was accompanied by his wife and, as his staff, Captain Tennant, I.M.S., and Norbu Dhondup; and in Lhasa he was

accommodated at the Dekyi Lingka house where the Mission stayed until 4 October. The atmosphere was far more friendly than it had been during the first Weir Mission of 1930 and there was none of the air of crisis and panic which had been such a feature of the second Weir Mission of 1932. The Williamsons were caught up in a round of social engagements which embraced most of Lhasa's elite. The Dalai Lama was treated by the British party to a cinema show of Charlie Chaplin films. Kunphel La took the Williamsons for rides in one of the Dalai Lama's two Austin Seven cars acquired in 1931. Tsarong, who was once more in favour, was a frequent contact. His sister-in-law (and former wife) Rinchen Dolma Taring, now married to Jigme Taring of the Sikkimese Royal Family and an officer in the Tibetan army, was a prominent member of the pro-British social scene which included one of the old Rugbeians, Ringang, who soon became an important intermediary between the British Mission and the Tibetan bureaucracy. Another of the Rugby party, Mundo (or Möndrong), called at the Dekyi Lingka: he had recovered from his fall from grace in 1925 and was now a respected Lhasa personage who showed no reluctance in meeting foreigners.[461] Similarly, many of the pupils of Ludlow's Gyantse English school during its brief life visited Williamson: some of them now held important military commands.

Lungshar was rapidly declining in importance, a fact which boded ill for him, Williamson thought, once the 13th Dalai Lama died. Kunphel La was still the Dalai Lama's favourite; and Williamson formed a not unfavourable opinion of him, though he thought that he, too, would suffer after the Dalai Lama had gone. The Chief Minister, Silon Langdun (the Yabshi Kung or the head of the Dalai Lama's family) was not above trying to score points of protocol over the British envoy; but he seemed rather young and silly and with little real influence. Trimon Shape, now old and wishing to retire from official life, was probably the most respected and influential member of the Kashag: he was the last of the old guard who had been directly involved with the Simla Conference of 1913-14 when he had been an assistant to the Lönchen Shatra, and he was well disposed towards the British. Another person of importance who could be classified as pro-British was Yutok Depon, commander of the newly formed Trapchi Regiment of the Tibetan Army, member of one of the noblest of all Lhasa families and associated with the tendency represented by Tsarong. All in all, even including Lungshar whom Williamson confessed that he rather liked, there was not much evidence (in contrast to Weir's experience in 1930) of pro-Chinese sentiment among the men who mattered in Lhasa politics.

Williamson visited Trapchi, now the site of the mint and an arsenal as well as the barracks of the Trapchi Regiment, which was situated some three miles from Lhasa not far from Sera monastery. The

arsenal, powered by water-generated electricity from Dote some six miles away, was the brainchild of Kunphel La and set up by Ringang. Its machinery was capable of the manufacture of shells of rather poor quality and rifles which were suitable for the police but not up to army standards. "The whole place", including the adjoining mint and the printing shop producing bank notes, Williamson thought, "had an air of energy and efficiency which is very rare in Tibet". The Trapchi Regiment, despite rather complex recruitment problems arising from the structure of the Tibetan social hierarchy, surprised Williamson who reported that "its turn out and drill were absolutely astonishing. Outside the regular units of the British and Indian Armies I have never seen such smartness and precision". It had, of course, never been in action so its performance in a crisis could not be guaranteed; but, like the Trapchi arsenal, it demonstrated a degree of hard work and competence which previous British envoys to Lhasa had not found it easy to detect.

Amidst all this sight-seeing and social activity a considerable amount of diplomatic business was done, not all of it to Williamson's satisfaction.

The problem of the Panchen Lama seemed no nearer to a solution. His representatives, some of whom had arrived in April, were still in Lhasa; but they had failed to wring any concessions from the Dalai Lama. No more successful, according to the Dalai Lama himself, had been the Chinese. The Dalai Lama told Williamson that

> the Chinese Government had appointed one person after another to come to Lhasa to discuss outstanding questions but that all had been afraid and had made excuses. In any case he did not want a Chinese official ever to visit Lhasa, as all that the latter would want to do would be to pave the way for the renewal of Chinese domination.

No progress was achieved in the Tehri-Garhwal boundary question, which did not surprise Williamson in the least. Some significant advances, however, were made in a British mediation in a dispute between Bhutan and Tibet over Bhutanese rights in the Darchin monastery in the remoteness of Western Tibet near Mount Kailas. The place had apparently been made over to Bhutan in the 17th century by the rulers of Ladakh, and the grant confirmed by the 5th Dalai Lama. The present issue was, as one might expect after all this time, complex in the extreme; but in essence it concerned tax collection and the proportions due respectively to Lhasa and Bhutan. The Kashag now agreed to the initiation of a proper investigation of the matter which would no doubt lead eventually to a just settlement; and they had written to the Maharaja of Bhutan to this effect in most conciliatory language.

From Williamson's report of his 1933 Mission everything sounded a little bit too good to be true. Either the Lhasa Government,

following the lead of the Dalai Lama, had decided to do all in its power to convince the Government of India that Tibet was well worth supporting, or Williamson had resolved to the same end to put the most favourable gloss on everything that happened. Reading between the lines one can detect some disturbing undertones. The Dalai Lama was clearly nearing the end of his time in this particular Incarnation. What happened after he had gone to "the Heavenly Field" was not so certain to be to the British advantage. The Trapchi Regiment might be smart; but its musketry left much to be desired. The attitude of the Chief Minister, Silon Langdun, might have been the product of his stupidity and conceit: it might, however, also have indicated that not all Tibetan politicians saw British India as the sole hope for the future. The pro-British Tsarong tendency was not the only element in Tibetan politics. The Chinese threat remained to impose a severe strain upon Tibet's resources. Out of a total regular army of some 7,500 men, no less than 4,000 were stationed along the Chinese truce line in the east. Of the remainder, some 500 were in Shigatse, no doubt to deter would be supporters of the Panchen Lama, and the same number in Pome to prevent a recurrence of rebellion.

Williamson, who left Lhasa on 4 October 1933, must have actually been writing up his report in Gangtok when news was received of the 13th Dalai Lama's death on 17 December 1933.[462] The tone of the report abruptly changed in its final paragraphs where the consequences of this event were considered. Kunphel La, whom Williamson regarded both as progressive and pro-British, was clearly now in deep trouble having lost his patron and been exposed naked to the venom of his many enemies. The army, Williamson thought, could now play a key role. However, while many military figures following in the Tsarong tradition were supporters of the British connection, it did not seem likely, as it had once to Weir, that they would stage a coup led by Tsarong himself. More probably they would support whatever regime emerged in Lhasa following the unique operations of the Tibetan theocracy. Williamson would have preferred to see a Tsarong regime (and regretted Tsarong's absence from Lhasa at the crucial moment of the Dalai Lama's demise); but he did not believe it would come about. What the army would do, he was convinced, would be to refuse any orders from the Kashag to oppose by force the return of the Panchen Lama if he chose this moment to come back to Tibet. They would not take up arms against the person of the sole remaining great Incarnation of Tibet.

The question of the return of the Panchen Lama was paramount. It was Williamson's view that

> all classes in Tibet wish him to return and it is almost certainly his own wish also. His representatives, who are still in Lhasa, were not able to reach any sort of agreement with the Dalai Lama. I believe that the latter did not really wish the Tashi Lama to return, but now that the Dalai

> Lama is dead it is probable that some movement towards the return of the Tashi Lama will take place almost at once. . . . I think that whoever keeps or obtains power at Lhasa will be glad to have him back by whatever route he comes. If he returns, his influence will be immense, and we shall be chiefly concerned with his attitude to ourselves and to China. He formerly had the reputation of being friendly to ourselves but he has now lived in China for nearly ten years and has everywhere been treated with the greatest regard and consideration. It will not be surprising if he has acquired a certain leaning towards China, though I think it probable that the interests of Tibet will always be his first thoughts. But different people have different ideas as to what these interests are. If we take any part in the Tashi Lama's return we should, I think, encourage it and in no way discourage it. He will probably return in any case and it is better that he should do so under the impression that we have assisted and not opposed his return. The Tibetan Government might reasonably demand that he should in no circumstances bring any Chinese with him, but they are likely to be so eager for his return that they may possibly forget or neglect to impose any conditions at all.

Apart from the Panchen Lama, who responded to his Lhasa rival's death in a way which can have hardly given Williamson any pleasure, the Tibetan situation was dominated by two factors, the nature of the new Government in Lhasa and the response of the Chinese.

The immediate reaction in Lhasa to the death of the 13th Dalai Lama was not a military coup or anything like it. Almost at once a Regency was established following traditional procedures. The names of three suitable candidates for the position of Regent were written on scraps of paper buried in balls of *tsampa* dough and placed in an urn which was rotated rapidly so that one of the *tsampa* balls jumped out. This contained the name of the successful candidate. The choice fell on the nineteen year old Abbot Incarnation of Reting, generally referred to simply as Reting, rather than on the Abbot of either Ganden or Sera. Reting monastery was small and some distance from Lhasa, which probably made its Abbot preferable to the heads of any of the great Lhasa monastic establishments. Reting's Chief Minister remained Silon Langdun, the late Dalai Lama's nephew.[463]

Kunphel La almost at once fell from power, due it was said to the intrigues of Lungshar. He was arrested, charged with an attempt to conceal the fact of the Dalai Lama's illness leading to his death and the failure to provide adequate medical care for his ruler. He was put in prison and then exiled to Kongbo.[464] The regimental unit of the Tibetan army for the organisation of which he had been responsible, the Dring Drak Makhar, was disbanded, allegedly of its own free will. The blow against Kunphel La fell even before the selection of Reting as Regent. Events in Lhasa were moving with a most uncharacteristic rapidity. Lungshar undoubtedly hoped that he would be the new strong man of Tibet. Tsarong, conveniently, was at this moment away

visiting a distant estate; and, in any case, he seemed to have no immediate ambitions – when Reting offered him a place in the Kashag, he refused, though he did shortly assume some of Kunphel La's responsibilities such as the command of the Trapchi mint and arsenal.[465]

With Kunphel La out of the way, Lungshar endeavoured to organise some kind of cabal of monks, soldiers and young officials who would support him in a bid for power. He was, however, frustrated largely through the influence of the old Trimon Shape. On 10 May 1934 he attempted to persuade the Tsongdu (National Assembly) to take ultimate responsibility for policy and administration into its own hands, under his guidance as a kind of constitutional prime minister.[466] One point which Lungshar's supporters made was that the present Tibetan rulers were being unduly supportive towards the forthcoming Huang Mu-sung mission from the Nanking Government (of which more below). Largely because of the influence of monks in the Tsongdu the proposals of Lungshar's faction failed to win approval. Trimon Shape, who had fled in haste to Drepung earlier in the day, was now able to return and stage a counter attack. Late in the afternoon Lungshar was summoned to the Potala by the Regent and Kashag; and there he was arrested on grounds of conspiracy and the use of sorcery in an attempt to murder Trimon. The main evidence against him was a scrap of paper bearing Trimon's name, intended to be used for evil magical purposes, which he failed to swallow in time, though he did manage to dispose of other name-bearing fragments. He was also accused of planning to make himself into the "King" of Tibet, reviving an institution which had been abolished by the Manchus in the middle of the 18th century. Attempts by his faction to rally support for his release produced but trivial results. He was blinded, deprived of most of his wealth and put in prison.[467]

The death of the 13th Dalai Lama, therefore, resulted in no military regime under the capable leadership of Tsarong, as some British officials had hoped. Instead, under Reting and Silon Langdun, with Trimon Shape in the Kashag, there was in control of Tibetan affairs what was essentially a caretaker administration awaiting the discovery of the 14th Dalai Lama and prepared for the more regular workings of a long Regency such as had been the norm in Lhasa since the beginning of the 19th century and only interrupted by the unusual career of the 13th Dalai Lama. This was not the sort of government ideally suited to fend off the Panchen Lama, particularly when the Tashilhunpo Incarnation was enjoying powerful Chinese support. It was certainly in no position to assert with confidence the 13th Dalai Lama's claims to dominion over all that area which was in the Simla Conference referred to as Inner Tibet and was at present under Chinese control. By the end of 1934, symptomatic of the times, one

of the Pangda brothers, Topgye, was organising a rebellion against Lhasa rule (and initially, it seemed, with at least the tacit assistance of Liu Wen-hui) in the Markham region of Tibetan controlled Kham.[468]

The new regime, under the influence of Reting and Trimon Shape, was at first very careful to avoid any obvious signs of pro-British leanings. The case of Sir Charles Bell is instructive in this context. In 1933 he had come out to India with the intention, at the invitation of his old friend the 13th Dalai Lama, of seeing Lhasa once more. In July 1934, despite the Dalai Lama's death, he reached Gyantse accompanied by his faithful companion Pa-lhe-se. He did manage to pay a visit to Shigatse; but was refused permission by the Tibetan Government to go on to Lhasa.[469] If ever there had been a symbol of the British connection, it was Charles Bell; and the implications of his exclusion from the Tibetan capital were clear for all to note and reflect upon when, a month later, an impressive Chinese mission arrived in Lhasa. The Chinese could go in Tibet where the British could not.

The Nanking Government saw in the 13th Dalai Lama's death the opportunity to send a full scale mission to Lhasa, ostensibly to offer China's condolences but certainly as well to attempt negotiations with the Regency which might be more amenable, as it had been on occasions during the 19th century, to establishing a closer relationship with the Chinese Central Government than had been the late Incarnation.[470]

On 12 January 1934 a senior Chinese General, Huang Mu-sung, who had been Chiang Kai-shek's Vice Chief of the General Staff and had headed an important (but far from happy) embassy to Sinkiang in 1933 (and who, incidentally, was said to have a working knowledge of English), was appointed to head the mission.[471] The Tibetans agreed to receive it, but they wanted it to come via India rather than overland from China.[472] Huang Mu-sung also at first preferred this easier access to Lhasa; and the Indian Government reluctantly agreed to let him through British territory on the grounds that if he travelled overland from the Marches he would certainly be accompanied by an excessively large military escort.[473] Eventually Huang Mu-sung and all but two of his party, 37 persons in all including 20 military guards, decided on the overland route, probably because Huang hoped to hold discussions with Liu Wen-hui on the way. The two members travelling via India apparently intended to bring with them wireless equipment which the Indian Government would be powerless to intercept and detain because wirelesses were not listed among those articles whose import into Tibet were prohibited by any of the Treaties or Trade Regulations (though the plan was in the end changed and the set came overland).[474] Huang Mu-sung, however, intended to return through India.[475]

Before setting out, Huang Mu-sung called on Ingram in Nanking

to explain his objectives which he described as purely ceremonial.[476] He then went to Chungking whence, on 6 April 1934 he set out for Chengtu, which he left for Lhasa on 5 May. He received, while passing through Sikang, a long memorandum on the Tibetan situation from Liu Wen-hui (whom he apparently did not meet), which suggested very strongly to the Government of India that he was concerned with Sino-Tibetan boundary and territorial questions as much as with the formal offer of condolences to the Regent and Kashag. No doubt he had been briefed on the sudden but short-lived flare up of fighting which had just taken place in the Derge in the neighbourhood of Dengko in which monks from Dargye were again actively involved.[477]

The advance party of the Chinese mission reached Lhasa on 24 May 1934, when they at once started making substantial cash gifts to the Ganden, Sera and Drepung monasteries as well as the presentation of 50,000 Chinese dollars to the Tibetan Government as a contribution towards the construction of a tomb for the late Dalai Lama.[478] They also hoisted the Chinese Nationalist flag over the house allocated to the mission, the first time a Chinese flag had been seen in Lhasa since the crisis of 1912. Huang Mu-sung himself arrived in the Tibetan capital on 28 August, where he was welcomed with more impressive honours, Mrs. Williamson relates, than were accorded to Williamson in 1933.[479] The moment Huang reached Lhasa the Chinese wireless set was operating and direct contact established between the Chinese mission and Nanking.[480]

While the advance party of the Huang Mu-sung mission were establishing themselves in Lhasa, Williamson and his wife made an excursion to Shigatse, for which permission had been granted by the late Dalai Lama, on their way to a routine visit from Sikkim to the British Trade Agency at Gyantse. It may be that the timing was intended to remind the Tibetan authorities that the British "counterpoise" to the Chinese had not been obliterated by the goings-on of Huang Mu-sung's vanguard in the Tibetan capital.[481]

For detailed intelligence on what was happening in Lhasa, however, the British had to rely on Norbu Dhondup, who had gone up there in April to remain throughout all the stages of the Huang Mu-sung mission from its preliminary preparations until the departure of the Chinese representative for India and China on 28 November 1934. He maintained constant communication with Williamson's office in Gangtok. It had been discovered that the India-Lhasa telegraph line could be adapted for use by field telephone, an apparatus which guaranteed that the Tibetans could not monitor messages as they could easily have done had Norbu Dhondup been obliged to rely on Tibetan telegraph operators.[482] Thus the British, always assuming that Norbu Dhondup was reporting all that he knew and heard, had a rapid and secure link with their Lhasa observer in this critical period.

Huang Mu-sung was in Lhasa for three months during which he had discussions with many people. He was by all accounts a gentlemen of the old Chinese school, rather authoritarian in outlook, who took his etiquette and ceremonial duties seriously; but this could not be said of all his entourage, some of whom breached convention by smoking in public, a practice which had been forbidden by the late Dalai Lama, while others went out shooting duck and geese which was offensive to the Tibetans because of the declared Buddhist dislike for the needless taking of life.[483] Norbhu Dhondup discovered the gist of much that was said; but he would have been indeed a master spy if he had penetrated some of the more private encounters between leading Tibetans and members of the Chinese mission. Reports reaching Gangtok, however, give one a fair idea of the kind of topics on the agenda.[484]

Huang Mu-sung's main objectives were twofold. First: he wanted to start a Sino-Tibetan dialogue without a vestige of British participation, thus demonstrating the termination once and for of all the tripartite legacy of the Simla Conference. Second: he sought to establish a permanent Chinese representation in Lhasa, the Republican equivalent of the old Manchu Amban, through whom this dialogue could continue to be carried on. In a very real sense the Chinese wireless, a counter to the direct Lhasa-British India telegraphic link, was a symbol of this new development. Lhasa would now be in as rapid communication, and without British eavesdropping, with Nanking as it was with Delhi.

Huang Mu-sung was not immediately concerned with the minutiae of Sino-Tibetan boundary delimitation: this was a matter which he declared "was trifling and could easily be settled". He wanted to establish certain general principles such as that Tibet formed part of the Chinese community of the Five Races; and he arranged for the public display in Lhasa of placards which explained the significance of this point. As a gesture of Sino-Tibetan collaboration he offered to present the Tibetans with a jade seal for the use of the 14th Dalai Lama when he was in due course discovered: despite the opposition of the Kashag this offer was accepted by the Tsongdu (National Assembly). While Sera monastery remained adamantly opposed to any of these ideas, other Tibetan individuals and institutions were at least prepared to listen, even to Huang's suggestion that Tibet declare itself a Republic (presumably what was meant was an integral part of the Chinese Republic). There would, beyond the retention of a Chinese presence in Lhasa after Huang's departure, be no question of Tibet, from which term of course were excluded Sikang and Ch'inghai, coming under direct Chinese administration. China, however, could offer Tibet protection from any external enemies (for example, Nepal).

Much of the actual negotiating with the Tibetans was carried out

by a member of Huang's Mission, one Wu Min-yuan, who had been born in Lhasa and who spoke good Tibetan. Norbu Dhondup said that a number of prominent Tibetans were attracted by Huang Mu-sung's approach, notably Trimon Shape and, perhaps, the Regent Reting, who were both rumoured to have been in receipt of large Chinese bribes. The Chinese proposals were strongly supported by the Panchen Lama's representatives, headed by Tsa Serkang, who were then in Lhasa. Li relates that out of these various discussions the Chinese prepared a set of formal propositions in reply to which the Tibetan side declared that they were ready to hand over the conduct of their foreign relations to China (evidently the technical equivalent of admitting Chinese "suzerainty") provided that

(1) Tibet never be reorganised into a Chinese Province;

(2) the Chinese impose no laws which were harmful to Tibetan internal politics and, above all, Tibetan religion;

(3) the Chinese would not interfere with internal Tibetan civil and military affairs;

(4) a Chinese representative could be stationed in Lhasa, but his retinue must not exceed 25 persons in all;

(5) until at least the discovery of the 14th Dalai Lama, of which the Chinese would be notified immediately, internal Tibetan political appointments (such as to the Kashag) would be made by the Tibetan establishment as at present constituted;

(6) Chinese citizens (and certain categories of those of mixed Sino-Tibetan parentage) resident in Tibet would be subject to Tibetan law and there would be nothing like Chinese extraterritorial rights in Tibet (such as the Nepalese had established by the 1856 Treaty);

(7) the Tibetans would maintain their military forces along the current Sino-Tibetan border for defensive purposes;

(8) the boundary recently established between Tibet and Kokonor (Ch'inghai) would, with a possible minor modification, remain as it now stood;

(9) the Chinese held districts on the Szechuan (Sikang) border of Derge, Nyarong and the neighbourhood of Dargye monastery would be handed back to Tibet as soon as practicable;

(10) the Chinese would not provide asylum for rebels, either lay and monastic, against the Lhasa Government: they would be surrendered at once to the Tibetan authorities.[485]

According to Li, who can safely be taken to reflect the records of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the Nanking Government, Huang Mu-sung neither accepted nor rejected these proposals which he considered to be a useful starting point for further negotiations. What Li does say is that Huang Mu-sung agreed with the Regent Reting that the Panchen Lama should be allowed back to Tibet provided that he was not accompanied by a large (but of undefined size) escort and that it was clearly understood that he

would play no part whatsoever in the temporal affairs of Tibet.[486]

Norbu Dhondup, who obtained a version for the Government of India of all this through his own Lhasa official contacts, reported that the Tibetan proposals contained a number of additional phrases and provisions, all stressing the essential autonomy of the country and its right to conduct its foreign affairs. All these proposals represented not so much a Tibetan initiative as the response of the Kashag and the Tsongdu after much debate to points raised by Wu Min-yuan. They did not, it was said, really meet Huang Mu-sung's requirements, and he was very depressed at the result. Norbu Dhondup thought the Chinese would not accept them, even though the proposals recognised Chinese "suzerainty" over Tibet and admitted the Chinese right to station a Resident (Amban) with a small escort as provided for in the Simla Convention (not more than 300 men, and certainly greater than the 25 men specified in Li's version).[487]

Li's account has in recent years aroused some extremely hostile comment from Hugh Richardson, who has dismissed much of it on the grounds that Tibetan policy remained fixed to the terms of the abortive Simla Convention of 1914 which provided expressly for British involvement in any settlement of the problems of Tibet's relations with China.[488] In fact, apart from the question of British involvement, the value of which was not always appreciated in Lhasa (and would have been less so had the implications of Sir Miles Lampson's new policy been understood), these terms as related by Li do not depart significantly from those accepted by Tibet at Simla (the Sino-Tibetan boundary definition always excepted). The Simla Convention, for example, had the Chinese adhered to it, would have established, albeit in an attached note, that Tibet formed part of Chinese territory but enjoying internal autonomy. The terms reported by Li make precisely this point. These proposals, indeed, do not differ in major respects from those which had been explored in direct Sino-Tibet dialogue ever since 1914, as we have already seen in earlier Chapters. The only difference now was that the Chinese Government behind Huang Mu-sung was far more representative of China as a whole than any Chinese regime since the collapse of Yuan Shih-k'ai's monarchy in 1916.[489]

Just before he left Lhasa on 28 November 1934 for his return to China via India (with a visit to Nepal on the way) Huang Mu-sung made further gifts of cash to the main Lhasa monasteries. He left behind him in the Tibetan capital, along with the wireless set, two Chinese officials, Liu P'u-chen and Chiang Chi-yu (the latter referred to in some British Indian sources as William Tsiang).[490] When he departed from Lhasa, Huang Mu-sung was bidden a formal farewell by two members of the Kashag, a sign of some considerable respect. *The Times* correctly interpreted Huang's intention when it reported on 13 December 1934 that the Chinese had decided to station a

resident at Lhasa "in order to cement relations between China and Tibet and facilitate the direction of affairs in the border territories". Williamson heard that immediately before Huang's departure he had received from the Kashag a "written acknowledgement of Chinese suzerainty" over Tibet.[491]

Huang Mu-sung left Calcutta for China in January 1935. He reached Shanghai on 13 February and made straight for Nanking to report to Chiang Kai-shek in person. He was soon to be rewarded with the Chairmanship of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission.[492]

The announcement of the impending Huang Mu-sung mission obliged both the India Office and the Government of India to try to work out exactly what their interests in Tibet were. The essentials were quite clear. The integrity and autonomy of Outer Tibet (in the Simla Convention terminology) should be maintained. There should be kept in being an effective Tibetan Government which could look after the peace and order of this "buffer state on the frontiers of India, where conditions have an inevitable reaction on the neighbouring States of Sikkim and Bhutan". Such a Tibetan Government should be free from the influence of Soviet Russia or, indeed, of any other foreign Power other than China. The Government of India recognised China's "suzerainty" in Tibet; but if, however, "the Chinese should attempt to re-establish full sovereignty", J.C. Walton, Secretary to the Political Department of the India Office, minuted, "we could not remain disinterested". There would inevitably be "disturbed conditions", an euphemism for civil war, since one faction in Tibet would surely resist the Chinese. Tibetan opposition would, moreover, lead to an inefficient Chinese administration in Tibet, which would thereby be opened to Soviet Russian or Chinese Communist influence. If the Huang Mu-sung mission should turn out to have marked the first step in the Chinese escalation of their Tibetan status from suzerainty to sovereignty, then it directly threatened British Indian frontier policy.[493]

What Huang Mu-sung had done to the suzerainty-sovereignty problem was not entirely clear at the time of his departure from Lhasa in November 1934. He certainly put a new gloss on the practice of Chinese suzerainty in Tibet. When he set out for home from Lhasa, as we have already noted, he left two Chinese officials behind, Liu P'u-chen and Chiang Chi-yu, along with a technician to operate the wireless, to serve as some kind of continuing Chinese representation. Liu died in or before March 1935, but Chiang remained. In March or April 1935 a further Chinese mission visited Lhasa, this time from the Sining administration of Ma Pu-fang.[494] During the summer of 1935 two more Chinese officials endeavoured to enter Tibet by way of India to reinforce the Chinese in Lhasa: they were turned back by the British on the grounds that they could not show evidence of an

invitation by the Tibetan Government. There was nothing the British could do, however, to close the overland route to other reinforcements for what was obviously turning into a permanent presence of the Nanking Government in the Tibetan capital other than rely on the length and difficulty of the journey involved.

With the passing of the 13th Dalai Lama the Panchen Lama once more became very active. He had recently been appointed to the high ranking official Chinese post of "Cultural Commissioner for the Western Border Regions",[495] He arrived in Nanking via Peking on 22 January 1934 to discuss with the Kuomintang the implications of the 13th Dalai Lama's death.[496] In February 1934 he was sworn in as a member of the National Government of China. He was in Nanking off and on until the early summer; and on at least one occasion he had a long discussion with Chiang Kai-shek.

The key question in 1934 was whether the new Lhasa regime would accept the terms for the Panchen Lama's return which had been put to the Dalai Lama in the last weeks of his life. According to reports reaching Williamson these included the following:[497]

(1) that all the Panchen Lama's former powers would be restored to him;

(2) that he and his officials would be free to travel throughout Tibet;

(3) that he could maintain his own bodyguard;

(4) that, should the need arise, the Panchen Lama would both pay for and, more importantly, control all troops in Tsang;

(5) the taxes in Tsang would be collected by the Panchen Lama and not by Lhasa;

(6) agreement to these terms would be witnessed by the representative of a foreign Power, either the British or China.

These demands, either wholly or in part, had been rejected by the Kashag; but would they continue to be?[498]

The Panchen Lama gave an interview in Nanking on 8 March 1934 to the new British Minister to China, Sir Alexander Cadogan, accompanied by Ingram, Teichman and A.P Blunt; and he saw Cadogan again in Hankow two days later.[499] He returned Cadogan's call on 26 March. On the following day Teichman was invited to another meeting with him. Teichman concluded that with the 13th Dalai Lama out of the way the Panchen Lama's return to Tibet would be made much easier. The trouble between the two Incarnations had been stirred up by "underlings" whose power had now greatly diminished. The Panchen Lama said he wished to retain close relations with the British and suggested that he might return to Tibet by way of India, a possibility in which Teichman detected the seeds of unwelcome British entanglement in Tibetan internal affairs. The Panchen Lama concluded by recommending that future British contact with him could be maintained through Tsa Serkang, who was in effect his representative in British India and was usually resident

in Kalimpong. Shortly after this meeting he left Nanking for Shanghai, where on 6 June he was shown over the sloop H.M.S *Sandwich* by its Captain, F.C. Flynn.[500] In June he sent scarves and various gifts to King George V, the Viceroy of India and the Commander in Chief of the Indian Army; and he announced that he would shortly be despatching another deputation to Lhasa for which he sought Indian transit facilities.[501]

In early August 1934 the Panchen Lama was back in Peking, where he was receiving a great deal of respectful attention from the Chinese authorities. Teichman called on him on 3 August when a discussion of a more specifically political nature took place. The Panchen Lama asked whether the British were prepared to mediate actively and directly between him and Lhasa. While Teichman was very sympathetic, he made it absolutely plain that His Majesty's Government could not "in any way interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet or assume any responsibilities in connection with His Serenity's affairs".[502]

This interview seems to have made up the Panchen Lama's mind. He saw no real prospect for the time being at least of active help from the British and no option remained to him but to continue in his close relationship with the Nanking Government. On 11 August he left Peking for Inner Mongolia in a special train provided by the Chinese authorities; and shortly after his arrival at his Inner Asian retreat he finally abandoned his project, about which he was already very uncertain, to return to Tibet by way of India.[503] He did not, however, it was soon to become evident, give up all hope of some form of eventual British mediation even though, by September, the only concrete British response he had received was a signed photograph of King George V.[504]

The policy of the Panchen Lama during this period remains somewhat enigmatic. It was obvious that his position had potentially improved greatly after the death of his rival. He knew that the Huang Mu-sung mission was going to result in an increase in Chinese influence in Lhasa, which could certainly be exploited to his advantage. At the same time, to return to Tibet in the wake of the Chinese might result in his becoming no more than a puppet of the Nanking Government. Probably the ideal would be to exploit both Chinese and British support and play one off against the other. It was unlikely at all events that the British, unless spurred on by Chinese competition, were going to do much to assist him. Of this, after his discussion with Teichman, he could have been in little doubt. Equally mysterious was what he would do if he ever did get back to Tibet. Did he want to replace the Dalai Lama as the supreme head of the Tibetan theocracy; or did he merely wish to have restored to him what he rightly considered was Tashilhunpo's due? Perhaps he did not know the answer to these questions himself, an uncertainty

which might explain the extraordinary lack of decisiveness he showed right up to the moment of his death in Ch'inghai on 30 November 1937.

Against the background of the Huang Mu-sung mission then almost at Lhasa, the Panchen Lama wrote to his old acquaintance Williamson to announce that he intended to get back to Tibet quite soon, that he was extremely well disposed towards the British, and that he requested transit facilities for his two representatives Ngagchen Rimpoche and Trungyik Chempo who were about to set out to Lhasa via India bearing yet another letter to the Tibetan Government (which was actually a repeat of that of the year before) setting out the conditions on which he was willing to return.[505] The two envoys passed through Sikkim for Lhasa in November 1934. Early in January 1935 he wrote once more to Williamson, this time returning to his old request for British mediation; but he added significantly that if such mediation were not forthcoming and the Lhasa Government did not show itself more amenable to reason he might have no other option but recourse to arms.

To the newly established presence of what many British observers suspected was in all but name the Kuomintang equivalent of an Amban in Lhasa was now added the unmistakable threat of a Tibetan civil war. Here was a situation which clearly called for a further British Mission to Lhasa.[506]

The Lhasa Government was under considerable stress at this time. Not only were there pressures from the Panchen Lama's representatives following in the wake the departure of Huang Mu-sung and the lingering Chinese presence in Lhasa, but also the leading officials were preoccupied with the vital, and incredibly complex, task of finding a successor to the 13th Dalai Lama which involved visits to holy places, consultations with oracles and, perhaps, much debate as to what sort of candidate would be most suitable in the particular circumstances in which Tibet found itself. The absence of a Dalai Lama undoubtedly added enormously to the prestige of the Panchen Lama and, of course, to that of his Chinese protectors. The Tibetan Government, too, could benefit from some British counterbalance to Chinese influence; and perhaps the British could persuade the Panchen Lama to moderate some of his demands.

By 20 March 1935 the Government of India had approved the idea of another Williamson Mission; and on 23 March the Regent Reting formally invited Williamson to visit Lhasa once more.[507]

The objectives behind the Mission were twofold. First: there was the obvious need to provide a "counterpoise" to the Huang Mu-sung mission of 1934. Second: there also remained the possibility of some kind of British mediation between the Panchen Lama and Lhasa. The shape of the desired British mediation, of course, depended upon the kind of arrangements which the Panchen Lama could make on his

own with the Tibetan authorities. Some reports suggested that the Panchen Lama's negotiating team in Lhasa were gaining most of their demands. Other intelligence, however, indicated that things were not going too smoothly and the Panchen Lama was in fact asking for much more than any Lhasa Government could concede. He was, for example, said to be insisting that the provincial boundaries of Tsang be greatly expanded at the expense of Ü.[508] If the Lhasa talks broke down there would be a real need for an honest broker.

By the time the second Williamson Mission set out it did indeed look as if relations between the Panchen Lama and Lhasa were fast approaching a crisis which gravely threatened Tibetan stability. In the absence of any clear signs of welcome from the Regent and Kashag, the 9th Panchen Lama had started the slow process of his physical return to Tibet without any agreement with Lhasa. By the middle of May 1935 he had reached the great monastery of Kumbum near Sining where he had been treated with the greatest honour by Mongol nobles and ordinary people alike; and his supporters from not only Tibet but the rest of the world where Tibetan Buddhism flourished were flocking to him, having heard that he was being rebuffed by Lhasa. The Chinese had provided him, it was said, with four motor trucks. There were more than hints that he might be escorted home by something like a motorised army which added another potential headache for the makers of British Indian frontier policy.[509]

By this time the India and Foreign Offices in London had agreed that on the whole the balance of advantage lay on the side of some kind of active British mediation between Lhasa and the Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama would be asked to "moderate his demands and be satisfied if the Tibetan Government will give him the position and possessions which he enjoyed before his flight from Tibet" and Lhasa would be urged to forgive what it considered to be the Panchen Lama's transgressions in the past. This position was communicated by Teichman to the Panchen Lama's Peking representative, the Lo Lama, on 20 April 1935.[510] There was an increasing risk, however, that the Panchen Lama would ignore such advice and resort to more drastic measures, in which case the presence of a senior British official in Lhasa might prove extremely valuable.

Williamson, whose health was far from good, was probably in private reluctant to set out on another arduous venture on the Tibetan plateau; but by now he had behind him the impetus of a new force, in the person of Olaf Caroe, applied to the formulation of British Indian attitudes towards Tibet and the Himalayan border which it would be indeed hard to resist.

After 1914 Tibet had become very much a sideshow in the conduct of British Indian foreign policy: it did not, for example, rank remotely in importance with Afghanistan and the North-West

Frontier. In 1935, with the arrival of Caroe as Deputy Foreign Secretary (his appointment dated to 1934 but it took a little time to take effect) there was to be a marked revival of interest in things Tibetan and in the problems of the northern borders of the Indian Empire.[511] Caroe's ideas about the proper shape of British Himalayan policy, even though at the outset expressed nominally through his superior in the person of the Foreign Secretary, Sir A. Metcalfe, were extremely influential. Caroe was determined that if the Chinese had re-established their reincarnated Amban in Lhasa the Government of India must offer an effective challenge. Not for him the negative approach of Sir Miles Lampson. There should be a positive and sustained British policy towards Tibet, a preliminary outline of which he set out in considerable detail in a despatch to the Secretary of State for India, the Marquess of Zetland (who as Lord Ronaldshay had extensive first hand experience of Indian affairs including the Tibetan problem and had also been Lord Curzon's biographer), dated 28 June 1935.[512]

Caroe admitted that the large British commercial interests in China made it necessary to subordinate Indian policy towards Tibet to the wider British approach to China, whose hostility should not be incurred by anything which might make Nanking think that the British intended to detach Tibet from Chinese "suzerainty". However,

> it is of the greatest importance at present, when new political forces are at work throughout Eastern and Central Asia, for the Government of India to maintain their influence in a friendly Tibet. It must be remembered that in Sinkiang restoration of Chinese control has only proved a cloak for the establishment in that Province of a Russian political supremacy not unlike that attained by the Japanese in Manchuria. Information has been received that the Chinese Communists have recently been driven into areas of China close to the Tibetan border and there is reason to believe that the Soviet authorities have considered the possibility of establishing connections between their authorities in Sinkiang and the Red Armies in Western China. The maintenance of an independent and autonomous Tibet, ruled on theocratic lines, is likely to be a stronger guarantee against a Soviet advance to the borders of India than any resumption of effective Chinese control in Tibet.

These broad, almost neo-Younghusband, considerations apart, the extension of effective Chinese influence into Outer Tibet would have a most unsettling effect on Nepal. The Chinese would also start interfering in the politics of Bhutan, and

> such a development would be likely to lead to constant attempts at Chinese encroachments on the North-Eastern frontier in a sector where, if Chinese Communists remain in control, the danger of Chinese penetration would seem to be considerable. The history of the

> Government of India's relations with China on the Burma frontier has recently demonstrated that China is in any case a difficult neighbour.

There was also, of course, the possibility that the Japanese one day, perhaps in the not too distant future, might take over the Chinese position in Tibet which they could well consider a valuable base from which to counter the Russians in Mongolia and Sinkiang, and, perhaps, to challenge the British throughout the Indian subcontinent.

Tibet was now in an unstable condition, Caroe went on. While the present rulers, following the death of the 13th Dalai Lama, were well disposed to the British, they lacked faith in British willingness or ability to help them against any increase in Chinese influence. Then there was the Panchen Lama, who clearly had designs for the extension of his spiritual power, "with a large measure of temporal power in addition", in Tibet. He, too, needed to be convinced that it was worth his while to maintain a friendship with the British, whose mediation with Lhasa he had sought.

Geography, Caroe argued, favoured the maintenance of British influence in Tibet, given the necessary will, because of the difficulties in communications between Lhasa and both Western China and Sinkiang. At this moment the Chinese, following the Huang Mu-sung mission, were not prepared, or indeed able, to do more than maintain a small presence; and they were unlikely for the time being to emulate the exploits of Chao Erh-feng. Now, therefore, was an excellent moment to expand British influence before either the Chinese (Nationalist or Communist) or the Soviets from Sinkiang were ready to take over this key territory adjacent to the British Indian border in the Himalayas.

From such general considerations Caroe derived a set of detailed instructions which should be given to Williamson for the proposed Lhasa Mission. These, of course, required the approval of the India Office; and, in the event, as we shall see, they were somewhat modified.

The first point concerned the dispute between the Lhasa authorities and the Panchen Lama. Because the Panchen Lama's domain was directly to the north of a section of the Indian border (Tsang touched upon northern Sikkim, and any disturbances there would have an immediate impact upon the main road from India through Yatung to Gyantse) the Government of India had a special interest in securing a reconciliation. Williamson in Lhasa should therefore make every effort to offer British good offices as mediator. It was just possible that Panchen Lama might have returned before Williamson reached the Tibetan capital. In any case, his representatives would still be in Lhasa. Therefore

> we consider that Mr. Williamson should be authorised to enquire from both parties what guarantees they require for the maintenance of

> friendly relations, and to offer to ascertain whether the Government of India would be prepared to assume some measure of responsibility for carrying reasonable guarantees into effect as between the two parties. Such guarantees should not extend to forcible intervention, but might include a standing offer to arbitrate at the invitation of either party in such disputes as may arise from time to time.

The next point was whether the Williamson Mission should result in the stationing of a permanent British representative in Lhasa since, "if the Government of India's position and influence in Tibet are to be maintained, it is necessary that they should be kept in close touch with the Tibetan Government". There were pros and cons. On the whole Caroe wrote, he was for the time being content with the situation in which it was possible for the Political Officer in Sikkim to visit Lhasa at frequent intervals with excursions in between by Norbu Dhondup. It was still not clear whether the Huang Mu-sung mission had left a permanent representative behind. Should, however,

> it transpire that the Chinese have decided to maintain a representative of diplomatic or equivalent status in Lhasa, he . . [Williamson] . . would proceed to sound the Lhasa Government as to their attitude to British representation as a counterpoise. He would not be authorised to press for such representation or even to commit His Majesty's Government on the subject without further reference.

Reading between the lines it is apparent that Caroe, had his hands been completely free, would have liked a permanent British representation established in Lhasa.

There remained the tricky question of British military support for the Tibetans against Chinese attack, Kuomintang or Communist. Caroe thought that for the moment Williamson ought to make no firm offers of British assistance. "The Government of India conceive that neither His Majesty's Government nor themselves could consider for a moment any proposal to maintain the integrity of Tibet by force against the establishment of Chinese Government". The Tibetans should be left in no doubt about this. However, if the attack came from some other Power, that is to say the Soviets, then he was to be empowered to say that the Government of India would be informed and might have to reconsider their position.

In conclusion, Williamson should be instructed to tell the Tibetans that "the Government of India, while prepared to admit the theoretic suzerainty of China, will adhere to their policy of regarding Tibet as an autonomous country in practice". They would not enter into negotiations with the Nanking Government on Tibet without Tibetan representatives being present on equal terms. Any Chinese representative posted to Lhasa would be treated by the Government of India as that of a foreign Power rather than part of the Tibetan governmental structure, and his right to interfere in internal Tibetan

policy would not be recognised. Further than this the Government of India could not go "in view of their own and the Tibetan recognition of Chinese suzerainty which precludes advice to the Tibetan Government to adopt a separatist attitude towards China on promise of outside support".

While showing a significant measure of restraint, Caroe's policy proposals were still a long way removed from the Lampson doctrine of letting the Tibetans sort out their problems with the Chinese as the best they could on their own. Caroe certainly considered that they represented a foundation upon which a much more active approach to the northern borders of India, and the land which lay beyond, could be constructed. If, as he believed, Bolshevism, either by way of Soviet influence in Sinkiang or through the advance into at least Eastern Tibet of the Chinese Communists (for the possibility of which as will shortly be seen there was some real evidence at this time), were likely to penetrate Tibet, then the Government of India might well have to react in a far more positive manner. The second Williamson Mission, therefore, was viewed as the preliminary to something much more substantial than had emerged from previous British Missions to Lhasa.

The India Office agreed with some of Caroe's points.[513] They would certainly not have let a Soviet or Soviet sponsored invasion of Tibet pass unchallenged. They were, however, extremely doubtful about a number of other key provisions. They could not guarantee absolutely that there would be no discussion of Tibetan matters between the British Embassy in China and the Nanking Government without equal participation by Tibetan representatives. In any future Sino-Tibetan crisis, for example, Tibet might well be in the wrong in which case it could hardly expect British support in China. All Williamson should tell the Tibetans was that the British would not talk to Nanking about Tibet without Tibetan "knowledge". Moreover, it might be as well "to avoid a categorical language" about any Chinese representative in Tibet being that of a foreign Power. This was hardly consistent with the concept of Chinese "suzerainty" in Tibet in whatever way it might be defined. The India Office proposed, however, that the Lampson doctrine should only apply to matters relating to the definition of the Sino-Tibetan border in the east. Here the Chinese and Tibetans could negotiate without a British presence. In any Sino-Tibetan discussions about the status of Outer Tibet, on the other hand, the British ought to be represented as an interested party.

The India Office reply to Caroe's letter concluded with a most significant point which had not, for obvious reasons, hitherto been expressly considered in the context of the Tibetan problem, even though Bell had foreseen it as early as 1920-21. The India Office declared that

> if the Political Officer should find that the policy of Government of Tibet is affected by misapprehensions regarding effect of the new Government of India Act, he might explain that basis of relations of Great Britain and India with Tibet will continue as at present since Act provides that India's foreign relations will be reserved to the Governor-General, who will act under the directions of the Secretary of State for India.

The fact was that from 1935 onwards the British were in the process, albeit slow and at times hesitant and inconsistent, of leaving India. The kind of long term view that so obsessed Lord Curzon, for example, at the beginning of the 20th century, was no longer possible. The British were reluctant to undertake for the all but immediate future commitments which might subsequently embarrass them. If they had a firm policy at all, it was to try to create the kind of conditions in India which would make the transition to Dominion status, and whatever might result from it, as easy as possible.

The British Mission in Peking (now raised to the status of an Embassy) regarded the original Caroe proposals with thinly veiled distaste.[514] The Ambassador, Sir Alexander Cadogan, agreed that a permanent British representative in Lhasa was not called for at present. Occasional British visits were much to be preferred. If it were necessary to give the Tibetans material help against the Chinese Communists, it should be done with the full knowledge of Nanking. Cadogan refused to abandon the right to enter into bilateral Anglo-Chinese negotiations on any Tibetan questions without Tibetan participation. He pointed out that the idea of the Chinese representative in Lhasa being the envoy of a foreign Power could not possibly be reconciled with the concept of suzerainty. Finally:

> as regards Thibetan policy of His Majesty's Government I endorse views expressed by my predecessors in China namely that we should openly regard and deal with Thibet as a self governing dominion of the Chinese commonwealth; make no attempt to give Thibetans encouragement to detach country politically from China and allow things to take their course as regards a settlement of Chinese-Thibetan differences (but doing our best should necessity arise to restrain China from armed aggression) and trust to the geographical propinquity and encourage economic and commercial intercourse to maintain and increase British influence in Lhasa and control Thibet. It should be possible to do this in these regions where geographical and economic conditions are as much in our favour as they are in favour of Russians in Sinkiang and Outer Mongolia. We should be then in a position to reconsider our policy should such a misfortune occur as break up of China or her domination by a foreign power.

This was still essentially the Lampson doctrine. If a foreign Power, that is to say Japan, took over all of China, then everyone connected with British policy would of course have to think again.

As a result of the triangular debate between India, London and the Peking Embassy, Williamson's final instructions were somewhat muted.[515] He was to find out what was implied by the continued presence in Lhasa of Chiang (Tsiang). Was he a Chinese diplomatic representative? If so, Williamson could sound out the Tibetan Government as to their attitude towards the establishment of a British equivalent; but he was not to commit the British Government to the implementation of this without further consultation. The British Government would prefer the continuation of the policy of occasional visits. If asked for British military support for Tibet, Williamson was to say that at present any attack from the Chinese side seemed unlikely. Support against some other Power would, again, call for further consultation with India and London. What Williamson could assure the Tibetans was that the British considered that Chinese "suzerainty", which they were prepared to admit in theory, in no way altered their view that Tibet was "an autonomous country in practice". The Government of India "were anxious to maintain their traditional friendship with the Tibetans and to continue to deal with them direct as in the past". The British were prepared "in so far as the merits of the case justified", to give the Tibetans their fullest diplomatic support in Nanking in any dispute with China. The Government of India Act of 1935, the Tibetans were to be assured, in no way affected the established pattern of Anglo-Tibetan relations. The British would not negotiate over Tibet with China without at least first informing the Tibetans. If there were to be some large scale Sino-Tibetan conference dealing with the wider issues of Tibet's status, the British would like to be represented. In all this, while there were to be expressions of good will, Williamson was to be careful not to make any specific commitments which might limit British freedom of action in the future. As in the case of previous British Missions to Lhasa from Bell onwards, the Chinese were not to be given prior notice.

Williamson reached Lhasa on 26 August 1935. He was accompanied by his wife; and his party included Captain R.K.M. Battye, Trade Agent at Gyantse, Norbu Dhondup, Captain J. Guthrie, I.M.S., and Dr. Bo Tsering as well a four clerks and no less than forty servants. As usual, the Mission put up at the Dekyi Lingka.[516]

Lhasa was, politically speaking, much changed since the previous Williamson Mission. Without the 13th Dalai Lama no official was prepared to take a firm grasp on policy, which had tended to pass increasingly into the hands of the Tsongdu (National Assembly) in which the monasteries were powerfully represented. There was no one individual of paramount importance. The real need now was to identify and then to persuade that elusive entity, Tibetan public opinion, of the value of the British connection. Trimon Shape was still its advocate; and he was probably the most influential Tibetan

politician, the Regent Reting being both young and somewhat timid. Tsarong was still "a man to watch"; but he was at present out of active politics. There were strongly pro-British soldiers like Jigme Taring and Yutok Depon; but their views might well not represent the army as a whole. There were now two Commanders in Chief of the Army, one of whom, Magtsi Tenpa (a monk) was probably not pro-British – he did not call on Williamson. The other Commander in Chief, Changra Magtsi, was a person of no influence.

The real political power in Tibet now lay with the monastic community. Nearly every Tibetan family had monks among its members. Many monks spent periods of up to five years at a time in monasteries in Chinese territory; and a number of important Tibetan monastic officials received regular stipends from the Chinese Government. Huang Mu-sung during his Lhasa mission was believed to have spent some 400,000 Chinese dollars of which about a quarter went to the major Tibetan monasteries, as opposed to individuals both lay and monastic. The attitude of the monastic body as a whole towards the Chinese was uncertain. China had monk enemies who remembered past Chinese attacks on religious establishments; but there were many Tibetan monks who for one reason or another looked favourably upon ties with China. Taking all this into consideration the Williamson report (which was actually written by Basil Gould after Williamson's death) ended on this note:

> it appears that at the time when the Mission was at Lhasa the sentimental and political scale was decidedly anti-Chinese. But it is a scale which is delicately poised. At present it is affected by the fidelity of all classes to the declared views of the late Dalai Lama. The majority of those who are now in authority favour the British connection. But they lack confidence.

The Williamson Mission concluded that Chiang Chi-yu (Tsiang) was not really a proper Chinese representative (or at least the Tibetans declared to the British Mission that they did not so regard him). The Tibetans did not in these circumstances favour the establishment of a permanent British representative in Lhasa.

While the 1935 Williamson Mission was at Lhasa the city was also visited by another party from the West, the American Suydam Cutting and his companion Arthur Vernay, who spent about ten days there.[517] This was the first time that an American had reached the Tibetan capital, the unattained goal in earlier years of the American diplomat W.W. Rockhill. Cutting, on this occasion accompanied by his wife, was back again in 1937.

The second Williamson Mission took place against a background of a fluctuating relationship between Lhasa and the Panchen Lama. When Williamson arrived, negotiations between the Panchen Lama's representatives and the Kashag which had been in progress through-

out the year had reached a stalemate. Most of the Panchen Lama's claims had been conceded. The Kashag had, however, refused to surrender to the Panchen Lama the control of certain key Dzongs (forts) in Tsang, including that at Shigatse, they had resolved not to restore any property which had not actually belonged personally to the 9th Panchen Lama, they had objected to Lhasa making any financial contribution towards the Panchen Lama's proposed personal army, and, above all, they had declined to accept the Panchen Lama's contention that he was independent of Lhasa.

The Panchen Lama had reacted to what he considered to be a diplomatic failure in two quite distinct ways. On the one hand, though in somewhat more forceful language, he had continued to seek British mediation. On the other hand, he had been examining the possibility that he might force his way home from Kumbum monastery near Sining in Ch'inghai with the aid of a military escort provided by the Chinese.

The idea of the Chinese escort had emerged by July 1935; and with time its implications gradually became clearer. What the Panchen Lama apparently now had in mind was that he would bring with him 300 Chinese troops, though, like everything else about him, his precise views were enigmatic. There would be Chinese troops, there would not be Chinese troops, if there were an escort it would consist merely of loyal followers. The Kashag wanted to know whether, if the Chinese escort were really coming, the British would despatch units of the Indian Army to Tibet to help oppose it. Williamson made it quite clear that "there was no possibility of active military support being provided by His Majesty's Government". He would, however, most strongly endorse any Tibetan request for diplomatic assistance with the Nanking Government. The Kashag at this stage seemed resolved to resist by force, with or without British help, any attempt by the Panchen Lama to cross the Tibetan frontier with a Chinese escort.

The various problems arising from this latest phase in the Panchen Lama saga had not yet been clarified in Williamson's mind when in late October or early November 1935 he became gravely ill. The Royal Air Force offered to try to fly him out to India for proper treatment, and a suitable landing ground near Lhasa was found by Captain Battye; but the Kashag declared that the Tibetan religious establishment objected on theological grounds to aircraft disturbing the spirits in the airspace over Tibetan soil.[518] They may also, of course, have been reluctant to create a precedent which could have been exploited by the Chinese: Huang Mu-sung had been an advocate of an air service linking Lhasa with Chengtu.[519] On 18 November 1935 Williamson died of chronic uraemia. Temporary leadership of the Mission was assumed by Captain Battye who had been acting during Williamsons's illness; but effectively the Mission

had now come to an end though under Battye it remained in Lhasa for a few weeks more.

The question of the Panchen Lama's escort, which had begun to emerge on the eve of the second Williamson Mission, continued to dominate British policy to the north of the Himalayas until the end of 1937. It is more than probable that the escort issue was encouraged by the Nanking Government in deliberate response to the Williamson Mission and as a demonstration of the new Chinese position in Outer Tibet. The fact that the proposed size of the escort remained, at least in the Anglo-Chinese diplomatic correspondence and discussion that arose, 300, is certainly significant. The Simla Convention had allowed the Chinese Resident in Lhasa to have an escort of up to 300 men. The British had ever since 1914 been quoting the Simla Convention to the Chinese. While the Kuomintang Government in Nanking refused to accept the Simla Convention as being of the slightest relevance to the present Tibetan situation because it was an invalid instrument, yet there could be no denying the fact that if the British insisted that it were valid they would find it harder to object to the figure of 300 than to anything larger. If it were to be agreed that the Chinese did have the right to have their man in Lhasa, then the British had committed themselves to allowing him an escort of 300; and who could say that the troops accompanying the Panchen Lama would not, once they reached Outer Tibet, become the Chinese Resident's escort?[520]

While Williamson was in Lhasa it became increasingly evident that the Panchen Lama's escort enjoyed official Chinese Government backing. In September 1935 one Ch'eng Yun, a member of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, had been appointed to accompany the Panchen Lama back to Tibet. By the middle of October the Lhasa authorities had no doubt that the escort of 300 Chinese soldiers including 10 officers would shortly be on its way; and once it had reached Shigatse with the Panchen Lama, there it would stay as a Chinese occupying force.[521] It would not be a friendly progress since the negotiations between Lhasa and the Panchen Lama had broken down (over two crucial points, that he should have sole command of all troops in the Province of Tsang and that his area of control should be made larger than it had been at the time of his flight from Tibet in 1923).[522] Williamson reported that the Lhasa Government were becoming really frightened. 300 men might not sound much; but it was suspected that the actual escort could be considerably larger. Who, after all, was going to count it? Moreover, once established in Shigatse the Chinese force could provide the nucleus for a Chinese military presence in Central Tibet which could be secretly augmented to a point where it could overwhelm the Tibetan army and take over the whole country.[523]

On the advice of the Government of India, the India Office agreed

that Tibet should receive full British diplomatic support when the escort passed into Tibetan territory; but there would be no British military assistance, not even the supply of additional ammunition – after all, there were only 300 men involved for the opposition of whom the Tibetan army had quite sufficient stores.[524] Sir Alexander Cadogan in Peking, accordingly, was instructed to "deprecate" the circumstances of the Panchen Lama's return if his escort were accompanied by Chinese officials, and also to protest at the possibility of the establishment of a permanent Chinese Mission in Lhasa.[525]

Cadogan had, in fact, already raised the matter with the Wai-chiao-pu as early as 11 November 1935 when he asked the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hsü Mo, whether the story of the Chinese escort for the Panchen Lama was true. He was told that it was. The fact, however, was that the Panchen Lama had requested a much larger force to convey him home; but, "in deference to representations made some months ago .. [during the Huang mission?] .. by Thibetan Government, had decided to reduce it to 300". Cadogan tried to argue that the escort, whatever its size, was a violation of Article 3 of the Simla Convention of 1914.[526] The Vice Minister did not comment on the question of the validity of the Simla Convention; but he did say that the escort was purely ceremonial and constituted no military aggression upon the part of China.[527] Soon after this encounter, the Foreign Minister, Chang Ch'un, told Cadogan that the Simla Convention was not valid because it was never signed by China. In any case, the 300 men were not troops but bodyguards. Article 3 did not apply; but, there was the clear implication, Article 4 relating to the "high official's" escort might, had the Convention any legal force, which, of course, it did not. Moreover, the whole question of the Panchen Lama's escort had already been agreed some time ago by the Tibetan Government when the Huang Mu-sung mission was in Lhasa.[528] A few days later the Wai-chiao-pu had come up with yet another argument. The escort was not really even that: reports of it related to "gendarmes" for service in Ch'inghai Province.[529]

On 4 January 1936 following instructions from London Cadogan handed over to Hsü Mo a formal protest against the Panchen Lama's escort. The main point was that, whatever Huang Mu-sung may have said the Tibetans had agreed to, the Lhasa Government was now objecting to the escorts. In any case, the Panchen Lama as a religious figure did not need this kind of protection; and, if he did, why could it not be provided by the Tibetans themselves instead of the Chinese?[530] On the same day the Kashag telegraphed Nanking to confirm that they would not allow the proposed escort to cross into Tibetan territory. They denied that they had agreed to anything on this subject with Huang Mu-sung.[531]

The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, began to think that all this fuss was overreaction. The Chinese replies on the whole had

been "conciliatory" even if "superficial"; but clearly because of Indian anxieties the British Embassy would have to go on making representations to the Wai-chiao-pu about the escort question.[532] Cadogan, accordingly, raised the matter again with the Chinese on a number of occasions in February 1936. The Chinese continued to deny that the Tibetans had objected to the escort and it was becoming ever more embarrassing for the British side to have to appear to be acting as spokesmen for the Tibetans, the very impression which since the formulation of the Lampson doctrine they had wished to avoid creating. The British Embassy were increasingly convinced that only by mediation through the Government of India in Tibet could the quarrel between Lhasa and the Panchen Lama ever be solved. What ought to happen was something along these lines. The Lhasa Government should ask the Political Officer in Sikkim to mediate. He would then write to the Panchen Lama setting out the appropriate terms and conditions for his return to Tibet. This procedure would probably not arouse much Chinese interest; and if it did, the British Embassy, not being directly involved, would find it easy to explain what was going on in a satisfactory way to the Wai-chiao-pu.[533] The Government of India and the India Office accepted this suggestion which was incorporated in the agenda of the forthcoming Gould Mission to Lhasa designed to carry on where Williamson had tragically left off.[534]

In April 1936, inspired by Olaf Caroe, the Government of India drew up a revision of Caroe's proposals of June 1935 concerning policy towards Tibet.[535] Underlying it was the conviction that there existed a serious Communist menace lurking in the depths of Central Asia. There was the situation in Sinkiang where not only was the dominant military figure, Sheng Shih-t'sai, closely allied to the Soviets, but also whence the man with whom he had not so long ago clashed violently, the Moslem Chinese (Tungan) leader Ma Chung-ying, had fled to Russia and possibly now was also prepared to work in the Soviet interest. Such was the impression conveyed in Peter Fleming's extremely popular *News from Tartary* which was published during the course of 1936; and there was nothing in his book which conflicted with intelligence already available to the Government of India. At the same time, in 1935 and 1936, Chinese Communist forces, one branch of the famous Long March, had penetrated into Sikang and Ch'inghai from Yunnan and Szechuan.

Communist columns under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Chu Teh marched deep into Sikang where they managed during the first months of 1936 to cut the main Tachienlu-Batang route, capture Litang and push as far north as Rongbatsa and parts of Derge with advance patrols even approaching the perimeter of Jyekundo where they were held off by the forces of Ma Pu-fang.[536] By the middle of August 1936 the Communist threat appeared to have gone,

the thrust of the advance having been diverted from the direction of Ch'inghai and Kansu towards Shensi. While it lasted, however, this facet of the Long March caused considerable anxiety in the India Office in London where it was seen as a potential threat not only to Tibet but also to northern Burma.[537] It certainly disturbed Olaf Caroe and coloured his thinking about what should now be the British attitude towards the problems of Tibet. It also much alarmed the Tibetans. Reports of the behaviour of Chinese Communist troops in Eastern Tibet had not indicated any benevolence towards either the workings of the Tibetan Buddhist theocracy or the social and political position of the Tibetan aristocracy.

The necessity for British India to "preserve an autonomous and friendly Tibetan Government" which could resist aggression from all potential foes, Chinese, Russian and Japanese, was more evident than ever. The return of the Panchen Lama was important, but only if achieved peacefully. Caroe thought that there was a possible way round the escort question which was worth examining.The Chinese could escort the Panchen Lama to the Tibetan border whence he could go on to Tashilunpo with an escort provided by the Tibetan Government, perhaps under British supervision. In order to bring this about Norbu Dhondup should go up to Lhasa as soon as possible both to convince the Regent and Kashag that the British Embassy in Peking were still trying to influence the Nanking Government and to arrange, subject to Tibetan agreement, the delivery of a personal letter to the Panchen Lama from Gould (of which Caroe prepared a draft) in which he would be told that the Tibetan Government had sent troops to escort him home from the border. It would be pointed out that the few remaining differences between the Panchen Lama and Lhasa could be settled after he returned. The Panchen Lama had repeatedly requested mediation either from the British or the Chinese. Since, the Caroe-drafted Gould letter declared,

> the Tibetan Government do not desire that any Chinese should come into Tibet there is no question of a Chinese mediator. I . . [Basil Gould] . . therefore especially visited Delhi to consult my Government, and I am glad to inform you that owing to our friendly relations my Government are prepared to give me full power to act and sign as guarantor or mediator between the Tibetan Government and Your Serenity. . . . I am one of the few remaining who met Your Serenity in days which are now long past. I give you this pledge of my friendship and sincerity. If you desire it I will gladly come to meet you at any place within Tibet which you may appoint and I will myself conduct you to your Palace.[538]

This letter opened up a whole new Tibetan policy. As Caroe admitted in a masterly understatement, it involved "our taking a considerably more active part" in the Panchen Lama-Lhasa Government negotiations than had been contemplated hitherto. Gould

would have to get into direct touch with the Panchen Lama, which meant that he would probably have to travel right through Tibet to the Ch'inghai border. He would have to offer firm guarantees on behalf of the Government of India which, should Lhasa turn against the Panchen Lama, might mean something very like British military action against the Lhasa Government on behalf of the Panchen Lama, whatever the officially announced British reservations on this point may have been. Caroe thought that economic concessions to Lhasa and further military training for the Tibetan army by the British would probably ensure that the Regent and the Kashag behaved themselves. Still, there could be no denying that there were risks; but Caroe argued these were extremely remote because of the existence of other non-military levers which could be used to exert pressure to the north of the Himalayas. The Panchen Lama could be kept in line by being told that if he misbehaved in this new dispensation and once more found himself threatened by Lhasa he would hardly be able to repeat his flight across the breadth or length of Lhasa controlled territory to China. He would have to go for the nearest border, which was with British India; and in these particular circumstances the Government of India would refuse him asylum and hand him back him to the tender mercies of Lhasa. On the other hand, if Lhasa tried any tricks against the Panchen Lama, the British could simply withdraw their diplomatic support in China as well as cut off their supply of arms and ammunition. The new approach depended, of course, following Norbu Dhondup's reconnaissance, upon Gould visiting Lhasa in the near future.

Caroe's letter was extremely cunning. Using the language of the Tibetan question as it had been expressed over the last few years, he yet set out a blueprint for what could evolve into a deep British penetration, military as well as political, far to the north of the Himalayas. For example, if Gould had to go all the way to the Sikang or Ch'inghai border to meet the Panchen Lama and then, in the face of hostile Tibetan forces loyal to Lhasa, he had to bring him right across Tibet to Tashilhunpo, the result could only be something rather like another Younghusband Expedition, and one with a vastly extended line of communication. Or again, if Gould at the frontier met a Chinese escort which insisted on remaining with the Panchen Lama all the way to his Tibetan home, then the possibility of an Anglo-Chinese armed clash could not be ruled out, with the consequent direct British military support of the regime in Lhasa. Finally, if all the parties, Chinese, Tibetan and British, decided to sit down and start talking on or near the Ch'inghai-Tibet border, then the result could well evolve into something along the lines of the old tripartite Simla Conference held in more or less the region that Teichman had advocated in 1918.[539] The last, in Caroe's view, would be the preferred outcome.

Most of these implications of Caroe's letter of 13 April 1936 did not escape the notice of British diplomats in China who sought to eliminate the least desirable features. R.G. Howe, then in charge of the Embassy in Peking, while he accepted some of Caroe's ideas in principle, urged that care be taken to ensure that every British proposal or action could be represented as having originated from a Tibetan initiative. The Tibetans would have to invite mediation by Gould with the Panchen Lama, following the Panchen Lama's request that Gould mediate with Lhasa. The Regent and the Kashag should be the ones to object to the Chinese escort. Any letter from Gould to the Panchen Lama should merely embody, and expressly so, terms already set out in letters from both the Lhasa Government and the Panchen Lama to Gould. If things went wrong, no party should be in any position to blame the British who would be no more than honest brokers. In these circumstances, Howe thought, the proposed Gould mediation could just possibly be presented in a manner acceptable to the Wai-chiao-pu. Chinese public opinion, preoccupied as it was with the Japanese, was unlikely at this juncture to be as sensitive about Tibet as it had hitherto been.[540] On this basis the British Embassy agreed to act as a channel of communication with Nanking for a Tibetan letter protesting against the proposed escort.[541]

Norbu Dhondup soon discovered that there were difficulties in obtaining the co-operation of Lhasa for this particular plan. Tibet was still in a state of panic following the passage of that fragment of the Long March to which reference has been made above; and no one in authority was prepared to take responsibility for any decisions. In any case, the Lhasa Government no longer appeared to want British mediation in any form. Attitudes towards the Panchen Lama had abruptly hardened. The Panchen Lama had sent, in anticipation of his return in the near future, large quantities of baggage from Ch'inghai towards Tashilhunpo which the Lhasa authorities had intercepted at Nagchuka, the frontier post on the road leading north from the Tibetan capital. Among other things, the convoy was carrying, so Norbu Dhondup was told, a "large" number of rifles along with ammunition and hand grenades. In Lhasa this was interpreted as evidence that the Panchen Lama really intended to impose his will by force on the Regent and Kashag, who were still governing in the total absence of a 14th Dalai Lama (for whom the search had indeed started, but without result so far) and were very conscious of their vulnerability and lack of authority. Not only did they now refuse to consider mediation but they wished the British to transmit to Nanking a protest against this alleged secret arming of the Panchen Lama's faction.[542]

The crisis of the Panchen Lama's baggage was short lived, and the Chinese Communist scare soon passed. Meanwhile, the Panchen

Lama question now began to drift away, so to speak, from many of the other objectives of the Gould Mission; and it is convenient to follow it through to its conclusion before considering what the British did in Lhasa in 1936.

By September 1936 the Lhasa Government once more began to think seriously about British mediation. The Nanking Government, however, far from being so distracted by the Japanese that Tibet was ignored, showed themselves to be as sensitive as ever to anything that in the least tended to challenge their claims over Tibet. When finally the Kashag did produce a letter of protest against the Panchen Lama's escort, the new British Ambassador in China, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, discovered that the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nanking, Hsü Mo (who was by now very experienced in fending off British attempts to involve themselves in Tibetan affairs), was not prepared to hand it on to the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission. Hsü Mo pointed out that the Panchen Lama needed an escort for his own protection from his enemies in Tibet: it would not be right for China to put the Panchen Lama, a good friend, at avoidable risk.[543] Three days later Hsü Mo, relenting a little (no doubt because it was foolish to alienate the British in the face of the Japanese threat), told Knatchbull-Hugessen that if a member of the British Embassy were to tell the Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission that "by chance" he had obtained a copy of a letter from the Tibetan Government on the question of the Panchen Lama's escort, then the Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission would "probably", indeed "most probably", agree to have a look at it.[544] This was not what the British Embassy understood by "mediation"; and the indirect approach was promptly abandoned.

Official opinion in Lhasa now once more began to lean towards letting the Panchen Lama have his way. In late 1935 and early 1936 there been much talk by members of the Tibetan Government about their intention to resist the passage of the Chinese escort should it cross into Tibetan controlled territory; but by November 1936, so Gould discovered, the Regent Reting had informed the Chinese that the escort would not, in fact, be opposed. When the Panchen Lama finally turned up on the Tibetan frontier he could probably march on into the heart of Tibet along with his 300 Chinese guards without the slightest difficulty.[545] If this escorted promenade were to be stopped, the British would have to do more than offer mediation.

The problems posed by the Panchen Lama's return were thrashed out at the India Office in the second week of November 1936. Algernon Rumbold of the Political Department proposed that a more formal note be presented to the Nanking Government in which it was stressed that there was a real need to settle the problem of the relations between China and Tibet, get the Panchen Lama back home

where he belonged, and, as a *quid pro quo*, retain British friendship for China in the face of the growing threat from Japan.[546] After discussion with J.C. Walton, a note was drafted which the Foreign Secretary, Eden, found satisfactory.[547] It contained two main demands. First: the Chinese Government should declare themselves ready to receive formally the Lhasa letter of protest concerning the Chinese escort. Second: the Chinese should agree to hand the Panchen Lama over to an escort provided by the Tibetan Government at some point on the effective Sino-Tibetan border beyond which the Chinese guards would not go. The note, along with the original Tibetan letter of protest, was sent off to Hsü Mo on 12 December 1936.[548]

Even if the Chinese should fail to respond to this note, the Foreign Office were still anxious that the Tibetans should not oppose the Chinese escort if it ever did cross the Tibetan border. War in Tibet ought to be avoided at all costs. Gould was accordingly instructed to tell the Regent and Kashag to exercise restraint. The Regent and Kashag were saying publicly that they would resist the escort with all their might, while Gould knew perfectly well that they had no such intention, not least because the Regent Reting was in receipt of funds from Mongolia and China which he would never put at risk. On the other hand, Gould could not be seen to advise the Tibetans to let the escort advance unopposed. For one thing, the Chinese would hear of it and the British bargaining hand in Nanking would become even weaker than it already was. Eventually Gould was told to let the Tibetan Government know that the British did not of necessity *favour* armed resistance; but how he expressed this was left to his discretion.[549] In other words, he could be so oblique as to be quite incomprehensible.

As had been the case with his predecessors, the Tibetan question soon began irritate Knatchbull-Hugessen. It was pointless acting as middleman in the transmission of sham protests. As he put it:

> I have uneasy feeling that we are being made dupes of Tibetan Government or a clique of the Government in this matter since there can be little doubt that the Chinese would be less persistent in their proposal to send an escort into Tibet unless they had received some assurance that it would not be opposed.

Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen did not really believe that China in its present state would actually run the risk of an armed conflict over Tibet. There was a large element of bluff in its attitude to the Panchen Lama's escort which could be called easily enough. The real threat would be if Liu Wen-hui from his Sikang base took a hand, for he probably did possess the strength to bring the Panchen Lama right through Tibet against the whole might of the Tibetan army; and he would not be influenced by diplomatic considerations which still

carried some weight in Nanking. Liu Wen-hui, however, had not so far involved himself and was unlikely to do so – he had other priorities.[550]

Knatchbull-Hugessen was more concerned about being "double crossed" by the Lhasa Government, who were apparently playing off the British against the Chinese for their own convoluted purposes, than he was about any problems of Indian security. If the Peking Embassy were to make any further approaches to the Wai-chiao-pu, Knatchbull-Hugessen insisted that there must be a clear statement in writing from Lhasa to the effect that the Tibetan Government intended to resist by military force the entry of the Panchen Lama with Chinese escort, that they had already protested to Nanking against the provision of the escort, and, finally, that they genuinely wished the British to make representations on their behalf to the Chinese Government. With such a letter to hand, including a properly signed and sealed Tibetan text, Knatchbull-Hugessen thought he would have "something substantial on which to base further representations to the Waichiaopu". The letter ought also to state that Lhasa was opposed to the Panchen Lama's return "until all outstanding differences between China and Tibet have been settled".[551]

By the end of March 1937 the Panchen Lama was reported to have left Kumbum and arrived at Jyekundo, just on the Chinese side of the Ch'inghai border where he was ready to set out for home with his escort.[552] In April the Chinese press was noting that Liu Wen-hui had decided that it was indeed right and proper that the Panchen Lama should be back in Tibet and had sent his own representative to Jyekundo to discuss plans. It looked as if Knatchbull-Hugessen might have been unduly sanguine about the lack of risk from Sikang.[553] Meanwhile the Kashag had produced a letter phrased exactly as Knatchbull-Hugessen had suggested, which was duly delivered to the Wai-chiao-pu at the very end of May.[554]

Throughout May, Lhasa representatives had been talking with the Panchen Lama's supporters at Dengko, on the upper Yangtze on the Tibetan side of the Ch'inghai border not far from Jyekundo, where they had been presented with a new formula by the Panchen Lama. It was now suggested that the Chinese Government should give both the Kashag and the British a firm undertaking that the Chinese escort, as soon as it had seen the Panchen Lama safely to Shigatse, would return at once to Chinese territory; and on this basis the Tibetan army would offer no opposition.[555]

Knatchbull-Hugessen thought it unlikely that the Chinese would accept such a compromise involving a specific acceptance of some limitation upon Chinese rights in Tibet; and his interview with Hsü Mo on 24 June gave him no grounds whatsoever to change his mind.[556] The Vice Minister merely repeated all the old arguments in support of the escort.[557] At the same time there were ever more

reports that the Panchen Lama and his escort were about to set out from Jyekundo some time in July or August.[558]

On 21 July 1937 Norbu Dhondup learnt from his Tibetan contacts that the Panchen Lama had now come up with some fresh proposals. He insisted on the Chinese escort, but promised that it would in due course return to China from Tibet by way of India. In return, he demanded that every Lhasa official be withdrawn from Shigatse. He proposed to visit Lhasa to discuss with the Kashag all the outstanding problems which had resulted in his flight from Tibet in 1923 and had since arisen. The Kashag and the Tsongdu accepted the first two stipulations. They wished, however, that the negotiations with the Panchen Lama take place somewhere in Kham (perhaps at Dengko where talks were already in progress) rather than in Lhasa.[559] In August, however, the Lhasa side had second thoughts. There could be no final settlement of disputes with the Panchen Lama, even in Kham, without a British representative being present. Moreover, it should be clearly established that the escort would go directly to Shigatse by way of Nagchuka and on no account pass through Lhasa.[560]

The Panchen Lama was reported in early September to have decided to disregard this alteration in conditions and to have set out for Lhasa. The Trapchi Regiment in Lhasa was being mobilised to resist the Chinese escort if it were really on its way. Lhasa would welcome the Panchen Lama unconditionally if he came without escort: otherwise he would be opposed by Tibetan troops. It soon transpired, however, that the Panchen Lama was not in fact on his way to Tibet at all but, rather, had removed himself to a fairly remote monastery in the Jyekundo region (Lungshogon or, according to Richardson, Rashi Gompa) where Lhasa representatives had gone to see him.[561] As a result of further talks, and on the insistence of the three great Lhasa monasteries of Sera, Ganden and Drepung, it was now agreed that he could come into Lhasa controlled territory with his escort provided that the party went straight to Shigatse and the escort did not remain in Tibet for more than five months before going back to China.[562]

No sooner had this new arrangement been arrived at than, Norbu Dhondup reported, the Chinese advisers to the Panchen Lama were wondering whether the Panchen Lama should return at all. What seemed to have happened was that the full scale Japanese attack on China, which had commenced in July, was at last beginning to have its impact on what was after all a fairly peripheral aspect of Chinese foreign policy. Rather than risk alienating the British, the Nanking Government had more or less decided to abandon their support for the Panchen Lama, who now had no option but either to turn to the British or to start dealing with Lhasa without the Chinese ace in his hand. The Government of India thought that now was the ideal

moment for direct Lhasa-Panchen Lama negotiations; but the Panchen Lama evidently concluded that, rather than compromise his future prospects, it would be better to abandon for the time being his hopes for a return to Tibet. He resolved to move from Jyekundo to Kantze, perhaps as the first stage of a return to Inner Mongolia or a transfer of his headquarters to somewhere like Tachienlu. The Wai-chiao-pu, on 18 October 1937, informed Howe in Nanking that the Panchen Lama's escort would not be entering Tibet for the present.[563]

Apparently the Panchen Lama was now starting to think once more about opening direct relations with the Government of India. The view in Lhasa was that if the Panchen Lama did not move quickly he would become the tool of Liu Wen-hui and find himself escorted not by the 300 men so far proposed but the full might of an army from Sikang and Szechuan.[564] Hugh Richardson, Gould's Additional Assistant, suggested that the time might again be ripe to offer the Panchen Lama asylum in India: the Government of India, however, thought otherwise.

In fact, the Panchen Lama could not quite bring himself to leave the Jyekundo region for Kantze or anywhere else; and there he died on 30 November 1937. Tibet now had neither a Dalai Lama nor a Panchen Lama.[565] It was a theocracy without its two great theocrats; and until at least a new Dalai Lama was installed it was in deep theological, and hence political, trouble.

453. Frederick Williamson was born in 1891 and joined the ICS in 1914. After War service in the Middle East, he returned to India where he joined the Indian Political Service in 1922. From 1924 to 1926 he was in charge of the Yatung and Gyantse Trade Agencies, which were then combined. For a while in 1926-27 he was in acting charge of the Gangtok Residency. From 1927 to 1930 he was Consul-General at Kashgar, and in 1931 he was Acting Political Officer in Sikkim in Weir's absence. In 1932 he visited Western Tibet in connection with the Tehri-Garhwal boundary dispute. Finally, on 4 January 1933 he took over from Weir as Political Officer in Sikkim, a position he occupied until his death in Lhasa on 18 November 1935. His wife has recently, with the assistance of John Snelling, published her account of the Williamsons' experiences in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet, a book which contains a great deal of extremely interesting material. See: Margaret D. Williamson, *Memoirs of a Political Officer's Wife in Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan*, London 1987. I am greatly indebted to John Snelling for giving me a copy of this fascinating book. See also: K. Mason, "In Memoriam. Frederick Williamson 1891-1935", *Himalayan Journal*, VIII, 1936.

454. L/P&S/12/4169, Williamson to India, 22 February 1933.

455. L/P&S/12/4169, India to Williamson, 1 March 1933.

456. Tsa Serkang may already have been in Tibet.

457. L/P&S/12/4174, Williamson to India, 20 April 1933.

458. The Panchen Lama left Nanking on 7 February 1933 and was back in Inner Mongolia by March.

459. L/P&S/12/4175, Williamson to India, 16 March 1933.

460. See, for an account of Williamson's Bhutanese tour: P. Collister, *Bhutan and the British*, London 1987, pp. 186-189

For the report of Williamson's 1933 Lhasa Mission, see: L/P&S/12/4175, Williamson to India, 6 January 1934.

The Bhutanese trip is described in some detail in: M. Williamson, *Memoirs, op. cit.*, pp. 61-80.

461. He was later to be of great help to the American traveller Suydam Cutting.

462. There were rumours that the 13th Dalai Lama had been murdered. Tsa Serkang, for example, one of the more important of the Panchen Lama's supporters, told Gould in February 1936 that just before the 13th Dalai Lama met his end the dispute between the two Incarnations had to all intents and purposes been resolved. It was the Dalai Lama's modified attitude towards the Panchen Lama, Tsa Serkang said, which resulted in the Dalai Lama being murdered by some person or persons with a vested interest in keeping the dispute alive. See: L/P&S/12/4186b, Gould to India, 17 February 1936.

463. Taring, *Daughter of Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 116, describes the process in detail.

464. In late 1937 Kunphel La fled from his place of exile and in January 1938 he turned up in Kalimpong as a refugee. The Tibetan Government sought his extradition; but the British refused on the grounds that there did not exist any Anglo-Tibetan extradition agreement.

Another victim of the Tibetan political turmoil of this period, Changlo Chen, of Kung (Duke) status but degraded in 1925, an ally of Lungshar after the 13th Dalai Lama's death, also arrived in Kalimpong in the company of Kunphel La.

465. There were the inevitable rumours that Tsarong attempted a coup following the Dalai Lama's death; but there is no evidence whatsoever in the British sources to support them. See: Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 165; Patterson, *Tibet in Revolt, op. cit.*, p. 52. According to Li, Tsarong failed to gain the support of any of the great Lhasa monasteries. Li portrays Tsarong as the leading figure in a "Young Tibet Party". Li's account is refuted by Richardson in: *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 137. Richardson says that the idea of a "Young Tibet Party" existed only "in the imagination and published works of Chinese writers".

466. There is some rather oblique evidence that Williamson was not unsympathetic to this approach; and there can be no doubt that Lungshar's ideas might have resulted in a more decisive Tibetan Government than in fact was going to emerge from the traditional methods. Whether there had been private discussions between Lungshar and Williamson is not entirely clear; but they certainly corresponded with each other and there is an intriguing India Office minute of 31 May 1934 which expresses the hope that the Lungshar-Williamson correspondence does not "get to the ears of the PM & Cabinet. These personal contacts have their special dangers just now". See: L/P&S/12/4178, IO minute, 31 May 1934; Williamson to India, 27 April 1934, where Williamson refers to letters from Lungshar seeking weapons (30 rifles, a Lewis gun and 31,000 rounds of ammunition). Williamson's reported reply, which was to get Norbu Dhondup to explain to Lungshar that the Government of India could not supply arms to a private individual, may not represent the totality of his response.

467. Taring, *Daughter of Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 115-118; Shakabpa, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 275-276. The two accounts, while differing in minor details, are in general agreement. Taring seems to me to be more reliable than Shakabpa. See also the admirable account in: M. Williamson, *Memoirs, op. cit*, pp. 133-135.

Lungshar was let out of prison in 1938. His son, Lhalu (adopted into the great noble Lhalu family) later occupied high office on the eve of the Chinese "liberation".

See also: L/P&S/12/4178, Williamson to India, 26 May 1934, and Williamson to India, 28 May 1934, transmitting Norbu Dhondup's version of these events. Norbhu Dhondup was in Lhasa at the time.

Lungshar's fall was reported in *The Times* of 7 June 1934.

468. At first Pangda Topgye defeated a number of Tibetan detachments and others deserted to him. He managed to take from the Tibetans 173 of the older Lee-Enfields and 65 of the new "short" model, the SMLE, of which 4,000 were supplied during 1933. Eventually, however, his project failed and he was obliged to withdraw to the family base at Po near Batang on the Chinese side of the border. See: L/P&S/12/2175, Kashag to Richardson, 20 March 1939; Shakabpa, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 277.

The activities of the Pangdatsang are not easy to work out in detail for this period. Pangda Topgye held a high administrative position at Markham Gartok when he rebelled. By 1939 he had apparently changed allegiance from Liu Wen-hui to Lhasa; and as the price of reconciliation he was ordered to make good the loss of Tibetan weapons for which he had been responsible in 1934.

As a result of the rebellion, members of the Pangda family in Lhasa were for a while arrested and their trading activities stopped. Pangdatsang, however, soon returned to favour. It has been suggested that one reason for Pangda Topgye's action was the fall of Kunphel La, with whom the Pangda family had been close. See: L/P&S/12/4182, Williamson to India, 4 April 1934; Williamson to India, 12 April 1934.

The Tibetans claimed that not only had Pangda Topgye taken the rifles but also three mountain guns; and they asked Williamson to hand over Pangda Topgye to them should he seek refuge in India, a request which Williamson refused. The Kashag also sought to take out a lien on the Pangdatsang assets in Kalimpong. Williamson told them through Norbu Dhondup that if they had claims on any property in British territory they could always have recourse to the British Indian courts. See: L/P&S/12/4182, Williamson to India, 14 July 1934. Subsequent investigation of the weapons at the disposal of the Tibetans did not disclose the loss of three 2.75 inch guns.

There is a great deal concerning the history of the three Pangda brothers, Yangpel (or Pangdatsang, the head of the family), Rapga and Topgye, in the various writings of G.N. Patterson. Patterson knew Topgye and Rapga during the course of 1949-1950, when he and Geoffrey Bull stayed at the Pangda family stronghold of Po (or Poteu) to the south-east of Batang. Topgye was the military leader while Rapga provided the political theory. According to Patterson the Pangda brothers where what might be described as Khampa nationalists. They revered the Dalai Lama as a spiritual figure but they repudiated the right of Lhasa to rule in Eastern Tibet which they hoped, possibly in alliance with Tibetans in Amdo (Ch'inghai), to turn into a state in its own right. They were prepared to collaborate with both Liu Wen-hui and Chiang Kai-shek when it suited them; but they were not in any sense pro-Chinese.

469. Bell was accompanied by Lt.-Colonel Harnett. Shigatse, in the absence of the Panchen Lama, "was like a city of the dead". The Panchen Lama's Chief Secretary told Bell that "the Dalai Lama passed to the Honourable Field last year, and the Pan-chen Lama is still in China. Neither of the two Great Religious Supports is

with us. Tibet is in black darkness". See: Sir C. Bell, *Portrait of the Dalai Lama*, London 1946, pp. 364-365.

470. The intention of the Nanking Government to send a High Commission to Lhasa was announced in *The Times* on 28 December 1933.

471. For Huang Mu-sung's Sinkiang mission, see: A.W. Forbes, *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia. A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949*, Cambridge 1986, p. 110. The object of Huang Mu-sung's mission to Sinkiang, as "Pacification Commissioner", was to arrange a peace between the Sinkiang Provincial Government and Ma Chung-ying. In this Huang Mu-sung failed; and, according to Forbes, his intervention precipitated the turning of the Sinkiang warlord Sheng Shih-t'sai towards the Soviets for help.
See also: Peter Fleming, *News from Tartary*, London 1936, p.250; Sir E. Teichman, *Journey to Turkistan*, London 1937, pp.23-24; Aitchen K. Wu, *Turkistan Tumult*, London 1940, pp. 170-189.
For Huang Mu-sung's appointment to the Tibet mission, see: L/P&S/12/4177, Ingram to FO, 18 January 1934. Huang Mu-sung's Mandate was signed by Lin Sen, Chairman of the National Government, and Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan.

472. L/P&S/12/4177, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 19 February 1934.

473. L/P&S/12/4177, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 26 January 1934.

474. There is an extensive correspondence on the wireless question in: L/P&S/12/4127.
The Chinese made no secret from the outset of their intention to bring in a set with their Mission. (Ingram to FO, 25 January 1934).
Williamson wanted to prevent the Chinese from bringing in this equipment on the grounds that, if Tibet needed wireless it ought to get it from the Government of India. (Williamson to India, 3 March 1934).
It then transpired that the Chinese had offered the 13th Dalai Lama a wireless installation shortly before his death, which the Dalai Lama had accepted on the grounds that it was a religious gift which he could not refuse. (Viceroy to Secretary of State, 19 June 1934).
The import of wireless sets, not surprisingly, was not prohibited in the 1914 Trade Regulations. (Viceroy to Secretary of State, 28 June 1934).
In the end the wireless travelled with the main party of the Mission overland, so the Indian Government were deprived of the opportunity of somehow accidentally causing it to be dropped at Calcutta or Kalimpong.

475. L/P&S/12/4177, Cadogan to FO, 4 April 1934; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 28 June 1934.

476. L/P&S/12/4177, Cadogan to FO, 10 March 1934.

477. According to Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 166-167.

478. L/P&S/12/4177, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 13 June 1934.

479. Not 25 April as stated by Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 168. See also: M. Williamson, *Memoirs, op. cit.*, p. 166.

480. L/P&S/12/4177, Williamson to India, 28 August 1934.

481. M. Williamson, *Memoirs, op. cit.*, pp.160-166, describes the Shigatse visit which took place in early July. See also: L/P&S/12/4184, which contains Williamson's report.

482. L/P&S/12/4177, Williamson to India, 25 July 1934. It is not clear how long this exclusive telephone service had been in operation.

483. It was not unknown, it should be said, for British visitors to Tibet both official and unofficial to go out and shoot the occasional bird or beast, and not always "just for the pot".

484. L/P&S/12/4177, Williamson to India, 18 December 1934.

485. Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 169-170.

486. Li, *ibid*, p. 171.

487. L/P&S/12/4177, Williamson to India, 22 November 1934.

488. Richardson, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 142-143.

489. Richardson wrote that Li's account of the Tibetan proposals (no doubt derived from the records of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission) varied "a good deal in detail from the information on the proceedings obtained from Tibetan sources by the present writer . . [Richardson] . ., some twelve years before the publication of Li's book" (i.e. 1944 or 1945). In fact, it was quite consistent with the kind of information reaching Williamson in 1934 by way of Norbu Dhondup in Lhasa. It is interesting that Richardson elsewhere reproduced a set of Tibetan propositions which was clearly but a version of that quoted by Li. This, he said, was the result of much discussion by both the Kashag and the Tsongdu. The Richardson version differs from that of Li basically in that it contains forms of wording which could well have been designed to be pleasing to the British ear. See: Richardson, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 142.

See also: H.E. Richardson, *Tibetan Précis*, Calcutta 1945, pp. 51-52. This is a detailed summary of British relations with Tibet up to the end of World War II, designed to provide a factual basis for the determination of subsequent British policy towards Tibet on the eve of the British departure from India. It contains a mass of information based upon the records of the Government of India. Many of the papers referred to and capable of identification were never sent back to the India Office. There are gaps in the files preserved in the India Office Library and Records in London which can only be filled by means of a judicious use of *Tibetan Précis*.

Richardson's version of the alleged Tibetan proposals, or counter-proposals to those advanced by Wu Min-yuan, which are quoted in *Tibet Précis* upon which Richardson based much of his book published in 1962, are in fact derived directly from Norbu Dhondup's report of 1934 outlined in: L/P&S/12/4177, Williamson to India, 22 November 1934; and they add nothing new to it.

490. Chiang, or William Tsiang, was one of the Chinese officials who had gone up to Lhasa by way of Calcutta and Sikkim to form the advance party. The Williamsons met him in Lhasa in 1935 and disliked him intensely.

491. L/P&S/12/4177, Williamson to India, 18 December 1934.

492. Where he took over in March 1935 from Shih Ch'ing-yan, the Mr. Shih who had negotiated with Jordan in Peking in 1919 and who had once been Chinese Trade Agent in Gyantse.

493. L/P&S/12/4177, minute by J.C. Walton, 12 February 1934.
Walton was Secretary of the Political Department from 1930 to 1936.

494. L/P&S/12/4177, Williamson to India, 5 April 1935.

495. This appointment seems to have dated from December 1932, and not 1935 as stated by Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p 173.

496. L/P&S/12/4181, Ingram to FO, 24 January 1934.

497. L/P&S/12/4181, Williamson to India, 8 January 1934. This list of demands agrees substantially with that derived later from other sources.

498. A further mission from the Panchen Lama was in Lhasa in early 1934, where it was joined in November by Ngachen Rimpoche and Trungyik Chempo.

499. L/P&S/12/4181, Cadogan to FO, 10 March 1934; memos. by Teichman of 11 January 1934 and 8 March 1934.

500. *The Times*, 7 June 1934.

501. L/P&S/12/4181, Cadogan to FO, 12 July 1934; FO to Cadogan, 27 July 1934.

502. L/P&S/12/4181, Teichman, 3 August 1934.

503. L/P&S/12/4181, Williamson to India, 4 August 1934. Williamson had heard that, in view of the large size of the Panchen Lama's party, the probability was that he would opt for the overland route.

504. L/P&S/12/4181, Cadogan to FO, 27 July 1934. Cadogan thought that a signed photograph of the King was the most appropriate reply to the Panchen Lama's gifts. In September 1936 the Panchen Lama received yet another signed Royal Photograph, this time of Edward VIII.

505. L/P&S/12/4181, Panchen Lama to Williamson, 9 August 1934.

506. L/P&S/12/4181, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 20 March 1935.

507. L/P&S/12/4181, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 20 March 1935; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 11 April 1935.

508. L/P&S/12/4181, Teichman, 26 February 1935.

509. L/P&S/12/4181, Cadogan to FO, 22 May 1935.

510. L/P&S/12/4181, Teichman, 20 April 1935.

511. Olaf Caroe was born in 1892. After Winchester and Magdalen College, Oxford, he joined the Indian Civil Service in 1919. From 1934 to 1937 he was Deputy Secretary to the Indian Foreign and Political Department, and from 1939 to 1945 he headed that Department as Foreign Secretary. He died in 1981.

512. L/P&S/12/4175, Foreign Secretary, India, to Secretary of State, 28 June 1935. It is probably indicative of Caroe's influence that he, not Metcalfe, signed this document.

513. L/P&S/12/4181, Secretary of State to India, 17 August 1935.

514. L/P&S/12/4175, Cadogan to FO, 12 August 1935.

515. Williamson's instructions and the report of his Mission are to be found in: L/P&S/12/4175, Gould to India, 18 February 1936.

516. Williamson did not survive to write the report of his mission. However, a great deal about it can be learnt from his wife's memoirs to which reference had already been made.

517. M. Williamson, *Memoirs*, *op. cit.*, p. 207.
Their presence does not figure in the report of the Mission (written up in 1936 by B.J. Gould) nor was Williamson's Mission mentioned in Cutting's book, *The Fire Ox and Other Years*, which, indeed, disposed of the 1935 Lhasa visit in a mere couple of lines (p. 175).
In fact while in Lhasa both Cutting and Vernay were in close touch with Williamson.

The Cutting visit of 1935 is of particular interest in that Cutting had by now become accepted as the Tibetan representative in the United States. Initial permission for his entry into Tibet had come not through the usual channels by way of the Political Officer in Sikkim but through a direct approach to the Kashag from the United States Government by way of David Macdonald in Kalimpong. It marks, therefore, an important stage in the evolution of Tibeto-American relations.

His companion, Arthur Vernay, at this time aged 59, was British, a big game hunter by occupation, who was married to an American and lived in the Bahamas. Cutting was 46 in 1935. Cutting and Vernay had made their way to Shigatse where they had sought permission to go on to Lhasa. After waiting in vain for a reply, they had returned to India and were in Calcutta when at last Lhasa's approval reached them. They promptly returned to Tibet where they were treated as official guests with particularly close relations with Tsarong. Cutting, of course, continued to have a special relationship with Pangdatsang.

The Cutting expedition emerged out of a more elaborate project in which the Roosevelt brothers (sons of the late President of the United States of America), Theodore Jr. (who had just completed a tour of duty as Governor of the Philippines) and Kermit, were going to travel through Tibet from the Sikkim border along the Tsangpo valley and then to China by way of Chamdo with the object of collecting zoological specimens. The Tibetan refusal to permit hunting put paid to this plan. Cutting and Vernay then decided to go on their own, it being clearly understood that no shooting of animals would take place. Cutting declared an interest in botany and Vernay announced that he intended to study the Tibetan use of hypnotism.

Cutting and Vernay enjoyed British co-operation at the highest level: their plans were supported by R.A. Butler (Under-Secretary at the India Office) and J.C. Walton. When Cutting, on his return, called on Walton at the India Office he was accompanied by Sir Frederick O'Connor, one of the key figures in the history of Anglo-Tibetan relations in the immediate post-Younghusband era.

For the 1935 Cutting visit to Lhasa and its background, see: L/P&S/12/4305.

518. L/P&S/12/4175, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 11 November 1935.
The Kashag had already shown its dislike for flights over Tibet in 1933 when it had refused to co-operate in the Houston Everest Expedition which planned an overflight of Mount Everest in specially modified Westland Wapiti aircraft. The Nepalese, in contrast, were very helpful.

519. L/P&S/12/4177, *China Weekly Review*, 26 January 1935, discussed Huang's ideas on a Lhasa-Chengtu air service by the China Aviation Corporation.

520. The Political Department of the India Office put the British position succinctly enough in a minute by J.C. Walton of 1 November 1934. "We could hardly object to a Chinese Amban, or to a reaffirmation of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet . . . since we are committed on both these points by the Simla Convention of 1914". If an Amban was permitted, then the Convention said that he could have an escort of 300 men; and those men had somehow to get from China to Tibet. There was no reason why, *en route* to their post they should not help out in escorting the Panchen Lama. The Simla Convention was a two-edged diplomatic weapon. Walton's minute, which was written long before the question of the Panchen Lama's escort arose, is in: L/P&S/12/4177.

521. L/P&S/12/4186b, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 16 October 1935.

522. The points under negotiation at this stage were as follows:
(1) restoration of all property sequestrated in 1923;

(2) restoration of all the property, both movable and immovable, of the Panchen Lama's followers – to which Lhasa agreed as far as movables were concerned; but immovables, that is to say land, had either been sold or redistributed and could not be restored, a fact which the Panchen Lama's side seemed to understand;
(3) freedom of movement for the Panchen Lama's officials throughout Tibet;
(4) the refund of all taxes collected by Lhasa from the Panchen Lama's estates since 1923, to which in general Lhasa agreed, though there were problems of detail which were again understood by the Panchen Lama's side;
(5) independence of the Panchen Lama's administration from Lhasa and its right to control its own troops – this was firmly opposed by the Lhasa side;
(6) control by the Panchen Lama of the Dzongs of Shigatse, Namling and Pennam – Lhasa refused on the grounds that these had not been controlled by the Panchen Lama prior to 1923, which may or may not have been true.
Items (5) and (6) represented the sticking point in the negotiations upon which Lhasa at this time appeared to be adamant. See: L/P&S/12/4181, f. 167, undated note on the Tibetan situation.
Gould, the new Political Officer in Sikkim, evidently thought that the Lhasa Government had offered the Panchen Lama all that he deserved, and that, both as a good Tibetan and a good Buddhist, he ought to accept. L/P&S/12/4175, Gould to India, 21 January 1936.

523. L/P&S/12/4181, India to Secretary of State, 16 October 1935.

524. L/P&S/12/4186b, IO to FO, 29 October 1935.

525. L/P&S/12/4186b, FO to Cadogan, 31 December 1935.

526. This prohibited the Chinese from sending, other than the escort of 300 men for the Chinese representative (described in the Convention as high official) in Lhasa permitted in Article 4, any troops into Outer Tibet.

527. L/P&S/12/4186b, Cadogan to FO, 11 November 1935.

528. L/P&S/12/4186b, Cadogan to FO, 29 November 1935.

529. L/P&S/12/4186b, Cadogan to FO, 7 December 1935.

530. L/P&S/12/4186b, Cadogan to FO, 4 January 1936.

531. L/P&S/12/4186b, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 7 January 1936.

532. L/P&S/12/4186b, FO to IO, 27 January 1936.

533. L/P&S/12/4186b, Howe to Peking, 2 May 1936.

534. L/P&S/12/4186b, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 21 May 1936.

535. L/P&S/12/4181, Caroe to Secretary of State, 13 April 1936.

536. L/P&S/12/4182, Telegrams from Peking Embassy to FO, 3 June 1936; 12 June 1936; 21 June 1936; Chungking Intelligence Reports for 1935 and 1936.

537. L/P&S/12/4182, Political Committee, 7 July 1936; Political Committee, 13 October 1936. One danger was that the Nanking Government might use the presence of Communist forces in these border areas as an excuse to send in their own troops.

538. L/P&S/12/4181, Caroe to Secretary of State, 13 April 1936, enclosing proposed draft letter from Gould to Panchen Lama.

539. This tripartite potential is clearly spelled out in a letter from the Indian Foreign Secretary, Sir Aubrey Metcalfe, to J.C. Walton of the Political Department at the

India Office, dated 17 November 1936 which reflected the views of, and may well have been drafted by, Olaf Caroe. See: L/P&S/12/ 4194, Metcalfe to Walton, 17 November 1936.

540. L/P&S/12/4181, Howe to FO, 2 May 1936.

541. L/P&S/12/4186b, minute by Rumbold, 9 November 1936, summarises the correspondence. The Embassy agreed to act as messenger in July 1936,

542. L/P&S/12/4186b, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 21 July 1936.

543. L/P&S/12/4186b, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 26 October 1936.

544. L/P&S/12/4186b, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 29 October 1936.
Up to August 1936 the Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission had been Huang Mu-sung. He was then replaced by Lin Yun-kai.

545. L/P&S/12/4186b, Gould to India, 4 November 1936.

546. L/P&S/12/4186b, minute by Rumbold, 9 November 1936.

547. L/P&S/12/4186b, minute by Walton, 12 November 1936; FO to IO, 21 November 1936.

548. L/P&S/12/4186b, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 12 December 1936.

549. L/P&S/12/4186b, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22 January 1937.

550. L/P&S/12/4186b, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 15 February 1937.

551. L/P&S/12/4186b, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 3 March 1937.

552. One of his first actions at Jyekundo was to send a message of congratulation, accompanied by *khatag* scarf and various gifts, to King George VI on his accession. See: L/P&S/12/4181, Cowan to FO, 15 April 1937.

553. L/P&S/12/4186b, D.J. Cowan, Peking, to FO, 22 April 1937.

554. L/P&S/12/4186b, Kashag to Richardson, 1 April 1937; Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 31 May 1931.

555. L/P&S/12/4186b, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 May 1937.

556. L/P&S/12/4186b, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 10 June 1937.

557. L/P&S/12/4186b, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 24 June 1937.

558. For example: L/P&S/12/4186b, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 25 June 1937.

559. L/P&S/12/4186b, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 23 July 1937.

560. L/P&S/12/4186b, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 20 July 1937; Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 26 July 1937; Norbu Dhondup, 14 August 1937.

561. On Teichman's map, in Teichman, *Travels*, *op. cit.*, Rashi or Lungshi Gompa (monastery) is shown about 40 miles to the south-west of Jyekundo very close to the border between Ch'inghai and Gyade.

562. L/P&S/12/4186b, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 7 September 1937; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 9 September 1937; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 14 September 1937; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 September 1937.

563. Right at the end the Panchen Lama had gathered about him, willingly or unwillingly, at least 1,000 armed Tibetan followers and an equal number of Chinese troops. These forces, combined with the support which the Panchen Lama enjoyed in Tibet and handled with moderate competence, would probably have sufficed to overthrow the regime then controlling Lhasa had this indeed been the Panchen Lama's wish. See, for an estimate of the size of the Panchen Lama's entourage: L/P&S/12/4182, Stark Toller to Peking, 11 September 1938.

564. L/P&S/12/4186b, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 6 October 1937; Lhasa reports 16-18 September 1937.

565. L/P&S/12/4186b, Peking to India, 21 September 1937; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 28 September 1937; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 8 October 1937; Howe to Peking, 18 October 1937; Norbu Dhondup to Richardson, 12 October 1937; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 October 1937; Norbu Dhondup, 2 December 1937.

IX

THE FIRST GOULD MISSION AND THE DISCOVERY OF THE 14TH DALAI LAMA, 1936-1940

Following Caroe's letter to the Marquess of Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, of 13 April 1936 it was proposed that there should be another Mission to Lhasa, headed by the new Political Officer in Sikkim, Basil Gould, who had taken over after Williamson's tragic death. One immediate objective was related to the question of the Chinese escort for the Panchen Lama's return and the proposal that this proceed no further than the Tibetan border, the remainder of the journey being under Tibetan escort on conditions guaranteed by the British. There was a distinct possibility that a British official might find himself somewhere near Jyekundo and that some tripartite negotiations might result to supplement or replace the Simla Convention of 1914. There were also reports of Chinese Communist penetration of Eastern Tibet which might call for further British support for Lhasa and which, in any case, should be investigated. On 21 May 1936 the Marquess of Zetland approved the Mission. Gould at once instructed Norbu Dhondup to go up to Lhasa to prepare the way.

Norbu Dhondup, because of ill health, did not actually reach Lhasa until 26 June 1936, when he found the attitude of the Kashag had somewhat altered. The Chinese Communist danger had apparently passed. Moreover, the wish for any mediated accommodation with the Panchen Lama had been replaced for the time being by anger at the discovery of weapons of war in his advance baggage indicating that the Panchen Lama's intentions might not be pacific. The Tibetans in these circumstances showed no great enthusiasm for another Mission so soon after Williamson. The Indian Government decided all the same to go ahead.

The Gould Mission was planned on a larger scale than any of its predecessors. Apart from Norbu Dhondup and Dr. Bo Tsering, with considerable previous Lhasa experience, there was a second medical man, Captain W.S. Morgan, I.M.S., and a greatly expanded European contingent. Gould had two aides, the explorer and mountaineer

F. Spencer Chapman as his Private Secretary, and Hugh Richardson, I.C.S., the Trade Agent at Gyantse, who was to serve as a special Additional Assistant to the Political Officer in Sikkim. The veteran David Macdonald would also have gone along (as Tibetan interpreter) had he not been prevented at the last moment by ill health. In addition there was a military element consisting of Brigadier Philip Neame, V.C., D.S.O., and Lieutenants E.Y. Nepean and S.G. Dagg of the Royal Corps of Signals who brought with them a considerable quantity of wireless equipment. The party leaving Gangtok had some 120 baggage ponies with it, to which were added more transport at Gyantse. With servants and pony men it was an impressive cavalcade which certainly matched General Huang Mu-sung's arrival in 1934.

As usual, no advance notice of the Mission had been given to the Chinese Government. This was particularly significant in that now, for the first time since the Younghusband Expedition in 1904, British military officers on duty were on their way to the Tibetan capital under the command, as indeed they had been in 1904, of a Brigadier. The main difference was that this Mission was friendly and came with no escorting army. If the Chinese could send a senior military officer to Lhasa, so too could the Government of India. The wireless sets, of course, were also a counter to the equipment brought by Huang Mu-sung; but they would also have been very useful if, as was still thought just possible, the Mission eventually made its way to Jyekundo to mediate with the Panchen Lama and his Chinese allies.

The Mission reached Lhasa on 24 August 1936 where it was housed as usual in the Dekyi Lingka; and Gould left the Tibetan capital for Sikkim on 17 February 1937 after the Tibetan New Year (Monlam) celebrations.[566] Other members had gone earlier, and others remained behind. Where earlier British Missions to Lhasa, the Younghusband Expedition excepted, had been executed in a rather secretive manner, the Gould Mission positively sought publicity. One of F. Spencer Chapman's tasks was to make a colour film of Tibet; and he was able to publish a book about his experiences with the Mission in 1938.[567] Even more remarkable was the fact that Gould contributed a piece to *The Times*, which appeared on 25 September 1936 while he was still in Lhasa, under the headline "Englishmen in Tibet". Nor was much effort made in all this publicity in spelling out the Chinese view of their "suzerain" status in Tibet. In one respect the whole Gould Mission could be described as an elaborate mime to demonstrate that the Chinese had no special status in Tibet at all, something that could not, of course, in view of the complexities of the treaty position and the requirements of British diplomacy in China, be stated explicitly.

What was presented to the outside world as a remarkable achievement, a second penetration of the mysteries of Tibet in the footsteps of Younghusband (since there was little attempt to point to the

previous ventures of Bailey, Weir and Williamson) and the reinforcement of a firm Anglo-Tibetan friendship, in reality achieved very little. The major result of the Gould Mission was the establishment, albeit indirectly, of a permanent British representation in Lhasa, Younghusband's ambition. When Gould returned to Sikkim in February 1937 he left Richardson behind as what was tacitly accepted by the Kashag as a kind of envoy residing in the Tibetan capital just as General Huang Mu-sung had left one of his associates, Chiang Chi-yu; and the Dekyi Lingka became in all but name the home of a British diplomatic mission in Lhasa. With Richardson remained wireless equipment (again matching that already possessed by the Chinese) operated by a civilian, Reginald Fox, who had taken the place of the military signals officers in March 1937. In theory, however, the British representative in Lhasa was no more than an extension of the Political Officer in Sikkim, to whom he was directly responsible. Richardson, Norbu Dhondup, Ludlow and Sherriff all acted in this capacity at various times, Richardson being both the first and the last. Indeed, he remained after the British had left India until his replacement by Dr. S. Sinha in 1950 on the eve of the Chinese "peaceful liberation".[568]

The most obvious immediate consequence of the Gould Mission, apart from the various publications in the West to which it gave rise, was the Tibetan granting of permission for another British Everest Expedition, that of 1938 (led by H.W. Tilman) which was to be the last before the outbreak of War. Everest permits now seemed to go with British Missions to Lhasa. The 1933 Expedition was given permission on the eve of the second Weir Mission, the 1935 and 1936 Expeditions were sanctioned just before the second Williamson Mission. These Everest permits were, so to speak, turning into welcoming gifts by the Kashag to a forthcoming British envoy. In the case of the Gould Mission, however, the permit came rather as a parting gift, and only after Gould had expressly requested it. The Tibetans, moreover, made it clear that they were getting tired of the whole Everest business of foreigners clambering over the slopes of an extremely holy mountain, and that they hoped that this would be the last time that they were bothered with it.[569]

In the context of the Caroe policy it is possible that the greatest hope for the Gould Mission was that it would be able to exploit the crisis of the Panchen Lama and his Chinese escort in Jyekundo to bring about a deep penetration by the British across Tibet and the possible initiation of tripartite discussions close to the Sino-Tibetan border in the east. The result might well be a substitute for the abortive Simla Convention and something rather more substantial than that which Eric Teichman had managed to secure in the same neighbourhood in 1918. As we have seen in the previous Chapter, the Panchen Lama situation never actually created such an oppor-

tunity. The Gould Mission remained in Lhasa and confined itself to discussions with the Tibetan Government.

The Chinese representative Chiang Chi-yu, though he did endeavour to establish social contact with the British on his own terms, did not call on Gould; and Gould, of course, was not going to "blink first" by calling on Chiang.[570] As for what Chiang was, there could be no doubt that, Gould reported, "*de facto*, he acts as a representative of the Chinese Government, and that his influence is by no means inconsiderable". The Tibetans constantly denied to Gould and his colleagues that Chiang (Tsang or Tsiang in many British accounts) enjoyed any official status in Lhasa; but the fact was that he was always there in a place of honour on every official occasion, accompanied by a small military escort armed with automatic weapons.[571]

The need to counter Chiang was probably, after the Panchen Lama question, the major inspiration behind the Gould Mission. There was really not a great deal to be done. Chiang was very much in evidence even though the Tibetans told Gould that they wished he were not; and there was the Chinese wireless, a formidable symbol of prestige, which the Tibetans maintained to Gould they had wanted removed. The immediate key here was the British wireless. Until its arrival Chiang had not only been able to disseminate the world news as it came from China but also to help out Tibetan officials, nobles, merchants and monks by enabling them to communicate with agents and colleagues in China. In addition, there were Chinese broadcasts in Tibetan every Sunday evening from Chengtu which had considerable impact in Lhasa where there were evidently a few receiving sets in private hands, some provided by the Chinese. The wireless was a formidable weapon. News, and propaganda, came at once, while newspapers from or through India might take weeks to arrive and then had to be translated into Tibetan. Gould took care, over and above setting up his own wireless at Dekyi Lingka, to present the Regent Reting and Tsarong with receivers, "listening sets", with the promise of one for the Chief Minister as well. Gould heard that Chiang had tried to persuade the Kashag to refuse permission to the British to operate their wireless: the Kashag, so he was told, had replied that if the Chinese could have a wireless so also could the British. At one point, in order to provide the Kashag with an argument to use against the Chinese wireless, Gould offered to hand the British equipment over to the Tibetans when the Mission left. In the end this did not happen (though the British wireless in Lhasa was eventually to evolve into part of a Tibetan wireless service). The original sets were Indian Army property and had to be sent back to India and be replaced by civilian apparatus.

A third priority of the Gould Mission was military. Brigadier Neame's task was to assess both the potential capabilities and the immediate needs of the Tibetan army. During his time in Tibet he

took a hard look at the Tibetans. His main impressions were that

> Tibetans as a nation are absolutely non-military and the thoughts and energies of ruling classes are largely absorbed in religious matters. Lama officials share all authority with civil and military officials. Tibetan Government and officials concerned with army have absolutely no idea of sound military organisation, administration or training. The two Commanders-in-Chief, one lama, one military, have no military experience. Depons or Generals are appointed from nobility with no military training. No regular soldier of experience can rise beyond rank of Rupon (lower grade commissioned officer). Tibetan official hierarchy are indiscriminately moved from civil to military appointments regardless of their qualifications. In fact those Tibetan officers who were trained previously in India were in nearly all cases put into civil appointments nothing to do with army on return. They have now forgotten nearly all they learned in India. Instructors trained in machine guns at Gyantse 4 years ago were never employed again on machine guns until this year and in consequence are incapable of instructing. Field training is practically never carried out, troops being employed in time of peace on coolie work for Government. Range practice with guns, machine guns or Lewis guns is never carried out and with rifles very seldom. In consequence troops employed on active service in East Tibet are incapable of firing with effect and waste ammunition when in action. Care and cleaning of weapons believed to be very poor.[572]

His final assessment was, indeed, that

> it is justifiable to say that, except for the fact that they possess a certain number of modern weapons, which few of them know how to use, the army has advanced little from its condition in 1904 when the British Mission advanced to Lhasa without any difficulty as regards military resistance although opposed at times by as many as 15,000 troops. The British Mission never had more than 3 battalions of infantry supported by 1 or 2 mountain guns, in action at a time.[573]

Neame had to make some recommendations as to what to do with this rather unpromising situation. The existing arms stocks had dwindled. Out of 10 mountain (2.75 inch) guns then in the Tibetan armoury, only three could be said to be in good order. The Kashag kept the bulk of the artillery ammunition under lock and key in the Potala. Of the troops themselves, Neame estimated that at any one time three quarters were on leave at their homes (this saved rations). There were some twenty detachments strung out along the Chinese border on the Yangtze; but there was no reserve. Neame suggested the training of an elite reserve body in Lhasa through which in stages the bulk of the Tibetan army would be passed to benefit from its skills and morale, a process which could take up to seven years. All so trained should have proper uniforms. He believed the traditional British pattern, including the Wolseley helmet (topi), was quite unsuitable for action in the Tibetan wilds. "It is recommended", he wrote, "that some Tibetan form of head dress should be introduced,

home spun Tibetan cloth used for uniform, and Tibetan boots, easily obtained, be substituted for British boots".

As far as the British were involved, Neame raised two points. First: there was a need for more instructors from the Indian Army. Second: Neame agreed that a case could be made, in response to Tibetan requests, for some further arms supply; and an appropriate shopping list had been drawn up when he returned to India in September 1936. The Government of India could perhaps supply Tibet with 4 more mountain guns, but 12 pounders instead of the 2.75 inch weapons hitherto provided, along with 800 rounds of ordinary HE shell, as well as 5 Vickers and 10 Lewis machine guns with modest quantities of ammunition in chargers and bandoliers.[574]

In the end the Government of India decided to keep to the 2.75 inch weapons and add to the Vickers guns a further three of D.P. standard, that is to say suitable for training only.[575] They were unable to persuade the General Staff of the Indian Army to release the necessary instructors for service in Tibet, and all they could offer the Kashag was training free of charge at Shillong in Assam for 12 officers and 12 NCOs. The weapons and ammunition, on the other hand, would have to be paid for in cash. The Tibetans already owed the Government of India more than Rupees 6,00,000 for past arms supplies.[576] London approved the supply of these additional military stores, but recommended that the demand for cash payment be replaced by some loan arrangement as in 1933.[577]

The lack of enthusiasm on the part of the British military authorities in India for Tibetan involvement is striking. The two Royal Signals Officers, Nepean and Dagg, were withdrawn as soon as possible along with their military equipment; and the Government of India had to find civilian substitutes for both men and matériel. Clearly Neame's report had persuaded the General Staff that the Tibetan army was not worth helping. The civilians had to put considerable pressure on the military in late 1936 and early 1937 to get anything at all.[578]

Inevitably the proposal to supply arms to the Tibetan army, about which Chiang Chi-yu doubtless learned from Lhasa gossip if not from his own contacts in the higher levels of the Tibetan Government and of which he surely informed Nanking by wireless, produced Chinese protests. During the course of September 1936 the Chinese Chargé in London, Dr. Chen, called several times on C.W. Orde at the Foreign Office to ask about the truth of these reports. Orde pointed out that Tibet and India were, after all, neighbours: India could not be expected "to subordinate all her dealings with Tibet to the wishes of the Chinese Government". When Dr. Chen replied that it was a pity that no Anglo-Chinese agreement existed on such questions, Orde retorted that China had "ample opportunity" and that "it was her own fault that further negotiations had not taken place

when she failed to ratify the Simla Convention". The India Office were tempted to see in this exchange the seeds, albeit minute, of a possible reopening of tripartite talks from some circumstance arising, perhaps, from the Gould Mission. The Foreign Office thought this extremely unlikely.[579]

The political situation which the Gould Mission found in Lhasa was rather unpromising from the British point of view. Trimon Shape, who had emerged after the death of the 13th Dalai Lama and the fall of Kunphel La and Lungshar as the strongest figure in the Kashag, was now suffering from fits of insanity and had virtually retired from public life. The Regent Reting was something of an enigma. Gould thought he was not without both ability and ambition. He was also, it was said, drawn to the religious life and might abandon the Regency once a new Dalai Lama had been discovered. He did, in fact, step down in February 1941 when his place was taken by Taktra Rimpoche.[580] The man who had for so long most impressed successive Political Officers in Sikkim, Tsarong, called on Gould immediately after his arrival. He was now in command of the Trapchi Mint and Arsenal; but he was not in the Kashag and he was certainly not the "strong man" of Tibet that he had once been seen to be by the British.[581] The fact of the matter was that there were in Lhasa at that moment no "strong men". Tibetan Government was in suspended animation pending the discovery of the 14th Dalai Lama. There were many friends of the British, like Jigme Taring and the old Rugbeian Ringang, the latter now acting as English interpreter to the Kashag in addition to his electrical duties; but there was no single individual upon whom the British could rely to serve as their protégé in any plan for Tibetan modernisation the better to defend it against further Chinese pressure.

One interesting activity of the military part of the Mission was to examine potential sites for an airfield near Lhasa.[582] Three possibilities were identified. Whether this search implied a British refusal to accept as final the Tibetan rejection of aircraft manifested at the time of Williamson's death it is hard to say. Had the Caroe doctrine resulted in increasingly close practical ties between Lhasa and India, then an air link might have been extremely useful. If the Tibetans could accept motor cars, in the shape of the late Dalai Lama's two Baby Austins, Tibet 1 and Tibet 2, then perhaps in time they might also come to terms with the flying machine.

On the question of the return of the Panchen Lama, as has already been seen in the previous Chapter, the Gould Mission made no significant progress. There were discussions with the Panchen Lama's representatives in Lhasa, including Ngachen Rimpoche (who may have fallen out of favour with the Tashilhunpo Incarnation); but nothing conclusive resulted. The possibility of the Mission going to somewhere near Jyekundo and supervising the Panchen Lama's

homeward journey was soon seen to be out of the question. Gould had been given discretion in the manner in which he told the Kashag that the British protests in China about the Panchen Lama's escorts had perforce to "be confined to the diplomatic sphere" and how he advised them against actively resisting the Chinese escort should matters reach that point. He decided to exercise his discretion by saying nothing on the question of resisting the escort "after full consideration" on the grounds that such advice to the Kashag "would inevitably come to the knowledge of the Chinese Government and would tend to prejudice the Tibetan Government in the spheres of bluff, procrastination, and diplomatic manoeuvre".[583]

Apart from the Panchen Lama, the Gould Mission had acquired at the very moment of its preparation another important issue to discuss with the Kashag, which, indeed, was to become one of the dominant themes in the subsequent history of Indo-Tibetan relations. This was the Tawang problem, which, along with other frontier questions such as the Tehri-Garhwal dispute, will be considered in separate Chapters. All that need be said here is that Gould did not solve Tawang in 1936-37.

The most significant consequence of the Gould Mission has already been noted. It resulted in the establishment of a form of permanent British representation in Lhasa. While this had been an objective of the Mission from the outset, it was not done formally. As Gould related in his memoirs, when some query from the Kashag arose just as he was about to leave Lhasa, he replied that his impending departure presented no problems because the matter could be considered later by Richardson who would be staying on for a while; and the Kashag offered no objections.[584] Richardson stayed, sometimes as we have already seen spelled by Norbu Dhondup,[585] and for a period replaced by Ludlow and Sherriff, until 1950, three years after the Transfer of Power. The Lhasa post, however, remained technically, as also has already been noted, right until the end of the British period an outpost of the Political Officer in Sikkim, an extension of Gangtok. It eventually acquired expanded premises and additional staff such as a medical officer; but it was never a diplomatic mission in the formal sense (like, for example the British Consulate-General in Kashgar) and, in consequence, its existence implied no formal British recognition of Tibet as a sovereign state. Only in the 1950s, after China had returned to Outer Tibet, did the independent Government of India turn this post into a Consulate-General.

The Tibetan Government certainly did not consider that the presence of an agent of the Political Officer in Sikkim in Lhasa on a permanent basis conferred upon the Government of India any special position in the supervision of Tibetan foreign policy. Just as the Kashag had established its own relationship in the early 1930s with the United States through Suydam Cutting without consulting the

British, so it was only too willing to establish contact with representatives of European states who ventured within its orbit. In 1935, for example, the French had somehow managed to obtain Tibetan approval for a mountaineering assault on Makalu without going through British channels; and in 1939 Nazi Germany was able to make its presence felt in Lhasa.[586] Only geographical isolation, reinforced by a measure of obstructiveness on the part of the Government of India, prevented such external relationships from proliferating to add further difficulties to any definition of Tibet's international status.

The nature of the status of Tibet was central to the Caroe doctrine. Gould, after his 1936-37 Lhasa experience, tried to help out in an analysis of the treaty position of that country which he appended to the final report of his Mission. The question had been particularly drawn to his attention by the fact that the Tibetans had of late been showing signs of a desire to reopen bilateral talks with China, always under the shadow of the Panchen Lama's presence in Ch'inghai. Indeed, in the beginning of 1937 they were seriously considering the despatch of a Shape, one of the members of the Kashag, to Nanking to talk over with Chiang Kai-shek's Government the problem of the Panchen Lama's escort: the project was generally referred to by the Government of India as the Shape Mission.[587] The Kashag were also much concerned over a crisis on the Sino-Tibetan cease-fire border in Derge which flared up briefly during the course of 1936 and had resulted in local talks between the Tibetans and Liu Wen-hui's representatives.[588] The Kashag considered that both these matters would benefit from the deputation abroad for discussions with the Chinese of an official of the highest rank, something which had not happened since the Simla Conference of 1913-1914. Gould wondered whether the British had any right in treaty to prevent this kind of high level bipartite discussion, and, if not, whether Tibet would not be able to take part not under Chinese "suzerainty" but as a fully independent state.

Gould argued ingeniously that by not signing the Simla Convention the Chinese had also debarred themselves from claims to "suzerainty" over Tibet. Indeed,

> it would thus appear at the present time there are extant no valid agreements in regard to Tibet except the Anglo-Tibetan agreement .. [of 1904, the Lhasa Convention] .. and Trade Regulations of 1914 which are valid between Great Britain and Tibet (with Russia consenting); and the special agreement negotiated by Sir Charles Bell with the Dalai Lama in 1921 whereby *inter alia*, instead of access to Lhasa being limited to the occasions contemplated in the 1914 agreement, a British officer may be despatched temporarily to Lhasa whenever the British and Tibetan Governments desire this.[589]

It was a gallant attempt, buttressed by many other points culled from

a study of the history of Anglo-Tibetan relations and the Chinese attitude to them since 1914, to show that Tibet was now to all intents and purposes an independent state free from Chinese "suzerainty". It failed, however, to convince Sir Aubrey Metcalfe, the Indian Foreign Secretary, who pointed out (surely with Caroe's agreement) that

> Mr Gould . . . takes the view that China is not at present entitled to claim suzerainty over Tibet . . . [but] . . . Chinese suzerainty over Tibet is not a privilege accruing from the Convention of 1914; rather it is based on age-long usage and was recognised in previous Conventions which were merely confirmed in 1914. . . . In these circumstances the Government of India do not consider that it is open to them to repudiate Chinese suzerainty over Tibet or to support the Tibetan Government in an attempt to do so.[590]

Gould was probably still hoping that if it could be made manifest that the Simla Convention, lacking Chinese signature, had in fact conferred *de jure* independence on Tibet, the Chinese might be induced to return to the negotiating table and, along the lines of their May 1919 proposals, agree to Tibetan autonomy in return for a settled Sino-Tibetan border alignment. He felt that the British were now in a position at last to make the Tibetans accept a reasonable (from the Chinese point of view) border in the east such as they would not contemplate in 1914.[591] The Government of India, on the other hand, thought that "question of Sino-Tibetan frontier can best be settled by stabilisation on the basis of *status quo* rather than by almost certainly unfruitful attempt to fix boundary by negotiations".[592] The immediate need to solve these diplomatic problems, however, disappeared with the abandonment of the Shape Mission, though the underlying problems, of course, remained.[593]

The importance of the Simla Convention in the evolving Caroe view was not that it was invalid and required a re-negotiated substitute but that it had actually existed; and it was this fact which needed to be made public. Caroe had been pondering on how to achieve such a demonstration since at least the beginning of 1936. He came up with an ingenious solution. The problem which most immediately concerned him, and which will be considered in another Chapter, lay in validating the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914; but the notes could not be separated from the whole diplomatic environment which produced the Simla Convention. Caroe therefore urged that "no time be lost in inserting in Aitchison's *Treaties*" not only the notes but also the hitherto unpublished text of the Convention.[594]

There was, however, one considerable difficulty. The last edition of Aitchison's *Treaties* had appeared in 1929 when the relevant Volume XIV treated the whole Simla episode of 1913-14 as having given rise to no valid instruments and hence none were reproduced.[595] Urged

on by Caroe, and with the hesitant acquiescence of the Foreign Office, the Secretary of State for India, the Marquess of Zetland, agreed that the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes (but without the accompanying maps), the 1914 Trade Regulations and the Simla Convention (July 1914 text), but not the Anglo-Tibetan Declaration of 3 July 1914, should be published.[596] They could have, of course, been made public separately by a variety of methods. What Caroe decided, however, was that they should find their way into the existing 1929 edition of Aitchison's *Treaties* (the last edition to appear in the British period) by the simple expedient of replacing the old Volume XIV by a new Volume XIV still bearing the 1929 date. The new Volume XIVs were printed in India and by August 1938 were on their way to England where they were distributed by the end of October. There were 62 copies sent to London. Apart from those retained in the India Office, 7 copies were given to the Foreign Office, and further copies were despatched to the Copyright Libraries, the Admiralty, the Colonial Office, the Imperial Defence College, the Royal Asiatic Society, The East India United Services Club, the Libraries of the House of Lords and House of Commons, and the Library of the London School of Economics. No copies were sent outside the United Kingdom, which explains why many libraries in the United States only possess the genuine 1929 Volume XIV. It was requested that the original Volume XIVs should be returned to the India Office for destruction. The India Office, in a minute of 22 October 1938, observed that "the reason for this new edition is that we want to publish unobtrusively the 1914 Convention (never ratified by China)".[597] The substitution was remarkably successful in that it appears to have escaped public comment until 1963. Up to the great crisis in Sino-Indian relations of 1962 the Simla Convention retained a sanctity by virtue of its inclusion in the Aitchison canon which it certainly did not merit.[598]

Would a valid Simla Convention have been of any particular significance?

The legal advisers to the India Office in 1937 thought that in theory, but probably not in practice, on the basis of the Convention taken together with the Anglo-Tibetan Declaration of 3 July 1914 (which, as we have noted, was not published), it might be possible to argue that the Kashag did not have the treaty right to enter into bilateral negotiations with the Chinese of the kind which were implied by the proposed Shape Mission – some British participation would be required. But this was a consideration of no practical value since it could not be enforced.[599]

Did the fact of Chinese refusal to ratify the Convention deprive them of their "suzerain" status in Tibet, at least as far as Great Britain was concerned?

The India Office went into this question in very great detail during

the course of 1937. The conclusion seemed to be inescapable. After an exhaustive examination of "how far are H.M.G. committed to the recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet?", the India Office lawyers could only say that

> the answer to this question seems to admit of no doubt. H.M.G. and the Russian Government recognised Chinese suzerainty over Tibet in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. This recognition was re-affirmed by H.M.G. in the Memorandum of 12th August, 1912; in the Simla Convention of 1914: and again in the Memorandum of 26th August, 1921. At the same time, we have always been careful to maintain our rights both political and commercial, and we regard Tibet as an autonomous State under Chinese suzerainty.[600]

By accepting Article II of the Simla Convention, moreover, the Tibetans, too, would appear to have acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over them.

The obvious immediate advantages of publishing the Convention were twofold. First: it had become clear during the Gould Mission to Lhasa of 1936-37 that the Tibetans had the vaguest idea as to what exactly the Convention said, let alone what it meant.[601] It would be very useful to be able to show them some book of earlier date in which the text was printed so that, suitably translated, its meaning could be expounded to them upon the basis of documentary evidence. It was open to question whether the Kashag could actually at that time lay their hands on their own copy; and they certainly proved unable to recover much relating to the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes, the maps in particular. Second: in the context of the McMahon Line in the Assam Himalayas (which is not our concern in this Chapter) a great deal could be made out of the Convention and the map associated with it (which was not the same as the maps accompanying the Anglo-Tibetan notes of March 1914). It was certainly this aspect of the matter which was of particular concern to Caroe.

The McMahon Line apart, in practice the Simla Convention in 1936 or 1937 was of little direct value to the Government of India; though this was not to say that a future use could not be found for it. British influence in Outer Tibet currently depended upon geographical proximity not treaty. As far as countering the Chinese influence there was concerned, the British presence in Lhasa combined with a number of obstructive ploys would have to suffice for the time being.

The most obvious means of demonstrating British power by making difficulties for the Chinese in Tibet lay in control of the quick, and comfortable, route between China and Lhasa by way of British India. The case of Chiang Chi-yu is instructive. By October 1937 Chiang was seeking to leave Lhasa, where he had been now for over three years, on health grounds. The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission ordered him to stay until a relief arrived from China. The Tibetans, so it was reported to the Political Officer in Sikkim,

had refused permission for the entry of his replacement (who was then at Jyekundo with the entourage of the Panchen Lama), then relented, only to change their minds once again in January 1938 shortly after the Panchen Lama's death. Meanwhile Chiang Chu-yi had defied his instructions and left Lhasa for India and China via Sikkim in late November 1937.[602] The Chinese, well aware that they were unlikely to slip in a new representative through India without, at least, reopening discussions on Tibet with the British Embassy in Peking, decided to confirm the Chinese wireless operator in Lhasa, Chang Wei-pei (in some British sources referred to as Tang Fe-tang), as head of the Chinese Mission and Chiang's successor. Chang was said to smoke opium and be rather eccentric in behaviour.[603] The problems implied by the British control of the Sikkim route to Tibet, therefore, might be argued to have forced upon the Chinese a rather unsuitable appointment in Lhasa which they would not otherwise have made.

The British raised difficulties again in 1939 over the passage to Lhasa of the Chinese envoy, Wu Chung-hsin (Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission from 1936 to 1944 and subsequently Governor of Sinkiang Province), sent to attend the installation ceremonies of the 14th Dalai Lama. They declared that he would only be allowed to pass through British territory if it could be shown that he had actually received an invitation from the Tibetans.[604] In the end, however, rather than face the prospect of a Chinese Mission escorting the new Dalai Lama from Ch'inghai, which is what would have happened had the Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission been blocked in this way, the appropriate visas were granted to Wu Chung-hsin without further question.[605]

The discovery of the new Dalai Lama dominated Lhasa politics from the time of the second Williamson Mission. The process was complex.[606] In 1935 the Regent Reting went to the sacred lake Lhamoi Latso (10 days' journey to the south-east of Lhasa near Chokhorgyal monastery) where he had a vision indicating that the new Dalai Lama would be found in the east, which most probably meant in Amdo, that is to say Ch'inghai under Chinese control. After much debate in religious circles in and around Lhasa and consultation with the appropriate Oracle, it was decided to despatch a mission of three men of suitable sanctity and learning to various parts of Eastern Tibet to look into the matter. During nearly three years of search a handful of likely boys came to light, of whom only three were really serious contenders and one from Taktser near Kumbum monastery in Ch'inghai (Amdo) was clearly the overwhelming favourite. This state of affairs was known to the Chinese Government (which had now moved from Nanking to Chungking) by September 1938,[607] and the Political Officer in Sikkim heard about it in Gangtok in December.[608]

The next step, at least according to the Chinese interpretation of things, would have been for the final choice to have been made by lot· (just as we have already described the selection of the Regent Reting in the last Chapter) – the famous method of the Golden Urn – in the presence of the Regent Reting and the Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, Wu Chung-hsin, who was the Kuomintang equivalent of the old Manchu Amban. In March 1939 the Chinese Embassy in London informed the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, that the selection ceremony would soon take place; and it offered an opportunity for a British representative to be present.[609]

Of the three candidate Dalai Lamas, one was from Tibet proper (that is to say what would have been the eastern part of Outer Tibet in the terminology of the Simla Convention), and two from Ch'inghai (Amdo) which was a Chinese Province. It appears that considerable Chinese pressure was exerted on the Lhasa authorities to persuade them to accept one of the Amdo candidates, the child from Taktser (who was born on 6 June 1935). It may be – accounts differ on this point – that part of the bargain was that all attempts to enforce the Golden Urn ceremony would cease if the Tibetans would only accept the Taktser boy as the sole candidate in what would now be an uncontested election. But if so, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission seems to have been unaware of it. It is possible that the deal to dispense with the Golden Urn was struck not with the Chinese Government but with the Ch'inghai ruler Ma Pu-fang. Be that as it may, it was the Taktser candidate who was accepted by the majority of the apropriate selectors or referees in Lhasa.

The new Dalai Lama elect was now in Ch'inghai. The Lhasa authorities had to extricate him from the Chinese and bring him to the Potala. The opportunity for the Chinese to provide an escort for him, as they had planned for the Panchen Lama, was obvious to all. It was also obvious that without Chinese co-operation, at least from the real ruler of Ch'inghai, Ma Pu-fang, the Dalai Lama to be (it was generally agreed that he would not really be Dalai Lama until he stepped on to, or was carried over, the soil of Lhasa territory) was trapped in Kumbum. In order to secure his exit from Ch'inghai, Lhasa had to pay the Chinese a substantial sum of money, at least 220,000 Shanghai dollars and probably as much as 400,000. Whether this was merely a means to swell the coffers of Ma Pu-fang or was part of the package whereby some element in the Chinese Government agreed to do without the Golden Urn procedure is not clear.[610] What is certain is that at least 220,000 Shanghai dollars were paid to some branch of the Chinese Government by way of Pangdatsang and the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank in October 1939.[611]

The Dalai Lama, with an entourage including a Chinese escort of some 20 soldiers, arrived in Lhasa on 8 October 1939. His departure from Ch'inghai took place in some haste and, apparently, with such

secrecy such that it was not certain to many elements of Lhasa political society exactly what had taken place at the moment of his selection. There were some who believed that the Golden Urn ceremonies were still to come and would be performed in Lhasa.

The discovery of the 14th Dalai Lama greatly strengthened the position of the Regent Reting who, far from retiring to a life of contemplation, had managed effectively to dismiss the Chief Minister, the late 13th Dalai Lama's nephew Silon Langdun (who was said to favour one of the other candidates as Dalai Lama over the child from Taktser), and was turning into something of an unpredictable autocrat.[612] He ignored the Kashag when it suited him. What he might do when another Chinese Mission arrived in Lhasa it would be difficult to prophesy.[613]

And there was a formidable Chinese Mission on its way, sent by the Kuomintang Government and consisting not only of Wu Chung-hsin, the Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, but also Kung Ch'ing-tsung, its Director of Tibetan Affairs, and nine other members of its staff. Whatever might have been agreed to in Sining with the Ch'inghai authorities, the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission evidently still believed that when Wu reached Lhasa he would preside over the final selection of the Dalai Lama by means of the Golden Urn ceremony.[614] Would the Regent Reting be able to withstand pressure to revert to the Golden Urn procedure, which would be a most dramatic demonstration of the role of Republican China in Tibet's traditional administration? His resolve would probably be firmer if there were a British Mission in Lhasa at the same time. Already, Gould observed in November 1939 while the chief Chinese representative was still travelling to Lhasa, Wu Chung-hsin was being referred to by the ordinary people of Lhasa as the new "Amban".[615]

Most of the Chinese Mission reached Lhasa overland by way of Tachienlu on 25 November 1939; and Wu himself, coming by sea and through India (after certain British bureaucratic obstacles had been removed), arrived in the middle of January 1940. He was at once informed by the Regent that the Dalai Lama elect was so clearly what he was that there would be no need for any lot drawing. The Kuomintang Government thereupon agreed to do without the Golden Urn: "the procedure of casting lots shall be dispensed with", the Executive Yuan decided; and to show goodwill it announced that it would contribute 400,000 Chinese dollars towards the cost of the installation ceremonies.[616]

On 9 December 1939 Gould received instructions from the Government of India to attend the installation of the new Dalai Lama in Lhasa.[617] On the same day the Kashag asked Norbu Dhondup, who was then in Lhasa, to inform the Government of India of the forthcoming installation; but not, in so many words, to invite a

British representative to be present. Gould, however, decided to take this communication as amounting "in effect" to an invitation. Accompanied by Captain Staunton, I.M.S. and Sonam Tobden of his staff at Gangtok, he set out for Tibet in January 1940, not long after the departure from Sikkim of Wu Chung-hsin and his party (who reached Lhasa on 15 January when Gould was still at Gyantse), both groups crossing the high passes in the middle of winter. The weather, fortunately, proved exceptionally mild and there was no snow. At Yatung the British were met by Tsarong who had recently been in India; and while in Lhasa Gould was joined for a while by Major Keys and Captain Thornburgh from the Gyantse Trade Agency. Gould remained in the Tibetan capital until June, by which time Wu Chung-hsin had gone (15 April 1940), leaving as Chinese representative Kung Ch'ing-tsung (who had a Doctorate in Political Science from the University of Brussels).

The Gould Mission was indeed fortunate to have been able to witness some part at least of a complex and ancient ritual which will almost certainly never be repeated with anything like its original purity. The British party, like those from Nepal and Bhutan as well as China, were presented to the new Dalai Lama who, despite being only four years old, showed a remarkable ability in withstanding the rigours of public life. All this took place amidst the general excitement of the Tibetan New Year festivities.[618]

There was a very clear political element in this second Gould Mission to Lhasa, to observe closely the activities of the Chinese party and, if possible, to counter them. Wu Chung-hsin was the highest ranking Chinese official to reach Lhasa since the days of the Manchu Ambans, his status being that of Junior Minister in the Kuomintang Government. His task, as had been that of the old Ambans, was undoubtedly to demonstrate that in the selection of the Dalai Lama the Chinese had a crucial role. Throughout the installation ceremonies Wu Chung-hsin endeavoured to make manifest that the Chinese position in Lhasa was not as that of other Powers. Quite how successful he was is open to question: the probability, however, is that he managed to convince the Tibetans to a greater extent than they were prepared to admit to Gould of China's place in the affairs of Tibet. The Wu Chung-hsin mission was met on its arrival at Lhasa with very great honour by three of the four Shapes in the Kashag and most of the senior Tibetan Government officials. At the installation ceremonies the Chinese somehow managed to acquire different, and more impressive, seating positions (usually explained by the Tibetans to Gould as the product of their rudeness or ignorance of protocol) from everyone else. At the ceremony of 22 February 1940, of crucial diplomatic importance as the first of three days during which visiting delegations presented gifts and compliments to the new Dalai Lama, Wu Chung-hsin was present

(along with the Nepalese and Bhutanese delegates) and Gould was not, a fact which was played down in the British accounts of this event, and for which not entirely convincing explanations were offered.[619]

Dr. Kung, Wu Chung-hsin's successor, was a senior official of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Department of the Chinese Government who described his post as being the Lhasa Office of that Commission. The Kashag does not appear to have disputed this pretension. He was allowed to open a Chinese hospital in Lhasa with its resident Doctor, in competition with a British hospital then in the process of construction.[620] Both Wu and Kung had easy access to the highest echelons of Tibetan officialdom. While Kung apparently was able to maintain that he was the head of what was now a permanent branch of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the Chinese Government in Lhasa, by the end of Gould's visit the British representative had not secured official Tibetan recognition for the permanency of the British presence there which remained as informal as it had been in 1937.

The Tibetans, not surprisingly, did their best to minimise in their conversations with Gould the importance and success of the Chinese Mission. The role of China in the installation of the Dalai Lama, they said, simply did not exist. The Dalai Lama had not become the Incarnation that he was as the result of any ceremonies in Lhasa: as far as Tibet was concerned he had entered fully into possession of his heritage when he crossed into Tibet at Nagchuka in September 1939 (where a member of the Kashag had welcomed him as the rightful Dalai Lama) and been confirmed in this when he reached the Potala in October.[621] Whatever the Tibetans might say to Gould, however, the impression conveyed to the world at large, duly reported in the Calcutta *Statesman* and *The Times* of London, for example, was that the Chinese were somehow essential to the recognition of a legitimate Dalai Lama. The Calcutta *Statesman*, Gould noted with irritation in his Mission report, declared "in detail, but quite inaccurately, that Mr. Wu had conducted the Dalai Lama to his throne, and read out a proclamation, and that the Dalai Lama had made obeisance towards Pekin".[622]

Wu Chung-hsin was the first Chinese envoy to Tibet with whom the Political Officer in Sikkim was able to establish anything like a social relationship. Gould had not, for example, even met Chiang Chi-yu during the 1936-37 Lhasa Mission. Williamson's earlier contacts with Chiang in 1935 could hardly be described as cordial to judge from his widow's memoirs.[623] Wu Chung-hsin stayed with Gould at the Gangtok Residency on his way to Lhasa; and the two men had long and serious conversation (Wu did not speak English but had an excellent interpreter in his party, Hsi Luen). They met again on a number of occasions in Lhasa. Wu demonstrated what Gould considered a characteristic Chinese attitude of racial

superiority towards the Tibetans; but he maintained, however, that

> as to the fundamental policy of China towards Tibet . . . the interests of His Majesty's Government and of the Chinese Government are fundamentally identical; that all that China desires is that Tibet should be peaceful and prosperous; and that, while China would at all times be ready to help Tibet if desired to do so, China would not force help or advice on an unwilling Tibet.[624]

In February 1940 the Government of India decided to seek the official view of the Chinese Government by way of the British Embassy in Chungking as to what the Wu Chung-hsin Mission was really all about.[625] The Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, reported on 7 March that he had spoken to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, who argued that

> the purpose of Wu's visit was to dispel the impression that China had designs on Tibet. He explained that the last Chinese envoys under the Empire had established a tradition of aggression which seemed to be still lively in Tibet. National Government wish to uproot tradition and Wu's task was to persuade Tibet that although China would at all times be ready to help Tibet if desired to do so Chinese Government hoped to see her developing along her own lines without interference.[626]

Gould no doubt thought that all this conflicted with a statement of Chiang Kai-shek's reported in *The New York Times* to the effect that Tibet was an integral part of China.[627]

This declared Chinese policy of non-interference in Tibet was very important. If it were not genuine, and yet it was believed by the Kashag, it might have severe consequences for British frontier policy. Should Gould discuss it with the Kashag? Gould was instructed to inform the Tibetans verbally that

> shortly after the date of the installation of the Dalai Lama, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs at Chungking informed His Majesty's Embassy as follows in regard to the visit of Mr. Wu Chung Hsin to Lhasa. . . . Mr. Wu . . . might tell the Tibetan Government that the Tibetan Government must not continue to think that China has any bad intentions towards Tibet. The Tibetan Government must not think that the present Chinese Government wish to treat Tibet in the way in which the Ambans used to treat Tibet in the days of the Chinese Emperors. Wu had been instructed . . . to say that China would at all times be ready to help Tibet if Tibet desired it, but that China promised not to interfere in the development of Tibet along Tibetan lines. His Majesty's Government consider that this declaration is in accordance with the relations which actually exist between China and Tibet.

Gould was told to add, however, that

> if the Chinese should show any tendency to act in a manner contrary to this declaration of policy, H.M.G. and the Government of India will

> certainly give to the Tibetan Government the support which has always been forthcoming since the time of the 13th Dalai Lama in maintaining the practical autonomy of Tibet.[628]

Gould on 27 May 1940, just before he left Lhasa, conveyed so he said the gist of all this "in simplest possible language". The Kashag agreed that their present position was one of practical autonomy (not, interestingly enough, of total independence) which had been established by the late Dalai Lama. They found the Chinese statement which had been secured by the British from the Chinese Government to be most helpful. They would certainly let the Government of India know if the Chinese went beyond its terms. On the following day the Regent gave Gould a description of what he regarded Tibet's present international policy to be. It was that he, on behalf of the Tibetan Government, should maintain equal relations with both India and China.

Gould's communication to the Kashag was verbal, and there is no record of exactly what he said. There is more than a hint in his report, however, that he indicated to the Kashag that it was only thanks to the intervention of the British Ambassador in Chungking at the instigation of the Government of India that the Chinese had now agreed that Tibet was entirely free of their influence unless expressly requested by the Kashag to exert it.[629]

Whatever the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs had meant as reported by Clark Kerr on 7 March 1940, he probably did not intend to go as far as Gould understood, let alone as he informed the Kashag. None the less, it was for the Chinese a very "liberal" statement on Tibet. The main problem was that it did not, of course, define the geographical limits of the term "Tibet" in a period when very precise boundaries were being assigned by the Chinese Government to Sikang and Ch'inghai, particularly the former, which challenged the actual facts of Lhasa control (as will be seen in a subsequent Chapter, as well as laying claim to extensive tracts of territory in the Assam Himalayas which the Government of India certainly did not want to see in Chinese hands). Definitions of the limits of Tibet apart, however, the Chinese statement as interpreted by Gould did not seem to conflict seriously with British policy which was "to do everything possible to maintain Tibet as a buffer state, but not to embark upon definite courses beyond the maintenance of British influence at Lhasa unless Tibetan authority is seriously threatened".[630]

Wu Chung-hsin, on his way down from Lhasa to Calcutta, considered making a detour to Delhi to have a talk about Tibet with the Viceroy, Lord Irwin; and an invitation to this effect was agreed to. The Government of India noted that, according to Gould at any rate, "Wu's attitude to be that British and Chinese interests in Tibet are fundamentally identical and that China only desires that Tibet

should be peaceful and prosperous". Wu was suggesting, moreover, that the discussions need not be confined to Tibet, but could roam over other issues of mutual interest in Asia.[631] Lord Irwin appreciated, and the Indian Department of External Affairs was surely surprised by, this apparent identity of Anglo-Chinese purpose in Central Asia for which one would have to go back to the late 19th century to find parallels.[632] In the end, however, Wu did not go to Delhi.

Caroe, for one, did not believe that Chinese interests in Tibet were essentially benevolent. Now Indian Foreign Secretary, in January 1940 while Gould was preparing for his Lhasa Mission Caroe produced a long paper entitled "The Mongolian Fringe" which was widely circulated at the time and which continued to be so for some years. He evidently took much pride in it as the clearest statement of his policy. It indeed contains some ingenious arguments albeit based upon a rather limited exposure to the Himalayan region (Caroe had visited both Sikkim and Assam, but had nothing like the experience of the succession of Political Officers in Sikkim from Bell to Gould, and his understanding of China was minimal).

He produced what might almost be described as a cosmological picture, a kind of mandala, of the entire problem of the defence of India's northern border. British India, an inverted triangle, had as its northern side the Himalayas including Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and northern Assam which linked Ladakh on the west with Burma on the east. This was a region with a predominantly "Mongolian" population (despite the clearly non-Mongolian nature of the Nepalese ruling family). To the north of this lay another "Mongolian" tract, Tibet, which was bounded by a crescent of Chinese (yet more "Mongolians") controlled territory from Sinkiang through Ch'inghai and Sikang to Szechuan and Yunnan. To the north of this lay a concentric arc consisting on the west of the Soviet Union and its Mongolian dependency and on the east of territory under Japanese control, Manchuria and the Japanese occupied portions of China. In all this area there were a number of distinct forces at work which Caroe analysed with some skill. The outer arc was the base from which Soviet and Japanese influences were applied towards China. Within was the Chinese crescent which was exerting an incessant force on Tibet. Tibet, in turn, was putting pressure upon the "Mongolian" peoples directly along the Indian border. There were, in other words, a number of distinct imperialisms at work, those of the Soviets and the Japanese, the Chinese and the Tibetans. This situation was complex, and from the point of view of British policy there were no simple answers though certain priorities could be defined.

The first priority was to contain the Tibetans in their aspirations towards the Himalayas and the states and peoples which lay within the mountain belt. The second was to preserve the Tibetans as a

buffer against the Chinese. The Chinese had proved themselves to be unsatisfactory neighbours to British India as the events of the 1910 period had demonstrated; and they too had their eyes on the Himalayan peoples whom they considered the be part of their sphere of ethnic interest. They were now even more dangerous, however, because they might eventually become subject either to the Soviets (either directly or through the expansion of Communist ideology) or to the Japanese (or, perhaps, both). The third priority, therefore, was to preserve China from both the Soviets and the Japanese.

How was all this to be achieved? As far as the Tibetan buffer was concerned, that policy which had already resulted in the establishment of a British presence in Lhasa might continue to be exploited to counter the Chinese in at least those parts of Tibet immediately adjacent to the Britsh Indian Himalayan border; but Caroe was doubtful whether this would be effective on its own. He therefore advocated two further categories of policy, what might be termed the local and the international.

The local approach was fairly simple. It was to resist by a variety of administrative measures the Tibetan "encroachments" in to the Himalayan border tracts along India's northern border. Here a number of quite specific steps could be devised (and Caroe's policy in this direction, which produced extremely important consequences, will be considered in detail in a separate Chapter). The risk was that the implementation of such a policy against the Tibetan aspirations in the Himalayas might, in fact, result in serious stresses in Anglo-Tibetan relations.

In the long term, however, the major threat to British India lay less in minor Tibetan infiltration into parts of the Himalayas than in, first, Chinese irredentist ambitions here, and second, behind them the looming menace of Communism and the Japanese. Caroe summed up his ideas about the general shape of British policy by observing that

> it is to our interest as far as may be possible to induce China to co-operate with India and Tibet in resistance to the penetration threatened by Russia and Japan, and of the maintenance of Tibet as an integral international unit. The ideal in fact would be some arrangement on the footing of the semi-abortive 1914 Tripartite Convention. But in working for a concert of this kind we must secure the respect of both China and Tibet for India's frontier interests in this region and, and always bearing in mind that a worse neighbour than China may succeed to her, we have to fix in our minds what is the real British and Indian interest in this area. It seems to me to be two-fold – first that India cannot afford to admit any Power in supercession to China to obtain control of Lhasa, and second that she must attach to herself in indissoluble union of interest all those parts of what I have called the Mongolian Fringe which look to her for protection and whose disintegration would throw open her own defences.[633]

Here we return again to the Simla Convention. Now enshrined safely in Aitchison's *Treaties* (and raised in status according to Caroe from "abortive" to "semi-abortive"), it could be used as a basis for some Anglo-Chinese agreement over Tibet in which the Chinese either adhered to it as it stood (which was unlikely), or could be persuaded to negotiate a substitute. Presented with a unilateral British renunciation of the concept of Chinese "suzerainty" in Tibet the Kuomintang Government would probably have no option but to persist in its position that Tibet was a matter of purely Chinese domestic concern. With "suzerainty" still on the table, they might possibly be induced to talk, if only because they might believe that obduracy could result in a formal British recognition of full Tibetan independence at a moment of maximum Chinese weakness in the face of the Japanese invasion.

"The Mongolian Fringe" did not convince Gould that the Simla Convention was a particularly useful basis upon which to build the future of Tibet as a buffer to India's Himalayan border; and he had his doubts about the wisdom of pressing the Tibetans too hard on the implementation to the letter of the boundary indicated in the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914 (on which he had found nothing but ignorance in Lhasa). He was too polite to say all this in so many words; but the tone of his report on Tibetan policy of 18 April 1940 is clear enough.[634] When Sir Eric Teichman had an opportunity to read "The Mongolian Fringe" in Chungking in 1942 he was likewise lukewarm about it.[635] The Political Committee of the India Office in a major survey of Tibetan policy of 30 May 1940 makes no mention of it.[636] The Simla Convention, which successive British diplomats in China had found to be a subject which did not inspire the Wai-chiao-pu with feelings of joy, does not figure prominently in the subsequent history of Anglo-Chinese discussions on the Tibetan question: in this respect Caroe's subterfuge of inserting it into Aitchison cannot be said to have been particularly fruitful. As we shall see, however, the application of some of the ideas outlined in "The Mongolian Fringe" was to affect profoundly the subsequent history of the Indian border in the Assam Himalayas. Moreover, the revival of the Simla Convention was to continue to inspire Indian makers of policy long after the Union Jack had been lowered in New Delhi in 1947. The concept of "suzerainty" as suggested by the Convention still figures prominently in non-Communist discussion of the status of Tibet. This is part of the Caroe legacy: without the insertion of the Simla Convention into Aitchison's *Treaties* the very term might well have passed into total oblivion.

It is interesting that in 1940 either the Japanese or their Chinese puppet regime in Peking headed by Wang Ching-wei also decided to publish some documents concerning the Simla Convention. These related to the course of the Simla Conference up to the Convention

of 27 April 1914 which Chen I-fan had initialled and Yuan Shih-k'ai's Government had then repudiated. While Caroe was trying to use the Simla Convention as evidence of some kind of Tibetan status in which Chinese rights and interests were extremely limited, those responsible for this particular publication were endeavouring to demonstrate that the same Convention was but another "unequal" treaty which British imperialism had tried to impose upon a China at a moment of maximum weakness.[637] This is a view to which the present Government of China still subscribes.

566. L/P&S/12/4197, Gould to India, 30 April 1937, contains the full report of the Mission.

567. F. Spencer Chapman, *Lhasa the Holy City*, London 1938.
For other accounts, see, for example: P. Neame, "Tibet and the 1936 Lhasa Mission", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXVI, 1939; Sir Philip Neame, *Playing with Strife: the autobiography of a soldier*, London 1947; Sir Basil Gould, *The Jewel in the Lotus*, London 1957.

568. Lowell Thomas, Jr., *Out of this World to Forbidden Tibet*, New York 1954, p. 122.

569. Chapman, *Lhasa, op. cit.*, p. 325.

570. Gould also refused to meet Chiang on neutral ground such as the Nepalese Residency. Chapman, *Lhasa, op. cit.*, p. 97.

571. Chapman, *Lhasa, op. cit.*, p. 236. Chapman was puzzled. "The Tibetans always laugh when they talk about him . . [Chiang] . ., yet he is allowed to appear at every state function without – so they declare – ever having been invited".

572. L/P&S/12/2175, Gould to India, 4 September 1936; P. Neame, "Military Recommendations to be made to the Government of Tibet", 8 September 1936.

573. L/P&S/12/4193, Lhasa Mission 1936. Diary of Events.-Part IV, Appendix, p. 9.

574. L/P&S/12/2175, Gould to India, 14 September 1936.
The 12 pdr gun was an outmoded weapon of little more than training and ceremonial value. Did Neame's recommendation mean that he thought it hardly worth supplying the Tibetans with any form of useful artillery?

575. L/P&S/12/2175, India to IO, 12 December 1936.

576. L/P&S/12/2175, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12 December 1936; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 15 January 1937.

577. L/P&S/12/2175, Secretary of State to India, 24 December 1936; FO to IO, 29 December 1936.

578. L/P&S/12/2175, minute by J.C. Walton, 16 December 1936, comments on "the *non possumus*" attitude of the General Staff after receipt of Neame's report in contrast to its extremely co-operative approach to the strengthening of Tibetan defences expressed earlier in the year when the Gould Mission was being planned. Walton deprecated the military view. "No doubt", he said, "the Tibetan Govt. are not only weak but incapable, but this fact does not demolish the case for practical assistance accompanied by advice".

579. L/P&S/12/4194, Orde to Walton, 28 September 1936; Walton to Orde, 22 October 1936; Orde to Walton, 2 November 1936.

580. Shakabpa, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 286.

581. Gould continued to hope that Tsarong might persuade the Tsongdu to "assert themselves" and bring about an active Tibetan opposition to the Panchen Lama's escort; but Gould concluded that it was "equally probable" that the escort would be allowed to enter Tibet unopposed. L/P&S/12/4197, Gould to India, 11 November 1936.

582. L/P&S/12/4193, Lhasa Mission 1936. Diary of Events.-Part IV, p.4.

583. In so deciding, Gould ignored the views of the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who told the India Office that "it is therefore desirable that Gould, in such terms as he deems appropriate, should tactfully but clearly convey an intimation to this effect to the Tibetan Government before he leaves Lhasa, if they are under any impression that His Majesty's Government would favour armed resistance to the escort". L/P&S/12/4197, Orde to Under-Secretary of State, India Office (R.A. Butler), 23 December 1936.

584. Gould, *Jewel, op. cit.*, p. 208. There has been some debate concerning the accuracy of this account. See: A. Tom Grunfeld, *The Making of Modern Tibet*, New York 1987, p. 73., discussing Richardson's comments.

585. For example, Richardson was away from Lhasa from June 1937 until October 1938, during which period Norbu Dhondup was in charge. See: L/P&S/12/4165, "Report on Tibetan Affairs from October 1938 to September 1939".

586. A number of European Governments, largely under pressure from their national mountaineering organisations, were eager to obtain permission for Himalayan expeditions which had, perforce, in the face of Nepalese reluctance to open their country, to be mounted from the Tibetan side. The Government of India was shocked in 1935 to discover that the French Government had obtained from Lhasa permission for a French assault on Makalu in 1936 despite the Indian Government's intimation to the French Alpine Club that this venture would not be welcome. See: L/P&S/12/4188, "Recent Events in Tibet", Political Department of the India Office, 27 June 1935.

A most interesting German approach to Tibet took place in 1938-1939.

In early 1938 the India Office received a request from Dr. E. Schäfer for permission to mount an expedition to Tibet from British India by way of the Assam Himalayas. Schäfer had previously taken part in two expeditions in Eastern Tibet with the American Brooke Dolan. He enjoyed the influential support of Lord Astor and Charles Hambro. The Government of India turned down the Assam Himalayan project which they declared to be too dangerous. They certainly did not want a German party wandering around the McMahon Line at this time.

In May 1938 Schäfer and his team of 4 young Germans, allegedly naturalists and other kinds of scientists, had arrived in India. With the Assam Himalayas out of the question, they sought permission to visit Bhutan. Once more they were turned down. Finally, they were allowed to carry out ornithological research in northern Sikkim.

The German team enjoyed a great deal of powerful backing. After their arrival in India it transpired that they were sponsored by a foundation (*Das Ahnenerbe*) established by no less a personage than H. Himmler and that the whole Schäfer project was seen as an S.S. venture. After they had failed to get into Tibet via Assam and had been turned down by the Bhutanese, Himmler wrote to Lord Halifax and to Admiral Sir Barry Domville on their behalf; and Domville then wrote to the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. The gist of all this was that

Schäfer's party ought not to be obstructed by the British as this would be an unfriendly act. The official British reaction in this period of appeasement was to instruct the Government of India not to be too unhelpful. Hence the permission secured by Gould from the Sikkim Durbar for the Germans to explore in that State.

In late 1938 Schäfer managed without the mediation of the Political Officer in Sikkim to obtain permission from the Tibetan authorities for a short visit to Lhasa of not more than two weeks. When in early 1939 Schäfer and his four companions reached Lhasa, however, they proceeded to persuade the Tibetans to extend their permission to stay again and again. While in Tibet, moreover, the Germans were given exceptional facilities for travel. The Germans finally left Tibet at the beginning of July 1939 after a stay of over five months. They might well have stayed longer had it not been for the deteriorating international situation.

While in Lhasa, the Germans established a close relationship with the Chinese Mission. They also indulged, it would seem, in a certain amount of anti-British propaganda. Their presence in Tibet was widely noted, not least in the British press: there were cartoons, for example, showing black shirted storm troopers talking to Tibetan Lamas; and the expedition was widely referred to as the "S.S." expedition.

While Schäfer was in Lhasa the era of appeasement was drawing to a close. The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, in a letter to Lord Zetland, the Secretary of State for India, on 27 April 1939 expressed the hope that in future the British would not be so helpful to the Germans. The Government of India could no longer afford to be seen to be weak towards the Nazis and their sympathisers.

The Nazi complexion of the whole expedition was apparent to all British officials who encountered it. Gould found his meeting with Schäfer most interesting in that it gave him an opportunity to experience at first hand the Nazi mind.

On its return to India the expedition obtained permission to visit Nepal. Intervention by the Government of India, however, managed to prevent the visit from ever taking place.

While in Lhasa the Schäfer party appear, despite reports to the contrary from Richardson, to have established quite good relations with certain leading Tibetans; and the whole affair can be taken as an illustration of Tibetan interest in making international contacts outside the world of China and British India. One wonders whether anything achieved by the Schäfer expedition assisted in the subsequent Tibetan adventures of H. Harrer. The records are silent on this point. It is a fact that Richardson and Hopkinson did their best, but without success, to persuade the Tibetans to expel Harrer and his colleague Aufschnaiter, whom they regarded as undesirable foreign influences.

For papers on the Schäfer affair, see: L/P&S/12/4343.

Recently evidence has come to light to the effect that the Schäfer visit to Lhasa gave rise to a correspondence between the Regent and Hitler.

587. L/P&S/12/4194, Gould to India, 7 February 1937; India to Secretary of State, 19 April 1937.

The Government of India considered that the British possessed no treaty right to prevent bipartite Sino-Tibetan discussions without British participation. On the other hand, "it would clearly be unwise to encourage Tibet to send emissaries to China since, first, we might compromise thereby our claim to enforce other important Treaty rights which we enjoy *vis-à-vis* Tibet under the 1914 Convention, e.g., Tawang, and, secondly, we think it most improbable that any satisfactory results will accrue to Tibet or ourselves from negotiations in which His Majesty's Government takes no part at all".

588. L/P&S/12/4182, Chungking-Consulate General Political Report, December 1936.

589. L/P&S/12/4197, Gould to India, 30 April 1937, enclosing "Report on Lhasa Mission 1936-1937". Appendix A to the "Report" is a long memorandum on "The British Treaty position in Tibet".

590. L/P&S/12/4194, Metcalfe to Under-Secretary of State for India, 17 June 1937.

591. L/P&S/12/2175, Gould to India, 11 September 1936.

592. L/P&S/12/2175, India to Secretary of State, 30 September 1936.

593. L/P&S/12/4194, the question of the implications of the Shape Mission is discussed in a long India Office minute by H.A.F. Rumbold, 24 June 1937. Rumbold pointed out that it was really impossible to stop the Chinese and Tibetans from talking directly to each other if they so wished. The important thing from the British point of view was to make sure that the Government of India knew what was going on "so that we are in a position to intervene at any time either at Nanking or Lhasa". He added that "such interventions . . . would tend to convert bipartite negotiations, possibly without formal arrangement, into tripartite ones".

594. L/P&S/12/4188, Caroe to Walton, 9 April 1936.

595. The exclusion of the Simla Convention and associated documents from the original 1929 Aitchison had been decided upon because they conflicted (regardless of their validity) with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and, moreover, they could well result in anti-British feeling in China. See: L/P&S/12/4188, Walton to FO, 13 June 1936.
All the original 1929 Aitchison's *Treaties*, Vol. XIV, had to say about the Simla Conference and the agreements emerging from it was as follows: "in 1913 a conference of Tibetan, Chinese and British Plenipotentiaries met in India to try and bring about a settlement with regard to matters on the Sino-Tibetan Frontier: and a Tripartite Convention was drawn up and initialled in 1914. The Chinese Government, however, refused to permit their Plenipotentiary to proceed to full signature". See: L/P&S/10/1192, for papers on what was to be included in the original 1929 Aitchison.
The fact that the 1914 Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations had not been published in the original 1929 Aitchison was implied by Sir Samuel Hoare, Secretary of State for India, in the House of Commons on 13 February 1933. See: L/P&S/12/4171.

596. L/P&S/12/4188, FO to IO, 9 July 1936.

597. See: L/P&S/12/4188, for the papers relating to this transaction.

598. It was the late Sir John Addis, using the Library of Harvard University, who seems to have been the first scholar to spot Caroe's ploy. See: J.M. Addis, *The India-China Border Question*, Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963. The whole question is examined in: Karunakar Gupta, "The McMahon Line 1911-45: The British Legacy", *The China Quarterly*, 47, 1971.
I am much indebted to the late Sir John Addis for letting me quote his Harvard paper in my *McMahon Line*.
Did this substitution of volumes amount to forgery?

599. L/P&S/12/4194, IO minute, 25 March 1937.

600. L/P&S/12/4194, minute by H. Barlow, 20 August 1937.

601. See, for example: L/P&S/12/4197, Metcalfe to IO, 17 June 1937. Perhaps the late 13th Dalai Lama had understood it all; but he had gone. Lacking anything like a Foreign Office (which the Tibetans only got around to setting up until 1942), the probability is that the papers relating to the Simla Convention of 1914 and similar matters were buried somewhere within the labyrinthine interior of the Potala.

602. Chiang, according to Richardson, came to be much liked by the Tibetan authorities in Lhasa. See Lhasa Diaries for 1939 in: L/P&S/12/4193.

603. L/P&S/12/4177, Norbu Dhondup to Sikkim, 7 October 1938.

604. L/P&S/12/4178, FO to IO, 30 May 1939.

605. L/P&S/12/4178, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 22 September 1939.

606. L/P&S/12/4179, Report by Gould on the discovery, recognition and installation of the fourteenth Dalai Lama. This is a mine of information.

607. Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 179.

608. L/P&S/12/4178, Sikkim to India, 16 December 1938.

609. L/P&S/12/4178, FO to IO, 31 March 1939.

610. L/P&S/12/4178, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 April 1939. Here it is clearly suggested that the money demand, "blackmail" or "ransom", would be dropped if the Tibetans accepted the Taktser candidate.
Li, who was in Kansu at the time and made a journey to Kumbum to see the young candidate Dalai Lama (presumably on behalf of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission), casts doubt on the "ransom" story. Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 178.
According to the information reaching Gould, Wu Chung-hsin told the Regent Reting that the Chinese Government would repay the sum in question, which rather suggests that if it were demanded it was from Ma Pu-fang not the Central Government. Reting is said to have refused repayment, though he had no objection to accepting the money involved as a "pious offering". See: L/P&S/12/4194, India to Secretary of State, 8 May 1940.

611. L/P&S/12/4178, Gould to India, 14 October 1939.
According to Richardson, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 153, "the Government of India helped the Tibetans to raise the ransom money by giving them certain import concessions". The total "ransom" which had to be raised, according to Richardson, was at least 300,000 Chinese dollars.
According to Gould much of the money was raised from the Moslem Ladakhi community in Lhasa. See: Gould, *Report, op. cit.*, p.8. Gould estimated the total sum involved came to at least 400,000 Chinese dollars, which he calculated as the then equivalent of about £30,000.
According to Roger Hicks and Ngakpa Chogyam (*Great Ocean. An Authorised Biography of the Buddhist Monk Tenzin Gyatso His Holiness The Fourteenth Dalai Lama*, Shaftsbury 1984, pp. 56-57) the ransom or blackmail money, which came to a total of 430,000 Chinese dollars, was borrowed from a party of Moslem pilgrims who were passing through Ch'inghai and Kansu to be repaid in Lhasa in Indian rupees.

612. L/P&S/12/4178, Lhasa to Sikkim, 23 April 1939; Richardson to Sikkim, 21 May 1939.
Silong Langdun kept his title but ceased to exercise any authority.

613. L/P&S/12/4178, Richardson to Sikkim, 21 September 1939. Richardson wrote: "I think that the Regent is chiefly interested in ensuring his own safety and position in any eventuality, and will prefer to continue his secret methods rather than incur the responsibility of taking a public decision with which many Tibetans would be unlikely to agree".

614. Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p.181.

615. L/P&S/12/4197, Gould to India, 14 November 1939. Gould used this as an argument for the construction of a more impressive building for the British Mission in Lhasa. This he was now authorised to do, seeking the lease of a new site from the Tibetan Government. The old Dekyi Lingka was so small, with only three main rooms, paper windows and no heating, that those who lived within were rather uncomfortable, while the bulk of the staff had to live outside in possibly greater discomfort in tents in the grounds.

616. Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp.181-182. L/P&S/12/4178, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in Chungking, to FO, 12 February 1940. The sum of 400,000 Chinese dollars was surely the same as that which the Tibetans said had been demanded as "ransom" for the Dalai Lama's extrication from Ch'inghai.

617. As Gould had been suggesting since at least September. See: L/P&S/12/4178, Gould to India, 15 September 1939.

618. Gould described the details of the ceremonial in his autobiography, *Jewel, op. cit.*, and in his *Report on the Discovery, Recognition and Installation of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama*, New Delhi 1941 (also in L/P&S/12/4179).

619. It is not mentioned in Richardson, *Tibetan Précis, op. cit.*, and a rather oblique explanation is offered in Gould, *Report, op. cit.*, and in Gould's autobiography, *Jewel, op. cit.*, p. 223. The explanation is not entirely convincing. Shortly after the event Gould was asked by the Government of India: "was there in your opinion ever any expectation that you would be invited to attend ceremony on February 22nd? Do you attribute exclusion to religious prejudices or to Regent's desire to placate Chinese by thus emphasising their special position *vis-à-vis* Tibet?" See: L/P&S/12/4194, Gould to India, 11 March 1940.

The failure to attend this ceremony, during which took place the presentation of gifts and the offering of expressions of national good will to the new Dalai Lama, on the first day when the Chinese were present, would certainly, whatever explanations might be offered, involve a loss of face.

The Chinese press at the time reported that the ceremony of 22 February 1940 *was* the actual installation the ceremony, the coronation of the Dalai Lama as it were; and on this point both Li, writing from the Chinese point of view, and Shakabpa, from the Tibetan, appear to be in agreement. It is hard to escape the conclusion that Wu was able to attend the key installation ceremony while Gould was not. See: L/P&S/12/4194, translation from Tientsin *Yung Pao* of 29 March 1940 describing the enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama on 22 February 1940; Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p.183; Shakabpa, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 285.

This is Gould's published explanation of what happened. "The Tibetan Government proposed that the British Mission should attend with their gifts on the second day and enquired whether we wished to be present on the first day also. They were careful to point out that there was no question of our not being welcome on the first day. The question for consideration was whether attendance on the first day, when there would be no occasion for the presentation of gifts, would tend to detract from the effect of a more official, and also more intimate, appearance on the second day. In matters of ceremony it is usually safe to be guided by the implied wishes of the Tibetan Government, who are past masters in all that falls within the sphere of courtesy. It was therefore decided that we should attend on the second day only, in company with our good friends the representatives of Tashi Lhunpo (the seat of the Panchen Lama) and of Sikkim". See: Gould, *Jewel, op. cit.*, p. 223. This explanation does not really stand up to careful analysis. It plays down the significance of the fact that the British delegation, for whatever reason, did not attend, as did the Chinese, Nepalese and Bhutanese, the grand opening ceremonies which were clearly, even from Gould's

own account, the most important, but had to make do with a lesser occasion in the company of the Panchen Lama's representatives (who were hardly the most popular figures in Lhasa) and the representatives of Sikkim (the least important of the Himalayan States).

620. The first Doctor was a German-trained Chinese who called himself Schaw. The Government of India hoped that his training had not resulted in turning him into a supporter of Hitler.

621. L/P&S/12/4194, Gould to India, 5 March 1940; Gould to India, 23 March 1940.
It is interesting that the Tibetans in their conversations with Gould emphasised that this was the northern frontier point of Tibet. It was a long way south from the Inner-Outer Tibet border of the Simla Convention. The fact, of course, was that beyond Nagchuka lay the wastes of the Chang Tang which were unadministered and inhabited only by nomads.

622. L/P&S/12/4194, Gould to India, 30 October 1940.

623. See: Williamson, *Memoirs*, *op. cit.*, pp.162-163, 203. When Chiang passed through Sikkim on his way to Lhasa in 1934 he did not call on Williamson. During the 1935 Williamson Mission, on 7 September, the Williamsons, so Margaret Williamson records, "had the dubious pleasure of lunching with them . . [the Chinese representative, Chiang, and his wireless operator] . . at their house in Lhasa. . . . I was absolutely convinced that Mr. Tsiang . . [Chiang] . . and his minions were conspiring in the most sinister Fu Manchu style to poison" Williamson.

624. L/P&S/12/4194, Gould to India, 30 October 1940.

625. L/P&S/12/4194, India to Secretary of State, 21 February 1940.

626. L/P&S/12/4194, FO to Clark Kerr, 2 March 1940; Clark Kerr to FO, 7 March 1940; Clark Kerr to FO, 18 April 1940.
Clerk Kerr became Baron Inverchapel in 1946. He died in 1951.

627. L/P&S/12/4194, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 15 May 1940.

628. L/P&S/12/4194, Gould to India, 30 October 1940, Enclosure 2.

629. L/P&S/12/4194, Gould to India, 30 October 1940, Enclosures 2 and 3.

630. L/P&S/12/4194, Gould to India, 30 October 1940.

631. L/P&S/12/4194, India to IO, 13 March 1940.
For papers on Wu's proposed visit to Delhi, see: L/P&S/12/2309.

632. When the British and the Chinese, in the 1890s, had worked together to check the Russian advance into the Pamirs and towards Kashgaria.

633. L/P&S/12/4194, Caroe, "The Mongolian Fringe", 18 January 1940. This is also reproduced in: Mehra, *The North-Eastern Frontier of India*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, pp. 111-124.

634. L/P&S/12/4194, Gould to India, 18 April 1940.

635. L/P&S/12/4194, Teichman to Weightman, 27 July 1942.

636. L/P&S/12/4194, IO memorandum "Recent Events and Policy in Tibet", 30 May 1940.

637. *The Boundary Question between China and Tibet. A' Valuable Record of the Tripartite Conference between China, Britain and Tibet held in India in 1913-14*, Peking 1940, with a preface by "A Pekinese".

X

THE WAR, 1940-1945

When Gould was in Lhasa to attend (he hoped) the installation ceremony of the 14th Dalai Lama and Caroe was circulating his "Mongolian Fringe" Great Britain was once more at war. By the time that Gould finally left Lhasa in June 1940 the situation in Europe was grave indeed. The higher echelons of British administration had little time to spare for contemplation of problems as remote as those posed by the nature of the Chinese presence in Tibet, a place which must have seemed as much a backwater as it did in 1914 after the end of the Simla Conference. In practice, however, it soon became apparent that even Tibet could not be isolated from the great global conflict that was World War II. While the Government of India could afford to devote only the minimal resources to Himalayan policy, yet they could not ignore altogether that mountain frontier and the land which lay beyond. As the War progressed, particularly after the entry of Japan and the United States, so Tibet acquired a certain geopolitical significance which perforce influenced British attitudes. There were three major factors involved.

First: Tibet, be it independent or subject to some form of Chinese "suzerainty", provided a link between the outside world and China now effectively cut off from the sea by Japanese invasion. By the end of 1939 the only practicable route open, other than those through Soviet territory, by which the Government of Chiang Kai-shek could receive supplies from outside China ran along the Burma Road from Lashio to Chungking by way of Kunming in Yunnan. In the early summer of 1940 the British gave way to Japanese pressure and closed the Burma Road (though they reopened it in October 1940), leaving Tibet as the major potential line of communication between Nationalist China and the ports of the Indian Ocean.[638] It was inevitable that attempts would be made by the Chinese and their friends to exploit this link.

Second: for this reason the most important supporter of Nationalist China, the United States, would now take an interest in Tibet as a possible Chinese lifeline. The United States did not share the anxieties of men like Caroe concerning the defence of India, a

country which American opinion on the whole considered should be freed from British rule; and American statesmen were not interested in the niceties of distinction between "suzerainty" and "sovereignty". In Washington Tibet was seen as part of China. As Cordell Hull, United States Secretary of State, wrote in July 1942, "the Chinese Government have long claimed suzerainty over Tibet, the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among the areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China, and this . . [U.S.] . . Government has at no time raised question regarding either of these claims".[639] The British were in no position to ignore American opinion in 1940. By 1943 they were so dependent upon American support that they had to adapt their Tibetan policy to avoid American accusations that they had imperialist designs upon peripheral Chinese territory.

Third: the Japanese advance into China increasingly threatened the British position in Asia. Once Burma had fallen in early 1942 there was the likelihood of a major invasion of India from the north-east, a direction which had not since the first Burmese War of the 1820s (with, perhaps, a brief era of concern during the Chinese presence in Outer Tibet from 1910 to 1912) received much attention from British Indian military strategists. The whole Assam border, including that along the Assam Himalayas, was now at risk. To this had to be added a further danger. If the Japanese pressed on into the heart of China (as they attempted rather dramatically to do in 1943 and 1944) there was a distinct possibility that Chiang Kai-shek's Government might have to retire westwards into Sikang and Ch'inghai and thence into Outer Tibet. The British were certainly in no position to resist such a development.

The crisis of the Second World War found Tibet politically far less stable than it had been in 1914 when the 13th Dalai Lama offered one thousand of his best troops to help in the defence of the British Empire. Not long after the new 14th Dalai Lama had been discovered and duly installed, the Regent Reting felt that his task had been completed. He resigned, his place being taken with the approval of the Tsongdu by Taktra Rimpoche, the 14th Dalai Lama's tutor who was then some 68 years old.[640] Taktra agreed to serve for two years only, though in the event he was to remain in office until 17 November 1950. His was not a dynamic personality; but he was not subject to serious challenge by the Kashag whose members, too, were singularly lacking in dynamism.

From the moment of the installation of the new Dalai Lama in Lhasa the affairs of Tibet came to be influenced profoundly by the family of the new theocrat, at first by his parents, who proved extremely eager to acquire wealth and power, and eventually by his elder brothers (Thubten Jigme Norbu or Taktser Rimpoche and Gyalo Dhondup). The new Regent Taktra was no match for the Dalai Lama's father, who began to behave as if he, not Taktra, were the real

Regent.[641] He insisted on being shown public honours such as normally would be accorded only to the Dalai Lama. He was open to bribery to involve himself in litigation. His commercial activities caused great resentment. The Dalai Lama's mother, in her own way, was even more formidable.

There also remained one bit of unfinished Tibetan theocratic business. The 9th Panchen Lama, whose death in late 1937 had saved Lhasa from immediate crisis, had yet to be replaced. Should the new Incarnation, the 10th Panchen Lama, be found in Chinese territory, then the threat of his return to Tashilhunpo under Chinese escort would be repeated. In the event this issue was postponed for a while; but Tibet has not to this day seen a satisfactory solution to the problem of the Panchen Lama.

In these circumstances the influence of the British and Chinese representatives in Lhasa, whatever their official status might or might not be, could only increase, either jointly or one at the other's expense. Dr. Kung, who remained after the departure of Wu Chung-hsin as the head of the Lhasa office of the Chinese Nationalist Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, undoubtedly made his mark on Tibetan affairs. He established a Chinese school in Lhasa which was certainly much more successful than had been the short-lived English school at Gyantse in the 1920s or the even shorter-lived English school which was set up in Lhasa in 1944-45.[642] His office ran a hospital. He had easy access to the Kashag and the Regent. British reports tend to play down his importance; but it cannot be denied that he represented a formidable Chinese presence which would have been much stronger but for the fact that the Chungking Government was preoccupied with the Japanese menace. After December 1941, of course, the same menace could be seen to confront the British, who at first were apparently no more successful than the Chinese in containing it. The fall of Burma during 1942 must mark the nadir of British Imperial prestige in Asia; and its implications were not lost on the Tibetans, not least because there was very nearly now a common border in the extreme north of Burma between territory controlled by Lhasa and that under the domination of Tokyo.

From a Tibetan point of view by 1942 it must have become evident that the British, while useful as a source of arms and technical assistance, and still retaining great economic power over Tibet particularly in the wool trade, no longer posed a serious threat to Tibetan independence (as had continued to be suspected by many elements of Tibetan political society since the Younghusband Expedition of 1904).[643] The Chinese, however, could not be taken so lightly. If the Japanese were ever to go away, then China if aroused could well return to the declared aim of incorporating into Sikang Province all of Tibet as far west as Giamda, and of establishing itself as the

paramount power in Lhasa. It did not need the advice of Dr. Kung to demonstrate the wisdom of maintaining a dialogue with the Chinese National Government.

One key to the future of Tibet, let alone the attitude of the Tibetan Government towards its neighbours, lay in Sikang. The concept of Chao Erh-feng, temporarily suspended following the Chinese Revolution, had been revived in principle by the Kuomintang in 1928.[644] In 1935 the Nanking Government issued an ordinance which gave the Province a second birthday, as it were, to take effect on 1 January 1939. Its declared territorial limits, which had already been shown on Chinese maps such as that in the *Shen Pao* Atlas of 1934, were based on the same criteria as Chen I-fan had advanced at the Simla Conference in 1913-14.[645] Sikang extended westwards from Szechuan all the way to Giamda, just over a hundred miles as the crow flies to the east of Lhasa, and included all the Assam Himalayas down to the Brahmaputra valley almost as far west as Bhutan.[646] Much of this area, of course, could not then be said by the remotest stretch of the imagination to be under Chinese control; but as an indication of long term Chinese aspirations the *Shen Pao* Atlas was instructive. Chinese control in 1934 actually stopped to the east of Chamdo.

The portions of the claimed Sikang which were under Chinese rule had by late 1936, the series of Chinese Communist incursion now having come to an end, been established under the undisputed domination of Liu Wen-hui, whose relations with Chiang Kai-shek were uncertain. It did not follow of necessity, therefore, that what was said in Chungking (the seat of the Nationalist Government from 1937 onwards) reflected accurately the views of Liu; though both Liu and Chiang remained extremely careful not to push each other too far. Liu Wen-hui's policy, whatever Chungking might have said were Chinese intentions at the time of the 14 Dalai Lama's installation in 1940, was gradually to extend Sikang, magistrate's district (*hsien*) by magistrate's district, both into Lhasa controlled territory and into the western parts of Szechuan. In early 1937, for example, Chinese magistrates were beginning to be inserted into Derge;[647] and in the following year Liu scored something of a triumph when he managed to secure the transfer from Szechuan to Sikang of no less than 14 *hsien* including Yachow (Yaan), the centre of the production of brick tea for the Tibetan market.[648] For a time Yachow was Liu Wen-hui's military capital, though the administrative centre (despite theoretical claims for Batang) remained at Tachienlu (Kangting).

As ruler of Sikang (with titles which varied with time) Liu Wen-hui showed considerable energy. He managed to arrange a final settlement of the Dargye dispute in 1938: the troublesome monastery was brought under the control of the Kantze *hsien* and the monks effectively disarmed.[649] Construction was pushed ahead on the road

link between Chengtu and Tachienlu (though the Yachow-Tachienlu section had not been completed in 1941) and was paralleled by a telephone line. By 1941 Tachienlu, so British Vice Consul Franklin reported, had acquired its share of schools and hospitals and, even, a small airfield. Its Han Chinese population was also increasing rapidly.[650] There was even talk of establishing a full British Consular post there to keep an eye on developments (which were also, of course, of particular interest to the Government of India).

The Chengtu-Tachienlu motor road was a project of great importance. On the one hand, there were plans, albeit still remote, to push it onwards to Batang and, ultimately, to Lhasa (which the Peoples' Republic of China has now done). On the other hand, and more immediately, it was to link up with another motor road from Tachienlu to Sining across Ch'inghai which would eventually connect with a highway to the Soviet Union through Kansu and Sinkiang. By the middle of 1942 work on the Tachienlu-Sining road was well in hand.[651]

These developments in the construction of what today would be called an "infrastructure" for Sikang (many of them controlled by the Sikang-Szechuan Development Corporation) could be explained to some extent by the genuine development philosophy which still inspired the Kuomintang (though the degree of Kuomintang influence in Sikang in 1941 or 1942 was open to question); but it was also creating an admirable military base from which to mount an assault on Outer Tibet on a scale which would make the flying column despatched by Chao Erh-feng in 1910 look like a Boy Scouts' outing, a point which did not escape the sharp eye of Eric Teichman, then recalled from retirement to service in the British Embassy in Chungking.[652] Meanwhile the Yangtze, more or less, remained the effective Sikang-Lhasa border, its instability a constant reminder of the Chinese threat.[653] It had been said that Liu Wen-hui appreciated that the final conquest of Tibet would earn him a unique place in the favour of Chiang Kai-shek and end once and for all their differences.[654]

Until he was in a position to do this, however, Liu Wen-hui's Sikang persisted, along with Ma Pu-fang's Ch'inghai, as a kind of buffer between the Kuomintang and Tibet. Chiang Kai-shek, even with the Japanese (and Communist) problem, still had the manpower and matériel to swamp all of Tibet had he been in undisputed direct contact with it. He was unwilling, however, to challenge Liu Wen-hui on his home ground if he did not have to; and Liu Wen-hui did not consider that he was strong enough to take on Tibet on his own, particularly if Lhasa, as all Chinese believed in the face of abundant evidence to the contrary, would receive unlimited British military aid and advice. If there ever was a justification for that aspect of the Caroe doctrine which made public implied British treaty relations

with Tibet, as in the substitute Aitchison Vol XIV, it was the need to convince the Chinese of a British will and determination to provide armed support for the Lhasa Government which was, in fact, notable for its almost total absence.

By the end of 1941 the Tibetans had received another sharp reminder that Chinese rule was not of necessity beneficial to those of the Five Races other than the Han. In the 1930s large numbers of the Kirei Kazaks, Moslem inhabitants of the Hami region of Sinkiang, broke away from the oppressive rule of Sheng Shih-t'sai. Some 18,000 Kazaks migrated into the Kansu-Ch'inghai steppes which were well suited to their nomadic way of life. Many remained there. In 1941, however, a large band of Kazaks pushed southwards towards Lhasa. They were halted by the Tibetans at Nagchuka and deflected westwards. They next tried to enter Nepal, where they were rebuffed by Gurkha border guards. They then moved to the neighbourhood of Lake Manasarowar, whence they tried to cross into India by way of the Lipu Lekh Pass. They were again frustrated, this time by armed Tibetan monks. They finally moved towards Ladakh where, after a clash with Kashmir Durbar forces in the Demchok region on the Indus, they crossed over on to British territory. Their passage through Tibet had been accompanied by a considerable amount of plunder and destruction. Once on Kashmiri soil, they were taken reluctantly under the wing of the British, and many of them were re-settled either on the North-West Frontier or, oddly enough, in Hyderabad.[655] Their plight could only have demonstrated to those Tibetans who knew about it (if they indeed needed convincing) both that life for non-Han minorities under Chinese rule was not of necessity a bed of roses and that demographic movements from Chinese territory did not always bode well for Tibetan tranquillity.

The Tibetan attitude towards China became during the course of 1942 a matter of some considerable concern to the Allies, the Chinese and the Americans in particular, following the closure once more of the Burma Road. The opening of a supply route to China from India across Tibetan territory now acquired a fresh importance in Allied strategy.

The Tibetan potential as a link between India and China was appreciated as early as the time of Warren Hastings in the late 18th century. During the second half of the 19th century there were several British enthusiasts, like T.T. Cooper, who saw great promise in a route up the Lohit tributary of the Brahmaputra in Assam to both Szechuan and Yunnan across the extreme south-eastern corner of Tibet; and between 1912 and 1914 serious efforts were made by the Government of India to build a cart road up the Lohit from Sadiya to the new McMahon Line border with Tibet and across it to the Tibetan administrative centre of Rima in Zayul.[656] The Lohit project was abandoned in 1914 with the outbreak of War; and

attempts to revive it in the early 1920s resulted in no more than the decision to maintain the road for a short stretch eastwards from Sadiya.[657] Thereafter, until the outbreak of the Second World War, the so-called Rima Road had mainly been exploited by explorers like F. Kingdon Ward and R. Kaulback.[658] By all accounts it was not the easiest of routes, much of it subject to landslides (not to mention earthquakes) and truly horrible when it rained. The Lohit valley was not pleasant trekking country. The Lohit route will be considered again in a later Chapter.

In 1940 this route was once more examined as a possible alternative to the Burma Road from Lashio to Kunming now under Japanese threat because, for all its defects and difficulties, it remained the shortest path connecting India with China. This was the conclusion of Flying Officer A. Silcock who looked into the question on behalf of the Air Ministry. His report, which the Air Ministry transmitted to the India Office in September 1940, after examining a number of possibilities recommended the route from Sadiya to Tachienlu by way of the Lohit valley and Rima, Chamdo and Batang, as the preferred option.[659]

The obvious advantages of this alternative to the Burma Road were pointed out by the British Ambassador in Chungking, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, to the Chinese Vice Minister of Communications in November 1940. The Vice Minister stated that the matter was already under consideration by the Chinese Government.[660] It soon transpired that China preferred to Flying Officer Silcock's proposal a variant which ran from Rima not to Chamdo but in a south-easterly direction via Menkong, Yakalo and Atuntze to Kunming, where it would join the original Burma Road.[661] This was indeed the most logical route, despite the problems of the terrain to which Silcock had pointed. It would, however, as in all other versions of these roads from Assam to China which did not run through Burma, cross a corner of territory at present controlled by the Tibetans.[662]

How were the Tibetans to be handled? The Chinese Government evidently decided that they did not need to be considered at all. In Chinese eyes the whole route lay within the bounds of Sikang Province and was totally Chinese. Consideration of Silcock's proposal, in other words, opened up a Pandora's box in that it provided the Chinese with an opportunity to demonstrate their Tibetan claims without involving themselves in preliminary negotiations with the British.

Thus it transpired in February 1941 that Chiang Kai-shek himself had decided upon the construction of a road from Yunnan to Assam by way of Rima and the Lohit. Clark Kerr was told that the project, which lay entirely through Chinese territory, would take up to three years to complete. The British were requested to start work on a road of their own from the Assam railhead to a Sino-Indian border point

to be mutually decided so that supplies needed for the project could start flowing as soon as possible. The Chinese pointed out that this route had a special advantage in that it would enable China, in desperate need of petrol, to exploit the oil resources of Assam.

The political implications of the proposal did not escape Clark Kerr. He noted that

> it appears that the Chinese Government proposes to turn aside political difficulties as regards Tibet, by claiming that the route chosen lies wholly in Chinese territory and taking their own measures to deal with the local populations along it;

and he advised that

> with regard to the political obstacles, I venture to observe that the Chinese penetration of Inner Tibet (now known as Sikang) has come, and that we should be wise to accept the fact. It would be a pity to allow political conception which has little relation to present-day facts to stand in the way of progress. In other words, I feel if the Chinese proposal to open up communications between Assam and Yunnan has anything to commend it, as I believe it has, we should endeavour to find the way to assist.[663]

To the Government of India, following the Caroe doctrine, this was shocking. It meant the surrender to China of a large tract of effectively autonomous Tibet immediately adjacent to the Assam Himalayas. The Government of India made it plain that they

> cannot subscribe to any proposal which is in conflict with their traditional policy of continued maintenance of integrity of the Tibetan buffer. Consequently we could not agree to construction of roads in territory under the jurisdiction of Lhasa without prior willing assent of Tibetan Government.

The problem, of course, was what exactly Tibetan, as opposed to Chinese, territory was. After reviewing the rather meagre evidence, mainly derived from the writings of Teichman and R. Kaulback, it appeared to the Government of India that Lhasa was in control at least up to the Salween-Mekong divide and was in possession of both Menkong and Yakalo (which was actually on the east bank of the Mekong).[664]

To give all this to China represented "a startling reversal" of British policy even as expressed hitherto by the British Embassy in China (never conspicuously sympathetic to the implications of the Caroe doctrine). British Indian commitments to Tibet, it was argued, prevented the Government of India from "conniving" at Clark Kerr's proposal and "require us to afford Tibetan Government active support in resisting it and maintaining practical autonomy of Tibet". The fact that it would take at least three years to build the road, by China's own admission, suggested that it was less the road than politics which was of interest to the Chungking Government. Finally,

the idea that China would be allowed to avail herself of the extremely limited petroleum resources of Assam was absurd. What there was India needed for her own use.[665]

In London the situation was seen as potentially most embarrassing. The Chinese seemed serious about the road. In early April 1941 the extremely influential Chinese statesman T.V. Soong had told the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, that Chiang Kai-shek very much wanted British help in its construction.[666] In view of the close relations at this period between the Kuomintang and the United States, British obstruction could all too easily become a subject of potentially acrimonious Anglo-American discussion.[667] At the same time, the views of the Government of India could not be dismissed out of hand. The obvious compromise was to help the Chinese with preliminary surveys but, at the same time, make it clear to them that there must be Tibetan consent before any work on the road could go ahead.[668]

Accordingly, visas were granted for a small party of Chinese surveyors and engineers to enter India to examine the proposed route from the Assam end, while simultaneously the practical difficulties which could arise from Tibetan opposition were pointed out to the Chinese authorities. Sir Arthur Blackburn, at that moment in charge of the Chungking Embassy, thought that there might be profit in looking at another route altogether, one that avoided Tibet and ran across the extreme north of Burma. The problem here was that the Sino-Burmese border was still disputed by China; and any road building would involve China's acceptance of British claims or *vice versa*. Blackburn believed that it might be better, if a suitable Burmese route existed, to offer it in exchange for a settlement of the Sino-Burmese border more in China's favour than had hitherto been British policy, rather than enter into arguments about the limits of Tibet, a subject of which Blackburn had acquired considerable experience and which he knew was a diplomatic minefield.[669]

As far as the Yunnan-Tibet-Assam road (the Rima Road) was concerned, the Government of India concluded that any Chinese surveying on Tibetan controlled territory would probably be as harmful to British interests as the actual construction of the road by Chinese supervised labour. They suggested that the Kashag be advised to approve to joint Anglo-Chinese aerial surveys of the proposed road trace; and no more.[670] They also agreed with Blackburn that a trans-Burma route, from Assam to Fort Hertz (Putao) and thence, perhaps, southwards to Myitkyina or directly eastwards across the mountains to join to original Burma Road to Kunming, would be preferable to the Rima Road.[671] It was evidently better to risk the status of northern Burma than put in jeopardy the hinterland of the McMahon Line in the Assam Himalayas.

In Lhasa Dr. Kung duly approached the Kashag to inform them of

what the Chinese had in mind for the Rima Road. According to the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commision in Chungking, the Kashag made no objection to the presence of Chinese surveyors along this alignment.[672] The British representative in Lhasa was, nevertheless, told to be careful not to initiate this matter with the Tibetans lest it appear that the Government of India were "conniving at Chinese encroachments or at an attempt to coerce the Tibetans".[673] The Kashag declared to the British that they had not accepted Dr. Kung's proposals in total. He had been informed, they said, that Chinese surveyors could go up to the very limits of Tibetan territory but no further; and under no circumstances would the Chinese be permitted to build roads in Tibet itself. This decision was affirmed by the full Tibetan National Assembly (Tsongdu).[674]

The reported attitude of the Tibetan Government inspired the Foreign Office to instruct Clark Kerr in Chungking to point out to the Chinese Government that the Tibetan Government

> are at present quite definitely opposed to allowing a road to be constructed through their territory. You should remind them that as already explained His Majesty's Government could not be parties to such a scheme unless the full and willing consent of the Tibetan Government were forthcoming. You should suggest in the circumstances it would be best to await the report of the Chinese ground survey party regarding the practicability of the Tibetan route before deciding whether to attempt to pursue the matter.[675]

By this time, in November 1941, Clark Kerr was beginning to regret his original optimism about the Rima Road. Discussions over roads were about to turn into negotiations over the status of Tibet and the boundaries of Sikang Province. He thought that the Chinese Government were so touchy about such matters that "I question the wisdom of making any such communication to them at present". Far better, he thought, to do nothing at all until some definite proposals about roads had emerged from the Chinese side.[676] It was clear, however, that Chiang Kai-shek was personally attracted to the idea of the Rima Road and the Foreign Office felt that his views could not be ignored.[677] An argument then developed between Clark Kerr and the Foreign Office out of which emerged a compromise of sorts. Clark Kerr was to explain to the Chinese the difficulties both geographical and political involved in the Rima project, while advocating the advantages of what came to be known as the "Southern" road (as opposed to the South or Gyalam Road from Lhasa to Tachienlu via Chamdo and Batang) to Yunnan from Assam via either Fort Hertz (Putao) or Myitkyina in northern Burma with its Indian terminus at Ledo.[678]

In early 1942, on purely technical grounds, the Ledo-Fort Hertz route was decided upon. By now, of course, the Japanese had begun their invasion of Burma which was to close for over two years all

routes through that country. The first Allied convoy actually to travel from Ledo to China did not set out until January 1945 along what was often described as the Stillwell Road by way of Myitkyina.

The total closure of the Burma road meant that oil supplies to China (without which there could be neither motorised land transport on any scale, despite all sorts of ingenious substitutes, nor continued Chinese air power) could now only come in either by air from India over the notorious "Hump" (where pilots were specifically instructed to avoid Tibetan airspace) or by long and extremely difficult routes from Sinkiang and the Soviet Union.[679] In March 1942 the Joint Military Council in Chungking, which co-ordinated China's role in the general Allied war effort against Japan, proposed that some kind of supply route through Tibet should once more be investigated. Clearly, political issues apart, no useful road could be constructed for some years. Tracks suitable for pack animals, however, already existed in abundance. Could not some use be made of these in a more systematic manner to develop what came to be called Trans Tibet Transport?

Norbu Dhondup, then in charge of the British mission in Lhasa, was accordingly instructed to ask the Kashag whether they would allow their country to be used in this way.[680] The Kashag refused on the grounds that "if war materials pass through Tibet, other powers will attempt to follow suit".[681] The Kashag were again approached a few weeks later in April 1942, after the Commander in Chief in India had supported the Chungking Joint Military Council's view, this time by Frank Ludlow, who found them no more co-operative. The idea of a systematic pack animal link with China, even though by now it was not going to follow the Rima route but start in Sikkim and run, so Ludlow suggested, right through Lhasa and Chamdo to Batang and Tachienlu (thus following the most traditional of trade routes, the Gyalam Road), was still unacceptable to the Tibetans.

The Government of India were now under considerable pressure from the India Office, urged on by the Foreign Office which was in turn influenced by Chinese and American opinion. The fall of Burma had lost Chiang Kai-shek at least 80% of the military supplies then in transit along, or on the way to, the closed Burma Road as the Japanese, after capturing the port of Rangoon, overran its Burmese end and blocked it.[682] If China were to continue to provide a credible resistance to Japan, these losses had somehow to be made good.[683] The view in London was that "something must be done even though the practical results in the way of supplies will be small, and it will probably involve the collapse of our valuable Tibetan policy".[684] The point, of course, was that for the Indian Government to exert pressure, which it could do easily enough, on the Kashag *in favour* of the Chinese was a dramatic reversal of attitudes and certainly a marked departure from the Caroe doctrine. One possibility was to

send Gould (now Sir Basil) up to Lhasa to explain matters. The Tibetans, it was thought in London, held Gould in immense awe. He could save something of the Caroe doctrine if anybody could.

In the event a Gould Mission was not necessary. By June 1942 the Regent had been persuaded by Ludlow, using a judicious blend of bribes and threats of economic sanctions applied to Indo-Tibetan trade, to relent to the extent of agreeing (apparently on his own authority and without consulting the Tsongdu) to the passage of non-military stores. But were petroleum products military?[685] The unofficial consensus of opinion was that they would not be so deemed. However, as the highest estimate for the load potential for goods of all kinds on this route was in the region of 3,000 tons per annum (about 750,000 gallons if every animal carried nothing but petrol), and some doubted that it could bear more than 700 tons, Trans Tibet Transport was hardly likely to solve China's fuel problems.[686]

Meanwhile Tibetan procrastination had not passed without notice in Chungking. The Chinese had not risen to the bait of a British proposal that a joint Anglo-Chinese declaration on the autonomous status of Tibet might do much to allay the anxieties of the Kashag.[687] Instead, they had ordered their man in Lhasa, Dr. Kung, to do his best to persuade the Kashag to agree to Chinese requests for transport facilities without prior reference to Ludlow. The obvious British counter was to arrange through private Tibetan contractors in Kalimpong for the transmission to China across Tibet of mail and certain crucial medical supplies, if only as a token gesture of British goodwill.[688] The Chinese Government were told by Sir Horace Seymour (who had followed Clark Kerr as Ambassador) that supplies on this basis were on their way.[689] The Chinese were not persuaded by such reported progress to agree to any declaration of non-interference in Tibetan internal affairs, a subject which Teichman was told by the Wai-chiao-pu Chiang Kai-shek found "rather difficult".[690] However, it did look as if for the time being at least the Chinese were prepared to drop proposals for major road construction through Tibetan territory. The term non-military was eventually defined formally to exclude from Trans Tibet Transport munitions but not petroleum products.

The Chinese Government now decided it wanted to station its own inspectors along the pack route, a proposal which would guarantee Tibetan opposition.[691] Once more, the Government of India considered the possibility of a Gould Mission to Lhasa to persuade the Kashag to accept a measure of increased Chinese presence in Lhasa controlled territory.[692] In the event the proposed route inspectors were allowed to fade away in the face of Tibetan hostility. By August 1942 Sir Horace Seymour summed up the situation thus:

> we may hope then that the immediate problem of the transportation of Chinese supplies through Tibet is in a fair way to being solved, but certain fundamental difficulties remain. Although the Chinese have not yet come into the open with us on the point, they base their behaviour towards Tibet on the theory that their suzerainty is still in force. The fact that they live in this respect largely in an atmosphere of make-belief (as is so often the case with the affairs of China) is immaterial. Thus while we spare no effort to induce the Tibetan authorities to allow this trickle of supplies to pass through their territory to China, the Chinese Government have not so far accepted the situation of being the beneficiaries of our intervention with the Lhasa Government; but profess to be in a position to communicate themselves their wishes to the Tibetans, and to hand down to the latter their decisions as to the arrangements to be made. This is the traditional attitude of Republican China, which refuses to abandon the theory that Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria and Sinkiang are as much integral parts of the modern Chinese Commonwealth as they were of the Manchu Empire.[693]

The pack transport system, based on private enterprise organised in Kalimpong, did not really get started until early 1943. It then developed rapidly, mainly in the hands of individual Tibetan traders (notably Sadutshang and Jangtsashang) with the enthusiastic financial participation of many prominent Lhasa families and monastic establishments. The Chinese Government had hoped that the pack animals would follow the route from Lhasa to Tachienlu via Batang, the old southerly main road, the Gyalam Road, while the Lhasa authorities preferred the more northerly route, that which ran from Lhasa to Jyekundo via Nagchuka and which the Tibetans called the Changlam Road. One advantage of the Changlam over the Gyalam, of course, was that it ended up in the domain of Ma Pu-fang in Ch'inghai, with whom Lhasa had relatively good relations for most of the time, rather than the stronghold of the detested Liu Wen-hui in Sikang.[694] The Tibetans also hoped, so Teichman was probably not alone in suspecting, that by demonstrating their ability to dictate the route used through their country they were asserting their autonomous status.[695]

In the event the traffic, as is the wont of the invisible hand of free enterprise, found its own path, flowing from the head of the Chumbi Valley by various routes (usually passing through Giamda) across southern Tibet to round the northern tip of Burma and down into Yunnan by way of the Chinese border town of Atuntze (Tehtsin) on the Mekong to a terminus at Likiang on the Yangtze.[696] From Likiang there ran a motor road capable of bearing lorry traffic to Siakwan (Hsiakuan) on the old Burma Road some 200 miles to the west of Kunming.[697]

Apart from now being an effective roadhead of the old Burma Road, Likiang had a long history of involvement in the Tibet trade. Indeed, many of the merchants in Szechuan, in Yachow and

Tachienlu, who specialised in this commerce were of Yunnanese origin with their roots in the Likiang region. Likiang merchants soon established their agents in Calcutta where they collaborated with various large corporations like Jardines and the Chen Ho Industrial Corporation (a politically well-connected Chinese body) in the export of such items as cotton yarn from India to China.[698] It is unlikely that much motor or aviation fuel moved over this long and difficult system of trails. By early 1943 there were over 5,000 mules at work on the route, taking about 105 days to make their way from Kalimpong to Likiang by way of Lhasa. It cost Rs. 40 per 110 catties in direct transport charges (which works out at about Rs. 1 for every 3.5 lbs. carried). In theory 110 catties (c. 250 lbs.) represented a mule load: in practice few mules could carry more than 60 catties of useful freight. Yaks were far more common on the trail than mules or ponies, but they carried less weight and were more likely to fall and damage their loads than mules. At the height of the trade, in late 1944 and the first half of 1945, one observer estimated that over 8,000 mules and no less than 20,000 yaks were travelling between Kalimpong and Likiang.[699]

The pack route was liable to Tibetan obstruction from time to time, usually related to an increase of Sino-Tibetan tensions along the Sikang-Tibet border. Traffic, however, never stopped for long. No doubt there were too many influential Tibetan interests involved. There was some Tibetan checking of loads at Yatung, just after the entry to Tibet from India, to ensure that the wares carried were truly non-military. Motor vehicle spares were among the items the Tibetans were particularly anxious to keep out of Chinese hands. On the Tibet-Yunnan border the trade was subject to heavy Chinese taxation both official and unofficial.

The rapid development of the Kalimpong-Likiang route seems to have rather taken the Chinese by surprise. The Chinese Ministry of Communications had imagined a rather formal Government to Government arrangement, with the Government of India arranging for goods to reach the Indo-Tibetan border whence, by means of Sino-Tibetan official collaboration, they would be carried onwards to China.[700] Towards the end of 1942 an official of the Chinese Ministry of Communications, Wong Pong, was sent to Kalimpong to negotiate with Tibetan traders and keep in touch with British officials.[701] In the event he played very little part in the growth of the trade. The Tibetan authorities, in any case, were determined not to deal directly with Chinese officials on matters of this kind.[702]

For a while the Kalimpong-Likiang pack route brought something of an economic explosion along its course; and Likiang rapidly developed into a boom town. We possess a fascinating account of Likiang during these years by a European observer, Peter Goullart, who was living in the town organising co-operatives on behalf of the

Kuomintang with the powerful support of H.H. Kung, one of Chiang Kai-shek's brothers-in-law. By early 1945 Goullart was watching the weekly arrival of a yak or mule train from Tibet laden with a blend of consumer goods, manufactured raw materials like cotton yarn, and the traditional staples of the trade of Eastern Tibet such as gold dust and musk pods. The transport men who reached Likiang frequently had experienced remarkable adventures en route, attack by brigands (who abounded in the remote mountains of the Yunnan-Tibet borderlands) and ordeal from floods, avalanches and landslides.

When the War with Japan ended in the summer of 1945 so did the boom time of Likiang. Many merchants, both Chinese and Tibetan, were left with large quantities of stock in transit the value of which had dropped abruptly. Goods were now starting to flow into China again through Hong Kong and Shanghai. Among those who suffered losses were the great Lhasa families and religious institutions (including Reting monastery whence had come the former Regent), some of whom sent their representatives to Likiang by way of the Calcutta-Kunming air service (which had operated throughout the War under the aegis of the China National Aviation Corporation with astonishing regularity and reliability) to see what could be salvaged. Not much, according to Goullart.[703] Likiang, however, continued to be an important entry point to Tibet until the final days of the Kuomintang in 1949, largely because of its freedom from the influence of either Liu Wen-hui or Ma Pu-fang.

While the Chinese officially played a very minor role in the organisation of the pack route from India to Likiang, the discussions to which its origins gave rise inevitably involved the Chinese status in Tibet. In practice by November 1942 the Executive Yuan of the Chinese Government had accepted the fact that this line of communication would develop informally.[704] All the same, the opening of the India-Likiang pack route was to have the most profound consequences for the future of Tibet. It would provide the United States for the first time, if we exclude the correspondence of the early 1930s through Suydam Cutting, with a direct interest in the affairs of the Government in Lhasa. It would lead to renewed fighting (or its threat) between Chinese and Tibetans in the east. Finally, it would bring about at the highest Allied level a formal British definition of Tibetan status.

The beginnings of the American involvement with Tibet have of late been seen as the first stages in what was to turn into CIA inspired intrigue against the Chinese.[705] While the available evidence leaves something to be desired, the motives behind the story are capable of explanation within the general political framework of the period. The United States showed great interest in the opening up of supply routes to its Chinese ally. The Tibetan route had obvious advantages which resulted in a series of Anglo-American exchanges concerning

its potential. It was not hard for both the State Department in Washington and the United States Embassy in Chungking to detect that the Government of India were less than enthusiastic in forcing the Lhasa authorities to co-operate with the Chinese along the lines advocated by the Kuomintang. There was a good case, from the American point of view, for American observers to look into the Tibetan situation for themselves rather than rely on what the British chose to communicate or report.

This would seem to be one of the objectives behind the decision by Major-General William J. Donovan, Director of the Office of Strategic Services (the ancestor of the CIA and not greatly beloved by the State Department), to send his own representatives to visit Lhasa. Whether Suydam Cutting and Kermit Roosevelt, who had been associated in a venture to the eastern borders of Tibet in 1928-29, had anything to do with the decision it would be interesting to know.[706] The men chosen for the Tibetan mission were Lieutenant Brooke Dolan II, who had taken part in two expeditions in the Sikang-Tibet border region in the 1930s, and Captain (Count) Ilya Tolstoy, a grandson of the great Russian novelist and son of an officer in the Tsarist Russian Army, who had travelled (as a boy) in Sinkiang and, subsequently, in Mongolia.[707]

Donovan informed the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, of the intended mission on 2 July 1942. The State Department were asked to secure British facilities for a journey to Tibet from India "without the necessity of returning to India", which was another way of saying that the mission would end up in China. The mission, Donovan went on, "is of strategic importance and we hope that it will prove of long term value in the furtherance of the war effort in the Asiatic theatre". It was to be "*most secret*" (Donovan's italics) and "we feel it desirable to avoid any mention of the military status of these two men in any negotiations". Normal British diplomatic channels had not been approached, but "certain British authorities in India are already informed as to the nature of their mission". It was all very mysterious; and what the "certain British authorities" do not appear to have been told was that an unsuccessful attempt had already been made via Chungking to get Dr. Kung in Lhasa to persuade the Tibetans to admit the mission, a fact which, when it eventually came to light, caused Caroe considerable annoyance. The mission was equipped with a letter from President Roosevelt to the Dalai Lama carefully phrased so as to refer to him in religious terms only and to make no specific commitment as to Tibetan autonomy.

Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy (with the by no means enthusiastic approval of the Government of India) arrived in Lhasa on 12 December 1942, where they called on the young Dalai Lama and met all the important officials.[708] They departed on 19 March 1943 for Jyekundo via Nagchuka. The Kashag not only gave them

permission for this journey but provided them with a small escort of Tibetan soldiers (a sergeant and five privates), because, so the newly established Tibetan Foreign Office explained, "there are many dangers from robbers and thieves".[709] The Dalai Lama through his advisers took this opportunity to inform President Roosevelt that

> Tibet also values her freedom and independence enjoyed from time immemorial and being a great seat of the Buddhist religion I am endeavouring, in spite of my tender age, to uphold and propagate our religious precepts and thereby emulate the pious work of my predecessors.

Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy made their way from Lhasa to Jyekundo in Ch'inghai, and thence to Lanchow in Kansu which they reached in July 1943.[710] It was a remarkable journey. Their main interest seems to have been less in the pack route, which ran nowhere near the line of their own travels, than in possible sites for airfields (and they made a careful study of the landing ground being constructed by Ma Pu-fang near Jyekundo). Ludlow in Lhasa was rather puzzled as to why the Kashag had ever permitted the venture. Possibly they hoped to win American support for a seat at the Peace Conference at the end of the War, a subject which Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy seem to have discussed freely during their extended stay in the Tibetan capital.[711]

The air of mystery surrounding the mission, particularly in Donovan's correspondence, may well have arisen as much from the enthusiasm for cloak and dagger attitudes entertained by the newly created OSS as from any deep political motives. It was possible, however, that General Donovan hoped that some kind of continuing direct (if informal) relationship between Tibet and the OSS might result. This could well have been a motive behind the authority given to Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy to offer the Kashag wireless equipment for a service which could be operated independently of the British mission (though, in the end, this equipment took a long time arriving and required the assistance of the British mission and its post-Independence successor to set up, not without technical and practical difficulties).[712]

The balance of probabilities suggest that the American officers had two main Tibetan objectives. The first was to investigate the Changlam Road from Ch'inghai to Lhasa by way of Jyekundo and Nagchuka, which, despite British scepticism, was probably the easiest line for a motor route. The second arose from the first. The Changlam Road joined the line of a motor road from Sikang to Ch'inghai which by 1943 was nearing completion. It was not clear whether this road was really directed towards Sinkiang rather than Tibet. If Sinkiang were the true destination, then there was a real danger that, given the powerful Soviet influence in Sinkiang, it would

turn out to be less a route for Chinese supply than for the extension of Soviet power. It is more than likely that Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy had been instructed to look into the possibility of establishing observation posts in Tibet from which Soviet activities could be monitored. Chiang Kai-shek (and doubtless Mao Tse-tung had he been asked) would have agreed that it was in China's interests that Russia be kept out of Tibet. The OSS, which in its early days was strongly influenced by the traditions of the British SIS, tended to see the Soviets as the true long-term threat (a view which does not seem to have been shared at this time by President Roosevelt). It was, however, an opinion that would have been held by those whom one imagines were the mysterious "certain British authorities in India".

In the end Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy had little impact upon the subsequent course of Tibetan history. Even the wireless sets arrived too late for the War, did not at first work, and were in practice eventually operated by the British on behalf of the Tibetans. Perhaps the major achievement of the whole adventure was an article on Tibet in the *National Geographic* by Ilya Tolstoy.[713]

Tolstoy's report convinced Major-General Donovan that goods could be carried across Tibet, perhaps as much as 4,000 tons a year if the business were organised properly. This would have little significance for the operations of major armies and air forces. It would, however, keep the OSS supplied with all sorts of useful items. What these would be used for, Donovan did not say. Possibilities which leap to mind are the supply of weapons and communication equipment for agents recruited for the observation, and perhaps combating, of Soviet influence in Sinkiang and the preparation of a variety of anti-Communist activities in China.[714] In the event the use of Tibet for these ends did not meet with State Department approval.[715] Donovan, however, persisted. In 1944 he was supporting Tolstoy, now a Major, in arranging a contract with the Tibetan trader Sadutshang (who possessed extensive interests in Eastern Tibet, Kham) through his Kalimpong agent, L. Gedund, for the transport of unspecified material from India to China.[716]

The visit to Tibet of the two American OSS men coincided with a renewed tension along the borders of Lhasa territory with both Ch'inghai and Sikang.

In Ch'inghai in late 1942 Ma Pu-fang moved a large body of Chinese Moslem (Tungan) troops into the Tsaidam region for reasons of internal Chinese politics. Some of these overflowed into unadministered Tibetan territory to the north of Nagchuka about the time Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy left Lhasa for Jyekundo. Tibetan troops were sent in response to Nagchuka; and the Tungans seem to have withdrawn without serious fighting. In early 1943 Chiang Kai-shek was reported to have ordered Ma Pu-fang in Ch'inghai, Liu Wen-hui in Sikang and Lung Yun in Yunnan to mobilise troops on

the Tibetan border, in part to put pressure on the Lhasa Government to co-operate in projects of road construction, in part in anger at obstructions temporarily imposed upon the pack route, and in part because of the Tibetans' resistance by force of arms to the crossing of the *de facto* Sikang-Tibet border by Chinese survey parties. Chiang Kai-shek may also have calculated that, should the Japanese renew their advance towards Chungking, he might have to shift his headquarters further to the west and would, in such circumstances, do well to secure his Tibetan rear. In the event neither Ma Pu-fang nor Liu Wen-hui wished to deploy their armies in this fashion; and the Yunnanese are said to have told Chungking that they had enough on their hands with the Japanese to waste any resources on the Tibetan border: the Yunnanese were always an independent lot. Chiang Kai-shek's orders would seem on the whole to have been disregarded and there was no repetition of the crisis of 1930-32 though the situation on the Tibetan border remained tense until the latter part of the year.[717]

These rumours of war, however, had important consequences. They resulted, inevitably, in a fresh Tibetan request to the Government of India for more arms and ammunition including no less than 16,000,000 rounds of .303 ammunition, 36,000 shells for the mountain artillery, and 20 machine guns, either Lewis or Bren (preferably the latter). Caroe, who clearly did not consider the Chinese military threat particularly acute at this moment, opposed letting the Tibetans have any more arms or ammunition on the grounds that

> it would be a mistake of policy to provide munitions of war to Tibet at this juncture and would lay H.M.G. and Government of India open to propaganda that war effort is being diverted to enable Tibet to resist China . . . We realise that refusal which would of course be based on . . [British] . . war needs will leave Tibetans without ammunition to resist aggression should it come. But we should prefer making considerable supply of munitions available to Tibet at the close of the war to risk of propaganda aforesaid, relying in meantime on diplomatic support.[718]

What really worried Caroe, as will shortly be described, was the direction which British, American and Chinese diplomacy was taking over the status of Tibet.

Neither the Foreign Office nor the India Office saw any reason why the Tibetans should be allowed to run out of ammunition even if it might be inexpedient to supply them with more automatic weapons.[719] A limited supply (perhaps 5,000,000 rounds of .303) was duly authorised which did not reach Lhasa until the following year. The Tibetans were also given some expert British technical assistance in overhauling the Trapchi arsenal and maintaining the mountain guns.[720]

The major danger to Tibet, as Caroe appreciated, during 1943 lay

not from Chinese military attack but from diplomatic manoeuvre in which China had acquired great strength by virtue of her prominent place beside the Americans in the Grand Alliance. The Chinese might well, despite their military problems, talk themselves back into a dominant position in Lhasa sufficient to undermine the essentials of the Caroe doctrine.

In 1943 China was politically and economically weak. She depended upon the United States for military and financial support. She was making no visible progress in the expulsion of the Japanese from her soil. She had failed to resolve civil conflict between the Kuomintang and the Communists. Yet, by virtue of her position after December 1941 as one of the four major Allies in the War, Chiang Kai-shek enjoyed an international position greater than that hitherto enjoyed by any Chinese Head of State in modern times. It was no use basing the defence of India upon a policy which pretended that he did not exist and that he did not have strong ideas concerning the place of Tibet in the China which he hoped to create.

The immediate issue which brought Tibet on to the Allied big stage, so to speak, was the problem of Trans Tibet Transport. The Chinese, from 1942 at least, had some grounds for arguing that their British ally was doing less than it might to promote a supply route across Tibet from its own Indian possessions to China proper. At the same time reports of Chinese aggressive plans gave British and American diplomats an excuse to seek clarification as to exactly what Chinese policy towards Tibet was.[721] In March 1943 talks on this subject had been initiated at the level of Secretary of State, Foreign Secretary and Minister of Foreign Affairs when T.V. Soong (who not only had charge of China's foreign policy but was brother-in-law to Chiang Kai-shek) was in Washington.

On 15 March 1943 T.V. Soong had a long discussion with Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, on a variety of matters during the course of which the Tibetan question arose. As Eden reported their conversation, T.V. Soong told him that

> the Generalissimo . . [Chiang Kai-shek] . . had not been wholly reassured by what he had learned of the attitude of the Government of India during his visit to that country, and, as I would be aware, the Government of China had always regarded Tibet as part of the Republic.[722] When recently a suggestion had been made for the opening of a route through Tibet we . . [the British] . . had appeared reluctant to agree. I . . [Eden] . . replied that my impression was that reluctance to which he referred was due to physical difficulties in the country and not to political ones.[723]

Soong and Eden then agreed to return to this topic when the former visited London later in the year.

Soong's views were immediately communicated to India, where Caroe was able to advise the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, on how to

react.[724] The first point was to go through the history of Sino-Tibetan relations from the fall of the Manchus to the present, emphasising that in Manchu times Tibet had indeed acknowledged Chinese suzerainty; but that the meaning of suzerainty had since, particularly after China's failure to sign the Simla Convention, worn rather thin. In 1940, at the time of the installation of the 14th Dalai Lama, the Chinese had declared that "China promised not to interfere in the development of Tibet along Tibetan lines" and that "the Tibetan Government must not continue to think that China has any bad intentions towards Tibet". The Government of India had to stress that "the relationship between China and Tibet is not a matter which can be unilaterally decided by China" but one on which the Tibetans were entitled both to their own opinions and, if need be, to British diplomatic support.

On the Trans Tibet Transport question Linlithgow was equally well briefed. There were sound practical reasons, geographical and meteorological, why the Rima Road from Assam to China could not be constructed in less than three years, if indeed it were practicable at all. Instead, the Government of India had encouraged the development of the pack route to China from Kalimpong, in which project one of the major obstacles was the Chinese attempt to impose route inspectors upon the Tibetans. The Chinese had also opposed a tripartite Tibetan-British-Chinese agreement over the general conduct of this route, despite the British readiness to use such an occasion to provide substantial finance mainly for the purchase of essential goods destined for China. All the same, the Government of India had kept on trying; and if the results were not all that could be hoped for, the Chinese only had themselves to blame.

This Indian riposte to the Soong-Eden conversation was duly communicated in full to the State Department by the British Embassy in Washington.[725] It constituted, therefore, the opening British position for the record in the 1943 negotiations over Tibetan status. The American reply was interesting as an explicit statement by the United States Government on this question. The United States Government, declared the State Department,

> has borne in mind the fact that the Chinese Government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet and that the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China. This Government . . [of the United States of America] . . has at no time raised a question regarding either of these claims.[726]

The State Department were not impressed by the subtleties of Caroe's argument. Whatever suzerainty might or might not mean, and whatever might or might not have happened after the fall of the Manchus in 1911, the fact was that the United States Government had to all intents and purposes always accepted Tibet as part of China.

When Caroe brought about the resurrection of the abortive Simla Convention he also gave a fresh lease of life to the term "suzerainty". One consequence of the Soong-Eden conversation of 15 March 1943 was to make the Foreign Office in London wonder whether "suzerainty" was such a good idea after all. It hampered Tibetan freedom in the making of treaties relating to the Indian border, notably the McMahon Line which the Government of India would, so Ashley Clarke of the Foreign Office noted, like to see buttressed by "a new and more binding agreement with Lhasa that might also prove to be a safeguard against Chinese pretensions in time to come". But, Ashley Clarke continued in a letter to R.T. Peel of the India Office,

> even if the rejection of Chinese suzerainty is not essential in the interests of India, it may nevertheless be desirable that we should free ourselves from any commitment for the following further reason. Although Dr. Soong, in speaking to Mr. Eden in Washington, declared that China had no territorial ambitions of any kind in (among other territories) Burma or Malaya, there are grounds for fearing that the Chinese nevertheless hope to bring these and other colonial territories of the Western Powers within their orbit. This part of the programme is presented as an unselfish desire on the part of the Chinese to secure for their neighbours the same freedom from foreign imperialism which they themselves desire. . . . The Atlantic Charter is invoked by the Chinese propagandists on behalf of the native races of the colonies, but when it comes to Tibet and Mongolia, which have successfully emancipated themselves from Chinese domination, we are required to accept an *ex parte* statement that these territories form part of the Republic of China, and are told that any tendency to dispute this would be offensive to the Chinese.

Chinese "suzerainty" in Tibet, in other words, could perhaps be exploited by China as a precedent for Chinese "suzerainty" in Burma or Malaya.

The problem, of course, was how to get rid of "suzerainty". The best that Ashley Clarke could suggest was a return to Lord Curzon's Memorandum of 26 August 1921. In that since then China had failed to enter into any kind of formal agreement with the British and the Tibetans, the British could argue that they were now free to abandon their previous position. "Alternatively", he went on, "we should frankly state that in the new state of affairs created by the war and particularly by the Atlantic Charter our previous attitude is no longer valid".[727]

The India Office considered that there was indeed merit in Ashley Clarke's argument. Perhaps it might be a good idea to discard of "suzerainty" once and for all. The question was discussed at length by India Office and Foreign Office officials, including Peel and Ashley Clarke, at a meeting at the India Office on 18 May 1943 in which the general feeling was that at the least the British recognition

of Chinese suzerainty in Tibet should be made conditional on a formal and unambiguous Chinese recognition of Tibetan autonomy.[728] However, the views of the Government of India were clearly called for before any decision could be reached, and it would be as well to have some idea as to American reactions.[729] Algernon Rumbold also subsequently pointed to a possible danger of some gravity in the Foreign Office line of reasoning, namely that the "reference to the ideas embodied in the Atlantic Charter . . . is open to the objection that the Chinese might reply that what is good for Tibet on abstract grounds should be equally good for India".[730]

At this point, however, Churchill himself took a hand, probably quite unaware of what was going on in Whitehall. At a meeting of the Pacific War Council in Washington on 20 May 1943 the Prime Minister declared, in reply to a denial by T.V. Soong of the hostile presence of Chinese troops on the Tibetan borders, that "no one contested Chinese suzerainty . . [over Tibet] . . and that the essential thing now was to avoid making any new difficulties".[731] Ashley Clarke's proposals, whatever else they might have achieved, would certainly have created "new difficulties" in Anglo-Chinese relations. Eden thought that Churchill's remarks did not invalidate instructions already sent to Chungking to the effect that British recognition of Chinese suzerainty in Tibet should be made conditional upon Chinese recognition of Tibet's autonomy.[732] It would have been naïve indeed, however, to suppose that such Chinese recognition would be obtained easily.[733]

The Caroe reply to the suggested disposal of "suzerainty" came quickly enough. The Government of India were of the view that while

> the proposal to adjust British policy towards the non-recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet may in certain circumstances be found well suited to maintain Tibetan buffer and might have to be revived, we are in general well content with linking of Chinese suzerainty with Tibetan autonomy.

The real need was for a good definition of "suzerainty" rather than its removal from the equation. What the Government of India wanted "suzerainty" to mean was something rather different from the Fowler definition which implied that one state under suzerainty of another had no right to conduct its own foreign relations. The Indian requirement was a state which could do otherwise. The Government of India should be free

> as at present to deal in Lhasa through the newly established Tibetan Foreign Office and that we should be prepared, if the Tibetans should propose it, to consider appointment of Tibetan Agent in India on grounds that Indo-Tibetan dealings in many matters including trade would justify such an appointment as complementary to the British Mission in Lhasa. Chinese susceptibilities could presumably be met by

> declining to give such agent full diplomatic status seeing that our own representation in Tibet is not at diplomatic level.

If T.V. Soong by claiming Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was in fact accepting this state of affairs, then this was "a great point gained".[734] The major objective of the Caroe doctrine, which had been steadily refined since the distribution of "The Mongolian Fringe" in early 1940, was to be found in the fact that

> our . . [Government of India] . . support for Tibetan autonomy is part of our policy of protecting India's land frontier against any eventuality with a succession of buffer states which include Persia, Afghanistan and Nepal as well as Tibet. Other considerations are, firstly that the Tibetans would be restive under Chinese control and Tibet would become an uncomfortable neighbour for India, and secondly that, while at present any disputes with Tibet can generally be settled locally on their merits, the Chinese Government once in control of Tibet would be likely to make the settlement of such disputes contingent on concessions in a wider diplomatic sphere. Moreover, there is an old Manchu claim to suzerainty over Nepal which is vital on recruiting grounds for the Indian Army and once the Chinese Government were established in Tibet they might seek to exploit this claim. Claims could conceivably be extended to Sikkim and Bhutan as well. Thus the elimination of Tibet would increase rather than decrease the possibility of friction between China and India.[735]

It did not really matter what the theoretical status of Tibet was so long as in practice that bit of it which served as a buffer for British India remained in effect autonomous. This was precisely what the abortive Simla Convention was designed to do, conceding to China the principle of suzerainty while reserving for Outer Tibet (which was the buffer part) practical autonomy. Caroe's resurrection of the Convention in 1936-38, while in some respects highly unorthodox, yet had a certain rationale behind it.

In the final analysis the supreme achievement of the Simla Convention as it had evolved in the thinking of the Caroe school of geopoliticians was that it could be interpreted to define "suzerainty" in Outer Tibet in a specific way to mean that, while the Chinese might have some vague symbolic rights over the place (perhaps a little bit as the British Monarch, even after the Reformation, retained the title "Defender of the Faith"), to the west of the Inner-Outer Tibet border the Chinese writ did not run in any practical sense. Outer Tibet must never be allowed to become part of the administrative structure of a future Chinese regime. It must always retain control over its internal affairs. It must never be garrisoned by Chinese troops. It must never be used as a channel for direct Chinese communication with Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal. It did not matter, if all this could be achieved, quite how peculiar the actual theocratic government of Outer Tibet was. The British were not in the business of charitable works, the

creation of democratic institutions on the Westminster model, or social reform to the north of the Himalayas.[736]

It was here that the real long term weakness of the Caroe doctrine lay. Was it really possible that the essentially 18th century Tibetan theocracy could survive any serious attempt by the Chinese to enforce "suzerainty", let alone "sovereignty", in a way acceptable to their political ideology, be it that of the Kuomintang or, after 1949, the Communists? Only, it seemed, if there were some guarantee that the physical presence of China in Outer Tibet would be severely limited by external diplomatic pressures, which in all probability would have to be reinforced by military intervention. It was not enough to get the Chinese to say that a nominal "suzerainty" which did not interfere with effective internal Tibetan autonomy was all that they were after, as Wu Chung-hsin had put it in 1940. In the end, the implementation of the current Chinese idea of China's rights in Tibet would mean the eventual return to something nearer the position of 1910-12 than that which had evolved *de facto* since the fall of the Manchus.

An appreciation of the real implications of the Caroe doctrine, however, still lay in the future. At the moment the main problem, once the Government of India's views were to hand, was to draft a suitable definition of "suzerainty" in time for T.V. Soong's forthcoming visit to London. A document was prepared by the Foreign Office (in close consultation with the India Office). This was approved by the War Cabinet on 7 July 1943; and was duly despatched on 22 July 1943 both to Sir Horace Seymour in Chungking (for his own information and not to be communicated to the Chinese at that time) and to the British Embassy in Washington which in due course (but only after receiving specific instructions to do so) presented a copy to the State Department.[737] Often referred to as the Eden Memorandum on Tibet, it established a correlation between British recognition of Chinese suzerainty in Tibet and Chinese acceptance of Tibetan autonomy and made it clear that "His Majesty's Government do not feel themselves committed to regard China as the suzerain unless she in turn agrees to Tibetan autonomy".[738] In the event that

> the Chinese Government contemplate the withdrawal of Tibetan autonomy, His Majesty's Government and the Government of India must ask themselves whether, in the changed circumstances of to-day, it would be right for them to continue to recognise even a theoretical status of subservience for a people who desire to be free and have, in fact, maintained their freedom for more than thirty years.[739]

Eden saw T.V. Soong in London on 26 July 1943, when the conversation, after a passing mention of the Tibetan suzerainty issue, was mainly concerned with problems of roads and transport of goods from India to China by way of Tibet.[740] The two met again on 28 July when the status of Tibet took a more prominent place in the

discussions. Soong told Eden that China had no territorial ambitions in Tibet but hoped that the British would recognise Tibet as part of the "Chinese dominions". Eden then agreed to confirm in writing the definitive British position on the question, which he evidently suggested verbally at the time was not so far removed from that which Soong appeared to indicate was China's (the British, after all, approved of Dominions), in a confidential memorandum to be sent on later. This was in fact only ready and despatched in early August after T.V. Soong had returned to Washington to attend, along with Churchill, another meeting of the Pacific War Council at which Tibet does not seem to have been on the agenda.[741]

The British statement was a rather less blunt version of the Eden Memorandum of 22 July approved by the War Cabinet (which had not been shown to Soong). Now the key wording on the suzerainty question declared that the British Government

> have always been prepared to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but only on the understanding that Tibet is regarded as autonomous. Neither the British Government nor the Government of India have any territorial ambitions in Tibet but they are interested in friendly relations with, and the preservation of peaceful conditions in, an area which is coterminous with the North-East frontiers of India. They would welcome any amicable arrangements which the Chinese Government might be disposed to make with Tibet whereby the latter recognised Chinese suzerainty in return for an agreed frontier and an undertaking to recognise Tibetan autonomy and they would gladly offer any help desired by both parties to this end.[742]

Soong appears to have made no direct comment on all this when it finally caught up with him – it could just be argued that it did not depart fundamentally from what he had said to Eden on 28 July, and he was not particularly anxious to engage in further discussion on a topic so fraught with difficulties; but in subsequent conversation with British and American officials in Washington in September 1943, including Sir George Sansom (Minister at the British Embassy) and Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck (Assistant Adviser on Political Relations at the State Department), he made it quite clear that he considered that Tibet was an integral part of China and the question of Sino-Tibetan relations was a purely Chinese domestic matter. He admitted that by virtue of geography British India did have some kind of special interest in Tibet, but "affirmed that politically and in law Chinese claims stand on far firmer ground than do British claims".[743] These remarks could well be taken to constitute Soong's reply to Eden's August 1943 memorandum.

In the opinion of Sir Horace Seymour, the British Ambassador in Chungking, expressed before the Eden Memorandum of 22 July had reached him, it was really rather pointless to press the Chinese on Tibet "unless and until we are prepared seriously to tackle the

problem of finding a solution acceptable to us, the Tibetans and the Chinese Government". He had no doubt that Chinese influence in Tibet would be reasserted one day; but he did not think that while the war was still on the Chinese Government would be so foolish as to seek a solution by force of arms.[744] He believed, indeed, that many of the rumours of impending Chinese invasion could well have been spread by the Tibetans themselves in the hope of influencing the Government of India to do something more on their behalf. "They have" Sir Horace Seymour observed, "done this before, having, not unnaturally, an exaggerated belief in the efficacy of our intervention with the Chinese Government". Sir Horace Seymour also considered it unlikely that any British statements about the nature of suzerainty would impress the Americans who had "at no time questioned that Tibet was Chinese territory".[745]

In October 1943 both Ashley Clarke from the Foreign Office and Sir Arthur Blackburn, a veteran of the China Consular Service who represented the views of the British Embassy in Chungking, visited Washington where, along with Sir George Sansom, they discussed the whole Tibet question with Dr. Hornbeck. The State Department appeared to have adopted an attitude of "benevolent neutrality" towards the status of Tibet. They would not go along with the possible declaration of Tibetan independence which was, when all was said and done, implied in the Eden Memorandum of 22 July; but nor was it likely that American opinion would welcome a Chinese invasion of Lhasa controlled territory which, in consequence, was now improbable. The British, therefore, Ashley Clarke told the India Office, should be content with the fact that T.V. Soong had not seen fit to make any formal reply to Eden's memorandum following their meeting on 28 July. Soong, so Hornbeck reported to his British visitors, had said that "Tibet was such a small matter that we ought not to allow it to come between us and disturb good Anglo-Chinese relations". Hornbeck had replied to the Chinese statesman that it was now "open to the British to reply *tu quoque*" and he doubted whether they would go on being difficult. A climb down all round seemed to be called for. Ashley Clarke thought that the Chinese had been sufficiently deterred and

> it seems to us that we are unlikely to add to these restraints by repeated representations which would, on the other hand, certainly cause increased resentment in Chungking. So far as the record is concerned we are in the position of having put in our views in writing without having provoked an uncompromising rebuttal.

As far as Anglo-American relations were concerned – which were far more important than what went on between the British and the Chinese – Hornbeck and Ashley Clarke clarified the position to their mutual satisfaction. The official American attitude, Clarke reported,

was that "the State Department had never found it necessary to take up any position towards the Chinese claim that Tibet was an integral part of China". The nature of suzerainty was also discussed and the British attitude revealed as flexible. Ashley Clarke

> admitted that our . . [British] . . formula was imprecise, but we were not trying to force on China a precise definition of Sino-Tibetan relationships but rather to prevent a disturbance of the existing relationship. As for Chinese apprehensions, no British imperialist venture had developed in Tibet during the past thirty years of her *de facto* autonomy and there was really no reason why the Chinese should seriously think that it was going to happen now.[746]

In a way at this point the Foreign Office had come to the same conclusion as had Sir Horace Seymour in Chungking before the circulation of the 22 July 1943 Eden Memorandum, namely that to argue in detail about the nature of Chinese suzerainty in Tibet was a waste of time. Lip service might be paid to the Eden Memorandum, but when it came to Tibet the Foreign Office from henceforth was essentially "pragmatic".

The suzerainty issue was really rather academic. The real problem of Indo-Tibetan relations was whether the Chinese were going to emulate Chao Erh-feng and send an army to occupy the Tibetan capital, suzerainty or no suzerainty. Caroe was in late 1943 pointing to evidence that the Chinese might sooner or later do just this. The Sikang-Ch'inghai motor road was rapidly nearing completion and a telegraph line from Tachienlu (Kangting) was approaching Jyekundo.[747] What was it all for if not to provide the logistic support for a Chinese drive on Lhasa? Tolstoy had reported that Ma Pu-fang, the ruler of Ch'inghai, had told him that the Chinese intended soon to push a road through from Jyekundo to Chamdo and Lhasa, and that this, clearly, would make a Sino-Tibetan war inevitable. Caroe was inclined to agree with Sir Eric Teichman, however, that there would be no Chinese attack on Tibet until after the War. Tolstoy was merely revamping outdated gossip. Ma Pu-fang was far too much concerned, Teichman considered, with the preservation of his Moslem army for defence against the Kuomintang to allow himself to be diverted into Tibetan adventures.

What happened after the War was, of course, another matter. Caroe thought that

> the Kuomintang would have to deal first with the Communists possibly supported by Stalin through Mongolia (if Russia ever joins in the war against Japan); they also have a considerable problem in respect of their Mahommadans in the North West and they might find it necessary to deal with these two problems before they turn towards Tibet; meanwhile much would have occurred which might induce the Chinese Central Government to decide to negotiate with Tibet rather than to attack.

He did not believe, as Teichman evidently did, that the moment the war was over the Chinese would try to deal with Tibet before any of their other Inner Asian problems. In any case, he concluded,

> we can only wait and see and meanwhile we should continue with our efforts to educate American opinion, at any rate in the War and State Departments, in the hope that they will ultimately decide that this is not a mere exhibition of British Imperialism but is a case in which they can honestly and properly support us in attempting to secure the autonomy of Tibet.[748]

The overall impression to be derived from Caroe's observations at this period was that he could not really make up his mind about the gravity of the Chinese threat. Where Teichman considered that it was inevitable that the Chinese would eventually take over Tibet when the War was over, Caroe wanted to believe that there was a course of action open to the Government of India which would avert this catastrophe even if he could not explain exactly what could be done. The Tibetan problem was far from simple, not least because, as we shall see below, the Government of India wanted not only that China keep out of Outer Tibet but also that Outer Tibet refrain from claiming bits of what it was argued was the Indian Empire.

In 1944 the geopolitical picture changed rapidly. While there could be little doubt that in the end the Allies would defeat Japan, the Japanese army on the Asian mainland was showing no signs of decline. It embarked on both the invasion of India from Burma through Assam and a formidable offensive (*Ichigo*) directed against advanced American airfields in China like Kweilin and Liuchow and which for a while appeared to threaten Chungking itself. Sino-American command squabbles and the manifest deficiencies of the Chinese army which became all too evident during the course of 1944 contributed to the decline in the prestige in Washington of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang in a year which saw the Anglo-American Alliance prepare and execute the massive invasion of Europe.[749] The British probably carried more "clout" in Washington in 1944 than they had in 1943. The Americans were less inclined to express opinions about British idiosyncrasies such as their views on the status of Tibet.

The altered climate of opinion is, perhaps, reflected in a memorandum of April 1944 by O. Edmund Clubb of the Division of Chinese Affairs of the State Department who observed that, in considering questions of Trans Tibet Transport (in which Donovan of the OSS continued to show considerable interest),

> any arrangements which might be undertaken should be made with primary reference to and in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan authorities themselves . . . It is felt that any action which the United States might take in this general connection should be designed carefully to avoid United States involvement in international politics respecting the status of Tibet.[750]

Caroe was now freer to conduct a Tibetan policy without having to keep such a close watch on American official opinion in Chungking and Washington.

1944 did not, however, see any Chinese loss of interest in Tibet, even if the alarms and excursions of 1943 were not to be repeated. In January 1944 Shen Tsung-lien, who had headed the Chinese Cultural and Educational Mission to India in 1943, was appointed Chairman of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in the place of Wu Chung-hsin (that official who had attended the Dalai Lama's installation in 1940), thus bringing to this post first hand experience of British India; and by April he was on his way to Tibet to replace Dr. Kung.[751] Shen Tsung-lien had not previously served in the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission; but he was close to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. He brought with him an entourage of three servants (including two cooks) and thirteen others which resulted in the by now habitual argument with the Indian Government about visas before being allowed to go on his way via Sikkim (where he stayed with Sir Basil Gould at the Gangtok Residency after a visit to New Delhi) to his new post. He described his position as that of "Resident Minister of the Chinese National Government in Tibet". Shen Tsung-lien (who should not be confused with Shen Shih-hua, the Chinese Commissioner in India since 1942) was a scholar who had studied at both Harvard and the Sorbonne before holding senior academic appointments in Chinese universities. His field was history; and he was in no doubt in his own mind on the basis of the past record that Tibet was part of China and the Tibetans were among the Five Races who made up the population of the Chinese Republic. He could, of course, communicate with British officials without the need for an interpreter.[752]

In early May 1944 in New Delhi Shen called on Caroe with whom he got on famously: they had already met the year before when Shen had stayed in Caroe's house.[753] Shen was really a mandarin who in another incarnation would have done well at Winchester. Caroe called him "a pleasant and eminently reasonable individual". Shen said that he had instructions from Chiang Kai-shek to work in the closest co-operation with the Government of India.

In early July Shen, while the guest of Basil Gould in Gangtok, talked at considerable length about Chinese policy towards Tibet. His brief, he told Gould, was to try to bring about an agreed Sino-Tibetan border. While he was empowered to work with the British in Tibet on such joint projects as education and the provision of medical facilities, on the basic issue of Tibetan status his orders were unambiguous. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek "could not regard Tibet otherwise than as an integral part of China" and there could be no question, if only because of the strength of Chinese public opinion on the matter, of anything like a tripartite agreement along

the lines of the Simla proposals of 1913-14. Nor would the Generalissimo tolerate the inclusion of the question of Tibet in any Allied deliberations once the War was over (which was perhaps a veiled reference to the prospect of a Tibetan presence at the Peace Conference raised by Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy when they were in Lhasa). What Shen said he really wanted was to achieve an amicable solution with the British on Tibet which did not conflict with basic Chinese beliefs but which, at the same time, met British Indian requirements: any formal agreement would, of course, be between the Chinese and the British on the basis of what the Chinese on their own had managed to negotiate with the Tibetans.

Like Caroe, Gould found Shen a good fellow, with "a frank and conciliatory manner". Above all, "he strikes me as an able man", an accolade not often bestowed upon Chinese officials by senior servants of the British Indian Empire. He was also, Gould implied, potentially extremely dangerous to British interests. He was well provided with funds and he evidently intended, apart from his Tibetan policy, to set up a base at Kalimpong for the extension of Chinese influence, if only cultural and ideological, in British India.[754] It was indeed a wise decision, confirmed in early April 1944, to send Gould on another Mission to Lhasa.[755] Shen, who had reached the Tibetan capital by the beginning of August, clearly needed careful watching.

The Gould Mission had two major categories of objectives. One, concerned with Indo-Tibetan frontier matters, will be considered in a later Chapter. The other was to ascertain the degree to which Chinese influence in Lhasa was increasing and what its ultimate shape might be unless resisted by the full exploitation of Gould's enormous prestige with the Kashag and the Tibetan elite.

The Chinese had of late been persistently showing Tibet on their maps as a Chinese Province. There had been announcements in the Chinese press that the Chungking Government intended shortly to open branches of the Central Bank of China in Lhasa and other Tibetan centres of population. There were reports that on his recent elevation to the position of President of China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had received congratulatory messages from the Tibetan Government which could be made to imply that they too accepted him as their President and acknowledged Tibet as part of China. Chinese broadcasts directed towards the United States proclaimed that the integration of all of Tibet into China was proceeding apace. There were Chinese press statements that a 10th Panchen Lama had not only been found but formally enthroned in the presence of a leading Kuomintang official. In the revised version of Chiang Kai-shek's *China's Destiny* (his equivalent of Chairman Mao's *Thoughts* of a later period) it was said that the Tibetans, along with the Manchus, Mongols and Moslems, were of the same ancestral origin as the Han (as indeed Caroe had more than implied in "The Mongolian

Fringe").[756] So long as the war with Japan went on, Gould thought, all this did not matter much and the Tibetans were not particularly impressed by theoretical Chinese pronouncements. What, however, would happen after the eventual Allied victory which was no longer in any doubt?

Caroe pointed out that after the war "it will be no less important ... to maintain the Tibetan buffer". Gould, therefore, during his Lhasa mission ought

> to make an attempt to bring the Tibetan Government to a realization of the dangers into which their apparent apathy is leading them. We would propose therefore that he should remind the Tibetan Government that His Majesty's Government's policy remains what it always has been, namely, willingness to recognise Chinese suzerainty over Tibet provided that the Chinese on their part recognise Tibet's local autonomy within agreed frontiers. He should reaffirm that His Majesty's Government and the Government of India are as before ready to implement this policy by giving Tibet the fullest diplomatic support vis-à-vis the Chinese Government and by the supply of reasonable quantities of munitions, by assisting them in developing education and by aiding in the improvement of trade and so on. But he should remind the Tibetan Government that His Majesty's Government's diplomatic support depends on their maintaining their own position. Many examples can be quoted ... of their apparent failure to do this in recent months and it is more than ever important that the Tibetan Government should take heed of their position in the face of the Chinese Government's publicity to create the belief in America and elsewhere that Tibet is no more than a province of China.

Apart from these general considerations the Government of India added that

> We would suggest that further specific proposals be put to the Tibetan Government to maintain a representative with the Government of India with headquarters in Gangtok and to take a suitable opportunity of sending an envoy with presents to the President of the United States of America in return for those which he sent to the Dalai Lama .. [via Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy] .. two years ago. On our part, we propose to promote certain practical measures to strengthen the link between India and Tibet, e.g. by the establishment of an English school in Lhasa, ... by broadcasting in Tibetan from Gangtok and by pursuing steadily our aim of improving communications with Tibet via Sikkim up to light M.T. .. [motor transport] .. standard.[757]

Gould reached Lhasa on 31 August 1944 to attempt to implement this updated definition of the Caroe doctrine; and he remained there until 12 December 1944 when it had become obvious that he would make no further progress.

Soon after his arrival he had the first of a series of talks with Shen in which the Chinese attitude became much clearer. Shen pointed out

that there were two major obstacles in the way of smooth post-War Anglo-Chinese relations. One was Hong Kong and the other Tibet. As far as Tibet was concerned, Shen said that China was prepared to concede internal autonomy but insisted on control over Tibetan external relations. China appeared, so Gould concluded from the tone of the talks, to have no particular interest in either Nepal or Bhutan which were never really considered to have been under China in the past. Shen thought that it was only a group of lay officials in Tibet who actually were in favour of a closer British connection: most of the monasteries were pro-Chinese.[758]

In a subsequent meeting Shen further explained the Chinese position. As Tibet was part of China, Shen said, there could be no question of any settlement by means of a Sino-Tibetan treaty which, in the circumstances, would be both absurd and superfluous: one part of one country did not make treaties with another part of the same country. Gould was assured, however, that China had no desire either to station troops and officials (other than those in the Lhasa mission) in Tibet or to interfere in any way with its internal administration. China was quite prepared to co-operate with the British in the exploitation of Tibet's mineral wealth. China accepted "that Tibet might be regarded as a predominantly religious area outside the sphere of ordinary politics". As far as the Simla Convention and the 1914 Trade Regulations were concerned, while China could accept neither as binding, yet much of what they contained could be covered by an Anglo-Tibetan exchange of notes at a conference after the War. Finally, while the principle of Tibetan internal self government was accepted, Chinese public opinion would not permit the terms "autonomy" or "suzerainty" to appear in any formal agreement be it treaty or notes exchanged.[759]

In yet another meeting Shen endeavoured to establish a definition of the physical limits of Outer Tibet, which he thought was divided from Sikang more or less along the line of the Yangtze and included the Isu Razi Pass (a key point in British eyes on the McMahon Line near or at its Burmese terminus) and territory just to the west of Jyekundo which Ma Pu-fang would certainly like to seize were it not that he was being restrained by Chiang Kai-shek.[760] Such a Tibet, which contained much land which the Chinese had hitherto maintained was part of Ch'inghai and Sikang, would still have no control over its external affairs.[761] To Gould and Caroe this meant that any negotiations about the McMahon Line, another of Gould's major objectives which will be considered in a later Chapter, would have to be conducted with the Chinese rather than the Tibetans (even if the Line bounded Outer Tibet rather than China proper). Subsequently, perhaps after reference by wireless with his masters in Chungking, Shen seems to have changed his mind about the Sino-Tibetan border which he now stated ought to run, as the Kuomintang

(following the precedents of Chao Erh-feng in 1910 and Chen I-fan in 1913-1914) consistently maintained, to the west of Giamda, which brought most of the McMahon Line back into territory which the Chinese considered to be part of an established Province, Sikang.[762]

Shen also confirmed in yet another meeting with Gould that Chiang Kai-shek had not forgotten about the possibilities of Tibet as a line of communication between India and China. The favoured route now was from Jyekundo to Lhasa by way of Nagchuka (the Changlam Road), and then down through Sikkim into India, a departure from the previous Chinese preference for either the Gyalam route from Kangting (Tachienlu) via Chamdo or the Rima Road entering India along the Lohit.[763]

Some of the meetings between Shen and Gould were also attended by A.T. Steele, an American journalist working for *Life*, the Minneapolis *Star Journal* and the Chicago *Daily News*, who had been permitted by and through the good offices of the Government of India to visit Lhasa in September 1944 as part of Caroe's policy of "educating" American opinion.[764] Steele did produce a number of articles in the United States which pointed to the non-Chinese nature of Tibet; but he had no significant impact upon either the course of events or the evolution of policy and attitudes.

The Kashag were clearly alarmed by what they gathered Shen and Gould were talking about. They told Gould that they were insisting on Tibetan independence (or, at least, total autonomy).[765] They wanted to be represented at the Peace Conference which would be convened after the War. They had heard of the recent joint declaration by Vice President Wallace of the United States and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek concerning the end of imperialism or colonialism in Asia which they considered applied to Tibet vis-à-vis China as much as to any other colonial or potentially colonial relationships.[766]

The Government of India were far from happy with the Shen-Gould discussions. They did not really trust the Chinese when they said they would not interfere with the internal affairs of Tibet. Caroe believed that in the end, if not checked, the approach indicated by Shen would lead to the return of Chinese military and political power in Central Tibet much as had been established in 1910-12. The revised definition of the Outer Tibet-Sikang border, drawn westwards from Shen's original essentially Yangtze proposal to Giamda, was particularly unpleasing. Apart from an instinctive British distaste for the presence of another colonial regime, and an Asian one at that, so close to the heart of the British Indian Empire, there was also the immediate and serious problem of the definition of borders which it was clear had not been solved in 1914. Caroe thought one line of diplomacy worth exploring was to try to secure from China the application "to Tibet of the analogy of British Dominion or Soviet

Autonomous Republic in respect of direct foreign relations". Leaving aside the rather inappropriate reference to the way in which foreign policy was conducted in Stalin's Russia, the British Dominion model had been one which Teichman had suggested as early as 1920.[767] It was a good one in principle; but there would seem to be no precedent for it in Chinese tradition. How in practice could it be introduced into Tibet?

In the end Caroe came to two conclusions. First: that there was no way that some such sovereign or quasi-sovereign status could be brought about by the back door as it were by getting Tibet a seat at the post-War Peace Conference because, when all was said and done, Tibet was not in its own right a belligerent. The somewhat revolutionary idea (in the context of the previous history of Anglo-Tibetan relations) of encouraging Tibet to have its own representative (Agent) in India and embarking on diplomatic ventures like despatching envoys to the United States, which as we have seen was floated at the beginning of the Gould Mission, was evidently abandoned. Second: whatever token concessions to China might be made to save Chinese face, at the end of the day nothing must be agreed to which would "impair validity" of the 1914 Simla Convention.[768] There was also a paradox, which will be discussed at length in a later Chapter, in that while claiming to defend effective Tibetan autonomy and freedom of internal administration the Government of India were at the same time laying their own claim to territory, in the shape of Tawang in particular, which the Tibetans clearly considered to be theirs despite anything that might have been said in 1914.

All things considered, what was Gould before he left Lhasa to tell the Kashag about British policy? How far were the British prepared to go to defend Tibetan independence or autonomy or whatever other term one might use to describe freedom from Chinese control, and what guarantees could be given? Would the Government of India, for example, offer to fight China in defence of the autonomy of Outer Tibet? In the end, before leaving Lhasa on 12 December 1944 Sir Basil Gould offered the Kashag some vague expressions of goodwill on the part of the Government of India, and, so R. Peel of the India Office minuted, "the Tibetans reacted well to the rather guarded promise of diplomatic support in the maintenance of their autonomy" without either demanding specific British commitments or, which was even better, raising yet again uncomfortable arguments about the whereabouts of the true Indo-Tibetan border in the Assam Himalayas.[769]

Shen evidently thought that he had made some progress with the British in the Chinese interest; and in January 1945 he was suggesting (with, it seemed, the approval of Chiang Kai-shek) that there might be some value in an Anglo-Chinese (strictly bilateral) Conference in

New Delhi intended, it is to be presumed, to produce a document to replace the abortive Simla Convention of 1914. The Government of India did not think this a good idea; and the India Office supported them.[770] The Foreign Office, however, while not expressly favouring such a Conference, were now increasingly inclined to consider that British policy towards Tibet as established in the Eden Memorandum of 22 July 1943 was outdated and in need of reassessment. Fresh problems for the Government of India were arising on the Tibetan horizon.

The central issue which concerned the Foreign Office was the effect that the Tibetan question might have on the shape of post-War British relations with China. The Chinese had included Tibet as part of China in the Kuomintang Manifesto of 1935 and the Draft Constitution of 1936 (which was currently undergoing revision). Was it really worth resisting what might turn out to be even more specific Chinese claims over Tibet? What was the importance, with all the recent developments in the technology of war on land and in the air, of the Tibetan buffer to the defence of India? Was it to remain British policy to permit Tibet to "remain indefinitely in her present state of seclusion"?[771]

The India Office were alarmed. The last thing they now wanted was a departure from the Caroe doctrine or the principles of the Eden Memorandum of 22 July 1943 (which if they did not coincide on all points at least marched parallel to each other). For the Caroe doctrine, with its concern for unresolved border questions, the Tibetan buffer was crucial. It looked as if Teichman's "defeatist" view that China was bound to absorb Tibet sooner or later had infected the Foreign Office and that, in these circumstances, the diplomats were preparing to make the best of a bad job and use Tibet as a possible bargaining counter in exchange for Chinese concessions over the future of Hong Kong. Peel at the India Office lost no time in warning Caroe of what was in the wind.[772]

A triangular struggle which was to persist until the end of the British period in India (and which will be examined in detail in a later Chapter) now developed over the nature of Tibetan policy. The Foreign Office, influenced by the wider problems of Anglo-Chinese relations, wished to discover a formula which would in some way satisfy Chinese aspirations towards Tibet without making too great an enemy of the Indian establishment. The Government of India, confronted with real administrative problems along the Indo-Tibetan border, adhered with determination to as many elements of the Caroe doctrine, even though Caroe himself in 1946 (by now Sir Olaf) had moved on from the External Department to govern the North-West Frontier Province, as could be retained in the face of Whitehall sniping. Why could not the British achieve in Tibet at least something like that which the Russians had managed to secure in Outer

Mongolia?[773] The India Office carried on a balancing act between the diplomats and the Imperial bureaucrats.

Throughout the first half of 1945, as the War drew to its close, the Kuomintang explored the constitutional shape of a China free of Japanese invasion (but, it was already becoming all too apparent, about to be confronted with a major challenge from the Communists). The question of the position of the various racial minorities, including the Tibetans, was not ignored. Sun Yat-sen had at one time proposed that these minorities be granted the right of self-determination and self-government along the lines advanced by President Woodrow Wilson after the First World War. Chiang Kai-shek, however, was a firm believer in the theory that they all belonged to one or other of the Five Races who made up the population of the Chinese Republic. Some of them might be allowed to enjoy "local autonomy", a very limited concept which the British Foreign Office were increasingly prepared to equate with that "suzerainty" to which British policy had managed to commit itself so firmly.[774]

Chiang Kai-shek's position was summed up in a statement which he made to the Chinese National Defence Council on 24 August 1945 in which he said that

> I solemnly declare that if Tibetans should at this time express wish for self-Government our Government would, in conformity with our sincere traditions, accord it a very high degree of autonomy. If in the future they fulfil economic requirements for independence, the Nation's Government will as in case of Mongolia . . . help them to attain that status. But Tibet must give proof that it can consolidate its independent position.[775]

The War was now over (officially on 15 August 1945). The Foreign Office certainly did not wish to usher in the peace-time era of Anglo-Chinese relations either with a series of acrimonious exchanges about suzerainty and autonomy in Tibet or, even worse, a questioning of the Generalissimo's good faith, particularly as in the same statement of 24 August Chiang Kai-shek had indicated a conciliatory attitude towards Hong Kong. "I now declare before all the world", Chiang had announced, "the status of Hong Kong which is based on treaties will not be changed without going through negotiations with Britain". The same applied, he said, to Kowloon and the New Territories. There was now even less enthusiasm for the Caroe doctrine in certain quarters in Whitehall.

August 1945 also saw the end of Sir Basil Gould's long tenure of the post of Political Officer in Sikkim, which he handed over to Arthur Hopkinson before going on an extended period of pre-retirement leave.[776]

During the course of 1945, since Gould had left Lhasa, Shen Tsung-lien had not been inactive in Tibet. The Government of India were

convinced that he had played his part in stirring up opposition to the British School in Lhasa, which never reopened after its holiday in January 1945, and in frustrating British medical projects. He was intriguing with Pangda Rapga, then in exile in Kalimpong.[777] Finally, he was arranging for a proposed Tibetan Goodwill Mission to visit China to attend the opening of the Chinese National Assembly, which it was hoped would take place in the latter part of 1945 – it eventually started business in November 1946 with Tibetans present. All this will be discussed in a later Chapter. In January 1946 Shen Tsung-lien left Tibet en route for China via India for consultations with his Government now returned to Nanking; and he never came back. Acting in his place in Lhasa was his assistant Chen Hsi-chang who remained until the Kashag expelled the Chinese mission and all persons connected with the Kuomintang, including doctors, teachers and their families, on 8 July 1949. By this time Shen had formally been replaced by Hsiung Yao-wên who never took up his appointment as head of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Office in Lhasa. Thus ended a Chinese presence which had started with the Mission to Lhasa of General Huang Mu-sung in 1934.[778] The next generation of Chinese officials to reach Lhasa were to be representatives of the victorious Chinese Communists.[779]

638. The Japanese demanded in June 1940 that the British close the Burma Road. The British duly shut the road down on 18 July 1940, hoping thereby to appease the Japanese; but they reopened it again, mainly because of American pressure, on 18 October 1940.

639. United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1942, China*, Washington 1956, p. 626, Cordell Hull to C.E. Gauss, U.S. Ambassador, Chungking, 3 July 1942.

640. Reting went into retirement. In 1945, however, he became involved in monastic political activity which was to result in his arrest by the Kashag and his death in rather mysterious circumstances in 1947. The Reting affair of 1947 is considered below in another Chapter. See also: Shakabpa, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 292-293; H. E. Richardson, "The Rva-screng Conspiracy of 1947", in Aris, M., & Aung San Suu Kyi, *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*, Warminster 1980; H. Harrer, *Seven Years in Tibet*, London 1954, pp. 199-208.
See, also: L/P&S/12/4165, Norbu Dhondup to Sikkim, 23 January 1941.

641. L/P&S/12/4165, Norbu Dhondup to Sikkim, 2 January 1942.

642. In January 1944 George Sherriff, then in charge of the Lhasa mission, discussed with the Kashag the possibility of opening an English school in Lhasa for the sons of the Tibetan elite. It was noted that there were already many such Tibetans at school in Darjeeling. Would it not be better if they could stay in Tibet to study?

The idea seems to have originated with the Kashag, who asked Sherriff for help in recruiting a suitable headmaster. In May 1944 one Mr. Parker was appointed, who arrived in Lhasa on 25 July. The school, with 40 boys of ages between 6 and 17, was formally opened six days later. Immediately fierce monastic opposition broke out; and the major monasteries, rather than permit the school to continue in Lhasa, offered to help finance the education of Tibetan boys in Darjeeling. Drepung, naturally, was in the lead, supported, it was suspected, by the Chinese. The result was that in January 1945 the school was closed for a long holiday, originally stated as four and a half months; but by the end of the month Sherriff was in no doubt that it had been closed for good, and Parker went back to India. Sherriff considered the possibility of running a less formal school within the confines of the British mission; but he doubted whether many boys would turn up. Sherriff did, in fact, give a little bit of private English tuition. The school, however, was never revived and further proposals to this effect were regarded by the Government of India as "imprudent".

Two main reasons, other than Tibetan conservatism, were detected by the Government of India for the fiasco of the English school. First: it was believed that opposition in Lhasa to the new British policy of "vindicating" the McMahon Line, particularly in the Tawang region, had much to do with it. Second: there were the intrigues of Shen Tsung-lien.

For the papers on this episode in Anglo-Tibetan relations, see: L/P&S/12/4216.

643. Raw wool at this time constituted about 90% of Tibet's exports by value. In 1940-41, 155,000 maunds (over 5,000 tons) were exported by way of Kalimpong. This was destined mainly for the United States where it was used for making carpets for the automobile industry. Tibetan wool was not of very high quality when compared to that from Australia, New Zealand and, even, Outer Mongolia. After Pearl Harbour the Government of India began to direct the bulk of this wool towards Indian mills. The price paid, fixed by Government, was kept high; and the Tibetans well knew that if it were reduced they could not avoid financial loss. This became all the more likely as the Indian demand for Tibetan wool declined when it was found that the war had not interrupted supplies from Australia. By the end of 1943 Tibetan wool was again being exported to the U.S.A.

Even more subject to Indian Government control was the supply to Tibet of various consumer goods from India such as cotton cloth, sugar, metalware and the like.

This whole question is discussed by Richardson, *Tibetan Précis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80.

644. Liu Wen-hui considered that his rule over Sikang by whatever title began in 1928. See: L/P&S/12/4182, E.W.P. Mills, Chungking Consulate-General, to Peking, 30 March 1937.

645. L/P&S/12/4182, D.J. Cowan to FO, 15 June 1936, enclosing tracing from map in the *Shen Pao* Atlas in response to a query from the Government of India (inspired by Olaf Caroe) as to exactly what were the claimed borders of Sikang.

646. The Chinese always conceded that the Tawang tract of Tibetan territory, also extending south of the McMahon Line to the edge of the Brahmaputra valley, separated Sikang from Bhutan. Chinese claims to the Tawang tract (the scene of their invasion in 1962) arose from Chinese claims to Tibet rather than to Sikang.

647. L/P&S/12/4182, Chungking-Consulate General to Peking, 9 February 1937.

648. L/P&S/12/4182, Stark Toller, Chungking, to Peking, 8 August 1938.

649. L/P&S/12/4182, Chungking Consulate-General, 7 January 1939.

650. L/P&S/12/4182, A.J. Martin, 20 October 1941, enclosing Vice Consul Franklin's report on a visit to Sikang.

651. L/P&S/12/4182, Teichman to Weightman, Chungking, 31 July 1942.

652. Where he was involved in the negotiations designed to do away with extra-territoriality in China after the War.

653. L/P&S/12/4182, Chungking Intelligence Report, 11 March 1943.

654. For example: L/P&S/12/4182, Stark Toller to Peking, 11 September 1938.

655. Richardson, *Tibetan Précis, op., cit.*, pp. 60-70; J. Snelling, *The Sacred Mountain. Travellers and Pilgrims at Mount Kailas in Western Tibet, and the Great Universal Symbol of the Sacred Mountain*, London 1982, pp. 49-50; Swami Pranavananda, *Kailas-Manasarovar*, Calcutta 1949, pp. 80-81.

656. T.T. Cooper and other advocates of the Lohit route from India to China are discussed in: Lamb, *India and Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 85-86. The background to the Lohit Road project of 1912-14 is discussed in: Lamb, *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, vol. 2.
At the time of the Younghusband Expedition of 1904 there were British advocates of the establishment of a Trade Mart at Rima on the upper reaches of the Lohit.

657. L/P&S/12/3113, IO minute, 12 July 1923; India to Assam, 24 October 1923.

658. See, for example: F. Kingdon Ward, *A Plant Hunter in Tibet*, London 1934; R. Kaulback, *Tibetan Trek*, London 1936.

659. L/P&S/12/4613, Air Ministry to IO, 30 September 1940 enclosing "Report on Strategic Routes alternative to Burma-Yunnan Road" by Flying Officer A. Silcock, R.A.F.V.R.

660. L/P&S/12/4613, Clark Kerr to FO, 20 September 1940.

661. L/P&S/12/4613, Clark Kerr to FO, 13 December 1940.

662. L/P&S/12/4613, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 December 1940.

663. L/P&S/12/4613, Clark Kerr to FO, 25 February 1941.

664. Teichman, *Travels, op. cit.*; R. Kaulback, *Salween*, London 1938.

665. L/P&S/12/4613, India to Secretary of State, 18 March 1941.

666. T.V. Soong, whose sister was married to Chiang Kai-shek, was then Chiang's personal representative in Washington. In December 1941 he was made Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs. One of his sisters had married Sun Yat-sen and another was married to H.H. Kung, a major figure in the financial policies of the Kuomintang. For a lively, if not always scholarly, account of the Soong family, see: S. Seagrave, *The Soong Dynasty*, London 1985.

667. L/P&S/12/4613, Halifax to FO, 5 April 1941.

668. L/P&S/12/4613, IO minute, 15 April 1941.

669. L/P&S/12/4613, Blackburn to FO, 22 April 1941.

670. For which DC2 aircraft would be used, to be supplied by the Chinese out of U.S. aid equipment.

671. L/P&S/12/4613, India to Secretary of State, 12 May 1941.
It is interesting that the Tibetan objections to overflights which prevented the evacuation of Williamson in 1935 seem to have been forgotten.

672. L/P&S/12/4613, Clark Kerr to FO, 15 September 1941.

673. L/P&S/12/4613, IO minute, 15 April 1941.

674. L/P&S/12/4613, India to Secretary of State, 25 July 1941; India to Secretary of State, 29 September 1941; India to Secretary of State, 30 September 1941.

675. L/P&S/12/4613, FO to Clark Kerr, 1 November 1941.

676. L/P&S/12/4613, Clark Kerr, 6 November 1941.

677. L/P&S/12/4613, FO to Clark Kerr, 11 December 1941.

678. L/P&S/12/4613, FO to Clark Kerr, 21 January 1942.

679. From 1941 until the end of the War the Allies gave a great deal of thought to alternative supply routes to China to that which had been provided by the Burma Road. There were, apart from Tibet, a limited number of possibilities.

There had long existed a route of sorts between North-Western India and Sinkiang by way of Gilgit and Hunza and across one or other of the passes of the Karakoram. This was probably one of the most difficult tracks in Asia which was quite unsuitable for the transport of bulk goods like petrol; and it terminated in western Sinkiang which was still a very long way from Chungking. Only since the 1960s, after prodigious engineering effort, has the Karakoram Highway been opened up to motor traffic between Pakistan and China through these mountains.

Another possibility lay through the Soviet Union into Sinkiang by a number of paths. The Soviet Union could only be approached through Iran either from India or from the Persian Gulf. The War resulted in much Allied road construction in Iran including the dramatic highway from Bushire up to the Iranian plateau to Teheran. From there the shortest line to China would be via Meshed and the Russian Central Asian railway system at Ashkhabad. Again, the route would reach China by way of Sinkiang where, apart from its distance from the main Chinese centres of population and administration, the attitude of the Provincial administration towards the Kuomintang was uncertain, to say the least.

There can be no doubt that the Tibetan routes would be preferable on practical grounds, lacking the Burma Road, to any of the alternatives. The major objection to the exploitation of the geographical position of Tibet was political.

There are interesting papers on the Karakoram route in: L/P&S/12/4609 and L/P&S/12/4610. The problems of supply routes to China were most ably surveyed by Sir Horace Seymour in a despatch to Eden from Chungking, dated 4 August 1942, which can be found in: L/P&S/12/4614.

Air routes had obvious advantages. They could be initiated rapidly. The shortest and, in practice, easiest, was the "Hump" route from Assam to Yunnan. Political (and theological) considerations apart, routes over Tibet involved high altitudes approaching the limits of aircraft of the time. The same applied to a possible air route from India via Gilgit to Kashgar. This, of course, would have involved a further long route over Sinkiang before reaching the major Chinese populations centres. Another approach to Sinkiang, from Iran over Afghanistan, was ruled out by the Afghan Government's adamant refusal to permit British or other Allied overflights. This left a roundabout route from Iran via the Soviet Union, which also was not without its problems. No air supply route, as practice was to prove, could carry really significant quantities of bulk supplies like petrol.

For some extremely interesting documents on Anglo-American discussions of supply routes to China, see: United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1942, China*, Washington 1956, pp. 600-605. The Afghan National Assembly resolved in November 1941 that "the use of land or air routes in or through Afghanistan . . [by the Allies] . . must in no circumstances be conceded". See: W. Hayter to State Department, Washington, 10 July 1942.

680. Hugh Richardson had at this time been posted to Chungking as Assistant to the Agent-General for India representing Indian interests with the Chinese Government (from 1943 K.P.S. Menon). This left Norbu Dhondup as head of the Lhasa mission until his replacement in 1942 by Frank Ludlow and his subsequent retirement in 1943 to end forty years service with the British which had begun at the time of the Younghusband Expedition. The British awarded him the O.B.E., then the C.B.E.; and the Tibetans gave him the high rank of Dzasa.

681. L/P&S/12/4613, FO to Washington, 15 May 1942.

682. By the end of 1941, on the eve of the Japanese invasion of Burma, there was a huge backlog of supplies for China both in Rangoon and at the Lashio railhead, some 120,000 tons in all, awaiting transport along the overworked Burma Road. See: Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun. The American War with Japan*, London 1985, p. 327.

683. L/P&S/12/4614, Sir Horace Seymour to FO, 22 May 1942.

684. L/P&S/12/4614, IO minute by R. Peel, 23 May 1942.

685. L/P&S/12/4614, Teichman, Chungking, 6 August 1942. See also: Richardson, *Tibetan Précis, op. cit.*, p. 72.

686. United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1942, China*, Washington 1956, pp. 628-629, Memorandum from J. Carter Vincent to Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, 30 July 1942. Vincent quoted Richardson for the lowest estimate of 700 tons per annum. The Chinese, who had originally hoped for 3,000 tons, had now concluded that 1,000 was a more realistic figure.

687. L/P&S/12/4614, FO to Chungking, 7 June 1942.

688. L/P&S/12/4614, IO minute by Algernon Rumbold, 29 May 1942.

689. L/P&S/12/4614, Seymour to FO, 2 July 1942.

690. L/P&S/12/4614, Seymour to FO, 9 July 1942.

691. L/P&S/12/4614, Seymour to FO, 10 July 1942.

692. L/P&S/12/4614, IO minute by Algernon Rumbold, 14 July 1942.

693. L/P&S/12/4614, Seymour to Eden, 4 August 1942.

694. L/P&S/12/4614, A.L. Scott, FO, to F.G. Newall, WO, 2 September 1942.

695. L/P&S/12/4614, Teichman to India, 19 August 1942.

696. In the first half of 1944 the official figures were that for 6,000 mule loads arriving at Likiang from Lhasa only 600 reached Tachienlu and 300 Sining via Jyekundo. The rise of Likiang must have been costing both Liu Wen-hui and Ma Pu-fang a great deal of money in lost taxes.

697. This must have been an incredibly beautiful drive, the road running for much of its way along the western bank of the great lake of Tali, the Erh Hai. The Burma Road between Siakwan and Kunming was never cut by the Japanese, though they mounted a formidable offensive in Yunnan in 1943 directed towards the isolation of Kunming from Chungking, in which objective they failed.

698. L/P&S/12/4614, J.C. Hutchinson, Chungking, to India, 16 September 1942; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 1 January 1943.

699. Peter Goullart, *Forgotten Kingdom*, London 1953, p. 88.

700. L/P&S/12/4614, Lhasa Letter, 13 September 1942.

701. L/P&S/12/4614, India to Secretary of State, 4 January 1943.

702. L/P&S/12/4614, Tibetan Foreign Office to Ludlow, 11 December 1942. The Tibetans insisted that the Government of India acted as intermediaries to guarantee the Tibetan terms such as the prohibition on war materials.
Elaborate arrangements were planned by the Government of India to provide for the financing of this trade without direct Sino-Tibetan contact unless the British also participated on a tripartite basis. The India Office, however, were prepared, if need be, to permit bilateral negotiations of a kind which the Government of India found distasteful. See: L/P&S/12/4614, IO minutes by Rumbold and Peel, 9 November 1942.

703. Goullart, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

704. L/P&S/12/4614, Seymour to Eden, 2 November 1942.

705. See: A. Tom Grunfeld, *The Making of Modern Tibet*, London 1987, pp. 80-84; Liu Shengqi, "The Making of Modern Tibet", review article, *Beijing Review*, Vol. 31, No. 1, January 1988.

706. See: Suydam Cutting, *The Fire Ox and Other Years*, New York 1947; T. & K. Roosevelt, *Trailing the Giant Panda*, New York 1929; H. Stevens, *Through Deep Defiles to Tibetan Uplands. The Travels of a Naturalist from the Irrawaddy to the Yangtse*, London 1934. Kermit Roosevelt certainly was connected with the OSS, and Suydam Cutting had excellent Washington contacts. He had also, in the 1920s, taken part with Kermit Roosevelt in an expedition to Sinkiang.

707. L/P&S/12/4229, Seymour to FO, 23 July 1943.
The major documentary sources for the Brooke Dolan-Tolstoy affair are: L/P&S/12/4229; United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1942, China*, Washington 1956; United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, China*, Washington 1957.
Brooke Dolan II was born in 1908. He was educated at both Princeton and Harvard. He took part under the auspices of the Philadelphia Academy of Natural Sciences in two expeditions to the Szechuan-Tibetan borderlands in the 1930s, in 1930-31 and again in 1934, on both occasions with the German naturalist E. Schäfer. He died in China on OSS service in 1945. Brooke Dolan's first expedition is described in: E. Schäfer, *Berge Buddhas und Bären. Forschung und Jagd in Geheimnisvollem Tibet*, Berlin 1933. There is some reference to his second expedition in: Duncan, *Yangtze and Yak*, *op. cit.*
Ilya Tolstoy, a grandson of the great novelist, was born in Moscow in 1903. After the War he remained in contact with the 14th Dalai Lama and worked on behalf of Tibetan refugees following the Chinese "liberation". He died in 1970.

708. The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, regarded "with apprehension the amateur efforts" of Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy in their dealings with the Tibetan authorities. L/P&S/12/4194, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 3 May 1943.

709. The Tibetan Foreign Office, the "Office of Foreign Affairs", was established in July 1942. In theory the British representative in Lhasa from now onwards could only approach the Kashag through this Office except in cases of unusual importance. Dr. Kung, on orders from Chungking, refused to have anything to do with the new Office and insisted on continuing to deal directly with the Kashag. The Nepalese had their own arrangements for relations with the Kashag; and they too did not use the Office. In effect, therefore, the "Office of Foreign Affairs" was concerned entirely with Anglo-Tibetan business. See: Richardson, *Tibetan Précis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

The "Office of Foreign Affairs" was placed in the charge of Ta Lama and Surkhang Dzasa.

710. L/P&S/12/4229, Seymour to FO, 23 July 1943, announcing the safe arrival of Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy at Lanchow.

711. L/P&S/12/ 4229, Ludlow to Gould, 20 February 1943; Ludlow to Gould, 4 April 1943.

712. See: United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, China,* Washington 1957, p. 626, Donovan to Hornbeck, 12 April 1943.

While Gould thought the American supply of wireless sets to the Tibetans to be quite a good idea – better another source of supply to take some of the Chinese odium off British shoulders – the State Department were very hostile to Major-General Donovan's scheme which they saw as "politically embarrassing" and liable to "cause irritation and offense to the Chinese" for a number of cogent reasons, not least because the Chinese had themselves been denied certain items of American wireless equipment. The Chinese would regard the wireless equipment sent to Tibet as potentially destined to be used against themselves since "the Chinese Government claims suzerainty in Tibet". *Loc cit,* Memorandum by G. Atcheson, Jr., Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, 30 March 1943. Whatever "Wild Bill" Donovan may have been up to, it can hardly be said that at this time the United States Department of State were trying to undermine the Chinese position in Tibet in favour of the British or anyone else.

The equipment, for which the Kashag expressed its thanks in November 1944 by way of the British mission in Lhasa, consisted of three transmitters and five receivers which arrived in February 1944. Pangdatsang took charge of the actual transport of the equipment into Tibet. The transmitters proved unsuitable for Tibetan conditions. They were powered by generators which turned out to be too feeble, probably because of the altitude at which they had to operate; and they were replaced in due course by fresh "diesel" motors which, when they finally reached their destination, were found to run on petrol. This was discovered by Robert Ford when tried to instal and operate one of these sets. The large supplies of diesel (not the commonest of fuels on the Tibetan plateau at that time) which had been carried on the backs of mules and yaks from India to Lhasa proved to be useless. Eventually one complete American unit was set up in Lhasa, while Ford in Chamdo used two of the original American generators for low powered sets obtained in India. See: R. Ford, *Captured in Tibet*, London 1957, p. 39.

Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy made no provision for the training of Tibetan wireless operators, which remained in British hands. Six Tibetans were under instruction by R. Fox in July 1943. By the middle of 1944, however, the only wireless transmitting sets in Lhasa were operated either by the Chinese mission or by the two British experts, Fox and his assistant Baker, who received new British equipment in April 1944. The American sets appear to have remained deteriorating in store until the end of the War.

The British mission sets were used to transmit official Tibetan messages to the representatives of the Lhasa Government in Chungking from 1943 onwards.

By October 1943 the Chinese had established a transmitter in Chengtu which was regularly broadcasting in Tibetan with an announcer who possessed a good command of the language. For wireless in Lhasa, see: L/P&S/12/4127; Richardson, *Tibetan Précis, op. cit.*, p. 81.

713. Ilya Tolstoy, "Across Tibet from India to China", *National Geographical Magazine*, 90, 1946.

Brooke Dolan and Tolstoy seem to have become very sympathetic to the idea of Tibetan independence from China and highly critical of Chinese policy as a

result of their stay in Lhasa; but their views had no impact upon American diplomats in China. See: United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, China*, Washington 1957, pp. 636-637, George Atcheson, Jr., Chargé in Chungking, to Hull, 17 August 1943. The State Department seem to have been no more enthusiastic about the adventures of these two officers than were the Government of India.

714. For an account of the sometimes bizarre nature of OSS activities in China, see: D. Pinck, "Getting to Mrs. Nestor's Farm. A Secret Agent in Wartime China", *Encounter*, July/August 1988.

715. In this sense the Brooke Dolan-Tolstoy adventure could be seen as a rehearsal for the various CIA activities in Tibet since the Communist "liberation" and particularly during and after the Khampa Revolt of the 1950s. It is extremely unlikely, however, that anything like this was anticipated by senior officials in Washington in 1942-44.

See: United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1944, Vol. VI. China*, Washington 1967, pp. 963-970; Donovan to Hull, 14 April 1944; Memorandum by O. Edmund Clubb, Division of Chinese Affairs, Washington, 21 April 1944; James C. Dunn, Director of the Office of Eastern Affairs, State Department, to Donovan, 17 May 1944.

Clubb was very doubtful about the figure of 4,000 tons. He pointed out that at Likiang, which was the real terminus of the pack route, only some 330 or so metric tons had arrived during 1943 and that goods were piling up in Lhasa awaiting onward transport towards China. He sympathised with Tibetan aspirations; but he advocated extreme caution and that the United States should do absolutely nothing with respect to Tibet without "the prior knowledge and acquiescence of the Indian and Chinese Governments". His general conclusion was that "any action which the United States might take in this general connection should be designed carefully to avoid United States involvement in international politics respecting the status of Tibet".

Dunn made it absolutely plain that the State Department would not co-operate with the OSS in any Tibetan projects.

716. United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1944, Vol. VI. China*, Washington 1967, Joseph C. Grew to Lauchlin Currie, Washington, 9 June 1944.

717. L/P&S/12/4210, IO minute by A. Rumbold, 27 April 1943, sums up the situation to that date. See also: Richardson, *Tibetan Précis*, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-75.

There were still reports of Chinese massing on the Tibetan border in September 1943.

718. L/P&S/12/2175, India to IO, 27 July 1943.

719. L/P&S/12/2175, Secretary of State to India, 16 September 1943.

720. In January 1944 Lieutenant Sendall was sent to Lhasa to look into the situation and to repair or overhaul the 2.75 inch guns which were stored in the Norbu Lingka. He stayed in Tibet for less than a month during which time he was able to restore to fighting condition a few mountain guns. He reported that the Trapchi arsenal, which once was capable making both rifles and shells, was now in a terrible state of decay with excellent machinery allowed to rust unused and uncared for. Papers on Sendall's visit are in: L/P&S/12/2175.

721. There is evidence to suggest that some at least of the rumours concerning Chinese aggressive plans towards Tibet in 1943 were confirmed in reports made by two American officers, an Assistant Naval Attaché and an Assistant Military Attaché, who visited Sining in April 1943, presumably to find out what was happening.

They said that some 10,000 Ch'inghai troops had been moved towards the Tibetan border on the orders of Chiang Kai-shek, but that Liu Wen-hui in Sikang had disregarded similar instructions. Chiang's motives were said to be to try to put some pressure on the Tibetans over the opening of routes, to establish a Central Government foothold in both Ch'inghai and Sikang, and in the long term to start the process of bringing all of Tibet under effective Chinese control. The justification offered for these moves, or proposed moves, by Chiang was that the Tibetans, inspired by Japanese agents, were planning aggression against Chinese controlled territory. Atcheson thought that while there might possibly be a few Japanese agents in Tibet, their significance was not great. See: United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, China*, Washington 1957, pp. 632-633, Cordell Hull to George Atcheson, Jr., 18 May 1943; Atcheson to Hull, 25 May 1943.

722. Chiang Kai-shek had visited India in February 1942, mainly to try to rally British support for the Kuomintang against Japan.

723. L/P&S/12/4194, Halifax to FO, 16 March 1943.

724. L/P&S/12/4614, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 31 March 1943.

725. See: United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, China*, Washington 1957, pp. 626-628, The British Embassy to the Department of State, Aide-Mémoire, 19 April 1943.

726. United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, China*, Washington 1957, p. 630, the Department of State to the British Embassy, Aide-Mémoire, 15 May 1943.

727. L/P&S/12/4194, Ashley Clarke to Peel, 29 April 1943.

728. L/P&S/12/4194, "Points for discussion at meeting on the 18th May in the India Office".

729. L/P&S/12/4194, Peel to Ashley Clarke, 7 May 1943. This is an extremely interesting document in that it explores at great length the concept of "suzerainty".

730. L/P&S/12/4194, minute by Algernon Rumbold, 22 May 1943. This was written after the 18 May meeting; but the consideration was equally valid four days earlier.

731. L/P&S/12/4194, Secretary of State to India, 24 May 1943.
Oddly enough, Martin Gilbert does not mention this particular meeting in his monumental biography of Winston Churchill and states incorrectly that the first meeting of the Pacific War Council in 1943 took place in Washington on 4 August. He has no entry at all for 20 May. According to Gilbert the initial meeting of the Pacific War Council, established to co-ordinate Allied war efforts against Japan, was in London on 10 February 1942. See: Martin Gilbert, *The Road to Victory. Winston S. Churchill 1941-1945*, London 1986, pp. 54, 410, 459.

732. L/P&S/12/4194, FO to Chungking, 25 May 1943.

733. Lest the Chinese be helped by some uninformed remark by some senior Dominion statesman, the Dominions Office sent telegrams to the Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa explaining at some length the historical background to the present position in Tibet and the official British interpretation of its implications. See: L/P&S/12/4194, Dominions Office to Prime Ministers of Canada, Australia, New Zealand & South Africa, 4 June 1943.

734. L/P&S/12/4194, India to Secretary of State, 1 June 1943.

735. L/P&S/12/4194, f. 159.

736. It was not easy to get a good definition of "suzerainty", let alone replace it by some other term. Various people had a try in 1943; and Weightman came up with either "dependent" or "owing some degree of allegiance". As Ashley Clarke at the Foreign Office pointed out, "dependent" was not a "happy" word and the suggested alternative invited the question "what is meant by allegiance?". It seemed to be "suzerainty" or nothing. See: L/P&S/12/4194, Ashley Clarke to Peel, 17 January 1944.

737. L/P&S/12/4194, War Cabinet paper (43) 267, 23 June 1943, signed Anthony Eden and L.S. Amery (Secretary of State for India); Extract from War Cabinet Conclusions 94(43), 7 July 1943.

738. But care must be taken to distinguish the 22 July document from other Eden memoranda on the same subject which differed slightly in both wording and emphasis, such as the memorandum sent to T.V. Soong on 4 August 1943.

739. L/P&S/12/4194, Eden to Seymour, 22 July 1943; United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, China*, Washington 1957, pp. 634-636. The Eden Memorandum was not in fact handed over to the State Department until 14 September 1943 when Sir George Sansom delivered it to Dr. Hornbeck. This delay was on the orders of the Foreign Office which did not want the Americans to see the document until Eden had been able to meet T.V. Soong in London. Doubtless, also, it was held back so that it would not reach Soong until after the Pacific War Council meeting in Washington of 4 August 1943, at which Soong, along with Churchill, was present. See: L/P&S/12/4194, FO to Washington, 6 August 1943.

740. L/P&S/12/4164, draft aide-mémoire of meeting of 26 July 1943.

741. Gilbert, *Road to Victory*, *op. cit.*, p. 459. The Council meeting was on 4 August 1943.
The chronology here was surely deliberate. In diplomacy as in so much else in life timing is all important. Soong did not get the British memorandum until *after* the Pacific War Council meeting, at which point the Americans had not yet been shown the original (Eden Memorandum) version in the 22 July document, which they did not receive until Sir George Sansom handed over a copy to the State Department on 14 September 1943.

742. L/P&S/12/4194, Eden to T.V. Soong, 5 August 1943.

743. See: United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, China*, Washington 1957, pp. 641-642, Acting Secretary of State A.A. Berle to Ambassador Gauss, 29 September 1943. Soong was required to explain yet more reports of Chinese troops massing on the Tibetan border. Soong denied these reports signified an impending invasion of Tibet, as also did the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Victor Hoo, in Chungking.
Soong's conversation with Dr. Hornbeck was most revealing as to the attitude towards Tibet of one of the most important of all Kuomintang officials. Soong said to Hornbeck that he had told Sansom that Tibet was an integral part of China and Sino-Tibetan relations were purely an internal Chinese problem;

> and he had suggested that the British not make representations at Chungking regarding this matter. . . . He was not informed regarding the alleged massing of Chinese troops; that he doubted whether it was a fact; but that if there should be such a development he did not believe that it would warrant apprehensions. There do not exist, he said, any serious tensions between the Chinese and the Tibetans. If there should arise difficulties, the Government at Chungking would have to meet the problems just as it would have to meet similar problems if they arose in any other part of China.

> I . . [Hornbeck] . . took occasion to ask what proportion of the people of China proper were aware of Tibet or take any interest in that area or what occurs there. Dr. Soong replied that all Chinese who have had any schooling have learned in their study of geography that Tibet is part of China; that it has never occurred to them that there is any question about this as a matter of simple fact; and that these are, politically speaking, Chinese people. I then asked him whether the same was true with regard to Mongolia. Dr. Soong replied in the affirmative. He went on to say, however, that, Tibet being something of a land of mystery, Chinese students and scholars gain more vivid impressions regarding that area, as they study geography and history, than the more prosaic outlying areas. He said, further, that he had suggested to the British that the question of Tibet was relatively of so much less importance than a number of more immediate and more significant problems of concern both to the British Empire and to China that the British ought not to make or let it become an issue. I made the remark that expression of opinion was one susceptible of being turned by the British against the Chinese. Dr. Soong replied: Yes, it might be for purposes of argument, but, China's interest and China's claim regarding Tibet are far better founded in law and history than those of India and Great Britain. I made the remark that on the basis of geography Tibet abuts upon China proper on the east and upon India to the south. Dr. Soong replied: of course, but Tibet is a part of China.
>
> I said that I wondered what is the popular concept, from the point of view geographically, historically and politically, regarding Korea. Dr. Soong replied that the Chinese in no sense think of Korea as a part, or a lost part, of an existing or a once having existed Chinese Empire. Nor, he added, do they so think of Indo-China.

Loc. cit., pp. 134-35, Memorandum on a conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck), Washington, 28 September 1943.

Here was the real Chinese answer to the Eden memorandum of 4 August 1943 (though not, of course the original 22 July 1943 document which he never saw). The Kuomintang attitude towards Tibet was unambiguous, though it might be wrapped up in evasive language from time to time. To ignore it was to kick against the pricks. Two days after the Hornbeck meeting, T.V. Soong left Washington for his return to Chungking.

744. This was the view of Sir Eric Teichman, who no doubt advised Seymour on the Tibetan question. Teichman thought that "Tibet proper will ultimately return to the Chinese fold as a self-governing dominion of the Chinese Commonwealth" (just as he had argued, soon after his triumph at Rongbatsa, was a good solution to the Tibetan problem), and it was in the best British interests to "promote" rather than "obstruct" this process. Any plans to encourage the Tibetans to seek total independence from China, Teichman thought, would lead "ourselves and the Tibetans into a false position". He doubted, however, that, contrary to Caroe's interpretation of Chinese policy in "The Mongolian Fringe", responsible Chinese leaders had any interest in reasserting claims to Nepal, Sikkim or Bhutan. The same, however, could not be said of Mongolia, Sinkiang or Tibet, where attempts in the future to re-establish Chinese influence were certain. See: L/P&S/12//4194, Teichman, Chungking, to Hugh Weightman (Joint Indian Foreign Secretary), 27 July 1943.

745. L/P&S/12/4194, Seymour to FO, 5 July 1943.

746. L/P&S/12/4210, Ashley Clarke to Peel, 1 November 1943. The meeting with Hornbeck took place on 11 October 1943.

747. L/P&S/12/4210, British Consulate, Chengtu, to Seymour, 8 November 1943.

748. L/P&S/12/4210, Extract from External Affairs Department Note, 7 December 1943.

749. In March 1944 John Service of the State Department wrote that "China is in a mess . . . for the sorry situation as a whole Chiang, and only Chiang, is responsible". Service's comment is quoted in: E.J. Kahn, Jr., *The China Hands. America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them*, New York 1975, p. 3. While there remained senior Americans who continued to see Chiang as China's saviour, notably General Hurley who became U.S. Ambassador in Chungking towards the end of 1944, there were many more at that time among the lower echelons of American diplomacy who did not.

750. United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1944, Vol. VI. China*, Washington 1967, pp. 961-963, O. Edmund Clubb, Washington, 21 April 1944. Clubb was one of the ablest of the State Department China specialists. His memorandum is pervaded by a certain pessimism about the effectiveness of the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek and its ability to retain both Chungking and Kunming in the face of the Japanese offensive then just getting started.

Pessimism about the Kuomintang was to turn out, after the War, to have been an expensive pastime for some American diplomats, and Clubb was one of those who suffered in the 1950s. For this appalling and tragic story, see: O. Edmund Clubb, *The Witness and I*, New York 1974; E.J. Kahn, Jr., *The China Hands. America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them*, New York 1975.

751. L/P&S/12/4218, Seymour to FO, 30 January 1944; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 May 1944.

752. The visa argument arose from the Indian attempt to insist on prior Tibetan acceptance of entry before granting a transit visa. This always produced problems because, as Ashley Clarke put it to Peel, "the difficulty is that the Tibetans are capable of telling the Chinese one thing and us another, and they may well maintain to Sherriff . . [then in charge of the Lhasa mission] . . that they do not want visas to be granted, while allowing the Chinese to believe that they have no objection to the entry of these people". See: L/P&S/12/4218, Clarke to Peel, 9 June 1944.

For a description of Shen's background, see: Gould, *Jewel*, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

Shen Tsung-lien, with his assistant Liu Shen-chi (Liu Shengqi), later wrote a book about Tibet, *Tibet and the Tibetans*, Stanford, California, 1953. Liu Shen-chi went on to work on Tibetan questions for the People's Republic of China and in 1988 was still publishing in China. These were men of the highest calibre, a fair match for the diplomatic skills of George Sherriff and Hugh Richardson. The present author has had the privilege of being able to talk about this period of Tibetan history with Liu Shen-chi (who used to play tennis in Lhasa with Hugh Richardson; but it is not recorded who usually won).

753. L/P&S/12/4194, minute by Caroe, 8 May 1944.

754. L/P&S/12/4217, India to Secretary of State, 8 July 1944.

755. L/P&S/12/4217, IO to FO, 12 May 1944, referring to India to Secretary of State, 3 April 1944.

756. See: Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory*, ed. P. Jaffe, London 1947, pp. 40, 47, 77. Chiang Kai-shek accused the Russians of manipulating the Panchen Lama at the same time that the British used the Dalai Lama as their agent during the period of internal turmoil in Szechuan and Yunnan.

757. L/P&S/12/4217, India to Secretary of State, 3 April 1944.

758. L/P&S/12/4217, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 23 September 1944.

759. L/P&S/12/4217, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 4 October 1944.

760. For the Chinese this was a very moderate defintion of Outer Tibet, involving the tacit acceptance of more or less the traditional Manchu line of 1727.

761. L/P&S/12/4217, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 October 1944.

762. L/P&S/12/4217, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12 October 1944. It is possible that Chiang Kai-shek appreciated that Liu Wen-hui would not welcome the abandonment of so much of what he hoped to incorporate one day into his Sikang.

763. L/P&S/12/4217, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 29 October 1944.

764. L/P&S/12/4217, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 23 September 1944. See also papers in: L/P&S/12/4201.

765. According to Richardson, the Kashag had only begun to appreciate in September 1944 that in the Simla Convention of 1914 the attached notes, which among other things declared that "Tibet forms part of Chinese territory" and provided for Chinese participation in some manner in the process of the initiation of the reign of a new Dalai Lama, were actually part of the Convention and not just a collection of vague thoughts. Richardson also pointed out that the Tibetan text of the Convention used words which implied a greater degree of Tibetan independence than that suggested by the English text (but in such cases, of course, the Convention was explicit: in Article 10 of the 3 July 1914 version it is stated that the "English text shall be authoritative"). L/P&S/12/4194, Richardson to India, 16 September 1944.

Richardson had returned from Chungking to assist Gould during his 1944 Lhasa Mission.

766. L/P&S/12/4217, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 3 November 1944, reporting call by Kashag on Gould, 29 October 1944.

Vice President Henry A. Wallace visited Chungking in June 1944. See: *The China White Paper, August 1949*, (reissue of *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-49, Washington 1949*) with an introduction by Lyman P. Van Slyke, Stanford, California, 1967, pp. 55-56, 549-560; E.J. Kahn, Jr., *The China Hands. America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them*, New York 1975, pp. 107-115.

767. In the reference to the Soviets it is possible that Caroe had Outer Mongolia in mind. Here it could just be argued that there did indeed exist some vague parallel with the Statute of Westminster concept of Dominion status.

768. L/P&S/12/4217, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 12 October 1944; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 1 November 1944; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 9 November 1944; India to Gould, 20 October 1944.

769. L/P&S/12/4217, minute by Peel, 13 December 1944. Peel was premature because, two days later, the India Office heard that the Tibetan National Assembly (Tsongdu), dominated by the monasteries, had rejected any prospect of altering the *status quo* (which meant Tibetan administration) in the key Tawang area south of the McMahon Line. See: *loc. cit.*, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 15 December 1944.

770. L/P&S/12/4217, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 15 January 1945; IO minute by D.M. Cleary, 19 January 1945.

771. L/P&S/12/4194, J.T. Henderson, FO, to Under-Secretary of State, IO, 2 January 1945.

772. L/P&S/12/4194, Peel to Caroe, 6 February 1945.

773. L/P&S/12/4194, Richardson, Notes, 13 January 1945, makes this point to which Caroe arranged that the attention of the Foreign Office in London be drawn.
    The British had been fascinated by the parallels between Tibet and Mongolia since at least 1912, though they had rejected them in 1906-1907 during the negotiations leading up to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. One crucial difference between Outer Mongolia and Outer Tibet, of course, was that Outer Mongolia had experienced Revolution which had swept away the Buddhist theocratic elements of its Government, while Outer Tibet had not.

774. See, for example: L/P&S/12/4194, G. Kitson, FO, to D.M. Cleary, IO, 31 July 1945.

775. L/P&S/12/4194, Seymour to FO, 26 August 1945, enclosing text of Chiang Kai-shek's statement of 24 August 1945.
    Mao Tse-tung at this period had similar, if at first sight slightly more "liberal", ideas about Tibet. On 14 July 1944 he told the journalist Guenther Stein that this was the Chinese Communist policy towards the Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans:

    > China must first recognize Outer Mongolia as a national entity and then organize a sort of United Sates of China to meet Mongol aspirations. The same is true of Tibet, and the Mahommedans should be given a chance to form their own state.

    See: United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1944, China*, Washington 1967, p. 537, enclosed in Ambassador Gauss to Secretary of State, 1 September 1944.

776. Gould actually handed over to Hopkinson on 15 August, V.J. Day. Gould, *Jewel*, *op. cit.*, p. 242.

777. The Government of India eventually, in 1946, deported Pangda Rapga to China.

778. Li, *Tibet*, *op. cit.*, pp.198, 287-288.

779. The Communist presence in Tibet after "liberation" was first headed by Chang Ching-wu who took up the post of Director General of the Military Headquarters in Tibet, based in Lhasa, in July 1951. For almost exactly two years, therefore, Lhasa had been entirely free of Chinese offialdom for the first time since 1934.

XI

BORDER QUESTIONS, 1914-1947: FROM LADAKH TO SIKKIM

In recent years Indian apologists have argued that the Himalayan borders of the Indian Republic had been exceptionally well established over the centuries by tradition, treaty and history.[780] In fact, far from being unchallenged during the period covered in this book, from the time of the Simla Conference to the arrival of the Chinese Communists in the 1950s, the border between British India and the area under the control of Lhasa was subject to a number of uncertainties or disputes of varying degrees of intensity which between them affected virtually its entire length. There were problems about the border between Ladakh (part of Kashmir State) and Western Tibet, between Tehri-Garhwal and Western Tibet, even between Sikkim and Tsang in Central Tibet, to say nothing of the complex question of the validity, let alone the precise whereabouts, of the McMahon Line in the Assam Himalayas. With the possible exception of the Sikkim border (and perhaps not even here as we shall see), none of these difficulties could be considered to have been adequately resolved at the moment of Transfer of Power in August 1947. Far from being a satisfactory frontier in terms of tradition, treaty and history, the border between British India and Tibet was actually one of the longest disputed or undefined boundaries in the world.

Up to 1910 this state of affairs was of no great concern to the Government of India. While a Tibetan challenge to both the alignment of the northern border of Sikkim and its status, which became apparent in the 1880s, produced a minor crisis and gave rise to one of the British Empire's smaller "small wars" (the Sikkim campaign of 1888), could be said to have been one of the starting points of the course of events leading to the Younghusband Expedition to Lhasa of 1904, that venture was not primarily concerned with matters of boundary alignment. Other Tibetan challenges in this period to British boundary ideas, mainly along that stretch of the Himalayas between Ladakh and Nepal which was to become known as the Middle Sector of the Great Sino-Indian

Boundary Dispute, were either ignored by the Government of India or disposed of by minor local police actions the reports of which did not always find their way into the records preserved in London. The Himalayas were seen by their very nature as constituting an ideal natural defensive barrier, and petty infringements by local Tibetan administrators were no cause for alarm.

The arrival of the Chinese in Lhasa in some force in 1910, however, changed abruptly this perception by threatening a fundamental challenge to the northern mountain borders of British India by a true Foreign Power (in which category the Lhasa Government was not really viewed by the Government of India). The threat was averted for the time being by the collapse of Chinese strength following the fall of the Manchus; but it remained latent and could with a revived China break out again with great virulence.

From this moment one fixed principle in British Indian foreign policy was that it would be best never to have to discuss this border with China (as the British had over the Sikkim-Tibet border in the late 1880s and early 1890s), or give the Chinese the slightest opportunity to demand any participation in Anglo-Tibetan border discussions. The result was a series of paradoxes. The ideal was to settle the border, if settled it could be, with the Government of what in Simla Convention terms was Outer Tibet. In that this settlement might require eventual Chinese ratification, it was essential that the concept of Chinese "suzerainty" in Tibet was interpreted to confer upon Outer Tibet the power to make binding boundary settlements with its Indian neighbour without reference to the Chinese Government. At the same time, it was highly undesirable, at least until a satisfactory definition of "suzerainty" was secured, to indicate publicly that any boundary settlements were in fact called for: to do so would only give the Chinese Government the opportunity to protest about the possible cession to an imperialist power of Chinese territory with a propaganda effect detrimental to British interests in China itself.

Had the Tibetan Government in Lhasa showed the slightest inclination on their own initiative to make formal boundary arrangements to the Government of India's satisfaction, ways might have been devised to surmount this particular hurdle. The experience of 1914-1947, however, was to show that Lhasa was not easily persuaded to make any such settlement. The nearest the Government of India got to this goal was the exchange of the Anglo-Tibetan notes of March 1914 which sanctified the McMahon Line; and, as has been argued in an earlier Chapter, the validity of these notes as binding on either the British or the Tibetans was, to say the least, open to question. How could the Chinese be persuaded to accept as valid agreements which their Tibetan dependents were themselves unwilling or unable to make or confirm? The best that was on offer from the British Indian point of view was the Simla Convention of 1914, the public

acknowledgement of the existence, if not the validity, of which was one of the pillars of the Caroe doctrine. It is unlikely, however, that Olaf Caroe, when through his inspiration the pseudo-1929 Volume XIV of Aitchison's *Treaties* was inserted into various libraries in 1938, had worked out in every detail what was going to be done with the documents now published. It was enough, in his eyes, for the moment to get the concept of "suzerainty", in the special sense that it could be interpreted upon the basis of these 1914 instruments, into the official British record. The map appended to the Simla Convention, which might conceivably be exploited in support of the McMahon Line, and indeed was so used both by the British and their independent Indian successors, was not published in the revised Aitchison Vol. XIV of 1938.[781]

The Government of India certainly appreciated the problems inherent in this approach. It would much rather keep Tibet in the international limbo that it had been since 1914 than face up to the realities of Chinese attitudes. However, from the 1930s, the Dargye-Beri crisis was probably the turning point, it was evident that the Chinese could not be ignored for ever. Hence there was enshrined in the Caroe doctrine another, and essentially contradictory, concept. The border might be made good by administrative action even without Tibetan consent and in some instances in the face of actual Tibetan opposition. But here again there were difficulties of a paradoxical nature. How could the British defend Tibetan autonomy from China and at the same time justify what amounted to a contested British Indian annexation of Tibetan territory?

Had Caroe and his immediate successors had a free hand, they would have tackled this head on by taking the necessary administrative measures in the hope that it could all in the end be sorted out with the Kashag by the Political Officer in Sikkim and the British mission in Lhasa. Tibet was a land of paradoxes which could probably accommodate one more easily enough. There were, however, two apparent obstacles. First: administrative action involved expenditure, slight though it might be, which the Government of India were unwilling to bear. Second: there was always the risk of a hostile Chinese reaction. This never ceased to worry the Foreign Office in London and the British diplomats in China, who were far more concerned with such specifically Chinese questions as trade and the future of Hong Kong than with British Indian borders in remote Himalayan tracts. As we shall see in another Chapter, for such reasons the Government of India could not bring itself before the Transfer of Power to extend its direct control north of the Se La into Tawang, a step which was finally taken largely at the instigation of one of Caroe's disciples, K.P.S. Menon, in 1951.[782] It is still open to question whether this was a wise move; but at least it showed a certain decisiveness and sense of timing frequently lacking in the final years of the British Raj.

Much of the substance which had lain behind Anglo-Tibetan relations up to 1947 disappeared after the final Chinese Communist "liberation" of Tibet in 1950-51. The question of "suzerainty" vanished into thin air when in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954 India accepted that Tibet was "The Tibet Region of China".[783] Tibet *was* now an integral part of China; and one pillar of the Caroe doctrine had been knocked down. What was not disposed of, however, was the boundary problem. It was, perhaps, thought that this could be sorted later in the benevolent atmosphere of the five principles of peaceful co-existence. This was not to be. At the moment of writing (1988) it has still not been sorted out.

One confusion injected into the whole Sino-Indian boundary question in recent times has resulted from the official Indian argument that the boundary in fact followed, on the basis of powerful precedents, a well established system of watersheds. The impression derived from this approach is that there exists a clear water parting line between the Indo-Gangetic plain on the one hand and rivers flowing into the Taklamakan Desert of Sinkiang and the interior of the Tibetan plateau on the other. In fact, as a study of any good map will show, there is no such watershed line. Two of the major rivers of northern India, the Indus (and its Sutlej tributary) and the Brahmaputra (which joins the Ganges before making its way to the Indian Ocean), have their sources deep in Outer Tibet; and the so-called natural watershed frontier beloved of Indian diplomats is cut by a large number of other rivers and streams. The watershed concept can make line drawing on maps easier; but the choice of possible subsidiary watersheds is almost countless. The watershed principle was enshrined in the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890; but even here it did not involve a really major parting between river systems; and to the immediate east of Sikkim lay the Tibetan tract of the Chumbi Valley whose stream, the Amu Chu, flowed southwards into the Brahmaputra – the best watershed boundary point here would have been at Phari, deep in Tibet. A true comprehensive watershed line to the north of India would have had to take in the Tibetan reaches of the Indus and the Tsangpo and its tributaries, which would have put on the Indian side both Lhasa and Shigatse and the greater part of the Tibetan Provinces of Ü and Tsang which constituted the bulk of inhabited Outer Tibet. This could only have been achieved by the establishment of an Indian protectorate over Outer Tibet. Failing that, watersheds were where one wished to find them. To the Tibetans, it should be noted, there was no tradition of watershed boundaries and they were frequently mystified by British claims to territory on this basis.[784]

There was not one single boundary problem between British India and Tibet but rather a significant number of distinct questions, some major like the McMahon Line issue, and some so obscure that papers

relating to them were never sent back to England and are not, in consequence, to be found in the files preserved in the India Office Library and Records in London. Some of the minor issues (mainly in what in the terminology of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute came to be called the Middle Sector) first came to public notice in the 1950s when outside observers were hard put to locate them on the map let alone understand their nature and history. These various boundary questions can be conveniently classified under five main headings, of which the first three are the subject of this Chapter and the remaining two (closely related to each other) are examined in the next two Chapters.

First: on the extreme western end of the Himalayan range, where it merges into the Karakoram, in Ladakh (part of what was once the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir), British India had a common border both with Tibet and with Sinkiang. All along this border there were still in 1947 ambiguities in that the ideas of the Kashmir Durbar did not always coincide with those of Tibet or, indeed, of the Government of India. The Kashmir-Tibet border makes up the Western Sector of the Sino-Indian Boundary dispute; and, because Kashmir was involved, from 1947 onwards it became complicated by the existence of the dispute between India and Pakistan over title to Kashmir, a problem with which the Government of British India never had to deal but for the genesis of which it must bear its share of responsibility.

Second: along the mountains separating Ladakh from Nepal there is a stretch of the Himalayas which had long been the scene of a number of small (in terms of the amount of land involved) disputes between the authorities in Western Tibet and either directly administered British territory in Kumaon and Garhwal or minor Indian Princely States in the hills between Garhwal and Ladakh. The most important of these in the context of Anglo-Tibetan diplomacy was generally referred to in the British period as the Tehri-Garhwal (or Tehri-Tibet) problem, and by India in the 1950s onwards as the dispute over Nilang-Jadhang. The issues in these disputes were often complex in the extreme; but dominating them were two questions, one concerning sovereignty over hill peoples ethnically Tibetan, or closely related to the Tibetans, who moved seasonally between the Tibetan world of the high pastures and the British or British Princely sphere lower down the mountains to the south, and the other relating to the Tibetan right to tax traders and pilgrims.

Third: there survived to the end of the British Raj a lingering doubt over the alignment of that Sikkim-Tibet border which, in theory, had been settled once and for all by the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 (without Tibetan participation), but in practice it would appear had not.

Fourth: there was the problem of what was sometimes known as the

Tawang tract, a tongue of territory extending from the Himalayan crest to the east of Bhutan right down to the very edge of the plain of the Brahmaputra in Assam. Here, in the 19th century the British had admitted Tibetan administration and even negotiated a Sino-Tibetan border far to the south of what was deemed by the Government of India to be expedient when, in 1914, the McMahon Line was defined.[785] The tract was dominated from its north by the Tibetan monastery of Tawang, a daughter house of Drepung (and, incidentally, the birth-place of the pleasure loving and poetic 6th Dalai Lama). The Tawang problem was the most difficult of the Indo-Tibetan border questions for which to find a satisfactory solution; and, from the point of view of Lhasa it was more important than all the other issues combined.

Finally: from the eastern edge of the Tawang tract to the extreme north of Burma along the Assam Himalayas up to 1910 the question of an Indo-Tibetan border alignment had never really arisen at all, even at the extreme eastern end across the Lohit valley, because between territory administered by Tibet and that by the British in Assam there existed a stretch of what was thought to be impenetrable (except, perhaps, along the Lohit) mountainous country inhabited by hill tribes who for ethnographic reasons acted as a buffer between the peoples of Assam and the Tibetans. After 1910, following evidence of Chinese penetration into these tribal areas, their value in this capacity was seen to be uncertain; and they were duly gathered in to the Indian fold on the British side of the McMahon Line.

For a large part of the Himalayas the states of Nepal and Bhutan served as extremely useful buffers between British and Tibetan territory; and the borders between Nepal and Bhutan on the one hand and British India on the other had during the course of the 19th century, though not without armed conflict, been laid down satisfactorily enough. The danger here to Indian security from a Chinese presence in Tibet was seen by the British as the challenge not to an Imperial border line but, rather and perhaps more seriously, to the status and loyalties of the rulers of the Nepalese and Bhutanese buffer tracts (though this was certainly influenced by the existence of a number of Tibeto-Nepalese and Tibeto-Bhutanese border and territorial disputes).[786] To date this danger, which once so perturbed British officials, has not assumed serious proportions despite all the tensions in recent years elsewhere along the Himalayas. Neither Nepal nor Bhutan has become a Chinese satellite state.

In some ways the Ladakh borders were of as great an importance to the long term security of India, or, at least, its perception of its security, as was the McMahon Line; but this fact did not arouse particular anxiety among the makers of British Indian policy in the period covered by this book. For one thing, there seemed to be no prospect at this time of any Chinese motor roads

linking Sinkiang with Western Tibet across the desolate Aksai Chin.

Ladakh was not only bounded by Tibet but also by the Chinese Province of Sinkiang. The Government of India had never really made up its mind by 1947 where Sinkiang gave way to Tibet. During the period between 1865 and 1914 its views had fluctuated as to alignment of the theoretical Indian border in this remote region where the Karakoram range ran into both the Himalayas and the Kunlun which, between them, formed the edges of the extreme west of the Tibetan plateau. Faced with the prospect of Russian advance into Sinkiang, there were British strategists (like Sir John Ardagh, Director of Military Intelligence from 1896 to 1901) who thought that the border ought to be pushed as far northwards as possible to run along the Kunlun (or beyond) and to embrace territory on the northern side of the Karakoram. In 1898 a more moderate border was decided upon.[787] It ran from the Karakoram Pass more or less south-eastwards to the neighbourhood of the Lanak Pass at the head of the Changchenmo River, a tributary of the Siyok River which, in turn, flowed into the Indus.[788] This boundary line was proposed to the Chinese in 1899; and while they did not approve it nor did they reject it.[789] By 1908 the Government of India considered that they had been committed to this particular line to which, despite fresh attempts to revive a more northerly frontier in 1912, they adhered in principle.[790] In practice they acted on the assumption that there was no boundary here at all and relied for the separation of British India from Chinese Sinkiang upon the physical obstacles presented by the terrain, which were real enough.

In 1914 it would appear that there was a sly attempt by the British side at the Simla Conference to commit the Chinese to the principle that some of this country, much of which could best be described as constituting a combination of formidable mountains with the world's highest desert, lay in Outer Tibet rather than in Sinkiang.[791] If so, this would have been the extreme west of the Tibetan Chang Tang, an area in which there was no Lhasa administration of any kind. In the event, the British initiative in 1914 was not followed up; and there is no evidence that the Chinese Government were ever aware that anything of this kind had been attempted. It is more than probable, moreover, that the British had forgotten all about it by the time that Olaf Caroe appeared on the scene in the mid 1930s.[792] Both Jawaharlal Nehru and K.P.S. Menon (who were among the first Indians to take over from British officials like Caroe the task of devising Indian frontier policy) produced books, written before the Transfer of Power, with maps which showed the boundary here in northern Ladakh as "undefined".[793]

The Indian claims to a border running along the Kunlun Range or beyond depend in the final analysis on the pretensions of the Kashmir Durbar which in the 1860s endeavoured in the face of official British

disapproval to establish direct contact with Khotan in Sinkiang (still at that time known to the British as Chinese Turkistan) for political and economic reasons at a period when that region (yet to be made into a Chinese Province, when the name Sinkiang – "the New Dominion" – ceases to be an anachronism) was entering a turbulent era of rebellion against Chinese rule.[794] The Kashmir Durbar managed to exploit the services of an employee of the Survey of India, W.H. Johnson, to execute a survey placing in Kashmiri territory what was thought to be a possible approach to Sinkiang which by-passed the established (and easily monitored) caravan track across the Karakoram Pass.[795] This was achieved by surveying into Kashmir the whole of the Aksai Chin up to the Kunlun and, even, a strip of territory beyond.[796] The resultant Survey of India map left a great deal to be desired from a technical point of view; but, in default of better subsequent material, it continued to influence cartographers for many years to come, and its legacy can still be detected in the Sino-Indian boundary argument.[797] The Johnson survey, it must suffice to state here, in its motives had very little indeed to do with the determination of the Indo-Tibetan border: it was a political affair concerned with routes between Kashmir and Sinkiang.[798]

The most extreme north-easterly point of Ladakh where any trace of continuous Kashmiri control could be recorded and adjacent to which Tibetan rule could be said to be detected was at the Lanak Pass at the head of the Changchenmo tributary of the Indus. Thence south-westwards and then southwards there was a long history of the meeting of Tibetan and Ladakhi administration, that of Tibet being exercised either from what was probably the remotest seat of Tibetan Government in the west, Rudok, or from the capital of Western Tibet, Gartok.[799]

Tibet-Kashmir relations were dominated by four main factors. First: prior to the Dogra conquest in the 1830s, Ladakh was to some degree subordinate to Lhasa, and the arrival of the Dogras, even though it shortly resulted in a war with Tibet, did not terminate an elaborate system of diplomacy and associated commercial relations which had its roots in the pre-Dogra past: indeed, many of its traditional features were confirmed in the Dogra-Tibetan Treaty of 1842. Second: across the Tibet-Ladakh border nomads moved as they always had. Disputes inevitably arose as to whom they owed allegiance, to Jammu or to Lhasa. Third: the Tibet-Ladakh borderland was a prime source of the valuable shawl wool upon which the Kashmir textile industry depended for its basic raw material. The Kashmir Durbar from the moment it took Ladakh in 1834 (and this was certainly a prime motive for its acquisition) also hoped to secure a monopoly over the shawl wool trade which caused it to look eastwards into Tibetan territory with envious eyes. Finally: along the

Indus River, which at some point crossed from Tibet to Kashmir on its way to the sea, ran a trade route of considerable importance. Its existence goes far to explain, for example, the special position which Ladakhi merchants (who in this instance were Moslems, unlike the bulk of the population of Ladakh who were Buddhist) occupied in the commerce of Lhasa. The precise place of transition from Tibetan to Kashmiri territory had both administrative and fiscal implications which resulted in interminable argument.

Arising from these factors there developed two major areas where disputed jurisdiction had not been settled when the British left India in 1947. One was on the extreme north-eastern edge of Kashmiri administration which ran south-westwards from the Lanak Pass to the Panggong Lake. The other was along the Indus in the region of the village of Demchok, title to which was contested between Tibet and Kashmir. In themselves both were trivial enough; but they acquired considerable importance in the 1950s in that they provided a southern anchor, as it were, to the great divergence of territorial claims raised by China and India which constitute the Western Sector of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute in the desolate wastes of the Aksai Chin.

The Kashmir-Tibet dispute immediately to the north of the Panggong Lake was of considerable antiquity. In 1863 the British Surveyor Godwin Austen (whose name is associated with one of the world's three highest mountains otherwise known as K2) noted that the Kashmir Durbar was challenging Tibetan possession of the seasonally occupied camping ground of Nyagzu and the abandoned fort of Khurnak (by the eastern end of Panggong Lake). He thought then that, all things considered, the Tibetans had a somewhat better case.[800] The dispute went on over the years; and in 1945 in his *Tibetan Précis* Hugh Richardson referred to it as still active. He called it the Dokpo Karpo dispute. He, too, thought that the Tibetan case had more merit than that of the Kashmir Durbar.[801]

The area involved in the Dokpo Karpo question was a few square miles of inferior grazing land with no fixed inhabitants. In 1918 the Tibetans under the orders of the Dzongpön of Rudok arrested a Kashmiri subject called Lhagyal (a Ladakhi) for running his flocks on to Tibetan territory in this tract of contention. An acrimonious argument developed between the Tibetans and the Kashmir Durbar in which a number of other issues came to be raised such as Kashmiri obstructions to trade with Tibet contrary to established agreements and the granting by Kashmir of asylum to Tibetan subjects escaping from Tibetan taxation, whose extradition was demanded. At least one such Tibetan tax-exile (Ganpo, who claimed Kashmiri citizenship) was arrested by the Tibetans in a raid across what Kashmir regarded as its border.

After a series of Kashmiri-Tibetan discussions at a fairly low level

had failed, in 1924 there was a more serious discussion between Major Robson, British Joint Commissioner in Ladakh acting on behalf of both the Kashmir Durbar and the Government of India, and one of the two Garpons (Governors) from Gartok. The formalities took place with considerable pomp and ceremony on a grassy plain called Dokpo Karpo situated on the south side of a range separating the Panggong Lake drainage system from the Changchenmo valley some twenty miles north to north-east of Nyagzu and not far from the Lanak Pass. There seems to have been no settlement at the time. Lhagyal was released (whether before or after the 1924 conference is not clear); but Ganpo was still being held by the Tibetans in 1929.[802]

As far as the boundary was concerned, after the 1924 conference the Government of India evidently decided, as had Godwin Austen some sixty years earlier, that the Tibetans had the better case and that Nyagzu and Khurnak Fort as well as Dokpo Karpo were in Tibet; and in 1929, over the protests of the Kashmir Durbar, they decided to drop all British claims on behalf of Kashmir to this wedge of territory.

The issue of tax evasion was not quite so simple as it at first sounded. The taxes in question were duties on the movement of goods and flocks across the disputed border. The Government of India suggested that both Kashmir and Tibet should impose such taxes at an agreed rate, presumably on the grounds that everyone should pay taxes to someone on a standard system of assessment. The Kashmiris, despite Tibetan non-agreement, proceeded at once to levy the new tax, which was fixed at 2% *ad valorem*. The Tibetans adhered to their old, and in Kashmiri eyes, arbitrary and unjust revenue system. This gave rise to fresh arguments. The problem was discussed with the Gartok Garpons in 1929 by E.B. Wakefield as part of his study of the conditions of trade between British India and Western Tibet; but Wakefield, according to Richardson, was treated in a manner which "was little short of insolence" and no progress was made.[803] Lt.-Colonel Weir was supposed to raise the matter with the Kashag during his two Lhasa Missions (of 1930 and 1932); but he may not have done so. The Gartok Garpons did not appear to want to avail themselves of the new tax; though the Dzongpön of Rudok did impose it. In 1937 there was another conference between the British and the Gartok Garpons, the Government of India being represented by the Gartok Trade Agent, Dr. K. Ram. By this time a host of new incidents had arisen. The major concern of the Tibetans was now, and perhaps always had been, to close off to their subjects (or those they claimed to be their subjects) an avenue of escape from their jurisdiction into Ladakh. They showed no inclination to decide on anything, particularly on the imposition of any new forms of taxation, until the Kashmir Durbar or the Government of India agreed to hand back to them all Tibetans seeking asylum on their territory, which neither the Kashmiris nor the British were prepared

to do. Further discussions in 1939 were no more conclusive.[804]

By the time of the Transfer of Power in 1947 nothing had been settled. The Government of India, unlike the Kashmir Durbar, were disposed to accept from the 1860s onwards the Tibetan boundary claims; and the frontier here shown on British maps has consistently placed Nyagzu and Khurnak Fort on the Tibetan side. The first official Indian maps following the Transfer of Power which showed a complete system of borders (in 1954) rather surprisingly advanced the frontier to embrace the Kashmiri claims and placed Nyagzu and Khurnak Fort in India. We will return shortly to the probable significance of this cartographical alteration in frontier alignment.

Not only did the disputed wedge of territory between the Lanak Pass and the Panggong Lake provide the point of departure, as it were, for the Chinese and Indian claims northwards in the Aksai China area, but it also produced a divergence of starting points for the frontier line southwards to the crossing of the Indus where that great river passes from Tibet into Ladakh. The border on British maps, beginning at the Tibetan claim-point in the Panggong Lake region to the west (just) of Khurnak Fort, passes a few miles to the west (downstream) of the settlement of Demchok on the Indus, which place is shown as Tibetan.[805] The border on Indian maps from 1954 onwards, commencing at a point to the east of Khurnak Fort, runs a small distance to the east (upstream) of Demchok which is shown, like Khurnak, as Indian.

Demchok was claimed by Lhasa as Tibetan throughout the British period. It was, however, the only settlement of any size in the general region of the Kashmir-Tibet frontier on a major trade route; and both Kashmiri and Tibetan officials supervising (and taxing) that trade were inclined to establish themselves in proper houses there rather than endure the discomfort of tented camps in the wilderness, particularly during the ferocious winter. Thus for all practical purposes Demchok *was* the frontier point, claimed by both sides and occupied by both. In 1939 general frontier discussions were held at Demchok between the British Trade Agent at Gartok and the Gartok Garpons from which there seemed to emerge a tacit assumption that, whatever the claims, the de *facto* border followed the line of a stream running more or less through Demchok itself into the Indus, though the Government of India still considered, to judge from the evidence of their maps, that the *de jure* border ought to run a few miles to its west.[806] This convenient arrangement disappeared when in 1954 the Indians put Demchok several miles on their side of the border on their maps while at the same time the Chinese had physically occupied the place.

Between Ladakh and the Sutlej lies the small state of Spiti, culturally Tibetan, geographically a southwards extension of Ladakh, and politically with complex relationships with a variety of neighbours

including Tibet, which marched with its eastern border. Spiti was brought under British control in 1846. Under the British it became part of the Kangra District of the Punjab; and in 1960 it was incorporated in the new Indian State of Himachal Pradesh. The eastern and south-eastern borders of Spiti were from the outset subject to some dispute between Spiti and both the Tibetans and the adjacent Indian State of Bashahr. In question was title to the lower reach of the Spiti River in the neighbourhood of its junction with its Pare tributary. In practice the dispute did not cause British administrators any concern up to the time of the Transfer of Power, and there seem to have been no discussions between the British and the Tibetans about it; but subsequently it was absorbed into the Great Sino-Indian Boundary dispute, though in such a tentative manner that many maps both official Indian and non-Indian do not indicate that there is any debate about the alignment of the Indo-Tibetan border here.[807]

Neither the Nyagzu (Dokpo Karpo) dispute nor that over Demchok involves a great deal of territory. For the historian the main interest in both cases lies in the fact that after the Transfer of Power the Indian Government showed on its maps as Indian territory which the British had been quite happy to consider to be Tibetan. How did this come about? How, with the departure of the British, did India suddenly get a bit bigger?[808] It may be that the simplest hypothesis is that after 1947 the Indian Government accepted uncritically the territorial claims of the Kashmir Durbar however insubstantial.

In both Nyagzu and Demchok this did not matter very much. In that it also saddled India with the old claims from the Johnson survey of the 1860s to Aksai Chin, which the Chinese regarded as part of Sinkiang and which the British had formally abandoned in part at least in 1898-99, it gave rise to a what was indeed a serious territorial dispute. It was across a corner of this very territory, approaching the Tibetan plateau from Khotan through the Kunlun range by way of the Karakash Valley, that the Chinese Communists constructed a major road linking Sinkiang with Western Tibet. The Chinese Communists in the 1950s proved quite as sensitive to challenges to their right to build lines of communication here through what they regarded without question as theirs as they had previously been under the Kuomintang over their freedom to construct roads from Szechuan to India in what they considered to be Sikang Province.

It is an interesting question why Kashmiri claims, if this is indeed what happened, should have been accepted by Government at this moment. Again, applying Occam's Razor, the probability is that the fact that Kashmir was being disputed between India and Pakistan in the United Nations created the need for maps of Kashmir. The maps prepared *by* the United Nations in 1948 are careful to show that the entire frontier between Kashmir (that is to say Ladakh as far as

territory controlled by India was concerned) and both Sinkiang and Tibet was undefined.[809] It is undoubtedly an advantage, however, if one is contesting proprietorship over a piece of territory to have all its limits clearly staked out. If one border is admitted to be undefined, then by the same token so other borders of the same region may be open to challenge; and in the end a great doubt hangs like a bank of fog over the whole question. The simplest and quickest way to lay down the alignment of the border in such a geographically, politically and historically complex area would have been for the Government of India to ask the Kashmir Durbar to supply its own version of its boundaries – it should, after all, know more about this than anyone else. The Durbar in such circumstances would quite naturally have pulled out of the files all the old claims it could find and presented them as established fact. Once stated publicly, of course, so long as the dispute continued the borders in a situation of this kind could not be changed. The Kashmir dispute continues to this day. Changes, accordingly, have not been made.

It could well be, moreover, that this approach was extended on the same logical grounds to the entire northern border of India. If one border dispute anywhere outside Kashmir were conceded, then the Kashmir case was to some extent, even if but slightly, weakened. Therefore, no claims whatsoever were to be abandoned anywhere. This line of argument represents characteristic human attitudes about property disputes even though it is not particularly sound diplomatic practice. Whatever merit there may or may not be in this hypothesis, there is no denying the fact that all sorts of compromise arrangements along the Indo-Tibetan border which the British had come to accept (even without any help from the Tibetans) were abruptly rejected after the Transfer of Power, a process which provided much of the meat and vegetables of the subsequent Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute.

Another possible hypothesis might be that the Government of India when they were preparing their maps after the Transfer of Power decided to show as advanced a border as possible in the Western and Middle Sectors so as to have in hand areas in which to make concessions to the Chinese (following their occupation of what had once been Outer Tibet) in exchange for balancing Chinese concessions in the region that really mattered to members of the Caroe school of frontier policy, the McMahon Line. Such Machiavellian gambits are not unknown in the history of diplomacy; and the technique would be familiar to any merchant in an Asian bazaar. The attitude of Jawaharlal Nehru and his advisers to the border question from the 1950s onwards, however, suggests that had any such thoughts existed in the Indian Department of External Affairs in the early days of Indian independence, then they were not communicated to him or he failed to understand

them, or for some reason he decided to abandon this particular tactic.

Between Spiti and Nepal lies a stretch of the Himalayas which constitutes what has come to be called the Middle Sector of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute. Here for some 250 miles or so Tibet meets India in a mountainous borderland which had before the arrival of the British been the home of States with relationships both to the north and the south with the inevitable evolution of ambiguities in sovereignty at the margin. The situation was further complicated in that in the late 18th and early 19th centuries the Gurkha conquerors of Nepal had expanded into this region, only to be expelled by the British during the Anglo-Nepalese War of 1814-16. The British then proceeded to annex the hill tracts immediately adjacent to Nepal, Kumaon and part of Garhwal, and to place the hill States further to the west, to whose rulers the territories which had been taken from them by the conquering Gurkhas were now returned, under their protection. The intention was in part to create a buffer to the west of Nepal to deter possible future Gurkha ambitions, which might include a highly undesirable territorial contact with the then powerful Sikh state, and in part to establish an unobstructed line of communication between the East India Company's possessions and the shawl wool producing areas of Western Tibet in the hope that some profit might be derived from trade in this valuable raw material of the Kashmir shawl industry. One immediate effect was to bring about for the first time the creation of a common border between Tibet and directly administered British territory which now extended from the west of Nepal to the point where the Sutlej cut through the Himalayas near the Shipki Pass.[810]

The annexation of Kumaon and Garhwal and the extension of protection over the hill states like Tehri-Garwhal and Bashahr inevitably resulted in some British attempt to survey the borders of the newly acquired possessions, in which context the work of J.D. Herbert and B.H. Hodgson in 1817 is particularly noteworthy. It was soon discovered that among the higher reaches of the Himalayas there were claims by the Tibetan authorities to jurisdiction over land (and it occupants) which might on other grounds be deemed to be British, or British-protected. The areas involved were in the main remote and of no great extent. Herbert, for one, was inclined where possible to give the Tibetans the benefit of the doubt and outline a boundary which minimised the possibilities of conflict with the Tibetan authorities who were at that period deemed to have behind them the might of the Chinese Empire. It was not British policy to risk needlessly offending the Chinese with whom the East Indian Company was trading by way of Canton to its considerable profit and the welcome benefit of the holders of its stock.

In 1827 Lord Amherst, the Governor-General, inaugurated the hill station of Simla lying close to the Sutlej valley which gave access from

the Indian plains to the Tibetan plateau and the Western Tibetan commercial and administrative centre of Gartok, the potential trace for a major road (the much discussed Hindustan-Tibet Road) which might tap the shawl wool trade.[811] The existence of this route so close to what was to become British India's summer capital was a constant temptation to European travellers to venture to the fringes of Tibet. The experiences during the 1820s and 1830s of men like the Gerards and Victor Jacquemont showed that there was a Tibetan frontier point which was actively manned and beyond which it was extremely difficult to pass. The Tibetan authorities often preferred to carry out their duties at or near the foot of a border pass rather than on its bleak, cold and windswept summit; and logic dictated that they should do this on the southern (Indian) side where traffic was concentrated by the approaches to the pass rather than on the northern (Tibetan) side where, the pass having been crossed, a divergence of tracks created opportunities for avoiding control points. The practical border, therefore, often tended to be on the Indian side of the passes, whatever theory might suggest; but the discrepancy when it was from time to time detected appears to have caused no great fluttering in official dovecotes at this period.[812]

The Tibetans, in resisting the advance of British and other European travellers and in insisting on their territorial rights in these frontier tracts, had three main objectives. First: they were following a policy laid down in Lhasa, no doubt with Chinese approval, that Tibet should be closed to penetration from the British side – the British, incidentally, suspected in these early decades of the 19th century that the Russians, particularly Russian Asiatic subjects, were not so firmly excluded. Second: they were determined to resist diversion of the shawl wool trade from its traditional channels by way of Ladakh, where well established patterns of taxation and the patronage derived from the conferring of monopolies were of great fiscal interest. Finally: these hill tracts were used as summer pasture by peoples who had long been considered to be part of the Tibetan world and subject to Tibetan jurisdiction from which they should not be permitted to escape.

This last consideration is well analysed by Marco Pallis in connection with what was to turn out to be the most important of these potentially disputed Indo-Tibetan border tracts in the Middle Sector, Nilang-Jadhang, which the British in the 1920s came to call the Tehri (or Tehri-Garhwal) dispute (we will consider this in greater detail later on). Pallis commented, on the basis of his experience in 1933, that

> the highest-lying villages in Garhwal, along the Tibetan border, are inhabited in the summer months by a semi-nomadic tribe called Jadhs or, farther to the east, Bhotias. These people are a typical frontier product, mixed racially and in tradition, who make the best of two worlds in any border dispute. The Tibetan half predominates in the

> Jadhs, however; six days out of seven they are Buddhists and, when not wearing European cast-offs purchased while they are wintering on the edge of the Indian plains, they clothe themselves in Tibetan style. In summer they pasture their flocks and ponies in the uplands, or cross into Tibet to barter Indian produce for a consignment of salt or borax.[813]

In the summer the Jadhs, and their ilk, found themselves subject to Tibetan jurisdiction. In the winter they perforce came under the jurisdiction of the powers to the south, in the case of the Jadhs the State of Tehri-Garhwal. The Tehri-Garhwal Durbar, perhaps not surprisingly given the avariciousness concerning land of such polities, claimed that if the Jadhs were Tehri-Garhwal subjects then their summer pasture land must by the same token be part of Tehri-Garhwal State. Equally unsurprisingly, the Tibetan authorities whenever their attention was drawn to the matter disagreed. Both parties, moreover, were extremely interested in the fiscal potential of the trading activities of these transhumant nomads. All along the Middle Sector this phenomenon was to be found, the various equivalents to the Jadhs usually being known to the British generically as the Bhotias.[814] In the Middle Sector the Bhotia groups presented to the Government of India a special problem in that they played a not unimportant part in the spiritual world of the Hindus, who made up the majority of the teeming population of the British Indian Empire; and they were, therefore, of more than local importance. They could not be ignored, if only as organisers of transport on the pilgrim routes from India to the holy lakes of Rakas Tal and Manasarowar and the sacred Mount Kailas, the home of the God Shiva, along which devout British Indian Hindu subjects travelled every year.[815] Moreover, the various sources of the Ganges, revered by all Hindus, lay in their habitat. A number of important Hindu temples and centres of pilgrimage were situated on territory belonging to Bhotias. Badrinath, for example, one of the most famous of these sites, was on the land of a Bhotia clan who received from the temple an annual rent on Rs. 40, 40 pounds weight of grain and one puggaree.[816] The assertion of Tibetan claims to sovereign rights over such Bhotia groups could not fail to have some impact throughout the Hindu world to the possible detriment of British Imperial prestige. This was an important element in the Tehri-Garhwal (Nilang-Jadhang) dispute which caused it to take up so much of the time and energy of British Indian officials over more than two decades.

The Tehri-Garhwal (or Nilang-Jadhang) question figured on the agenda of all the Missions to Lhasa by the various Political Officers in Sikkim from Bailey to Hopkinson. It involved a significant area of a hundred or more square miles. It concerned one of those parts of the Himalayas which, because it was an important centre of Hindu pilgrimage, impinged upon the religious life of all India, and it

extended from the high pastures (which could be ignored safely enough) to the actual roadbed of a major line of communication of purely internal Indian import on the Indian side of the mountain barrier. It also came to include not only an international dispute but also an internal one between two Indian States: and, in passing, it raised the question of the right of such States to have a foreign policy of their own. In terms of Anglo-Tibetan discussions on or near the spot it gave rise to at least as many conferences as any other disputed sector of the long Indo-Tibetan border in the Himalayas, including the Sikkim-Tibet frontier and the McMahon Line (which was in fact never discussed on the ground by anything like a joint Anglo-Tibetan Boundary Commission). It is, at least for a student based in London, by far and away the best documented of all the Middle Sector Indo-Tibetan disputes.[817]

As far as the Government of India were concerned, the dispute between Tehri-Garhwal and Tibet began in 1921 with a report from the Ruler of Tehri-Garhwal to the Commissioner, Almora, to the effect that a letter had been received from the Tibetan Dzongpön of Chabrang, then visiting Nilang, requesting the despatch of a Tehri-Garhwal official to discuss with him outstanding territorial disputes.[818] It transpired that these concerned not only Nilang, which lay in a fairly remote corner on or near a track leading to watershed passes giving access to the Tibetan plateau, but also land lower down reaching to the Bhagirathi River on which was situated Gangotri, an important Hindu temple and place of pilgrimage. The Tibetan claim actually touched the Bhagirathi River at its junction with the Gumgum Nala (ravine or stream): this was downstream of Gangotri. It not only involved the actual pilgrim road from the plains to Gangotri (and the Gaumukh – "Cow's Mouth" – glacier beyond, which was particularly holy because one of the sources of the Ganges sprang from it), but also embraced a valuable expanse of *deodar* (cedar) forest.[819] It appeared that the Tibetan authorities from Chabrang in addition to asserting rights over these *deodar* trees were also taxing the Jadhs (those Bhotia-like people who we have already seen inhabited the border hills), whom Tehri-Garwahl considered its subjects, to the north of Gumgum Nala and in the settlement of Nilang in particular. It further appeared that the Tibetans in 1914 had placed, or attempted to place, a boundary pillar at the point of junction of the Gumgum Nala with the Bhagirathi River near the Jangla Forest Rest House and a recently constructed bridge across the Bhagirathi River.[820] Tehri-Garhwal, it later transpired, had riposted to the Tibetan action by placing its own boundary pillars on the Tsang Chok Pass (about 25 miles to the north of Nilang) and endeavouring to collect revenue from the unfortunate twice-taxed Jadhs as well as carrying out some survey work in the disputed areas.[821]

The immediate British response was to comment that the Tehri-

Tibet border had never been defined but that the *deodar* forest was certainly not in Tibet. The position north of the forest, however, from the Nilang settlement to the high passes, had long been contested between the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar and the Tibetans. It was inhabited seasonally by Jadhs who certainly had relationships with both parties. "In Tibet they are Tibetans and in Tehri they are Tehri subjects", one British official put it.[822] The same official thought that the real boundary *ought* to be the watershed; and, should the Lhasa Government involve itself in the question the Government of India was duty bound to do its best to secure recognition for the watershed frontier. Such a claim might deter Lhasa from making too much of the issue. There was a hint that Tehri-Garhwal, too, should be given some face saving gesture to prevent it from embarking on its own initiative on negotiations with the Tibetans which would be *ultra vires* for such a State under British protection. The major difficulty seemed to be that while the border had never been defined formally, there had for many years been an unofficial understanding that it ran south of the Nilang settlement.[823]

The geography of the dispute can be better understood after reference to a good map.[824] The Bhagirathi River a few miles downstream from Gangotri runs through a very narrow valley between two glacier covered massifs. Here it is joined by the Jadhganga River which has a number of feeder streams rising from a *cirque* bounded by a wall of mountains traversed by high passes on the main watershed like the Mana, the Muling, the Thaga and the Tsang Chok, which between them mark out two sides of a rough triangle with an east-west base line passing through or near Nilang (the *de facto* border in the view of most British observers). The distance in a straight line from Nilang to the extreme north of this triangle is about 25 miles. The pasture within the triangle was only used by the Jadhs in summer and, from the point of view of the Government of India, was of minuscule economic value. Pilgrims returning from Mount Kailas and the sacred lakes Rakas Tal and Manasarowar sometimes came this way; but not before they had traversed a great deal of undoubted Tibetan territory. There was, moreover, a potential trade route to Western Tibet through it which required more development than it was ever likely to receive from the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar, though the Jadhs during the course of their seasonal migration carried goods to and from Tibet and depended for a considerable part of their livelihood on this commerce. None of these factors, in themselves, would have warranted serious attention by the Government of India.

A few miles downstream from the Nilang settlement on the right bank of the Jadhganga River before it joins the Bhagirati River there is a pass traversed by one of the tracks from Nilang towards the plains. This is the Nilang Pass, often confused with Nilang settlement.

It crosses a ridge running down from the Nilang Peak (part of the massif between the Bhagirathi and Sutlej systems).[825] To the immediate west of this ridge another stream, the Chorgad, joins the Jadhganga River. The Jadhganga River flows roughly west from Nilang settlement, a direction which it retains until some ten miles after its junction with the Bhagigathi River: the combined course, now called the Bhagirathi, then runs in a south to south-westerly direction to join the main stream of the Ganges in the plains which it meets near the Tehri-Garhwal capital, Narendranagar. The Gumgum Nala enters the Bhagirathi River from the north at a point about twenty miles downstream from the Chorgad tributary and ten from the Bhagirathi-Jadhganga junction. The bridle path leading to Gangotri and Gaumukh, maintained by Tehri-Garhwal State, in the 1920s and 1930s crossed the Bhagirathi River from time to time; and there was a bridge just downstream from the Gumgum Nala which took the track from the settlement of Harsil on the right bank to that of Darali on the left bank and then upstream to another bridge near the Jangla Rest House and the Gumgum Nala where it crossed once more to the right bank. While the bridle path does not appear to have actually crossed the Gumgum Nala, it certainly passed through territory which, by virtue of the Tibetan claim to the Gumgum Nala, would be in Tibet rather than India. The *deodar* forest lay on both banks of the Bhagirathi River from Harsil (where the river begins to flow southwards) upstream to Gangotri.

In 1923 the Government of India proposed that the best solution to the Tehri-Tibet dispute would be a joint Anglo-Tibetan Boundary Commission; and this suggestion was communicated to the Kashag by F.M. Bailey, then Political Officer in Sikkim, on 14 January 1924. The Kashag, following further discussion during Bailey's 1924 Lhasa Mission, agreed. It was decided that the Commission should meet, after various postponements, in 1925 at a point somewhere on the Tibetan side of the disputed border. By this time the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar were having second thoughts and suggesting that the whole matter be dropped: the existing state of affairs, in which Tehri-Garhwal was in control up to Nilang for the vast majority of the time and the Tibetans did not in practice make their presence felt either in the *deodar* forest or on the pilgrim road to Gangotri and Gaumukh, was far from intolerable after all. However, it was now too late to bring the matter to a halt. T.J.C. Acton, Collector of Bulandshar (in the United Provinces), had been deputed to represent the Indian side in discussions with the Tibetans; and Lhasa had been informed. The Commission was again postponed until 1926 (though the Tibetans claimed that their Commissioners duly turned up in 1925 and waited in vain for Acton to make his appearance). The Commission finally met near Nilang, Tibet being represented by two officials of reasonable seniority, in early June 1926; and until the beginning of July

occupied itself with hearing evidence and visiting the whole area.[826]

Acton was clearly not very interested in the Tibetan point of view. He proposed that he should reinforce the Tehri-Garhwal claim before the Commissioners met by erecting boundary pillars along the watershed line to which he could then point in subsequent discussions with the Tibetans as evidence of where the frontier ought to be. He was quite properly overruled by his immediate superior, the District Commissioner, Garhwal. Despite all the evidence presented during the meetings of the Commission, however, Acton stuck to his belief that the watershed border, what he called the "scientific frontier", should be adopted by the Government of India.

The evidence presented was, as has so often been the case in this kind of dispute, confusing to say the least; and much of it was far from reliable. The hole in the ground by the Gumgum Nala where the Tibetans claimed they had erected their boundary pillar in 1914 was examined; but the pillar had gone, removed by the Tehri-Garhwal people so the Tibetans said. Scratch marks were detected which might, or might not, have been evidence of its recent removal. There was also nearby a notice painted on a rock, said to have been executed by a Tibetan official in 1925, which the Tibetans alleged had also been defaced on the orders of the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar. While perhaps suspecting that there was truth in the Tibetan claims, Acton was not prepared to contemplate a Tibetan presence at this point where the Gumgum Nala joined the Baghirathi River for two reasons. First: the *deodar* forest here was of real economic value to Tehri-Garhwal. Second: if the Tibetans occupied this point they effectively took control over all access to the important Hindu temple at Gangotri and the pilgrim traffic thither and to Gaumukh.

Acton also inspected the site of the Tehri-Garhwal pillars on the Tsang Chok Pass, on the significance of which he did not comment in his report; and numerous witnesses were heard. Six Tibetans were produced who said that the frontier had always been at Gumgum Nala, but without being able to supply supporting details. A number of Tehri-Garhwal witnesses came forward to declare that Tehri-Garhwal had always cut timber in the *deodar* forest. Two witnesses from neighbouring Bashahr State were called by the Tibetans in support of their case: Acton considered them to be liars and pointed out that Bashahr was also in dispute with Tehri-Garhwal over portions of this tract.

Acton also had gone through the records and the literature of Western travellers in the region. The key items here were the following: a reference by Moorcroft (in the early 19th century) to the fact that the territory given by the British to Tehri-Garhwal after the Gurkha War extended as far north as the settlement of Nilang, which was on the border with Tibet;[827] a rather similar line of demarcation between Tehri-Garhwal and Tibet, but running a little further to the

south of Nilang (and, if the truth be told, not too far north of the line implied by the Gumgum Nala claim), which had been surveyed by Herbert and Hodgson in 1817, immediately after the Gurkha War; T. Kinney's survey of 1878 from which he had concluded that the border ran in an east-west line either through or just north of Nilang, leaving the tract between Nilang and the main watershed line to the north in Tibet; a Survey of India map, prepared in 1902, apparently at the request of the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar, which showed more or less the Kinney border. The implications of all this were supported by the evidence of several Jadh witnesses from the disputed area.[828] Out of 53 such witnesses, 42 said that Nilang was in Tehri-Garhwal, 3 did not know, while 8, all from Jadhang, said that Jadhang at least was in Tibet. This opinion poll could be interpreted to mean (if it meant anything at all) that the Tehri-Tibet border ran between Nilang and Jadhang, with the former in Tehri-Garhwal and the latter in Tibet.

Acton came to a number of conclusions of his own. He thought, largely because of their dress and manners, that the Jadhs were really far closer to the Garhwal folk, ethnographically speaking, than to the Tibetans. The various administrative documents which the Tehri-Garwhal Durbar produced in support of their claims were accepted by Acton without question (which certainly indicated a degree of preconception on his part since it was not normal for British officials of any experience to treat such papers, copper plates, inscriptions and the like with anything but extreme caution). He believed on the basis of his travels over the ground that "geographically the true frontier is undoubtedly the Sutlej-Jadhganga watershed".[829] Having said this, however, Acton also observed that "there is no doubt that in the past the boundary has been undefined".

The Tibetans throughout these talks and investigations never deviated from their original claim that Tibetan territory extended southwards across the main watersheds and down the Jadhganga River all the way to the Gumgum Nala and the right bank of the Bhagirathi River to the west of Gangotri; and they insisted that the *deodar* forest here was theirs and not the property of the State of Tehri-Garhwal.

During Acton's travels in the Nilang-Jadhang region good surveys had been carried out which made precise boundary definition possible. On this improved map Acton recommended that a firm boundary line should be laid down. He noted that

> the most reasonable and convenient frontier is undoubtedly the watershed between the Jadhganga and Sutlej rivers. This main watershed between Tibetan and Indian rivers is now recognised as the frontier to the East in the United Provinces districts of Kumaon, and to the West in the Punjab States and districts of Bashahr, Kulu and Spiti. It is true that the Sutlej itself cuts through the main watershed at the

> Shipki pass, but the watershed between the two systems of rivers and tributaries is nevertheless recognised as the Indian-Tibet frontier.

He therefore recommended that

> a formal claim should be made to the watershed frontier. It will be unnecessary to demarcate it, and even if no agreement is reached the claim will probably, as in the case of the frontier in Garhwal, stop the Tibetans from ever raising the boundary question again for fear they should definitely lose all pretext for control over the Jadh traders who visit them in Puling and Tsaparang . . [Poling and Chabrang] . . With the lapse of time the frontier now delimitated and claimed will crystallize into an admitted frontier, and no demarcation will ever be necessary.[830]

The Government of the United Provinces supported Acton's proposed watershed boundary and backed the Tehri-Garwhal claim in its entirety.

In view of the emphasis from the 1950s onwards placed by Indian apologists on the watershed principle in Himalayan boundaries, it is interesting to see that Acton's proposal (supported by the United Provinces Government), which was as clear a statement of that principle as one could wish for, was rejected by the Government of India on the advice of the Political Officer in Sikkim. As Bailey tactfully put it:

> the arguments in favour of the watershed frontier are no doubt very strong and this frontier would be more convenient in many ways, and may be ethnologically more correct, but such considerations could not I think be put to the Tibetan Government as arguments for what they consider is the giving up of territory, and I do not think that a formal claim to the watershed frontier would stop the Tibetans from raising the boundary question again as suggested by Mr. Acton.[831]

Bailey proposed that the Tibetans be offered what became known as the "compromise" frontier running east-west between Nilang and Jadhang with Nilang in Tehri-Garhwal and Jadhang in Tibet. The territory extending twenty five miles or more to the north of Nilang up to the main watershed would be conceded to Tibet. Tibet, in due course, would be asked to abandon its claim below Nilang including the *deodar* forest and the Gumgum Nula. It was at all events worth giving it a try even if, as Bailey certainly suspected, nothing would come of it. Bailey also noted a point in Acton's report, that Bashahr State, too, had claims to Jadhang: he hoped that Bashahr would receive no British encouragement in this since it could well upset any agreement which might be reached with the Tibetan Government. As seen from Gangtok the whole affair appeared to have been sparked off by the Tehri-Garhwal attempt to survey the terrain up to the main watershed after 1919, which, along with the Tehri-Garhwal work on frontier pillars without prior consultation with the Tibetans, was interpreted in Lhasa as evidence of deliberate encroachment from

the British Indian side. All this resulted in the deputation of a Tibetan official to Nilang in 1921 from which the present discussions had evolved.

Bailey's personal view was that the Kashag would not open negotiations on the dispute, even with the offer of the "compromise" line: they would, he thought, stick to their claim to the Gumgum Nala. He proposed, all the same, to discuss the whole question with senior Tibetan officials when an opportunity presented itself; and he would see what he could arrange. The Government of India agreed to the "compromise" line.[832]

The "compromise" line was formally put to the Kashag by Bailey in March 1928; and in June it was rejected, as Bailey had suspected it would be. The Kashag insisted that the Gumgum Nala boundary point was the true and historically correct limit to Tibet. To accept any line further to the north, they said, would be to surrender land which was without doubt Tibetan.[833] For the time being the Government of India agreed to instruct the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar to limit its administration to the "compromise" line and not to go north of Nilang and, thereby, provoke the Tibetans. This did not stop the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar in 1928 from cutting down trees in the *deodar* forest (in its eyes a perfectly legitimate action) which gave rise to fresh Tibetan protests.

In 1930, during his first Lhasa Mission, Lt.-Colonel Weir once more urged the Kashag to accept the "compromise" line, and once more they expressed their determination to stick to the Gumgum Nala. Weir then discussed "without prejudice" a second compromise, apparently floated initially by the Tibetan side, in which the Gumgum Nala point was conceded to the Tibetans in exchange for some minor reduction in the Tibetan claim area so as to leave it beyond doubt that Gangotri lay in India.[834] This was unacceptable to the Government of India which insisted that the original "compromise" line was compromise enough.[835]

In 1932, while Lt.-Colonel Weir was engaged on his second Mission to Lhasa, Frederick Williamson, who was soon to take over from Weir as Political Officer in Sikkim, used a period of leave to pay a visit to Western Tibet in the company of his old friend Frank Ludlow (formerly British schoolmaster in Gyantse and during World War II to be for a while in charge of the British mission in Lhasa). It had been indicated to Williamson that the Kashag would be pleased if during this journey he investigated the site of the Tehri-Garhwal dispute and formed his own opinion as to the merits of the Tibetan case.[836]

In early October 1932, towards the end of their journey, Williamson and Ludlow, accompanied by the Dzongpön of Chabrang (Tsaparang), reached Nilang, "a village of about fifty wooden houses with perhaps a hundred acres or so of cultivation", whence they all went

on south to inspect the Gumgum Nala. Here they left the Dzongpön and made their way into Tehri-Garhwal and undoubted British India, accompanied by a junior Tehri-Garhwal official whom they had encountered at Nilang.[837] They concluded their tour with a visit to Narendranagar, the capital of Tehri-Garhwal State, where they talked not only with the Ruler and officials of the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar but also with the Political Agent, Stubbs, and Acton who has taken part in the 1926 Commission. On the basis of this field research Williamson was able to produce a detailed report on the whole dispute.[838]

Williamson ruled out the possibility of the Government of India allowing the Tibetan claim to territory right down to the Gumgum Nala to stand. The road from the plains to Gangotri ran for some of the way here on the right (north) bank of the Bhagirathi River and, if the Tibetan claim were accepted, would have to pass through a salient of Tibetan territory. Apart from the undesirable impression this would create among British Indian pilgrims it would also be unjust to Tehri-Garhwal which had expended money and effort on road improvement. The border would have to run further north. Williamson thought the ideal line was that shown on the carefully surveyed map of Kinney of 1878 (and published in 1879) which was very close to the "compromise" line currently under discussion. The only difference between the two arose from the location of the village of Nilang. Kinney showed Nilang on the Tibetan side. Williamson was able to demonstrate, however, that the place had been moved since 1878; and it now lay on the Tehri-Garhwal side of the Kinney border.[839] He proposed, therefore, that the Kinney border, with one very slight modification, should be adopted, Nilang now being placed in Tehri-Garhwal. If the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar, who adhered resolutely to their watershed claims, were unhappy about this, they might be compensated with territory from British India: Williamson thought that they could be given the Badrinath area, to be transferred to them from British Garhwal.[840]

With considerable experience of the Tibetan world, Williamson concluded that the Jadhs were really more Tibetan than Garhwali. Unlike Acton, he was not deceived by their manner of dress (when down from the hills they tended to wear second hand clothing acquired in India). In Nilang or Jadhang they behaved like Tibetans: down further south in the winter they adopted a Brahminical veneer. When questioned by Acton in 1926 the Jadhs had given answers favourable to Tehri-Garhwal because they had been intimidated by Tehri-Garwhal officials; but this had been false evidence. They were frightened, among other reasons, lest their failure to support the Tehri-Garhwal position would result in their being deprived of the ability to acquire goods in Tehri-Garhwal for that trade in Tibet which was so important to their economy. To Williamson, when he

talked to them in private, the Jadhs denied that there was any tradition of Tehri-Garhwal administration north of Nilang up to the watershed passes. As far as revenue collection was concerned, Williamson found that the Jadhs had been paying taxes both to Tibet, through the Chabrang Dzongpön, and to the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar. A Rs. 300 tax which the Chabrang Dzongpön had collected in 1922 was a special, non-recurring, levy on the value of live-stock applicable throughout Tibet and intended to meet the cost of defence against the Chinese in the east.[841] The normal revenue raised annually by Tibet from the Nilang region was Rs. 74 (while Tehri-Garhwal raised Rs. 24 from the same villages).

Williamson discovered that the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar had been levying customs duties on goods entering from Tibet. He felt that Tehri-Garhwal had no more right to impose such duties on transfrontier trade than had, in the past, Sikkim; and, should Lhasa learn about this practice the result might be highly detrimental to the established pattern of Indo-Tibetan trade elsewhere. It should be stopped at once. Williamson also was able to find out by discreet questioning of the local inhabitants that there had indeed been a boundary pillar at the Gumgum Nala which a junior Tehri-Garhwal official had removed just before Acton's arrival in 1926. Williamson was on the whole sympathetic towards the Tibetan point of view and had a low opinion of the probity of the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar, as the Government of the United Provinces did not fail to protest. They still wanted the "scientific" watershed border advocated by Acton in 1926.[842]

Williamson's trip was unofficial and his proposals did not result in a fresh initiative by the Government of India; but his first hand experience of the Tehri problem was certainly of value to him when at the very beginning of 1933 he took over from Weir as Political Officer in Sikkim and had to deal with the Kashag on this question to which the Tibetans seemed to attach a disproportionate importance. By the time he had arrived in Nilang, moreover, the dispute was rapidly acquiring a new dimension.

In May 1932 the Raja of Bashahr, the State along the Sutlej immediately to the west of Tehri-Garhwal, raised a claim to possession of both Nilang and Jadhang and requested that, in any further discussions on this border problem, a representative of Bashahr be present. This claim complicated the issue in a number of ways. Not only did it add another party to the dispute but also it involved another British Provincial Government since Tehri-Garhwal came under the United Provinces while Bashahr was the responsibility of the Punjab, which at first was quite sympathetic to the Bashahr case. There was, for example, a settlement map of 1892 which showed both Nilang and Jadhang in Bashahr State. The Superintendent of the Punjab Hill States, however, was soon obliged

to admit that the 1892 Bashahr settlement maps were singularly inaccurate and "no attention should be paid to them".[843]

During his 1933 Lhasa Mission Williamson tried to explain to the Kashag the significance of this new factor in the Tehri-Garhwal dispute, the introduction of claims by Bashahr. The Kashag failed to see what difference it made. They pointed out that there was no doubt that the Tibetan frontier point was at the Gumgum Nala, and that they were in no position even to consider a modification of their policy without consultation with the Tsongdu (National Assembly). They thought it best, in any case, to let the matter rest until at least the dispute between Tehri-Garhwal and Bashahr had been resolved when they would welcome for their consideration a final proposal from the Government of India, though it was unlikely to cause them to modify their attitude.[844]

The conclusion of the Government of India was that, while it might be irritating to have Bashahr butting in, apparently in some obscure way in the Tibetan interest, the fact of the matter was that this was essentially an *international* dispute which neither Bashahr nor Tehri-Garhwal, as Indian States, had the right to settle on their own. The international element was highlighted in late 1934 when a Tibetan official came right down to the Gumgum Nala and destroyed a milestone and a Forest Department notice board in the evident belief that these were symbols of Tehri-Garhwal sovereignty over territory claimed by Tibet. Here was an act of aggression, albeit very minor, by a foreign power on the protected soil of the British Empire. It was also, incidentally, Olaf Caroe's introduction to the problems of the Indo-Tibetan border after he had taken up his post as Deputy Foreign Secretary.

Before the Tibetans could be tackled it was necessary to resolve the argument between Tehri-Garhwal and Bashahr since there could be no question of a multi-partite conference on the Tibetan border.[845] Neither Tehri-Garhwal nor Bashahr, as Indian States, had, as has already been noted, any *locus standi* in an international matter. An internal Boundary Commission was accordingly convened, with the Tehri-Garwhal side under the supervision of R.H. Williamson, Political Agent for Tehri-Garhwal, and E.A.R. Eustace, Superintendent, Hill States, Simla, looking after Bashahr. It first met at the Tehri-Garhwal capital, Narendranagar, on 28 September 1934, visited the Nilang region in October and concluded its deliberations at Simla on 28 February 1935. Its terms of reference precluded it from discussing international issues; but it felt itself competent to consider title over the entire tract up to the main watershed regardless of Tibetan claims which it decided to ignore. The findings of Williamson and Eustace, while not in total agreement on all points, were that Bashahr had a valid claim to a tongue of territory reaching the right bank of the Jadhganga River along the Chorgad tributary

and extending to at least the Nilang Pass and probably to a point opposite the current location of Nilang village. Nilang itself and the bulk of the Jadhganga basin right up to the watershed, however, belonged to Tehri-Garhwal, and the Jadhs were subjects of that State.[846] After the Commissioners had submitted their separate reports the arguments between Bashahr and Tehri-Garhwal lingered on for another year; but by 1936 both States had accepted the essentials of the Commission's recommendations. The Tibetans, of course, took no part in any of these proceedings. One consequence was that in the Nilang region Bashahr as well as Tehri-Garhwal now had a common, and disputed, frontier with Tibet: this did nothing to simplify the problem.[847] As far as Tibet was concerned, the two British Commissioners seem to have concluded that the real interest of Tibet in the country south of the main watershed was economic rather than territorial. The Government of India, therefore, should offer the Kashag special trade concessions here in exchange for a renunciation of all Tibetan claims.[848]

Frederick Williamson thought this last suggestion, advocated by his namesake R.H. Williamson, was hardly calculated to appeal to the Tibetan Government. "The question of trade", he told Caroe, "may be of importance locally, but the Lhasa authorities only regard the question of prestige and their only interest is in the actual position of the frontier".[849] There is no evidence that Williamson or, following his tragic death, Gould, ever put such a proposition to the Kashag.

The Chabrang Dzongpön after 1935 continued from time to time to cross over the watershed, or send his agents there, to collect taxes from the Jadhs.[850] With the introduction of Bashahr into the dispute, reports of these actions reached the Punjab Government as well as that of the United Provinces, thus no doubt doubling the volume of protest at Tibetan "incursions" which reached Caroe at the External Affairs Department in New Delhi.[851] The question of the frontier in this tract, therefore, was inevitably suggested as part of Gould's agenda for his 1940 Lhasa Mission. Gould thought that formal protest against Tibetan activities here was quite pointless. The Government of India would be well advised either to ignore the annual "promenade" of the Chabrang Dzongpön across the high passes or instruct the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar to station troops or police to prevent him and his representatives from entering what they considered to be their territory.[852] While the latter suggestion accorded well with Caroe's view of what ought to be done in the last resort in frontier matters, he believed, however, that to say nothing further to the Tibetans on the subject, whatever other action might be taken, would be tantamount to telling them that the Government of India were no longer directly interested in this stretch of border. Any use of force against Tibetan officials, moreover, might prejudice far more important negotiations with Lhasa concerning the

McMahon Line. Gould, therefore, should inform the Kashag that the matter was still very much alive but had for the time being been assigned an extremely low priority by the Government of India because of more pressing matters arising from the War.[853] This, it seems, was done; and there this boundary dispute rested until the Indian Government, seven years after the Transfer of Power, published for the first time its own post-British official maps showing a frontier with Tibet, now under Chinese control, to the north of Nilang and following the "scientific" watershed line.[854]

The Chinese, of course, inherited the Tibetan conviction that the true frontier ought to include territory all the way south to the junction of the Gumgum Nala with the Bhagirathi River to the west of Gangotri, and that it undoubtedly placed on the Tibetan side Jadhang and the bank of the Jadhganga opposite Nilang. At 1230 hours on 28 April 1956 a Chinese patrol of 12 soldiers under the command of an officer and equipped with submachine-guns and telescopes visited a point about half a mile east of Nilang.[855]

To the immediate east of the area of the Nilang-Jadhang dispute, in what was directly administered British Garhwal, there was another frontier tract with Tibet which presented very similar problems. There were pilgrim routes through the high mountains to Mount Kailas and the sacred lakes Rakas Tal and Manasarowar, and there was a major centre of pilgrimage on the upper reaches of one of the streams feeding the holy Ganges, Badrinath on the Vishnuganga River.

Immediately to the north of Badrinath is the Mana Pass leading onto the Tibetan plateau, and there are further passes in an arc running in a south-easterly direction from the Mana Pass towards the trijunction of Kumaon, Nepal and Tibet. These fall into two groups. First: the Niti, Shaishal, Kungribingri and Darma Passes are among those which dominate the routes to Tibet from the Dhauli River (which joins the Vishnuganga River downstream of Badrinath to form the Alaknanda tributary of the Ganges) and the Goriganga River (flowing into the Kali, a river marking the western border of Nepal which eventually becomes the Sarda, then the Chauka, and finally the Ghagra before joining the mainstream of the Ganges just to the west of Patna). Second: there is the Lipu Lekh Pass which lies on the main route to India from the Tibetan administrative centre of Taklakot (Taklakar). Both groups of passes are traversed by trails leading down on the Indian side to the administrative centre of Almora in Kumaon; but they are located in border country occupied by rather different groups of Bhotias. All the Bhotias in this part of the Himalayan Range in the British period possessed ties of some kind with Tibet as well as with India; and the greater part of the trans-border trade was in their hands. Without their seasonal movements many remote parts of Western Tibet would have been deprived of

the simplest of manufactured goods coming from or through India.

While on the Tibetan side the majority of the Bhotias of the first region came under the influence of the Daba Dzongpön, the Bhotias who traditionally crossed the Lipu Lekh Pass as part of their transhumant way of life were subject to taxation by the Dzongpön at Taklakot. The existence of at least two Tibetan authorities meant, in practice, a number of possible histories of border and jurisdictional disputes, all distinct from the Nilang-Jadhang question which involved yet another Tibetan Dzongpön, that of Chabrang (Tsaparang).[856]

The stretch of the Middle Sector border from the Niti Pass eastwards to the Kungribingri Pass has received considerable notoriety in the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute as the scene of the Barahoti or Wu-Je "aggression" by the Chinese against India which first began to generate notes and memoranda on 29 June 1954.[857] While the Indians still maintain that the border here has been defined beyond doubt, it is a fact equally beyond doubt that during the British period it was subject to some Anglo-Tibetan argument and, indeed, a minor exercise of British military strength.

The situation here in the British period was very similar to that applying in the Nilang-Jadhang area which we have already examined. Hill peoples of the Bhotia group migrated seasonally over the passes and grazed their animals in the high pastures in the summer. They also traded with Tibet. While in reach of the Tibetan authorities they were taxed by them. The zone within which the Tibetans imposed their authority extended south of some of the passes along what would appear on the map as the watershed line (which, as such, had no particular significance in Tibetan eyes).

Richard Strachey, who in 1848 and 1849 visited the Niti Pass and the country to its east, including an excursion across the Tibetan border to the sacred lakes Rakas Tal and Mansarowar, provides us with a good picture of the border situation here in the middle of the 19th century. The Niti Pass was an undoubted boundary point and the settlement or camping ground of Niti twelve miles as the crow flies to its south was in British Garhwal.[858] The Tibetans, however, considered that their territory extended south of a line of passes immediately to the east and south-east of the Niti Pass such as the Barahoti, Chotahoti, Shaishal (Shelshel or Shalshal) and Balcha Dura Passes. On the Indian side of these there were a few settlements or camping grounds, notably Barahoti and Lapthal, which the Daba Dzongpön clearly regarded as within his jurisdiction. As a result of his experiences in 1848 Strachey had this to say about Barahoti and its international status:

> I do not think that our Bhotiya subjects have any definite ideas as to the boundary between the British possessions and those subject to Lhasa; nor indeed am I aware that any boundary has ever been settled between

> the two powers. We English in Kumaon affirm that the watershed is the boundary, and I think no one will dispute the assertion. I was indeed told that *Hoti*, a pasture ground north-east of *Niti* within the watershed, was considered by the Tibetans to be a dependency of *Daba*. But as it was convenient for me to consider it British ground when I was geologizing here in the following year . .[1849] . . I did not find any one, either Bhotiya or Tibetan, inclined to deny my positive assertion that it was British. A dispute about a few square leagues of snowy range will hardly give rise to a *casus belli* between us and the Government at Lhasa, and the geographers on both sides may, I think, be safely left to put the boundary in their maps where they please.[859]

Strachey's levity about frontiers on maps was not shared by the local Tibetan authorities. They may not have known much about maps but they knew exactly what Lhasa officially considered that their territory was and who in it were their subjects.[860] This certainty the Chinese inherited after 1951.

A crisis in Anglo-Tibetan relations developed in this region in 1888 when, in order to prevent J.S. Campbell, Senior Assistant Commissioner, Garhwal, from entering Tibet by way of the Niti Pass, the Daba Dzongpön sent a small party of his men to Barahoti whence they could keep an eye on the main path from India to the Niti Pass and sally forth from time to time to impose dues on travellers and their goods. All this took place at a particularly sensitive moment in the history of British relations with Tibet. A rather larger Tibetan force had in 1886 crossed into Sikkim and established itself a few miles within that State at Lingtu overlooking the main road from Bengal to Lhasa. In March 1888 the British had despatched a force of some 2,000 men which duly expelled the Tibetans.[861] It is possible that the Barahoti move by the Tibetans was in some way related to the Lingtu affair. The local British authorities in Garhwal thought the Tibetan post at Barahoti did not deserve serious notice: it could do no harm. The Government of India, with the Sikkim situation very much in mind, decided otherwise. The Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, declared that "I should be sorry to resort to a little expedition, but it would not do to overlook a deliberate encroachment"; and he instructed the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, to take the necessary measures. Two Gurkha battalions under the command of Major C. Pulley were despatched to the spot and the Tibetans promptly made their exit. There were only about a dozen of them, no match for more than a thousand soldiers of the Indian Army.[862]

This was not, of course, the end of the story. The Tibetans did not easily give up territorial claims however trivial. From time to time the Daba Dzongpön sent parties to re-establish the Barahoti post; and travellers using the passes to the east of Niti continued to face the prospect of Tibetan fiscal exactions (or extortions). In 1914, at the time of the Simla Conference, Charles Bell tried to explain to the

Lönchen Shatra where the border in the Barahoti region ought to be, and drew a sketch map to make his point clearer.[863] There is no evidence, however, to suggest that this had any practical effect; and it would be reasonable to suppose that the Tibetan attitude towards Barahoti and its neighbourhood was exactly the same in 1947 as it had been in 1888.

The final group of passes, of which the Lipu Lekh was the most important, but in which the Darma Pass may well be included, also saw the trans-border extension of Tibetan administration in the form of both taxation of the local Bhotias, here often referred to as the Shokas, and interference with British travellers to prevent them from crossing into Tibet. The villain, in British eyes, in this case was the Dzongpön of Taklakot (a far more formidable figure than his opposite number at Daba). His activities on what might be considered the British side of the border were commented upon by Major-General G.L. Channer, Commander of the Rohilkhand Division, in 1894 after he had visited this tract in search of *Ovis ammon*. The result of such a high military opinion was the temporary posting of a Gurkha detachment just south of the Lipu Lekh Pass (evidently with the active co-operation of the Deputy Commissioner, Almora, T.U. Sturt).[864] In 1897 the traveller A.H. Savage Landor, whose experiences of Tibetan justice were far from happy, reported that the Taklakot Dzongpön was still taxing the Bhotias on the southern (Indian) side of both the Darma and Lipu Lekh Passes. Landor was not highly regarded by the Government of India; but his views received wide publicity through his writings.[865]

After the Younghusband Expedition of 1904 the British authorities in Kumaon began to keep a watch for Tibetan fiscal extortion on the Bhotias here (Byans and Chaudans Bhotias according to C.A. Sherring) who were deemed to be subjects of the Indian Empire. Sherring visited Taklakot in 1905 and other officials followed, Cassels in 1907 and Stiffe in 1911.[866] Bhotia complaints, however, continued about the rapacity and obstructiveness of Tibetan officials from Taklakot with the result that Hugh Ruttledge was sent on a mission there in 1926. Ruttledge and his party, which included his wife and Colonel R.C. Wilson of the Indian Army, took the opportunity to see the sacred lakes and Mount Kailas. It is unlikely, however, that Ruttledge managed to bring about any significant improvements in the conditions of trade for the Bhotias, and the problem of Tibetan taxation on the Indian side of the Lipu Lekh was still the subject of British offical comment up to the moment of the Transfer of Power.[867] The problem here, it is worth emphasising, was fiscal (involving the status for purposes of Tibetan taxation of certain Bhotia groups) rather than territorial; and the Lipu Lekh Pass region does not seem to have figured in the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute.

To sum up this account of the border in the Middle Sector. Contrary to post-1947 Indian claims, there was indeed a great deal of argument or potential argument about the whereabouts of the Indo-Tibetan border along the Middle Sector during the British period; and it was clear that any negotiations on this matter with the Tibetans were singularly unproductive, as witness the Nilang-Jadhang issue. Once made, the Tibetans adhered to territorial and jurisdictional claims with extraordinary tenacity; and attempts on the part of the British at a systematic Anglo-Tibetan discussion of the whole frontier with a view to definitive demarcation would have surely resulted in nothing but interminable and fruitless argument. Nowhere was this conclusion more apparent than in the case of northern Sikkim which we must now examine.

Sikkim, which once extended right down southwards through the Himalayan range to the edge of the plains, was gradually brought under British protection or control during the course of the 19th century. Starting with the establishment of diplomatic relations between Sikkim and the East India Company in the immediate aftermath of the Gurkha War, in 1835 the British acquired from its rulers the Darjeeling District. In the following decades, as a result of a series of crises, the State came increasingly under British protection. In the period covered by this book Sikkim's status, while in practice clear enough, was theoretically somewhat vague. It was not quite an Indian State, and it did not enjoy as much independence as either Bhutan or Nepal. The powers of the British Political Officer in Sikkim, whose post in Gangtok had been established in 1889, were very considerable. At the same time, the Sikkimese ruling family was, in fact, Tibetan, with ties of loyalty to, and property in, Tibet. Seen from Lhasa, Sikkim was a Tibetan dependency for the time being under British influence. Immediately after the Transfer of Power the Kashag asked the new Government of India when, now that the British had gone, such temporarily lost Tibetan territories as Sikkim (including Darjeeling) would be handed back to their rightful owners.[868] The Sikkim Government, at the same time, made a gallant attempt to distance itself from post-British India. Had Tibet not been "peacefully liberated" by China this might have led in the end to a close Sikkim-Tibet association. In the event such hopes came to naught and Sikkim was eventually annexed outright by the Government of India with a lack of scruple which would have disturbed some of the more tender hearted Viceroys of the British Raj.

The ambivalent status of Sikkim plays a particularly important part in the history of Anglo-Tibetan relations in that it contributed towards the situation which was exploited by Lord Curzon to justify the despatch of the Younghusband Expedition to Lhasa in 1904. The proposal by the Government of India to send Colman Macaulay on a Mission to Lhasa in 1886 by way of Sikkim provoked the Tibetan

despatch, as has already been noted, of troops across their border into Sikkimese territory at Lingtu. The Tibetans were clearly convinced that they were entirely justified in this action by virtue of their own rights over Sikkim, a belief which the Government of India could not allow to continue unchallenged. The immediate result of the Lingtu episode, therefore, was the negotiation of the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 relating to Sikkim and Tibet.

The Sikkim-Tibet Convention had four main consequences. First: it established that Sikkim was a British protectorate and that Tibet had no right whatsoever to interfere in its internal affairs. Second: the principle was laid down, if only by precedent, that China could deal directly with the British over Tibet without the participation of Lhasa representatives. The Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 did more to reinforce British acknowledgement of Chinese claims to something like a sovereign status in Tibet than any diplomatic instrument to date; and in a very real sense the subsequent interjection by the British into the Tibetan equation of the concept of "suzerainty" was an attempt to undo the damage inflicted in 1890. Third: the 1890 Convention paved the way for the 1893 Tibet Trade Regulations which opened up Yatung in the Chumbi Valley to British Indian commerce and created yet another building block upon which the Younghusband Expedition of 1904 was founded. Finally: it provided an opportunity for an attempted joint demarcation of the Sikkim-Tibet border applying clearly defined geographical principles.

The demarcation of the border in practice gave rise to great problems. The Tibetans would not take part. Without them, the Chinese also withdrew. Accordingly, the border was laid down on the ground unilaterally by the British in 1895. The British boundary pillars were immediately defaced or removed by person or persons unknown, presumably Tibetans acting under official instructions (but whether from Tashilhunpo or Lhasa we cannot say). In the extreme north of Sikkim, in the region of Giaogong on the upper reaches of the Lachen River, the Tibetans disregarded the boundary defined in the 1890 Convention and posted men to its south; and they claimed jurisdiction over the inhabitants of this remote tract. The situation here, indeed, was very similar to that applying in Nilang-Jadhang or Barahoti, with the local Sikkimese playing the part of the Middle Sector Bhotias. The Tibetans were eventually expelled from Giaogong in June 1902 by J.C. White, the Political Officer in Sikkim, and his military colleague Major Iggulden. They had with them an escort of a hundred troops; but in fact it required no more than a few strokes from White's and Iggulden's walking sticks to set the Tibetans rapidly on the move back home across the border.

The boundary pillars and the "invasion" of Giaogong figured prominently in the Curzonian arguments justifying the setting up of

the Younghusband Expedition which assembled as Khambadzong in 1903. Following the British occupation of Lhasa in 1904 and the long history of subsequent Anglo-Tibetan contact the Government of India certainly assumed that the Tibetans had accepted beyond question both the alignment of the Sikkim-Tibet border as defined in 1890 and the fact that Giaogong was in Sikkim on the British side of that line. In 1934 it became evident that the Tibetans had done nothing of the sort.

On 1 August 1934 the Political Officer in Sikkim, Frederick Williamson, reported to the Government of India that he had just received complaints from a number of village headmen from the extreme north of Sikkim to the effect that certain minor Tibetan officials had been declaring that Tibetan territory in fact extended south of the main range all the way to the Donkhya Pass to include Giaogong on the upper Lachen River.[869] A few weeks later Williamson discovered that the Dzongpön of Khambadzong had erected mile posts (or their Tibetan equivalent) along the road from the Kongralama Pass to Giaogong on the grounds that this was part of a Tibetan national policy to so mark all roads throughout the land. It also came to light that the boundary pillars in this remote corner of Sikkim which J.C. White had put up after his expulsion of the Tibetans from Giaogong in 1902 had somehow disappeared.[870]

Williamson instructed Norbu Dhondup to raise the matter with the Kashag in Lhasa. This Norbu Dhondup duly did, only to find the Kashag highly evasive. He concluded that the easiest way to settle the matter would be for the British simply to remove the offending mile posts; but to do this might arouse Tibetan resentment.[871] It had by now became clear that there was buried somewhere in this affair a challenge of sorts to the validity of the Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 in the negotiation of which the Tibetans had not participated. The Kashag were suggesting that the term "waterparting" used in the Convention was rather vague. It might mean this or it might mean that. Williamson was inclined to call the Kashag's bluff, if that was what it was, and go ahead and remove the mile posts: it could be done discreetly by agents of the Sikkimese Government without direct British involvement.[872] Caroe, however, advised him to delay issuing the necessary instructions until he had been able to investigate the situation on the spot.[873]

In early June 1935 both Williamson and Norbu Dhondup went up to the head of the Lachen Valley to have a look and to talk with the local Tibetan officials across the border. There was no Dzongpön at Khambadzong at this time; but other Tibetan officials said that they were not sure exactly where the border was. They did manage, however, to produce from some store an old notice board inscribed in both Chinese and Tibetan which they maintained indicated that the border did in fact include within Tibet both Giaogong and the

Donkhya Pass. This object certainly dated from the 19th century, yet the Tibetans considered that it was still, despite all that had since taken place, of legal significance. Norbu Dhondup, however, persuaded these Tibetans, who were all of fairly junior rank, to put their seals to a document which said that the true border ran along the waterparting, wherever that might be.[874] Nothing further was done about the mile posts which, however, had been so inefficiently put up that they were rapidly falling down and would shortly disappear without human intervention. The Tibetans, one imagines, continued to retain faith in their antique notice board.

On his visit to Lhasa in 1935 Williamson apparently, so Gould concluded, raised the question of the validity of the 1890 Sikkim-Tibet Convention border with the Kashag who in an informal (but evasive and ambiguous) way seem to have confirmed it without actually saying so.[875] There were no guarantees, however, that the whole business would not again rear its head at some future date. At all events, during the remainder of the British period in India, so far as the records in London show, no more mile posts were erected on Sikkimese territory as defined by the 1890 Convention.

The affair of the Tibetan mile posts to Giaogong so impressed Caroe that he made a specific reference to the episode in his "The Mongolian Fringe" of January 1940 where he stated that in 1935 Tibetan "local officials threw down the boundary stones which marked the Sikkim frontier".[876] Presumably he was referring to the missing pillars erected by White in 1902, the loss of which had been noticed in 1934 and the cause of the disappearance of which had never been determined.

We will probably never know the truth about the affair of the mile posts and the missing pillars. Was it some signal from the Kashag in Lhasa either to the Government of India or to the Chinese? Or was it the action of the Khambdzong authorities who, situated in Tsang, had remained loyal to the Panchen Lama and wished to disturb relations between Lhasa and the British? Or was it simply that, in the cosmology of Khambadzong, Giaogong and the Donkhya Pass really were in Tibet, always had been and always would be? White's pillars, for all one can tell, might have gone years before. What this episode did show, as Caroe made clear in "The Mongolian Fringe", was that there were many real difficulties associated with the management of the Indo-Tibetan border. Unlike Richard Strachey in 1848, he did not believe that "geographers on both sides may . . . be safely left to put the boundary on their maps where they please". Should the Chinese take over from the Tibetan "geographers" in practice, as they were already doing in theory by the mid-1930s to Caroe's alarm, as we shall see in the next Chapter, then the Government of India would indeed have a problem on its hands.

The boundary questions covered in this Chapter, diverse and

complex though they were, could all have been resolved easily enough by direct British unilateral administrative action. The Tibetan mile posts in northern Sikkim, for example, could simply have been removed as we must presume the Tehri-Garhwal authorities removed the Tibetan pillar at the Gumgum Nala. Small British garrisons could have been stationed north of Nilang-Jadhang or at Barahoti: the cost would not have been great. To do anything like this, however, would certainly have created a measure of ill feeling in Lhasa which would not have helped in the resolution of other boundary questions which Caroe undoubtedly considered vastly more important. These, which all lay to the east of Sikkim, are the subject of the next two Chapters. Post-British experience was to show that, from the point of view of the defence of India they were indeed more serious than anything on the Middle and Western Sectors (with the possible exception of the Aksai Chin, which can only be described as a special case). The Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute began in the Middle and the West; but it was in the East after the Transfer of Power that India appeared for a moment to be faced with the prospect of massive Chinese invasion through the Himalayan barrier right down to the Plains.

In conclusion, then, what was the state of definition of the various sectors of the Indo-Tibetan border, when all is said and done, along that stretch from north-eastern Ladakh to the western edge of Nepal at the moment of Transfer of Power in 1947? The situation can perhaps best be illustrated by four snapshots, as it were.

First: in the map attached to various volumes of *The Imperial Gazetteer of India* in the late 19th century the lowest possible level of definition is indicated for the boundary along the Karakoram and Western Himalayas in contrast to boundaries further east (including the Assam Himalayas where a surprisingly firm line is shown, though not one with which Olaf Caroe would have entirely agreed).[877]

Second: Sir Algernon Rumbold recorded in 1977 that, when asked in 1929 (when he was working in the India Office) whether he could throw any light on the whereabouts of this border for inclusion on the map to be printed with the first volume of the Report of the Simon Commission, he found that in northern Ladakh at least there was no defined border at all.[878]

Third, during the period 1929-1933 the Sino-Swedish Expedition, a venture initiated by the great Swedish explorer Sven Hedin, carried out extensive surveys in the Aksai Chin region which the Government of India after the Transfer of Power considered to be part of the Indian Republic. The construction by the Chinese Communists of a road across this tract was one of the major factors in the crisis in Sino-Indian relations which culminated in the war of 1962. Some of the members of the Sino-Swedish Expedition, which was a venture in which the Chinese Central Government and the Provincial authorities

in Sinkiang took an active part, spent extended periods camping out in this remote tract, surveying, executing geological research, investigating the flora and fauna, without seeking the permission of the Government of India. The accounts of some of the Swedish participants, like E. Norin and N. Ambolt, leave one in no doubt that they considered that they were working either in Chinese territory or on the remotest fringes of Western Tibet. The Government of India were well aware of what was going on, if only because both Norin and Ambolt, as well as one of Ambolt's Chinese colleagues, Dr. Liu Ch'eng-ngo, crossed from time to time into unquestioned British territory in northern Kashmir; and Ambolt, his work completed, returned to Europe by way of the Lingzitang (on the Indian side of the 1898-99 proposals), Leh, Srinagar, Rawalpindi and Calcutta. The Government of India did not give the slightest indication that it considered that all this activity in the Aksai Chin north of the Lokzung mountains was taking place within the confines of the British Indian Empire.[879]

Finally: when the British Cabinet Mission were preparing to go out to India in 1946 they were briefed by the Chiefs of Staff on the defence implications of Partition. The military presented the Mission with a map of India on which were marked not only the possible boundaries between India and Pakistan but also the land frontiers of all British India where they could be determined. The Sikkim-Tibet border was shown as having been fully demarcated. An undemarcated boundary was indicated for the McMahon Line in the Assam Himalayas (which it was evidently acknowledged represented the policy wishes of the Government of India). For the stretch from Afghan border on the Wakhan Tract in the Pamirs all the way to the Almora-Nepal border along the Kali River, no frontier of any sort whatsoever was shown. The internal divisions between British Districts, Provinces and States simply ended in thin air when they reached the Himalayas. This map was dated January 1946 and was drawn very much with border matters in mind. The implication was clear enough. Whatever various Atlases might show, in the view of the Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff there was *no* officially defined border between India and Tibet along what were to become the Middle and Western Sectors of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute when the British left India in 1947.[880]

780. There is a vast literature on this subject of which, as an official Indian statement, the most important is: India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and of the Chinese People's Republic on the Boundary Question*, New Delhi 1961. See, also, for example: P.C, Chakravarti, *The Evolution of India's Northern Borders*, New York 1971; G. Narayan Rao, *The India-China Border. A Reappraisal*, Bombay 1968. The last is a detailed attempt to counter the points made in my *China-India Border*.

For an almost mystical interpretation of the rightness of India's case for a well established Himalayan border, see: S. Gopal, *Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography, Volume Three. 1956-1964*, Delhi 1984. The Appendix to this work, "The Northern Border of India" is an extraordinary statement by one of the officials most responsible for the preparation and presentation of the Indian case.

781. It has sometimes been said that the Simla Convention map, and the map (in two sheets) relating to the McMahon Line, were published in the 1930s. See, for example: J. Lall, *The Aksaichin and Sino-Indian Conflict*, New Delhi 1988, p. xi. This is not true. None of the maps emerging from the Simla Conference were published until c. 1960 when they were made public by the Government of India.

782. From 1948 to 1952 K.P.S. Menon occupied the post of Secretary to the External Affairs Ministry, Caroe's old post which he was the first Indian to hold, taking over from Humphrey (later Lord) Trevelyan. He was largely responsible for giving instructions in January 1951 for the Indian occupation of Tawang, which was carried out with such secrecy that it was neither reported in the Indian press nor aroused any Chinese protest at the time.

Tawang was formally brought under Indian administration in February 1951 by Major R. Khating (who was a Naga). See: S.R. Johri, *Where India China and Burma Meet*, Calcutta 1962, p. 146. At this time the North East Frontier Agency, NEFA, was under the Governorship of Assam of Jairamdas Daulataram. For a detailed account of these intial stages in the post-British administration of NEFA, see: N. Rustomji, *Enchanted Frontiers. Sikkim, Bhutan and India's North-Eastern Borderlands*, Delhi 1973, pp. 114-133.

Menon was probably the only Indian (as opposed to British) official who understood fully the nature of the Caroe doctrine, including the facts behind the substitution of the 1938 pseudo-1929 Aitchison Vol. XIV for the original; though T.N. Kaul must also have been well informed. Unlike Caroe, in later years Menon was prepared to admit what had been the truth about this and other frontier matters then being denied by many other authoritative figures. While Menon may not always have sympathised with the Chinese point of view, his great experience of Chinese affairs, first in Chungking as Agent General of the Government of India and then as India's first Ambassador to China, enabled him to understand it. It is unlikely that his successor in China, K.M. Panikkar, appreciated the implications of the Indian occupation of Tawang.

783. India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged, and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China 1954-1959. White Paper*, New Delhi 1963, pp. 98-101.

784. For an admirable critique of the watershed principle as applied to the McMahon Line, see: J.R.V. Prescott, *The Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty*, Melbourne 1975, pp. 279-280.

785. This was in 1872-73 when Major Graham and Tibetan representatives laid down a stretch of Indian border to the east of Bhutan which ran along the foot of the hills not many miles north of the Brahmaputra in Assam. See: Lamb, *McMahon Line*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

786. The Bhutanese rulers possessed estates in Tibet which provided a fertile breeding ground for argument. The Tibeto-Nepalese boundary had developed its share of disputed sectors, some of which greatly strained relations between Lhasa and Katmandu. The question of Tibeto-Nepalese boundary argument from the 1850s up to 1930 is most ably discussed in : Prem R. Uprety, *Nepal-Tibet Relations 1850-1930. Years of Hopes, Challenges and Frustrations*, Katmandu 1980.

787. The origins of this alignment, which in my *China-India Border* I called the Macartney-Macdonald line, had nothing to do with Tibet. The problem arose from claims to rights over Hunza (which the British had recently brought under their protection) by the Chinese authorities at Kashgar in Sinkiang, as well as from Hunza interests in territory to the north of the main Karakoram crests in Raskam and the Taghdumbash Pamir. In that Hunza derived benefit from these relationships with Sinkiang it was reluctant to surrender them. From the British point of view the problem was solved in 1936 by suitably compensating the Mir of Hunza in return for the *de facto* abandonment of this traditional situation. On 2 March 1963 the whole question was settled once and for all by a Sino-Pakistani Boundary Agreement which some observers would consider as a model to be followed in any final settlement of the infinitely greater and more complex Sino-Indian boundary problem. One of its achievements was to put an end to all Chinese claims to any special status in Hunza. As Major-General N.A.M. Raza, once Pakistani Ambassador in China, observed in 1963, the border now agreed with China was just about what the British considered to be the correct border in 1939. I am very grateful to General Raza for his discussions with me on this and other topics.

The Hunza question and the Macartney-Macdonald Line of 1898-99 are discussed in detail in my *China-India Border* and my *Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*. See also: A. Lamb, "The Sino-Pakistani Boundary Agreement of 2 March 1963", *Australian Outlook*, December 1964; C.P. Skrine & P. Nightingale, *Macartney at Kashgar. New Light on British, Chinese and Russian Activities in Sinkiang, 1890-1918*, Hong Kong 1987; M. Razvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan. A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy*, Karachi 1971, pp. 177-180.

I am much indebted to the late Sir Michael Gillett, whose knowledge of these matters was incomparable, for explaining to me the state of the Mir of Hunza's claims to Raskam and the Taghdumbash Pamir in the 1930s. S.C. Bajpai misunderstood a passage from K.P.S. Menon's *Delhi-Chungking* when he used it as evidence that in the 1940s the Mir's claims beyond the Karakoram were still in being as far as the Government of India were concerned: they were not. See: Bajpai, *Northern frontier*, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

Recently (1988) an Indian establishment figure, J. Lall, has published an account of the Macartney-Macdonald proceedings which shows their bearing on the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute. Lall, however, omits certain features of the story. He blames the failure of the 1899 proposals to evolve into a settled border between India and China on the negligence of British officials. See: Lall, *Aksaichin*, *op. cit.*, generally.

788. The Lanak Pass at the head of the Changchenmo valley was the most northerly established boundary point on the Kashmir-Tibet border in 1898; and it so remained for the remainder of the British period in India. In 1902 and again in 1903 it was so described by Captain C.G. Rawling who reported the presence of a boundary pillar near the summit. Rawling's map shows the Ladakh-Tibet border ending abruptly at this point, beyond which no borders of any kind are indicated. See: C.G., Rawling, *The Great Plateau, being an Account of Exploration in Central Tibet, 1903, and of the Gartok Expedition, 1904-1905*, London 1905, p.38 & map at end of Pt.I.

Beyond the Changchenmo valley lay the Lingzitang basin, and beyond that, separated from it by a line of mountains, the Lokzung range (along which ran the proposed 1898-99 boundary), was the Aksai Chin. The spokesmen for the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, led by Dr. S. Gopal and other champions of the Indian cause, have in recent years for some obscure reason of polemic denied that this range between the Lingzitang and Aksai Chin basins actually exists, safe in the knowledge that no Western observer was likely to visit the region to

see for himself or herself. (See: for example, Sir O. Caroe, "The India-China Frontiers", *Geographical Journal*, 130, 1964, who stated that "recent surveys" had shown that the Lokzung, or Lok Tsung, range had been "shown not to exist". What surveys one may ask and made by whom? If by Indians, then brave men indeed, since the Lokzung range had been firmly under Chinese control since the early 1950s). The truth of the matter is that the Lokzung range was visited, and commented upon by a number of travellers in the 20th century. The area, for example, was investigated in 1914 by the Italian explorer F de Filippi. See: F. de Filippi, *Storia della pedizione Scientifica Italiana nel Himalaia, Caracorum e Turchestan Cinese*, Bologna 1923. Another Western traveller who did visit this part of the world in 1927-1928, Dr. Emil Trinkler, actually crossed these mountains between the Lingzitang and the Aksai Chin, the Lokzung range. He wrote: "I must confess that I have rarely seen such utterly barren and desolate mountains". As a frontier line, as proposed in 1898-99, the Lokzung range clearly had a great deal going for it. See: E. Trinkler, "Notes on the Westernmost Plateau of Tibet", *Himalayan Journal*, III, 1931. The area was once more, and thoroughly, surveyed by E. Norin, a member of Sven Hedin's Sino-Swedish Expedition, in 1930-32. Norin published a series of photographs of the formidable mountains which make up the Lokzung range. Any "recent" surveyor who failed to find them must have been blind, a liar, or too busy hiding from the Chinese to get out his surveying instruments. See: E. Norin, *Geological Explorations in Western Tibet*, Stockholm 1946.

The political status of the Aksai Chin region is well illustrated by the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin's experience in 1906. Sven Hedin had been refused permission by the India Office to enter Tibet from British India; but he managed to persuade the Government of India to permit him to go from Kashmir to China, that is to say Sinkiang, whence he could divert into Tibet without involving the British. From the British point of view there was the question of the new policy towards Western travellers in Tibet which the Liberal Secretary of State for India, Morley, had just laid down, as well as considerations arising from the negotiations of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 which were then in progress. Sven Hedin, having given his word to the Viceroy, Lord Minto, who was extraordinarily friendly and helpful, that he would adhere strictly to these ground rules, refrained from crossing into Tibet over the Lanak Pass – this was an undoubted point of direct contact between British protected territory and Tibet. Instead, he pushed on beyond the 1898-99 proposal line into the Aksai Chin. He now felt free of his parole. As he put it:

> we were now in a country belonging to the unannexed region of Aksai-chin in north-west Tibet. Or tell me to what Power this land belongs? Does the Maharaja of Kashmir lay claim to it, or the Dalai Lama, or is it a part of Chinese Turkestan? No boundaries are marked on the map, and one looks in vain for boundary stones. The wild asses, the yaks and the swift-footed antelopes are subject to no master, and the winds of heaven do not trouble themselves about earthly boundary marks, From here, therefore, I could move eastwards . . [into Tibet] . . without acting in direct opposition to the wishes of the English Government and the Chinese would certainly forgive me for not using their passport.

These words were published by Hedin in his *Trans-Himalaya*, Vol. I, pp. 93-94 in 1909. The Viceroy, Lord Minto, to whom Hedin dedicated the book, never considered that Hedin had broken his word and crossed directly from Kashmir to Tibet. The Aksai Chin, as far as the Government of India were concerned, was certainly not part of the British Indian Empire; though there was no firm view as to who else it might belong to. This remained the effective situation up to the end of the British Raj in 1947.

789. The 1898 proposed boundary definition here, which was explained to the Chinese in Peking by the British Minister, Sir Claude Macdonald, on 14 March 1899, was misquoted by Jawaharlal Nehru to Chou En-lai in a communication dated 26

September 1959. Nehru, by omitting a few words from Macdonald's 1899 Note, gave the impression that the British in 1899 had merely confirmed with China the border currently claimed by India in the Aksai Chin. In a way this was a far more serious distortion of the evidence than Caroe's pseudo-1929 Aitchison Vol. XIV. The reasons for it have yet to be explained satisfactorily. See my *Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*, where the question of the 1899 Note and Nehru's use of it is examined in some detail. The Nehru misquotation, it has been calculated, gave India an extra 4,800 square miles which the British in 1899 informed Peking they considered to be part of Sinkiang. See: Bajpai, *Northern Frontier*, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

790. It has been said that the Government of India undertook some review of this boundary in 1927. The records available in London give no indication of such a review. In 1927, as in 1908 when the Government of India prepared a map for inclusion in the forthcoming 1909 edition of Aitchison's *Treaties*, the British considered themselves committed to the 1898-99 boundary. The Indian position in this respect was made quite clear in a letter, dated 4 July 1907, from Sir Louis Dane, the then Foreign Secretary of the Government of India, to the India Office in London. In this letter Dane also suggested that the Aksai Chin region, while in fact in Sinkiang, might perhaps be transferred by some sleight of hand to Tibet (as was indeed attempted in 1914). See my *Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*, pp. 11-15.

An interesting insight into the state of definition in 1927 of the northern borders of Ladakh beyond the Changchenmo-Lanak Pass line is provided by the 1927 expedition from Kashmir across the Aksai Chin to Sinkiang of the German travellers E. Trinkler, W. Bosshard and H. de Terra. In order to obtain Government of India permission to leave Kashmir and British territory, it was necessary to guarantee in writing that no attempt would be made to enter Tibet from British India (following the Sven Hedin precedent). This presented some problems which H. de Terra described thus:

> The local government .. [of Kashmir] .., encouraged by the help of the British authorities, secured us transport for "as long as our travels should keep us in Kashmir territory".
>
> "But where are your boundary posts?" we asked the Hindu official. He made a heroic effort to collect his geographic knowledge, but evidently in vain, for he advised us not to worry over such minor difficulties.
>
> But, alas! This was no minor difficulty, for we had to sign an agreement with the Indian Government promising to stay out of Tibetan territory. As the boundaries between Kashmir, Tibet and Chinese Turkestan are so manifestly vague, this promise seemed difficult of fulfilment. Even the British officials smiled at our dilemma, as a veritable no man's land exists beyond the Himalayas.

See: H. de Terra, "On the world's highest plateau: through an Asiatic no man's land to the deserts of Ancient Cathay", *National Geographic Magazine*, LIX, January-June 1931. It may be that these experiences were somehow distorted or misinterpreted to give rise to the belief that something happened about Kashmir boundaries in 1927. Or it may be that the process of preparation of the 1929 edition of Aitchison's *Treaties* has left some mark in the records in India in the shape of a query about the whereabouts of the border in Ladakh.

791. On the map appended to both texts of the Simla Convention of 1914 the British negotiators carefully extended the "Red Line" indicating the external boundaries of Tibet as a whole (both Inner and Outer Tibet) to the north-west such that it showed that much of the Aksai Chin region claimed by India in the 1950s lay in Tibet rather than Chinese Sinkiang. The point is discussed in the second volume of my *McMahon Line* to which the reader is referred.

792. The implications of the extreme upper left-hand end of the "Red Line" on the Simla Convention map are quite clear. However, they do not seem to have been referred to again in the British records. The lower right-hand extremity of the

same "Red Line" was used by the British to introduce the McMahon Line obliquely into Anglo-Chinese dialogue.

793. In some editions of Nehru's *The Discovery of India* (1946) the endpapers contain such a map as do both text and dust jacket of Menon's *Delhi-Chungking* (1947), to which Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a foreword.

794. Sinkiang is used here for reasons of convenience to describe a region well understood today by that name even if at the period in question the name had not yet come into use. Sinkiang became a Chinese Province in 1884.

795. By the 1890s the summit of the Karakoram Pass was the undisputed *de facto* frontier point between Kashmir and Sinkiang.

796. The Johnson survey was from a technical point of view not without its faults. Reliance on plane-table measurements and some confusion as to the relationship between peaks and watersheds resulted in Johnson locating the eastern edge of his Aksai Chin border to the east of the 80th meridian when, on the basis of the position on the ground of the features which determined it, it should have been to the west. This was to cause a great deal of trouble in subsequent years and to complicate the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute. For a detailed discussion of this point, see: Lamb, *Sino-Indian Border on Ladakh*, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9.

797. Johnson, who seems to have been a Eurasian, was an embittered man who felt that because of his birth his prospects of promotion in the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India (to give it its full title) had been blocked. Almost immediately after completing his survey of the extreme north of Kashmir, within the borders of which he included the Aksai Chin and territory on the northern slopes of the Kunlun up to some hundred miles as the crow flies from Khotan itself (no watershed principle here), he took up a post with the Kashmir Durbar and ceased to be an employee of the Government of India. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, while making his survey in 1865 (when his future employment with Kashmir had already been agreed), his loyalties lay more with Jammu than with Calcutta.

The British at the time did not accept the validity of Johnson's survey on either political or, indeed, cartographical grounds; and a few years later another employee of the Kashmir Durbar, Drew, modified significantly the Johnson territorial claims to include the entire Karakash river system within Sinkiang. See: F. Drew, *The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories*, London 1875, map. The Drew boundary seems to have continued to represent the official view of the Kashmir Durbar as to its territorial limits to the north until well beyond the Transfer of Power in 1947. See, for example: *The Chinese Threat*, published by the Ministry of Information of the Government of India in 1963. Map No.10 is a Kashmir Durbar Revenue Map of Ladakh from 1909 which shows precisely the Drew boundary of 1875 (with the Aksai Chin in Kashmir but the Karakash Valley excluded). See also the map reproduced by P.L. Lakhanpal, *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute*, Delhi 1965. There are good grounds, therefore, to suppose that this was in the eyes of the Kashmir Durbar their border.

The major change on the part of the Government of India in 1954 was to revert to Johnson and re-annex the upper Karakash Valley on grounds which have never been made public. Perhaps it made for a straighter line which pleased some tidy-minded draftsman. The Aksai Chin may have been until recently a no man's land; but the Karakash Valley was a source of jade which had been known to, and exploited by, the Chinese for a very long time indeed, which was certainly one reason why Drew did not include it in Kashmir. It was also to turn out to be the easiest route for a motor road from the edge of the Taklamakan in Sinkiang up on to the Tibetan plateau, and therefore of great interest to the Chinese as an access to "liberated" Tibet in the 1950s.

798. The history of the Johnson survey is considered at some length in my *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*, Canberra 1973, as well as in my *The China-India Border*. See also: Lall, *Aksaichin, op. cit*, where the Johnson story is gone into in considerable detail.

799. Gartok was not really a town. It contained some 50 permanent dwellings. In summer it became a large tented encampment. In winter the Garpons moved some 50 miles to the north-west to Gar Dzong (Gar Gunsa) where the climatic conditions were less severe.

800. H.H. Godwin Austen, "Notes on the Panggong Lake District of Ladakh", *The Geographical Journal*, 1867.

801. Richardson, *Tibetan Précis, op. cit.*, pp. 122-125.

802. The sources for the Dokpo Karpo affair are: A.R. & K.M. Heber, *In Himalayan Tibet*, London 1926, pp. 100-108; Richardson, *Tibetan Précis, op. cit.*, pp. 122-125. The Hebers were medical missionaries. Dr. A.R. Heber accompanied Major Robson to Dokpo Karpo in 1924. The map to their book is most useful in locating the spot in question.

803. Richardson, *Tibetan Précis, op. cit.*, p. 40. One does not get quite this impression from Wakefield's own writings. See: Edward B. Wakefield, "A journey to Western Tibet, 1929", *Alpine Journal*, 66, 1961; Sir Edward Wakefield, *Past Imperative. My Life in India 1927-1947*, London 1966. Wakefield's report on his 1929 visit to Western Tibet is in: L/P&S/12/4163. The Rudok Dzongpön at the time of Wakefield's visit was the former Rugby boy, Mundo.

804. See papers in: L/P&S/12/4164.

805. A boundary point between Tibet and Ladakh (then a Tibetan dependency) had been established somewhere in the Demchok region in the late 17th century; but exactly where it was located is still not clear. In 1846 a British Boundary Commission, following the Treaty of Amritsar which brought under British protection the State of Jammu (including Ladakh), to which the former Sikh possessions in Kashmir had been sold by the British for Rs. 75,00,000, was assembled in the hope of settling the Indus sector of the Ladakh-Tibet border with Tibetan or Chinese participation. The Commission was headed by Alexander Cunningham and P.A. Vans Agnew. In the event neither Tibetan nor Chinese Commissioners ever turned up. The Commission was much concerned with the implications of the treaty between the Dogras, the rulers of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Tibetans of 1842, which related more to political matters and trade than to the border. In 1847 a member of the Commission, Henry Strachey, visited Demchok and concluded that the border was actually a stream running through the settlement (which except for a few rude houses was really a camping ground seasonally occupied). For some reason the British subsequently decided that Demchok lay entirely in Tibet. It is quite possible, of course, that the site of Demchok had in fact moved. The Indus was a dangerous river subject to catastrophic floods which frequently rendered places uninhabitable. The Kashmir Durbar possessed territorial interests deep in Western Tibet, including the *jagir* of Misar or Minsar some 50 miles south-east of Gartok which had been granted to Ladakh in return for Ladakhi rights over Tashigong, 20 miles upstream on the Indus from Demchok. It may well be that there were various ways to interpret the demarcation between Tashigong and the Ladakhi border in the Demchok region; and that from this fact may have emerged the Indian claim to territory extending east of Demchok which has been shown on Indian maps since 1954.

For the Kashmir Boundary Commission of 1846-1847, see: Lamb, *China-India Border*, *op, cit.*, pp.64-69; Lamb, *India and Tibet*, *op.cit.*, pp. 57-64; A. Cunningham, "Correspondence of the Commissioners deputed to the Tibetan Frontier", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XVII, 1848; A. Cunningham, "Memorandum detailing the boundaries between the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh and British India as determined by the Commissioners, P.A. Vans Agnew, Esq. and Captain A. Cunningham, of Engineers", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XVII, 1848; J.D. Cunningham, *Ladak, Physical, Statistical and Historical*, London 1854; H. Strachey, *Physical Geography of Western Tibet*, London 1854; T. Thomson, *Western Himalaya and Tibet*, London 1852.

806. For the 1939 Demchok discussions, see: L/P&S/12/4204. This slim file is not very illuminating.

When Sven Hedin passed down the Indus from Tibet into Ladakh in 1907 he discovered that the last Tibetan post was actually at Demchok though the border itself was a few miles to its west, just as shown on British maps. See: S. Hedin, *Trans-Himalaya. Discoveries and Adventures in Tibet*, 3 vols., London 1909-1913, Vol. III, p. 60. There is no evidence that the situation had changed significantly up to 1947. In the itinerary from Leh to Gartok provided by Swami Pranavananda in 1949, for example, the Kashmir-Tibet boundary is located in Demchok village. See: Swami Pranavanda, *Kailas-Mamasarovar*, Calcutta 1949, p. 163.

807. For a history of Spiti, see: W.C. Hay, "Report on the valley of Spiti; and facts collected with a view to a future revenue settlement", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XIX, 1850; P.H. Egerton, *Journal of a Tour Through Spiti*, London 1864; A.F.P. Harcourt, *The Himalayan Districts of Kooloo, Lahoul and Spiti*, London 1871; J.D. Cunningham, "Notes on Moorcroft's Travels in Ladakh, and Gerard's Account of Kunawar, including a general description of the latter district", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XIII, 1844; Thomas Hutton, "Journal of a trip through Kunawar, Hungrang, and Spiti, undertaken in the year 1838, under the patronage of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, for the purposes of determining the geological formation of those districts", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, VIII, 1839; A. Cunningham, "Memorandum detailing the boundary between the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh and British India, as determined by the Commissioners P.A. Vans Agnew, Esq., and Captain A. Cunningham, of Engineers", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XVII; A. Cunningham, "Correspondence of the Commissioners deputed to the Tibetan Frontier; communicated by H.M. Elliot, Esq., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XVII, 1848; G. Tucci & E. Ghersi, *Secrets of Tibet, being the Chronicle of the Tucci Scientific Expedition to Western Tibet (1933)*, London 1935 ; Alastair Lamb, "The Spiti Valley Today", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, October 1956; Sir E. Wakefield, *Past Imperative. My Life in India 1927-1947*, London 1966; E.B. Wakefield, "A Journey to Western Tibet, 1929", *Alpine Journal*, LXVI, 1961; G.D. Khosla, *Himalayan Circuit. The Story of a Journey in the Inner Himalayas*, with a foreword by Jawaharlal Nehru, London 1956; S.C. Bajpai, *Lahaul-Spiti. A Forbidden Land in the Himalayas*, New Delhi 1987.

808. One of the more skilled apologists for the Indian case in the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute, Professor P.C. Chakravarti, has admitted that the boundaries of Independent India were those inherited from British India, neither more nor less. As he put it:

> the Indian Independence Act of 1947 defined the territories of India as those "under the sovereignty of His Majesty . . (George VI) . ., which immediately before the appointed day (15 August 1947) were included in British India, except the territories which . . . are to be the territories of Pakistan". This meant that the Dominions of India and Pakistan

> inherited the borders as the British had made them. Both under the provisions of this Act and as a successor state under international law we have every right to hold on to territories and borders which we have inherited from the predecessor government. As a sovereign state India is, of course, entitled to change the boundaries by new arrangements, but to be binding on her the change must be brought about by consent and agreement, not by force.

See: P.C. Chakravarti, *The Evolution of India's Northern Borders*, New York 1971, pp. vii-viii.

809. See, for example: Pakistan, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, *Kashmir in Maps*, Rawalpindi 1954. This reproduces a number of UN, as opposed to Pakistani, maps. The Pakistani maps show definite boundaries all round which follow the same line as those on Indian maps, suggesting that the Pakistanis, like the Indians, at that time accepted uncritically Kashmir Durbar claims. The UN maps give an undefined frontier for both the Sinkiang and the Tibetan sectors.

810. A Chinese patrol crossed the Shipki Pass and ventured for a short distance into Bashahr on 1 September 1956. They encountered an officer of the Indian Border Police who told them they were in Indian territory and should return to Tibet at once, which they did. There were further incidents on 8 and 10 September 1956 of a rather less amicable nature. All the same, there does not appear to be any outstanding Chinese claim to territory on the Indian side of the Shipki Pass along the left bank of the Sutlej. See: India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China 1954-59. White Paper*, New Delhi 1963, pp. 17-19.

In 1818 Lieutenant A. Gerard found the village of Shipki, on the left bank of the Sutlej upstream of the Shipki Pass, to be firmly in what he called "Chinese" hands. The summit of the Shipki Pass was, he considered, the effective border point between British protected Bashahr (Kanawar) and Tibet. See: A. Gerard, "Narrative of a Journey from Soobathoo to Shipke, in Chinese Tartary, in 1818", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XI, 1842.

The Shipki Pass does not cross a major watershed: it simply takes the Hundustan-Tibet Road over a ridge running down to the left bank of the Sutlej at a point where the river flows through particularly narrow gorges. There is, in fact, a track along the actual bank of the Sutlej by which the Pass can be by-passed. As Tucci and Ghersi noted, however, "the gorge is a veritable abyss, bounded by a vertical wall along whose side runs a mere suggestion of a path which looks out over empty space". The prudent traveller preferred climbing away from the gorge over the Shipki Pass. See: Tucci & Ghersi, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

As the Hindustan-Tibet Road approached the Shipki Pass from the Indian side so it passed through territory where signs of Tibetan cultural influence were increasingly abundant. It is probable that the Tibetans, as well as the Bashahr authorities, collected various dues from this region; but Bashahr enjoyed particularly close relations with the Tibetan authorities in Western Tibet with the result that disputes, if they did arise, did not lead to crises requiring British intervention.

811. For the founding of Simla and the early history of the Hindustan-Tibet Road, see: Lamb, *India and Tibet*, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-41, 64-65.

812. See, for example: A. Gerard, "Journey to Soobathoo and Shipke in Chinese Tartary", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XI, 1842; G. Lloyd, ed., *Narrative of a Journey from Caunpoor to the Boorendo Pass in the Himalaya Mountains etc., by Major Sir W. Lloyd, and Captain Alexander Gerard's Attempt to Penetrate by Bekhur to Garoo and the Lake Manasarowara, etc.*, 2 vols., London 1840; G. Lloyd, ed., *Account of Koonawur in the Himalaya, by Captain Alexander Gerard*, London 1841; V.Jacquemont, *Letters from India*, 2 vols., London 1834; V. Jacquemont, *Voyage dans l'Inde, Vol.II.*, Paris 1841.

813. M. Pallis, *Peaks and Lamas*, London 1939, p. 25.

814. The question of the Bhotias is examined in great detail in: C.A. Sherring, *Western Tibet and the British Borderland: the Sacred Country of Hindus and Buddhists with an Account of the Government, Religion and Customs of its Peoples*, London 1906.

815. On the pilgrimage to Mount Kailas and the lakes Rakas Tal and Manasarowar, see: J. Snelling, *The Sacred Mountain: Travellers and Pilgrims at Mount Kailas in Western Tibet*, London 1983. An interesting narrative of one such pilgrimage, made in 1908, is: Baghwan Shri Hamsa, *The Holy Mountain, being the Story of a Pilgrimage to Lake Manas and of Initiation on Mount Kailas in Tibet*, with an introduction by W.B. Yeats, London 1934.

816. See: Sherring, *Western Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 348.

817. L/P&S/12/4172.

818. L/P&S/12/4172, Tehri-Garwhal to Almora, 29 August 1921.

819. On *deodar* trees, see: H. Yule, & A.C. Burnell, *Hobson-Jobson. A Glossary of Anglo-Indian Colloquial Words and Phrases*, London 1903, pp. 305-306. *Cedrus deodasa.*
   A description of Gangotri and Gaumukh is to be found in: Pallis, *Peaks and Lamas, op. cit.*, pp. 18-26. Pallis visited these holy places in 1933.

820. Tehri-Garwhal denied that the pillar had ever been put in place. The Tibetans throughout the long history of the dispute persisted in saying that it had, even pointing to the hole in which it had once been located and charging that the Tehri-Garwhal people had removed it. It is interesting that this action in erecting the pillar by the Tibetans should have coincided with the Simla Conference.

821. All this Tehri-Garhwal activity took place between 1918 and 1920. There were three pillars on the Tsang Chok La. Tehri-Garhwal made mention of repairing, rather than erecting them; but there seems no doubt that they were not there before 1918.

822. L/P&S/12/4172, G.B.F. Muir, Revenue Secretary to Government, United Provinces, to Commissioner, Kumaon, 7 September 1921.

823. This is clear from the map appended to Muir's letter already referred to.

824. Sheets 53I, 53M, 53J and 53N of the Survey of India Quarter Inch series show most of the details though they do not indicate by name the Gumgum Nala.

825. Sherring uses Lilang for Nilang; and some maps confuse the Nilang Pass with the Muling Pass, the latter being situated, in fact, on the eastern edge of the Jadhang basin. The distinction between Nilang and the Nilang Pass is of some importance to those seeking watershed frontiers. The Nilang Pass is on a watershed of sorts, albeit a subsidiary one, while Nilang settlement is on the floor of a valley.

826. Acton was observed at work on this Commission by Philip Neame who was in this neighbourhood hunting game. He thought that Acton, whom he called "Nimrod", was probably more interested in shikar than in frontier diplomacy. Neame was in no doubt that the effective border was at the Nilang settlement, to the north of which was Tibet (though there had, he had reason to believe, been cultivation by definitely non-Tibetan Garhwalis north of Nilang in the past, perhaps before the Gurkha War). See: Neame, *Playing with Strife, op. cit.*, pp. 161-165.

827. W. Moorcroft, & G. Trebeck, *Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan*, ed. H.H. Wilson, 2 vols., London 1841, Vol.I, p. 14.

828. The Tibetans seem to have referred to Nilang as Tsong and Jadhang as Sang.

829. One reason for coming to this conclusion was that Acton noted that *Ovis ammon* rarely if ever come south of this watershed line. The movement of wild sheep is not normally advanced in support of a particular international boundary alignment. Perhaps Neame was right that Acton ("Nimrod") was really more interested in shikar than in political matters. This would not, of course, make him unique among the British in India.

830. L/P&S/12/4172, Acton's Report, in United Provinces to India, 4 October 1926. Acton's geography was not very good; and he was certainly wrong about the watershed being the Spiti-Tibet boundary.

831. L/P&S/12/4172, Bailey to India, 7 March 1927.

832. L/P&S/12/4172, IO minute by G. Laithwaite, 11 July 1927, sums up the situation up to this point.

833. L/P&S/12/4172, Bailey to India, 30 August 1928.

834. L/P&S/12/4172, Weir to India, 14 November 1930.

835. L/P&S/12/4172, India to Political Officer in Sikkim, 23 December 1931.
Herbert and Hodgson, in their 1817 survey, had placed the boundary here actually along the course of the Bhagirathi River. Their problem was to select a line which ran across the Bhagirathi Valley between watersheds on either side. Their survey would probably have put the much discussed Gumgum Nala in Tibet. The new "compromise" involved allowing the Tibetan border to run along a short stretch of the north bank of the Bhagirathi to where it was joined by the Jadhganaga tributary. The line would then continue northwards along the right bank of the Jadhganaga to Nilang. This would keep the Tibetans away from the main stream of the Bhagirathi in its final stages to Gangotri and Gaumukh. This proposal was in fact slightly less favourable to Tibet than the Herbert and Hodgson boundary of 1817.

836. L/P&S/12/4163, F. Williamson, Report on a visit to Western Tibet in August to October 1932, 14 December 1932.

837. There was no evidence of a Tehri-Garhwal presence north of Nilang at this time. The Government of India's instructions were clearly being respected by the Tehri-Garhwal Durbar.

838. L/P&S/12/4172, F. Williamson, Note on Tehri-Tibet Boundary Dispute, 31 October 1932.

839. Danger of landslides seems to have caused the move, which took place some time between 1896 and 1901 according to the evidence of one very old Jadh. The Nilang settlement, which had originally been situated on the right bank of the Jadhganga, was now on the left bank.

840. This was not a happy thought which all concerned allowed to pass quietly into oblivion.

841. Perhaps part of the same revenue raising exercise which had so disturbed the Panchen Lama and precipitated the crisis which resulted in his flight in 1923.

842. L/P&S/12/4172, J.M. Clay, Chief Secretary, United Provinces, to India, 10 May 1933.

843. L/P&S/12/4172, Punjab to India, 3 April 1934.

844. L/P&S/12/4172, Williamson to India, 19 September 1933.

845. L/P&S/12/4172, Caroe to United Provinces, 10 September 1934.

846. L/P&S/12/4172, R.H. Williamson to United Provinces, 14 March 1934, enclosing Report of the Commission appointed to make recommendations with regard to the territory in dispute between Tehri-Garhwal and Bashahr darbars in the neighbourhood of Nilang, 1934-35.

847. All the territory awarded to Bashahr in fact lay well within the Tibetan claim and north of the "compromise" line.

848. L/P&S/12/4172, IO minutes by K. Clayton, 27 February 1935, and H.A.F. Rumbold, 7 March 1935. Rumbold thought this quite a good idea.

849. L/P&S/12/4172, Williamson to Caroe, 20 March 1935.

850. The situation here in 1939 was described thus by J.P. Auden on the basis of first hand experience over several years:

> the whole of the Jadh Ganga down to the Bhagirathi river at Jangla, and I believe to the junction of the Gumgum nala, is claimed by the Tibetans as part of Tibet, while the Tehri-Garhwal officials regard the boundary as on the Tsang Chik La. Both Tibet and Tehri-Garhwal have placed boundary pillars on their respective frontiers, but these are periodically uprooted and the political status of the Jadh Ganga remains unsettled.

According to J.F.S. Ottley, who also travelled in this region (along with Auden) in 1939, the boundary dispute had resulted in a working compromise. As Ottley put it:

> a boundary dispute has been going over this neighbourhood for several years. Tibetans claim Nelang, and even as far as Harsil. At present there is a compromise. The people who use the village pay a house-tax to Tehri-Garhwal and a stock-tax to Tibet.

This would seem to have remained the position up to the time of the Transfer of Power in 1947. See: J.B. Auden, "A season's work in the Central Himalaya", and J.F.S. Ottley, "The Jadh Ganga Valley and the Nela Pass", *Himalayan Journal*, XII, 1940.

851. See, for example: L/P&S/12/4172, C.P. Skrine, Resident for Punjab States, to India, 27 October 1939 and 30 November 1939.

852. L/P&S/12/4172, Gould to India, 22 March 1940.

853. L/P&S/12/4172, India to Gould, 6 March 1940 & 12 April 1940.

854. The records in London appear to be silent on whether the Chabrang Dzongpön continued his annual "promenade" after 1939. It is more than probable that he did.

855. India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between the Governments of India and China 1954-59. White Paper*, New Delhi 1963, p. 11.

856. The classification of the various Bhotia groups in this part of the Himalayas is complex; and it is not easy to define precisely their relationships with the local Tibetan administrative districts to the north of the Himalayas. Sherring, *Western Tibet, op. cit.*, Chapter XVII, has a great deal of information on this question. Since the outbreak of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute it has become fashionable in certain quarters to deny that any such relationships exist or ever existed.

857. See: India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China 1954-1959. White Paper*, New Delhi 1963, p. 1.

The Chinese, on 17 July 1954, protested against the presence on 29 June 1954 of some 30 Indian soldiers armed with rifles on the northern side of the Niti Pass in what was described as Wu-Je in the Ali (Ari or Gnari) Area of the Tibet Region

of China. The Indians denied that their men had crossed the Niti Pass. They had camped at Hoti on the Indian side of the Pass. It was to transpire during the course of further Sino-Indian diplomatic exchanges that the Chinese considered that Hoti and other points *south* of the Niti Pass were in Wu-Je. The incident of 29 June 1954, whatever the facts might have been, was the first of many incidents of varying degrees of gravity which were to culminate in the Sino-Indian War of 1962.

858. There are a very large number of references to this fact in the literature. See, for example: Major-General D. MacIntyre, *Hindu Koh: Wanderings and Wild Sport on and beyond the Himalayas*, London 1889, p. 417, referring to the situation in the 1860s. The confirmation that the Niti Pass was on the boundary does not of necessity mean that to its east the boundary followed any particular watershed.

859. R. Strachey, "Notice of a Trip to the Niti Pass", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XIX, 1850; Sir Richard Strachey, "Narrative of a Journey to the Lakes Rakas-Tal and Manasarowar in Western Tibet, undertaken in September, 1848", *The Geographical Journal*, XV, 1900, p. 407. The boundary by Strachey's Hoti, which today would probably be called Barahoti in the terminology of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute, was marked by a stone wall of some considerable antiquity.

For another early account of the Niti Pass and its environs, see: J.H. Batten, "Note of a visit to the Niti pass of the grand Himalayan chain", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, VII, 1838. Batten visited Niti in 1837.

The Bhotias of this region, usually known as the Johars, played a significant role in the history of British contacts with Tibet. Members of the Rawat clan of the Johar Bhotias had been encountered by European travellers in the Kumaon hills ever since the journey of Moorcorft and Hearsey in 1812. In the 1850s E. Smyth, at that time an officer in the Bengal Army, travelled widely in the Kumaon Himalayas and established close relations with the Rawats, which he was able to exploit when he was appointed Inspector in the Kumaon Education Department. Colonel Smyth, on the basis of his official position and his long experience of travel along this sector of the Tibetan border, proposed to the Government of India in 1861 that he be authorised to undertake the leadership of an official British scientific and political mission to Tibet. The mission, despite the approval of the Government of India, failed to obtain permission from the local Tibetan authorities to enter that country. Smyth, however, continued to be interested in the problems of Indo-Tibetan relations. He advocated the employment of members of the Rawat clan of Johar Bhotias, at least one of whom he had already recruited as a teacher in the British service, as agents for the exploration of Tibet. To this end, with the approval of Major (later Colonel) Montgomerie of the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India, two Rawats, Nain Singh and Mani Singh, began training as surveyors at the Survey's headquarters in Dehra Dun in 1863 and at the Thomason Civil Engineering College, Roorkee. The Rawat family went on to provide a succession of remarkable explorers, the *pandits*, who in the years before the Younghusband Expedition added so much to British knowledge of Tibet. No doubt one secret of the success of these Rawat Johars was that they were to all intents and purposes Tibetan when travelling in Tibet. They are, in fact, the nearest to a British equivalent of the Russian Buriats in the penetration of Tibetan barriers of exclusion. As explorers they were very successful. As political agents they failed to produce anyone to compare with Dorjiev for reasons which doubtless lie in the social structure of British rule in India when compared with that of Russia in Asia.

For the projected Smyth Mission to Tibet, see: Lamb, *India and Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 91-93; for Smyth and the Rawat Johar Bhotias, see: C. Allen, *A Mountain In Tibet. The Search for Mount Kailas and the Sources of the Great Rivers of India*, London 1982,

pp. 122-145; T.W. Webber, *The Forests of Upper India and their Inhabitants*, London 1902, pp. 92-93.

Colonel Smyth, along with the Hon. R. Drummond, H. Hodgson and T. Webber, ventured into Western Tibet in the region of the sacred lakes in 1864. According to Webber, the party found that between the Niti Pass and the route into Tibet north of Milam by way of the Unta Dhura Pass lay what Webber called a "no man's land" including Laptel (Lapthal) and, by implication, Barahoti or Hoti. If this interpretation is correct, then Webber supports the Chinese rather than the Indian claim here. So also it would seem does Swami Pranavananda, based on experience relating to the final years of British rule in India. One of his itineraries from India to Mt. Kailas clearly places the Barahoti region on the Tibetan side of the border. See: Webber, *op. cit.*, pp. 157, 161; Swami Pranavananda, *Kailas-Manasarovar*, Calcutta 1949, p. 155.

860. In this category they certainly classed the local Bhotia group, the Johars.

861. For the Lingtu affair and its background, see: Lamb, *India and Tibet, op. cit.*, Chapter VII. The Tibetan incursion to Lingtu in Sikkim was a reaction to the British proposal to despatch the Macaulay Mission, equipped with Chinese passports, to Lhasa. It would not be surprising if the Tibetans reacted similarly to reports of British officials approaching other parts of the Indo-Tibetan border. Perhaps the Tibetans feared that Campbell was a replacement for Colman Macaulay.

For all aspects of Sikkimese history during the British period in India, see: Rajkumari Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh, *Himalayan Triangle. A historical survey of British India's relations with Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan 1765-1950*, London 1988.

862. For an account of this episode, based on archives in India, see: S.C. Bajpai, *The Northern Frontier of India. Central and Western Sector*, Calcutta 1970, pp. 28-29.

863. This nugget of information is buried in: India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and of the Chinese People's Republic on the Boundary Question*, New Delhi 1961, p. 84. The records in London are singularly deficient in details of exactly what was discussed with the Tibetans during the Simla Conference.

864. See: Bajpai, *Northern Frontier, op. cit.*, pp. 29-30.

865. A. Henry Savage Landor, *In the Forbidden Land. An Account of a Journey in Tibet, Capture by the Tibetan Authorities, Imprisonment, Torture and Ultimate Release*, 2 vols., London 1897, Vol. I, pp. 75-77, Vol. II, pp. 213-214. As the full title of his book suggests, Landor did not have a happy time in Tibet during his attempt to visit the sacred lakes.

866. W.S. Cassels' report is in: L/P&S/7/207. N.C. Stiffe's report is in: L/P&S/11/21.

867. Hugh Ruttledge, "Notes on a Visit to Western Tibet in 1926", *The Geographical Journal*, LXXI, 1928.

These issues were among those discussed with the Gartok authorities by Captain Saker, Trade Agent, Gyantse, in 1942 and Sonam Tobden in 1943. See: Richardson, *Tibetan Précis, op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

868. Richardson, *Tibet, op cit.*, p. 174.

869. L/P&S/12/4183, Williamson to India, 1 August 1934.

870. L/P&S/12/4183, Williamson to India, 13 October 1934.

871. L/P&S/12/4183, Norbu Dhondup to Williamson, 3 December 1934.

872. L/P&S/12/4183, Williamson to India, 6 February 1935.

873. L/P&S/12/4183, Caroe to Williamson, 27 February 1935.

874. L/P&S/12/4183, Williamson to India, 13 June 1935.

875. L/P&S/12/4183, Gould to India, 13 April 1936.

876. Caroe, "The Mongolian Fringe", dated 18 January 1940. The text of this occurs in numerous places. For example: L/P&S/12/4194; Mehra, *North-East Frontier, op. cit.*, Vol II, pp. 111-124.

877. W.W. Hunter, *The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Volume V, Ganjam to Indj*, London 1885.

878. Quoted by K. Gupta in *Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers*, Calcutta 1982, p.151. Rumbold said that in the end a fairly arbitrary line along the Karakoram range, but excluding the Aksai Chin, was decided upon.

879. See: L/P&S/12/4282 for British papers on the Sino-Swedish Expedition. For work of the Expedition in the Aksai Chin region, see: N.P. Ambolt & E. Norin, *Sven Hedin's Central Asian Atlas. Memoir on Maps. Vol. 1. Records and Surveys*, Stockholm 1967; Statens Etnografiska Museum, *Sven Hedin Central Asian Atlas*, Stockholm 1966; E. Norin, *Geological Explorations in Western Tibet*, Stockholm 1946.

The map NI-44 (Panggong Tso) in the *Atlas* shows just how extensive was the coverage of the Aksai Region in the surveys of Ambolt and Norin; and the precise itineraries and camping places of these two can be seen on the map appended to *Geological Explorations*. This work also contains a number of excellent photographs of the allegedly non-existent Lokzung (Loqzung) Range dividing the Aksai Chin basin from that of the Lingzitang which marked part of the British proposed border with China of 1898-99. No doubt the work of the Sino-Swedish expedition, evidently supplemented by further survey work by the Chinese Provincial Government of Sinkiang (with, perhaps, some Soviet help) and by the Kuomintang Government after 1935, was available to the Chinese Communists when they planned their road across the Aksai Chin in the 1950s. None of this survey work would have given any indication that the territory in question was still in any way claimed by India. The initial hint of this came in July 1954 with the publication of the first official Indian maps since the Transfer of Power which showed international boundaries. The only question raised by all this survey work was whether the Aksai Chin region lay in Sinkiang or Tibet, which did not concern unduly the People's Republic of China in the 1950s when it was under no doubt that both were sovereign Chinese territory.

880. I am indebted to the late Karunakar Gupta for drawing this to my attention. See: Gupta, *Spotlight, op. cit.*, p. 24. The map in question, Annexure A to JPC(46)3 marked "Top Secret", is in the India Office Library and Records, L/PO/D3.

XII

BORDER QUESTIONS: THE McMAHON LINE AND THE ASSAM HIMALAYAS, 1914-1936

Of infinitely greater importance to the security of British India than any problem of boundary definition in what were to become known as the Western and Middle Sectors of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute appeared to be the alignment of the border along the Assam Himalayas. This, as we have already noted, involved two categories of situation, on the one hand the status of the entire Tawang tract from north of Tawang monastery down to the foot of the hills, and, on the other hand, to the east of the Tawang tract, the international position of the remainder of the Assam Himalayas and its foothills.

Before 1914 the entire Tawang tract had been recognised by the Government of India as Tibetan territory, though on the eve of the Simla Conference there had been British strategists who considered that some of it at least ought to be located on the British side of the Outer Line in the interests of Imperial defence. To achieve this, however, would involve the major task of the moving northwards by roughly a hundred miles of a border which had already been demarcated by British and Tibetan representatives in 1872-73 to run along the foot of the hills only a few miles from the right bank of the Brahmaputra River. Within the Tawang tract it had come to be understood by the British at the time of the Simla Conference that there were at least two distinct zones. In the extreme north was Tawang proper, the region around the great Tawang monastery (northern Mönyul and part of Mago), which was as Tibetan as, say, Phari at the head of the Chumbi Valley. To the south-east of Tawang proper (the south-western border being with Bhutan) there was situated a ridge of the main Himalayan range running south-westwards to form a watershed between the Kameng and Dangma (Manas) river basins which was crossed by the Se La. Below the Se La down to the demarcated border at the foot of the hills lay a region which was less clearly under Tibetan control, though the fact that there was an important Tibetan presence here of some kind was not

challenged by the British. There was no defined eastern edge to the Tawang tract so far as the Government of India knew in 1914: it gave way in some manner not understood to territory inhabited by tribal peoples who were neither Tibetan nor significantly influenced by Tibet. Their terrain extended eastwards along the hills all the way to the Burmese border.

At the time of the opening of the Simla Conference the formal boundary situation along the entire length of the Assam Himalayas was easy enough to describe (on the basis, for example, of the map appended to Vol. II of the 1909 edition of Aitchison's *Treaties*). From the Bhutanese border to a point just before the 93rd meridian of longitude there was a demarcated border along the foot of the hills. Further eastwards, as far as Nizamghat on the Dibang, the British acknowledged an extension of this line as an undemarcated international border of the British Indian Empire. From Nizamghat eastwards, crossing the Lohit River and going on until Burma was reached, there was no British border at all. In practice, however, a further extension of the line eastward from Nizamghat, still following the foot of the hills, was taken as the effective administrative frontier which ran in an arc to the north and east of Sadiya along the edge of the Himalayan foothills across the Lohit River to meet Burma in the Hkamtilong region. The entire border, demarcated, undemarcated and informal, followed the line of the foot of the hills and was a long way south of what was to become the McMahon Line.

This Assamese border was perfectly satisfactory in practice from a British administrative point of view until the first decade of the 20th century. The tribes who lived along and beyond it might prove troublesome from time to time; but they were never a major threat to security and could be disciplined by means of the occasional punitive expedition into the lower hills. On the whole, however, the majority of the tribal peoples occupying land immediately adjacent to the sphere of direct British administration had been pacified by agreements in which they accepted the receipt of sums of cash (*posa*) from the Assam authorities in exchange for an understanding that they would not disturb the peace. Such a system of institutionalised blackmail worked well enough most of the time until 1910. The official British policy during this period was "non-interference" in the tribal areas, which meant that ideally there would be as little British governmental activity as possible in the zone between the Inner and Outer Lines and none at all beyond the Outer Line.

In the first decade of the 20th century, and particularly after the Younghusband Expedition to Lhasa had such an unsettling effect upon Tibet, the merits of "non-interference" came to be questioned by a few British officials, notably the person directly concerned with the administration of the Assam Himalayan border, the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya. This post had been occupied for many years

by J.F. Needham, who had made a number of excursions beyond the Outer Line including the exploration of the Lohit valley all the way up to the Tibetan administrative centre of Rima in Zayul. In 1905 Needham retired. His place was taken by Noël Williamson, who immediately began urging the Government of East Bengal and Assam (as the governing body responsible for Assam had been named following Curzon's partition of Bengal) to reconsider the "non-interference" approach towards the land and peoples beyond the Inner and Outer Lines.

There were a number of economic causes for dissatisfaction with current policy, which conflicted with the interests of timber companies and tea estates.[881] The critical factor which ultimately produced a major change, however, was political, a consequence of the rise of Chinese influence in Lhasa following the departure of the Younghusband Expedition which culminated in the Chinese military occupation of 1910 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India. It was obvious to anyone with direct administrative responsibility for this kind of frontier that it was highly undesirable to permit an extensive tract of unannexed territory to remain in being between British India and the new Chinese masters in Central Tibet. The temptation for the Chinese to fill, even if slowly and unevenly, such a power vacuum would sooner or later prove to be irresistible. The theoretical arguments for British activity in the Assam Himalayas voiced by a few officials in the years immediately before the Chinese military advance to Lhasa in 1910 were greatly strengthened following that event when it did indeed seem that the Chinese intended to penetrate this no man's land, possibly all the way to the edge of the Brahmaputra plains.

During the course of 1910 a new policy towards the Assam Himalayas began to be discussed with some urgency. The Liberal Government in London, its outlook still dominated by the aftermath of the Younghusband Expedition and the self-imposed restrictions of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, were reluctant to consider change. The Viceroy, Lord Minto, whose appointment had been made on the understanding that he would *not* be another Curzon, was soon converted, however, to the belief that the Outer Line would have to be pushed northwards right up to the crest of the Assam Himalayas. By the end of 1910 he was advocating a new boundary which, while it still left the entire Tawang tract in Tibet, to its east ran north-eastwards all the way up to the 29th Parallel and more or less the line of the highest peaks.

What had decided Minto was the growing evidence of Chinese activity in the tribal areas north of the Outer Line, particularly along the Lohit river down which during the course of 1910 on two occasions Chinese officials had come through Mishmi tribal country to a location known as Menilkrai, about half way through the

Himalayan range, where they had erected boundary markers. The Chinese, moreover, were reported to have declared that a number of Mishmi groups had come under their protection and to have indicated that their border also now actually touched the lower Lohit at a point only sixty miles or so to the east of Sadiya, and far closer to the Assam plains than Menilkrai. There were signs as well, albeit imprecise, of Chinese activity overflowing from Pome on to the upper reaches of the Dihang (Siang) where that river probably (for geographical knowledge here was still very defective) turned into the Tsangpo. Both developments were unpleasant; but the Chinese interest in the Lohit was particularly so because it threatened to push a wedge of Chinese territory between Assam and northern Burma (to which the Chinese already laid claim from Yunnan to its east).

In the response to this challenge, well aware of the reluctance of both the British Government in London and the new Viceroy Lord Hardinge (who took over from Minto in November 1910) to depart radically from the established principles of "non-interference", Noël Williamson evidently decided to take matters into his own hands. In March 1911 following a rapid reconnaissance up the Lohit, Williamson, accompanied by a tea estate doctor named Gregorson, undertook a venture up the Dihang well to the north of the Outer Line, his objective evidently being to investigate rumours of a Chinese presence in Abor tribal country (though he claimed he was only doing a bit of geographical exploration, seeking the anticipated giant falls on the Tsangpo where it cut through the Himalayas). Both Williamson and Gregorson were killed by Abor tribesmen in unadministered territory, thus creating an incident which could not possibly be ignored by the Government of India. The outcome was a massive punitive expedition against the Abors which was accompanied by a series of parallel ventures elsewhere in the Assam Himalayas from the Lohit valley in the east to the Subansiri basin in the west. These provided much of the geographical data for the McMahon Line proposals which were to be given shape during the course of the Simla Conference of 1913-1914.

The detailed story of the Williamson tragedy, its background and its consequences, has been told elsewhere.[882] For an understanding of the subsequent history of British policy it must suffice here to emphasise one particular feature of the whole story. Williamson, despite attempts to argue to the contrary, was in his fatal venture up the Dihang acting against both the letter and the spirit of British policy. He was killed in territory which, technically at least, lay beyond the international frontiers of the British Indian Empire. The Abor punitive expedition and the various other ventures which followed the tragedy likewise took place beyond the frontier. The Government of India, however, were extremely reluctant to admit this fact which could only provide an opportunity for the Chinese to raise territorial

claims (or at least challenge British territorial pretensions) at a diplomatic level where they could hardly be ignored.[883]

The aftermath of the Williamson tragedy, moreover, presented the Government of India with another problem of some difficulty. According to Section 55 of the Government of India Act, 1858, it was laid down that

> except for preventing or repelling actual invasion of His Majesty's Indian possessions, or under other sudden and urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any such military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions by His Majesty's forces charged upon such revenues.

Did the Chinese activity in the Assam Himalayas in 1910-1912 constitute an invasion or create "other sudden and urgent necessity" as understood by the Act? Probably not. It would be better, therefore, if it were possible to create the impression that all the British military and political activity in the Assam Himalayas after Williamson's death was in fact taking place on territory which was already in some way within the external frontiers of British India. Having once come to this conclusion both the Government of India and, in its train, the India Office, became increasingly vague as to exactly where those external frontiers were. The waters were muddied so effectively that they still have not completely cleared.

The process of concealing the true background to the British advance into the Assam Himalayas in these years leading up to the Simla Conference also resulted in the burial of a most significant fact which could have been exploited to some advantage by the British (or Indian) side had there ever been any genuine Indo-Chinese discussions about the whereabouts of the border here. The spot where in 1910 the Chinese had placed their markers on the Lohit, the so called "boundary stone" on the right bank by Menilkrai where the main river is joined by the Yepak stream, was well known since at least the middle of the 19th century as indicating the lowest point on that river valley over which Tibet had ever asserted claims; and in 1910 these Tibetan claims were merely reiterated by the Chinese.[884] At the very beginning of 1912 a third set of Chinese markers were set up here, this time by officials who declared their loyalty to the Chinese Republic. These were secretly removed two years later by the British Political Officer in charge of an expedition up the Lohit which was quaintly named the Walong Promenade, T.P.M. O'Callaghan, who put them in a concealed spot many miles upstream near Kahao.

These last Chinese markers, which were erected on 9 June 1912 by two fairly senior officials, represent during the British period in India a very rare phenomenon indeed along the two thousand miles or so of Indian border between the Karakoram Pass and Burma, a

unilateral Chinese statement of the whereabouts of a boundary point. There was a late 19th century notice of this kind on the summit of the Karakoram Pass. A representative of the Ambans in Lhasa, also in the latter part of the 19th century, had put up such a notice near Giaogong in northern Sikkim (which was probably what the Khambadzong officials produced again in 1935 for inspection by Frederick Williamson and Norbu Dhondup). Apart from these, the Menilkrai notices are the only other examples which the present author has discovered in the British records; and the final set on the Lohit are certainly the *only* such boundary markers erected by representatives of the Chinese Republic. In that they were located at a mid point between the McMahon Line and the extreme claim which started to appear on Chinese maps in the 1930s, they could have made a useful foundation for a post-imperial Sino-Indian dialogue based on the proposition that neither the Kuomintang nor the British positions represented the truth which could be decided now in a new atmosphere of freedom and friendship. Possibly somthing positive might have emerged from such an approach. It was, however, effectively precluded by O'Callaghan's action.[885]

The Walong Promenade of early 1914, of course, took place after the Chinese had lost control of all of Tibet well to the east of the Tibet-Assam border. Had the Chinese not been driven from Central Tibet during the course of 1912 it is hard to see how the Government of India could have avoided, sooner or later, discussions with them over the alignment of the Assam Himalayan border in which the British Legation in Peking would to some degree have participated. The initial diplomatic motive behind the various British ventures beyond the Outer Line which followed Williamson's death was to present the Chinese with as great a British presence here as possible as a *fait accompli* before any talks began. The talks would have been extremely difficult because of the shadow of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Even if the Chinese could have been persuaded to accept British ideas as to where the border ought to be, there was always the prospect that the resultant agreement might have aroused Russian protest and a Russian demand for compensation of some kind on the grounds that the British were annexing a portion of Tibet. It did not matter in this context whether or not there had been Chinese approval. For much of the Assam Himalayas beyond the old Outer Line the Government of India could probably have argued that Tibetan sovereignty had never been involved; but they could not easily do this with the Tawang tract, which may well explain why in his initial appreciation of the need to advance the Outer Line Lord Minto specifically excluded this region.

With the Chinese departure, of course, the situation changed dramatically. The Chinese could for the time being at least be ignored. What mattered now was to ascertain those areas which it

seemed expedient in the interests of British Indian security to be included in some way within the confines of the British Indian Empire, and to so arrange matters that the Tibetans did not make a public challenge to any such extension, however theoretical, of British territory. What still could not be done, at least without Russian collusion given the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, was to make public either a unilateral British annexation of territory which could be argued to have been part of Tibet or a negotiated transfer by the Tibetans of any portion of their territory to the Government of India. The problem, in fact, was incapable of satisfactory solution.

What Sir Henry McMahon, advised by Charles Bell, tried to do during the Simla Conference of 1913-14 was to settle the border without having seemed to do so. The Conference was convened ostensibly to try to secure an agreed boundary between Tibet and the Chinese Republic. A major British objective, of course, was to obtain Chinese recognition for some form of Tibetan autonomy which excluded the Chinese from what came to be known as Outer Tibet while at the same time not so modifying the international status of Tibet as to give grounds for Russian objections and demands for British concessions elsewhere, in Afghanistan or, even, in the Eastern Mediterranean. With the Chinese having lost direct control over Outer Tibet, the Government in Lhasa might be persuaded, perhaps in exchange for a guarantee of British support for the continuation of the Chinese absence, to agree privately and in secret to a boundary line in the Assam Himalayas which would unavoidably include within British India some Tibetan territory. If the Chinese did not know about the agreement they could not object to it; and it could perhaps be explained eventually to the Russians in such a way that they did not protest too strenuously. Because of Section 55 of the Government of India Act, 1858, of course, the true position had also to be concealed from the British Parliament.

In practice the experience from 1910 to 1914 had shown that there were three main sectors along the Assam Himalayas where some kind of threat, potential or actual, to British security existed. The first was on the Lohit, which offered a route directly from the eastern corner of Outer Tibet to the Assam plains. The second was down the Dihang Valley where there was undoubtedly an area of possible instability. The third lay through the Tawang tract. In all three the principal British requirements, given a continued Chinese absence from Outer Tibet and an acquiescent Government in Lhasa, could be met well enough by very limited measures.

The main problem on the Lohit was to ensure that minor Tibetan incursions made in the name of revenue collection did not disturb the Mishmi tribesmen. There was at this period no trade route here of any great importance. The population was small and the terrain

extremely difficult. What was needed, it seemed in 1914, was the construction of a road suitable for cart traffic up the Lohit Valley and the establishment of a British observation post on it not too far south of the Tibetan administrative centre at Rima. It might even suffice to set up the post at or near Menilkrai, which the Tibetans (and the Chinese) had accepted as being on or near their border. If so, then there would be no risk at all of Tibetan objections.

Lord Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, was doubtful on the eve of the Simla Conference whether the Lohit Road was really needed and showed no enthusiasm for more ambitious projects such as the construction of some kind of cable or rope transport ("monorail" based on "Ewings's System"). As he put it on 1 July 1913:

> negotiations about to undertaken with China and Tibet .. [Simla Conference] .. may result in the permanent exclusion of Chinese from Za-yul ... in which case need for early completion of Mishmi road .. [up the Lohit] .. will presumably disappear. I should prefer in these circumstances to postpone question of monorail for the present until situation is clearer even at risk of losing a working season.[886]

The "monorail" was dropped; but during 1913-14 a measure of road construction did take place, though not all the way to Menilkrai. By the time that the First World War broke out in 1914 the Government of Assam had set up a forward post at Hayuling, on the right bank of the Lohit by its junction with the Du tributary (but still nearly 70 miles short of Menilkrai). This was linked to Sadiya by a reasonable track with bridges over a number of sizeable streams including the Delei and the Tiding. The Government of Assam hoped, eventually, to establish a permanent border post much further upstream at Walong (this had been the advice of O'Callaghan in early 1914 after the Walong Promenade, and, as the experience of the 1940s was to show, it was a guaranteed formula for arousing Tibetan opposition). With the coming of War, however, further work was abandoned and the existing roadbed and bridges allowed to decay.

On the Dihang, where had taken place the murder of Williamson in 1911 from which sprang all other activity by the British in the Assam Himalayas on the eve of the Simla Conference, virtually nothing had happened after 1912. Projects for the establishment of permanent posts a short distance to the north of the old Outer Line, some of which had been set up on a temporary basis during the Abor Expedition, had yet to be implemented. The proposed police post at Yembang, some ten miles upstream from Rotung, on the right bank of the Dihang and not far from the spot where Williamson had been killed on the other side of the river, was a casualty of the coming of War in 1914.[887] Apart from some highly unpleasant memories of British military might, the tribal peoples here still lived in an international vacuum much as they had before 1911.

In the Tawang tract, while the Simla Conference was in session and, indeed, at the very moment that the area was being notionally ceded to British India by the Lönchen Shatra, a journey of inspection was undertaken by Captain G.A. Nevill (without previous reference to the Tibetan Government). On 1 April 1914 he entered Tawang itself and had discussions with the two representatives of Tibetan authority, the Tsona Dzongpöns.[888] As far as Nevill was concerned (and he was, apparently, unaware at this moment of the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes), Tawang was part of Tibet. On his return Nevill (now informed of the Lönchen Shatra's cession of Tawang to the British) made a number of recommendations to the Government of Assam on the future shape of frontier policy in the Tawang tract (an area which had by now become known in Indian official terminology as the Balipara Frontier Tract) of which two are of particular importance. First: the country here to the south of the Se La, while certainly under the jurisdiction of Dzongpöns at Dirangdzong and Kalaktang, was rather less clearly Tibetan than that around Tawang monastery north of the Se La, and it would probably be as well to bring it under a measure of direct British administration. This could be done without too many problems. Second: beyond the Se La Nevill reported that "I can see very great difficulties in administering the Tawang country". He urged that an experienced British officer, fluent in Tibetan, be sent there as soon as possible in order to smooth the transition from Tibetan to British rule.[889] This last proposal was very much in line with the views at that time of Sir Henry McMahon and Charles Bell who between them had brought Tawang proper within the theoretical confines of the British Empire.

In the event, in the Tawang area as elsewhere along the edge of the Assam Himalayas the outbreak of War brought all projects for the extension of British administrative responsibilities to an abrupt halt. It was not until 1919 that the attention of the Government of India turned once more to the subject. The responsibility for the entire Assam Himalayan border was now redistributed and redefined, there being two (instead of the previous three) Political Officers, the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract (Captain Nevill) and the Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract (W.C.M. Dundas, followed in 1920 by T.P.M. O'Callaghan), to look after the entire border from Burma to Bhutan. The Government of Assam began, once more, to urge a somewhat more active approach towards this border. The Lohit road, and its bridges, should be repaired at least as far as the Delei and the old Hayuling post, which should be manned again. Posts should be pushed up the Dihang almost as far as Riga, some thirty miles as the crow flies beyond the old Outer Line but still at least seventy miles short of the McMahon Line. The Tawang tract seemed peaceful enough and no specific proposals were advanced for it.[890]

The India Office view shared by the Government of India, however, was that any measures at all on this frontier tract would be both unnecessary and expensive, particularly as the Chinese were no longer in direct contact with it.[891] The great majority of proposals were, therefore, not sanctioned because of the "grave financial stringency" then obtaining, though the possibility of the repair of bridges along the Lohit road, purely as a measure of maintenance, was not ruled out and authority was given to re-activate the police post at Yembang on the right bank of the Dihang a few miles south of the point where it was joined by the Siyom tributary. By 1923, however, it had been decided to abandon altogether the idea of a road suitable for wheeled traffic along the Lohit. A bridle path would suffice for all practical purposes.[892] Even the bridges over the Du and Delei tributaries of the Lohit would not be repaired.[893] The India Office thought it was a pity to abandon the fruit of so much effort with the result that, if ever the need for a Lohit cart road should again arise, work on it would have to start from scratch; but the policy of retrenchment stood.[894] Protests of the Government of Assam were ignored.[895]

From the viewpoint of the India Office in 1923 the evolution of British policy towards the Assam Himalayas since the death of Noël Williamson in 1911 could be classified into four distinct phases: in 1911 "loose political control sanctified"; from 1912 to 1914, "advance"; from 1914 to 1922, "mark time"; and, finally, as planned for 1924, "retire". There had, in other words, been a complete reversal of policy since 1914. The situation in 1923 was that administration had been extended from the Inner Line to the old (pre-McMahon) Outer Line and no further. Of the Lohit Road, all that now remained in reasonable order was some 15 miles of cart road eastwards of Sadiya (and still right down in the plains) and a bridle path only as far as the junction of the Tiding tributary with the Lohit, well short of the Hayuling post on the Du: beyond the Tiding even the bridle path had all but disappeared.[896]

In 1928 the Dihang sector of the Sadiya Frontier Tract became active as a result of events on the fringes of Tibet far to the north of the limits of British administration. Close to where the Tsangpo River in Tibet makes its great turn southwards to cut through the Himalayas, first as the Siang and then as the Dihang, there was situated the state of Pome or Po. Pome had traditionally been independent of direct Lhasa rule, though some of its districts paid dues to various bodies in Central Tibet: it possessed its own line of rulers and fell into the same geopolitical category as many of those independent or quasi-independent states of Eastern Tibet of which it could perhaps be classed as the most western example. Its inhabitants, the Popa, spoke a Tibetan far closer to that of Kham than of Lhasa. To the south-east of Pome lay the district of Pemakö

bordering the Tsangpo (and extending well below the McMahon Line). Pemakö was an area of demographic change during the first decades of the 20th century. Popas, Mönpas from Mönyul, Bhutanese and people from Kham had been migrating there at the expense of the non-Tibetan tribesmen, the Lopas (a Tibetan term which referred here somewhat unspecifically to Abors, Mishmis and others). Pemakö was evidently a region of some political instability.

So too, it transpired, was the Pome state. In 1910-12 it had been particularly vigorous in resisting Chinese control; and with the departure of the Chinese it firmly reasserted its independence from Lhasa though its ruler was connected by marriage with the powerful Tsarong Shape. With the decline of Tsarong's influence in the late 1920s Lhasa began to entertain designs on Pome which in 1928 it attacked and annexed on the grounds that it had refused to pay taxes. The Pome ruler, the Gyalpo, fled down the Siang-Dihang to Sadiya where in December 1928 he was reported to be seeking asylum. His flight raised the possibility of pursuit by Tibetan troops below the notional new British Outer Line (McMahon Line), wherever precisely that might be. In 1931 the Pome Gyalpo ran away from the British in Sadiya, where he had been placed under some kind of protective custody, and endeavoured to return home with the help of Abor tribesmen. He died in Abor country in 1931; but some of his followers kept his cause alive and managed to enlist the support of a number of Simong Abors who advanced against tribes to their north nearer to Pome and Pemakö. Small bodies of men in the service of the Lhasa conquerors of Pome retaliated by mounting raids down the Siang as far as the Abor villages of Simong, Karko, Riga and Domsing.

Some of these Tibetan raiders came to within ten miles of the British police post at Yembang a few miles south of the Siyom-Siang junction, which had been activated in late 1928 when the disturbances first began (on the basis of an outline approval granted in 1919 and then forgotten).[897] The Tibetans were severely mauled by local Abors and by March 1932 had been obliged to retire back north to undisputed Tibetan territory. The crisis passed as suddenly as it had erupted; but for a moment it looked as if the British post at Yembang might find itself on the front line of a kind of Tibetan civil war. After a long sleep, this sector of the Assam Himalayan frontier, barely touched by the British except on its southern fringes, came very much awake.[898] The Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract (during most of the Pome affair T.E. Furze), was now aware of the possibility of Tibetans, or tribal groups acting on behalf of the Tibetans, penetrating down the Dihang almost to the old Outer Line just north of Pasighat and only thirty miles as the crow flies from Sadiya itself.

The immediate British reaction was to propose that the Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract, undertake a journey of investigation as far north as Riga (which was well beyond the point where

Williamson had been killed); but the possibility of some kind of clash with the Tibetans combined with considerations of finance persuaded the Government of Assam to cancel the venture.[899] A longer term consequence was the decision to move the police post at Yembang a few miles further northwards to Pangin which controlled the crossing of the Siyom on one of the main tracks up the Dihang. This was an important first step in a slow process of the extension of direct Indian administration right up to the McMahon Line where it crossed the Siang near Geling and Korbo.

The Tibetans, though in 1932 they were rebuffed in their attempt to impose some measure of Lhasa authority down the Siang below Pemakö, did not abandon their interest in the Abors and other non-Buddhist hill tribes (Lopas) here. Yearly thereafter Tibetan parties came down the Siang to collect taxes from such villages as they could persuade to comply with their orders. It was inevitable (as we shall see in the next Chapter) that sooner or later some confrontation between British and Tibetan pretensions and interests in this part of the Assam Himalayas would take place. It was only the extreme reluctance of the Government of Assam to disturb a border that was working well enough in practice, added to the distaste of the Government of India for any measures likely to result in increased public expenditure, which enabled the British to go on turning a blind eye to Tibetan activity on the Siang for a few years longer.

The Pome crisis seems to have passed without giving rise to any discussion by the Government of India of the need to do something about the McMahon Line, below which much of the trouble had taken place. The existence of the Line, however, was by this time becoming increasingly difficult to overlook.

The Government of Burma appear to have initiated a post-War revival of concern with this boundary enshrined in the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914. The extreme eastern end of the McMahon Line was also the extreme western end of the border between British Burma and Tibet and China. The Line had been run so as to include within British territory all the basin of the upper Adung River and its tributaries (which fed the Malihka branch of the Irrawaddy). These rose on the eastern side of a watershed with the valley of the Lohit crossed by the Diphu (Diphuk or Talok) Pass, the inclusion of which in British territory had determined the alignment of the McMahon Line across the Lohit.[900] East of the Adung the McMahon Line continued in a great sweep south-east and south to its terminus close to its crossing of the Taron, one of the tributaries of the Nmaihka branch of the Irrawaddy. The area embraced by the McMahon Line in northern Burma was at this period potentially far more critical than any sector to the west in that it touched not only on Outer Tibet but also on Inner (Chinese controlled) Tibet as well as on what was to all intents and purposes part of Yunnan Province in China.

The new border was of great interest to the Government of Burma, who were dealing with serious difficulties in consolidating their position in northernmost Burma in the face of continual Chinese challenge. W.A. Hertz, the man who more than any other was responsible for bringing this tract within the British Empire, urged in 1917 that the entire Burmese stretch of the McMahon Line be demarcated on the ground without delay. This was not done. Indeed, with time administrative practice caused the boundary here to be considerably modified. The Adung basin sector was to all intents and purposes allowed to drift back into Tibet and its small number of Tibetan settlements continued to be subject to unobstructed administrative control by the Tibetan authorities in Zayul. The Taron sector was also modified, but to increase rather than decrease the size of the British Empire. Here the border was pushed in theory upstream to include within Burma perhaps 100 square miles of territory which the McMahon Line would have left in China. In 1929 the Government of Burma came to appreciate that it would be as well to bring this extreme northern stretch of the Burmese border back into line with what had been arranged in 1914. There were two problems involved. First: to draw back the border down the Taron would mean a change in an alignment which had been proclaimed formally. Should the alteration be proclaimed also? To do so might invite extremely unwelcome Chinese questions. It was decided after some debate in 1932 and 1933 to make no public announcement, but merely to adjust both maps and administrative practice in the hope that the Chinese would not notice that the border had been moved (to their advantage). Second: in the Adung sector Tibetan officials continued to cross the border on business. Should they be stopped? Again, it was finally decided to say nothing. The degree of Tibetan administration in an area where the population was minuscule was not serious and could safely be ignored. In both sectors, however, by 1932 the McMahon Line had potentially come alive. The possibility that it might soon become the subject of Anglo-Tibetan or Anglo-Chinese discussion could not be ignored.[901]

By 1932 another issue involving the McMahon Line had been latent for some time, emerging from Bhutanese pressure for a redefinition of a sector of the Indo-Bhutanese boundary. The eastern stretch of the border between Bhutan and Assam had been demarcated by Lt.-Colonel Graham in 1873 without Bhutanese participation; and it was to transpire that the Bhutanese did not accept the point at which the Tawang tract was deemed to begin, the Deosham River: they considered that their territory ought to extend a little further along the foothills to the east to the Dhansiri River (including Amatulla on its left bank, where the Tibetan authorities in Tawang also maintained a post for the taxation of traders returning from the annual fair at Udalguri).[902] From at least 1923 there had been a series of

incidents arising from the Bhutanese claims here to revenue rights over catchers of elephants and loggers. In 1924 Bailey, Nevill and a Bhutanese representative had agreed upon a border point on the right bank of the Dhansiri which was marked by a cairn to indicate the precise spot of the Bhutan-Assam-Tawang trijunction. The Dzongpöns of Dirangdzong (who were the end of a long chain of command which ultimately went back to Lhasa) protested to the Government of Assam in 1933 against this revised demarcation. They maintained that the Bhutanese were, and had been for some time, trespassing on Tibetan territory and usurping Tibetan rights.

When the Bhutanese claim was again considered by the Government of India, which was not until the middle of 1935, both the Political Officer in Sikkim, Frederick Williamson, and the Government of Assam agreed that there was indeed a problem here which could prove embarrassing for British Himalayan policy. Any overt support by the British for the Bhutanese case, as had been forthcoming in 1924, might result in arousing explicit Tibetan counter claims to a piece of territory along the old Outer Line and at least sixty miles as the crow flies to the south of the McMahon Line. Williamson thought that

> all that is necessary is an understanding between Assam and Bhutan to the effect that the area is to be regarded as belonging to Bhutan. No action should be taken on the boundary which might draw the attention of the Tibetans to the matter. If Tibet is once brought into it, the question will drag on for years without any settlement, as has been the case in the Tehri-Tibet boundary dispute.[903]

The Government of Assam disagreed. They did not accept the Bhutanese case and they were extremely reluctant to "commit themselves to recognising a claim by Bhutan which will almost certainly be claimed by Tibet and within which Assam has exercised valuable rights for many years without any question being raised of her title to do so".[904] Williamson and the Government of Assam were in agreement, however, that it was best not to stir the Tibetans up if it could possibly be avoided.

By 1935 it was also becoming clear that the Chinese, as well as the Tibetans, might advance specific and public claims to the country to the north of the old Outer Line in the Assam Himalayas. Since the War the fact that the Chinese had once endeavoured to penetrate this part of the world had been largely ignored by the administrators of the British Indian borders; and until at least 1928 even the precise alignment of the new Indo-Tibetan boundary which was proposed during the Simla Conference (the McMahon Line) seems to have been forgotten by both the Government of India and the India Office (though perhaps not by the Government of Burma).[905] After all, even the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, had in 1914 dismissed the entire episode

of the direct Anglo-Tibetan negotiations leading to the McMahon Line as being quite outside the terms of reference of the Simla Conference and representing no more than the private views of Sir Henry McMahon. The McMahon Line was shown on no official British maps; and while some non-official cartographers showed boundaries in the Assam Himalayas which ran north of the old Outer Line, the majority did not. For anyone not privy to the secrets of the British side at the Simla Convention there was virtually no way to know that the McMahon Line even existed, let alone exactly where it ran. There was no mention of it in the 1929 revision of Volume XIV of Aitchison's *Treaties* (until, as has been noted elsewhere, Caroe caused the revision of the revision to appear in 1938). The Chinese had never been told formally about it, though of late much has been made of their awareness of the existence of a line of this sort (the "Red Line") on the map appended to the Simla Convention.[906] Be that as it may, a Chinese diplomat seeking evidence as to where the British thought their boundary in the Assam Himalayas was, or ought to be, would still have found in 1935 that the majority of British maps, official and unofficial, indicated that the border ran along the line of the foothills, the old Outer Line.

If the Indian border ran along the foothills, then it followed that the territory immediately to its north either represented a no man's land of unannexed territory or it belonged to Tibet or China. By 1935 a number of Chinese maps had been published which took this line of argument to its logical conclusion. Tibet, as recognised by the Chinese to be a region in its own right (albeit still part of China), embraced the whole Tawang tract right down to the edge of the Brahmaputra Valley. To its east was the Chinese Province of Sikang. Chinese cartographers continued to represent Sikang as it had originally been conceived in the Chao Erh-feng era and had been represented by Chen I-fan during at least the initial stages of the Simla Conference. Its western boundary with the rest of Tibet was marked by a line running through Giamda, a hundred miles east of Lhasa. In 1913-1914 the Chinese side had argued that the southern boundary of Sikang ran through the middle reaches of the Assam Himalayas from the east of the Tawang tract (which they conceded to Tibet) to somewhere in Burma (where it ran into another zone of disputed borders). This left a strip of territory between the Chinese claim and the old Outer Line which, on the basis of British maps, the Chinese now included within their own border. On paper, therefore, there was no boundary argument. Chinese maps such as that in the Chinese Postal Atlas of 1933 and the *Shen Pao* Atlas of 1934, merely adjusted the south-western border of Sikang to coincide with the British Outer Line border which the majority of British cartographers evidently believed represented geopolitical reality.[907]

The Chinese *Shen Pao* Atlas of 1934 represented something rather

new, a Chinese map of China which, on the basis of cartographical principles capable of being understood easily enough, could be said to reflect Chinese *official* policy. Up to now Chinese maps, that is to say maps published in China or by Chinese official bodies, had tended to show a number of variations in the details of their boundary alignments derived as often as not from non-Chinese cartography. These have been sifted through time and again during the course of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute; and it cannot be said that they have been shown to throw much light on Chinese ideas as to their territorial limits. In the 1930s, however, Chinese cartography did become more politically aware; and maps like that in the *Shen Pao* Atlas certainly showed borders which represented the policy of the Kuomintang. After 8 September 1936 the Ordinance on Maps and Charts came into force. This enacted that any map showing Chinese boundaries to be published in China had to be approved first by an Inspector of Maps and Charts. Only if the borders agreed with the official view could such a map be permitted to see the light of day. The *Shen Pao* maps are among the first of this class of officially approved map. The Ordinance on Maps and Charts was not to become law for two years yet, but its general principles were well understood and Chinese map publishers were already abiding by them for reasons both commercial and patriotic. The *Shen Pao* map of Sikang indicated Sino-Indian and Sino-Tibetan boundaries precisely as were to be shown on official maps published by the Kuomintang up to 1949, and subsequently both by the Kuomintang in Taiwan and the Communists on the Mainland.[908]

The significance of this new direction in Chinese cartography began to be appreciated by Olaf Caroe during the course of 1935; and during the remainder of his career he was acutely sensitive to the possibility of the Chinese asserting territorial claims by means of maps. Once these Chinese maps had acquired an official status, as they did from September 1936, it was desirable to challenge them, if not directly then at least by ensuring that the appropriate boundaries were shown on British maps. Any agreement between British and Chinese maps could all too easily be interpreted as a tacit British acquiescence in Chinese pretensions. The *Shen Pao* Atlas map had alarming implications. If correct, then there was no buffer of Tibetan territory between Assam and China. The Chinese, once they had made good their position in Sikang, would endeavour to extend their direct Provincial administration all the way to the old Outer Line. They could try this, moreover, whatever status Outer Tibet might eventually acquire and whatever the position of the Chinese there might be, since they could argue that Outer Tibet was not involved with this particular area which was in China proper. The Chinese challenge was all the more effective in that it did not require any specific declaration from the Chinese side. The maps spoke

for themselves; and it was up to the British to rebut them.[909]

The new Chinese maps not only challenged the British position in the non-Buddhist tribal areas of the Assam Himalayas but also in the Tawang tract. While the Tawang tract was not directly claimed by China, it was, so the mass of Chinese cartographic evidence would indicate, acknowledged as part of Tibet and in consequence still subject to Chinese scrutiny by virtue of those Chinese claims to a special position within all of Tibet. In the Tawang tract, unlike the Assam Himalayas to the east, there did exist a major trade route right through the mountains from Assam to the Tibetan plateau. If the Tibetans (with Chinese cartographical support) were not challenged in their pretensions to control over this tract, then one day a sector of Indo-Tibetan border along the Old Outer Line might receive formal international recognition. This, should China ever re-establish herself in Tibet, would turn into yet another stretch of Sino-Indian border which outflanked the great mountain barrier and brought the Chinese to within striking distance of Calcutta.

There can be no doubt that Caroe saw the Tawang tract as posing a far greater risk to British Indian security than the valleys of the Subansiri, Siang and Lohit to the east. The Tawang problem, which was from this moment until the Transfer of Power in 1947 to be a central issue in Anglo-Tibetan relations, was far from simple as Caroe soon discovered when he endeavoured to formulate a coherent British policy towards it. Some of its features had been perceived by Charles Bell and Sir Henry McMahon at the time of the Simla Conference; and the failure of the Government of India to follow McMahon's advice and take immediate steps to bring the entire Tawang tract, including Tawang monastery, under British rule allowed the problem to evolve. When its significance once more began to be glimpsed in the early 1930s, the Government of India lacked the will for decisive action. It was at pains to prevent its officers from visiting Tawang itself and in any way interfering with the traditional Tibetan supervision of the trade route down to the plains which gave access to the markets of Assam. Thus N.L. Bor, who was Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract, from 1932 to 1934, while he was permitted to visit one of the main Buddhist tribal groups in the Tawang tract south of the Se La, the Sherdukpen of Rupa and Shergaon, was explicitly instructed by Government not to go further north to Tawang proper, even if invited by the Tawang authorities, and to refrain from making his presence felt on the main Assam-Tibet route, the so-called Lhasa Road.[910]

By Bor's time the Sherdukpen were rapidly drifting into the British Indian sphere. Tawang proper, however, was just as it had been at the time of Nevill's visit in 1914, an integral part of Tibet. Since 1914 it had been visited by no British official. Its authorities both lay and monastic had never been informed of the fact that, if the Anglo-

Tibetan notes of March 1914 meant anything at all, it had for the last 20 years been technically part of the British Indian Empire. The main question which faced Caroe was whether after such a lapse of time what he considered to be the facts of the Simla Conference should now be communicated to the authorities in Tawang. There were strong arguments against such a step. There was no clear administrative necessity for Tawang itself to be British: the Se La marked a perfectly adequate boundary which, indeed, had originally been accepted as such by McMahon before being persuaded by Charles Bell of the charms of Tawang monastery. To raise claims to possession of Tawang now would certainly result in Tibetan protests which could not fail to come to the notice of the Chinese. On the other hand, if Tawang were left alone, then the validity of the entire 1914 proceedings would be open to question. The McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914 transferred Tawang from Tibet to British India. There was no way that the process could be reversed without renegotiation; and this would surely be impossible without arousing Chinese comment. Any casting of doubt on the validity of the 1914 notes with respect to one section of the McMahon Line boundary, moreover, undermined the treaty basis of the entire border, a conclusion which again could be exploited not only by the Tibetans but also by the Chinese.

Until 1934 there was very little up to date information about Tawang available to the Government of India. The last British official to visit the tract to the north of the Se La, as has already been noted, was Nevill in 1914. Since then, moreover, no unofficial European traveller had reported on this remote corner. The botanist F. Kingdon Ward had hoped to return from Tibet to Assam by way of Tawang in 1925, but had been frustrated by snow on the passes and had been obliged to follow a route through Bhutan instead.[911]

It may well be no coincidence that 1934 saw the beginning a series of visits to Tawang and its environs by George Sherriff and Frank Ludlow. Both men combined British official or semi-official service with apparently private travel in Tibet for purposes of botanical research. Ludlow had been head of the short lived British school at Gyantse and had held a number of other positions in the Indian Educational Service. Sherriff had been British Vice Consul, and then Consul, in Kashgar from 1928-1932. The two men met in Kashgar in 1929 where Ludlow had been invited to stay by his friend Frederick Williamson, then Consul-General. Between 1942 and 1945 Ludlow and Sherrif in succession took charge of the British mission in Lhasa. During the 1930s the two men carried out a series of journeys in Tibet, many of them along the northern side of the McMahon Line, ostensibly solely in quest of flowers.[912] It is hard to avoid the suspicion that there was also a political motive behind their wanderings. From at least the time of the 1932 Weir Mission to Lhasa (and the Dargye-

Beri crisis) it must have been obvious to the Government of India that the stability of the Sino-Tibetan border was under serious threat. If this line should collapse, then the Chinese could well be back to the same position north of the Assam Himalayas that they had occupied in 1910-1912. The implications for Indian security of such a development could undoubtedly be better understood in the light of accurate and recent information about the terrain; and Ludlow and Sherriff were well qualified to gather this kind of data. Ventures of this sort, of course, could well leave little or no archival trace. The higher echelons of the service of the Government of India were represented by a fairly small number of individuals, many of whom possessed their own social and family links with each other. Paper was not, therefore, always called for. A great deal could be achieved by a private word here and there. No formal instructions or reports were needed. The Political Officer in Sikkim would do all he could to guarantee assistance for his close friends from the Tibetans without being told to do so by Government; and Government would learn of any interesting items of news from the two travellers by informal channels.

Ludlow and Sherriff planned to visit Tawang in 1933 after their journey through Bhutan in the company of Frederick Williamson and his bride. Their declared purpose was botanical collecting on behalf of the British Museum (Natural History) in London. Circumstances, however, dictated a postponement of the Tawang project until the following year. The visit to Tawang, from eastern Bhutan and en route to the Tibetan administrative town of Tsona Dzong, took place in July 1934. Ludlow and Sherriff had received explicit permission for it from the Kashag, a fact which was known to Caroe who apparently saw nothing strange in the Tibetans allowing British subjects to travel in what could be argued technically to be British territory.[913] The Kashag then approved a further visit to Tawang for 1935 (which did not, in the event, take place until 1936).[914]

In 1935 the botanist F. Kingdon Ward also made his way to Tawang, travelling up directly from Assam. Kingdon Ward, who was born in 1885, was the son of Marshall Ward, one time Professor of Natural History at the University of Cambridge (under whom Frank Ludlow had studied). In 1909 he began a series of journeys in Western China, Eastern and South-Eastern Tibet, Northern Burma and North-Eastern India in quest of botanical specimens which were to make him the leading authority on this area.[915] Unlike Bailey, Ludlow and Sherriff, his only British rivals in this expertise, Kingdon Ward possessed no obvious direct links with the higher levels of the Government of India and was certainly not part of its Tibetan establishment. He had, however, powerful connections in London in both the scientific and political world; and in India he was known personally to many officials who were willing to give him a helping

hand even if his plans did not always reflect the policy of New Delhi and Simla. On many of his journeys Kingdon Ward took as companion some young Englishman of means and good birth, such as Lord Cawdor or Lord Cranbrook. There can be no doubt as to the botanical purpose behind Kingdon Ward's travels; but there is also reason to suspect that there were political motives as well. In the preparations for his 1935 journey he enjoyed the active support of the Under-Secretary of State for India, R.A. Butler, with whom he subsequently corresponded on matters of more than purely botanical import.[916] In a most revealing letter to Lord Lloyd in 1937 he pointed out that he had in the past done service for various unspecified Intelligence Departments and noted the continuing need for someone to keep an eye on the progress of the Communist menace in western China and its environs.[917] It would be reasonable to suppose that, just as Ludlow and Sherrif most probably were reporting their impressions of the state of the Assam Himalayas and South-Eastern Tibet to some person or persons in New Delhi, Simla or Gangtok, so Kingdon Ward was in direct touch with certain organs of the British Government in London.

Kingdon Ward's 1924-25 Tibetan expedition (with Lord Cawdor), which had resulted in the examination of much Tibetan territory to the north of the McMahon Line and had nearly produced a visit to Tawang, appears to have resulted in some problems with the Tibetans over payment for transport; and in 1926 the Kashag declared to Bailey that they did not wish to see the return of Kingdon Ward.[918] In 1932, with the strong backing of the British Museum (Natural History), the India Office urged the Government of India to seek Tibetan permission for another expedition by Kingdon Ward, into South-Eastern Tibet by way of the Lohit Valley through the Assam Himalayas, to take place in 1933. This Weir managed to obtain from the Kashag; but for Kingdon Ward only, since no Tibetan passport was forthcoming for his intended companion, R. Kaulback. After his 1933 venture Kingdon Ward once more applied through the India Office for British assistance in obtaining permission for another Tibetan journey in 1935, one objective of which being, it would seem, the investigation of the impact of the Huang Mu-sung Mission (which it could be supposed had raised Chinese prestige in Tibet) on the political situation along the lower reaches of the Tsangpo, the scene of the recent conflict between Pome and Lhasa. Despite strong India Office support, including (as we have already noted) the endorsement of R.A. Butler, the Government of India's view was that "it was improbable" following the death of the 13th Dalai Lama "that such an application would be favourably received by the Tibetan Government", which meant, in effect, that Williamson would oppose it. In February 1935, as Kingdon Ward was about to reach Bombay from England by sea, Williamson after some rather oblique approaches to

the Kashag had finally concluded that Tibetan permission would not be forthcoming and "it would be best if he . . [Kingdon Ward] . . were to give up the idea of going to Tibet this year".[919]

Kingdon Ward seems at first to have accepted that he would have to change his plans. During March 1935 he set out through the Naga hills into Burma and then back to Manipur. Here, however, news reached him that he might get permission after all to travel in the Assam Himalayas. He at once dashed back to Tezpur whence, after a short delay due to an attack of fever, he moved on to Charduar, the Headquarters of the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract, Captain G.S. Lightfoot. He picked up here an Inner Line pass (in the absence of Captain Lightfoot) and, on 29 April 1935, set off towards the foot of the Se La.[920] At Shergaon Kingdon Ward met "by appointment one of the ruling monks of Tawang" who gave him permission to go ahead through Tawang to Chayul Dzong, situated on the Loro Chu, one of the main sources in Tibet of the Subansiri tributary of the Brahmaputra.[921]

There are a number of mysteries concerning the trip up to this point. How was the "appointment" made with the Tawang monk official? Was it through Captain Lightfoot, Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract? In this context it may be significant that Kingdon Ward had with him an official letter from Lightfoot, dated 28 March 1935, enclosing a document from the Tawang Dzongpöns instructing all headmen in the Tawang tract to give Kingdon Ward transport facilities. It does rather look as if Kingdon Ward's Tawang venture had been preceded by considerable discussions with and preliminary arrangements by Lightfoot.[922] A question mark also hangs over the extent to which Lightfoot deliberately ignored (perhaps turning a blind eye would be the way to put it) the orders of the Government of India in helping Kingdon Ward. Throughout Kingdon Ward's journey he remained in contact with Lightfoot; but at the same time it somehow proved impossible for Lightfoot to transmit to him instructions from the Government of India such as their letter of 3 April 1935 which declared that Kingdon Ward would not be allowed to enter Tibet in 1935. Plausible explanations were provided towards the end of 1935 for this failure in communications.[923] It is hard to avoid the suspicion, however, that some members of the Government of Assam, like Captain Lightfoot, knew exactly what Kingdon Ward was up to and played a clever game to ensure that he was not stopped by the Government of India. It is a fact that at no time during the course of his journey over the Inner Line and in Tibet (which lasted from 29 April to 29 October 1935) was Kingdon Ward more than four weeks by messenger away from the office of the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract, at Charduar. Until 3 June, when he crossed the Se La north of Sengedzong, Kingdon Ward was actually only a few days march from Charduar; and his

whereabouts were no secret to the local Government of Assam officials. A messenger could have reached him without difficulty. Once across the Se La he became less easy to contact; but was never entirely out of touch. Indeed, the first intimation that the India Office received of the fact that he had entered Tibet at all was a letter which he sent on 22 June 1935 from Chayul Dzong in Tibet to R.A. Butler in London.

Kingdon Ward's 1935 journey covered a crucial sector of the western end of the McMahon Line from Tawang to the region of Migyitun where the Subansiri passes through the main Himalayan range, and thence, following a route a short distance north of the McMahon Line, eastwards along the Tsangpo almost to the point where that river makes its great bend southwards to run through the high mountains towards its eventual junction with the Brahmaputra. The return journey took Kingdon Ward back through the Tawang tract by another path to Dirangdzong. When added to Kingdon Ward's exploration, with Lord Cawdor, of 1924-25 and his work on the Lohit and the Assam-Burma border in 1926, 1928 and 1933, the 1935 venture virtually completed a survey of the Tibetan side of the McMahon Line from one end to the other. It is difficult to believe that this result was entirely an accidental byproduct of plant collecting on behalf of the British Museum (Natural History).

News of Kingdon Ward's presence in Tibet first reached the Government of India (and Olaf Caroe) in September 1935 by way of Williamson, the Political Officer in Sikkim then on his second Mission to Lhasa, who heard from the Kashag of the unauthorised travels of one "King" or "King-da". Williamson, who was not at this stage certain who this person was, urged that he be prosecuted under the Inner Line regulations. It soon transpired that "King-da" was indeed Kingdon Ward, and that he claimed to have received verbal permission for his journey from some official in Tawang. At once two questions came to Caroe's mind. By what right did any official in Tawang, notionally by virtue of the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914 part of British India, grant such permission? Further, in that the Tibetans were claiming (presumably by implication rather than explicitly) that Kingdon Ward had gone beyond the "Red Line" outlined by the British in 1914 as the boundary, where now did the Tibetans consider that "Red Line" to be? Behind both questions was the possibility that the Tibetans had decided to repudiate entirely the validity of the McMahon Line.

The Kingdon Ward affair is admitted by all who have written on the history of the McMahon Line on the basis of the British archives to have been a turning point in British Indian policy toward the Assam Himalayas.[924] There would seem to be, however, some uncertainty as to exactly what the Kingdon Ward affair was and how it served to influence events. The story is far from clear. There are

elements which have left virtually no trace in the records. The degree of reaction on the part of the Government of India is quite out of proportion to the inherent gravity of the case. It is not easy to match the attitude of local Government of Assam officials with that of men in New Delhi like Caroe.[925]

The most revealing, and at the same time perhaps the most puzzling, aspect of the Kingdon Ward affair was the violence of the Government of India's reaction. There had been occasions in the past when official British displeasure descended upon a European traveller in Tibet. Sven Hedin experienced a great deal of hostility from John Morley early in the century, all the more distressing for him in that he had previously basked in the favour of Lord Curzon.[926] The business, however, was carried on with a degree of gentlemanly moderation. Not so with Kingdon Ward.

As soon as Kingdon Ward's presence in Tibet was confirmed, the Government of India wished to prosecute him under the Inner Line regulations even though the Under-Secretary of State for India, R.A. Butler, advised against such a drastic step. Eventually the absurdity of this procedure was appreciated by Caroe and his colleagues. What had Kingdon Ward actually done? It appeared that he had, as the rules required, indeed obtained an Inner Line Pass, and what he did beyond the frontiers of India, while perhaps diplomatically embarrassing, was hardly a breach of British Indian law. In any case, the maximum penalty for an Inner Line violation, a fine of Rs. 100 and the confiscation of the jungle produce collected by the violator – which, in this case, could well mean the botanical specimens collected by Kingdon Ward on behalf of the Natural History section British Museum – was absurdly small as a deterrent, to which was added the inanity of one organ of the British Government confiscating the property of another; and, moreover, there could be no doubt that any attempt to punish Kingdon Ward would give rise to a political row of some magnitude. Kingdon Ward was, after all, a widely read author, and he knew many influential people in the British Establishment. The idea of prosecution was, accordingly, abandoned. The Government of India, however, still kept Kingdon Ward steadily in their sights.

In 1937, which was after all well over a year after Kingdon Ward's return from his 1935 Tibetan venture and, moreover, after he had agreed to keep silent about certain features of that journey which Caroe felt ought to be kept secret, the Government of India decided to make a fairly public demonstration of their attitude towards the botanist. They wrote to the Indian Provincial Governments of Assam, Bengal, the United Provinces and the Punjab, as well as to the Government of Burma and the British Embassy in Peking, warning those bodies that Kingdon Ward was on no account to be allowed into Tibet or near the adjacent tribal areas in Assam or elsewhere. If this

were not enough, the India Office in London endeavoured to keep Kingdon Ward under some kind of surveillance.

This is what happened. In early 1937 it was rumoured that Kingdon Ward, who had returned to England for a while, was about to embark upon another journey. Was he, despite the expressed views of the Government of India, bound once more for Tibet? In order to answer this question, H.A.F. Rumbold of the India Office wrote to his friend J.H. Burrell of the Home Office to seek a discreet investigation of the troublesome traveller to determine where he was and what he was up to.[927] Rumbold supplied Kingdon Ward's address, Cleeve Court, Streatley-on-Thames, Berkshire, and he observed that "it would, of course, be necessary that these enquiries should be discreet, as it is undesirable that Mr. Kingdon Ward should be led to suspect that his movements are of interest to the Government". Burrell got in touch with the Chief Constable of Berkshire, who told him that Kingdon Ward had recently gone abroad to a destination unknown. It soon transpired that Kingdon Ward was now in Burma. The India Office lost no time in getting in touch with the Government of Burma to advise them not to let Kingdon Ward get anywhere near Tibet. Kingdon Ward, when approached by the Burmese authorities, agreed to keep away from Tibet: he made, instead, for Tali in Yunnan.[928] The Government of India, thereupon, began to draw up a theoretical boundary line in Western China across which Kingdon Ward was not to go. This ran from west to east across Yunnan and adjacent Provinces from a point just north of Tali. The India Office demurred, perhaps under the moderating influence of R.A. Butler, and put forward an alternative and more generous line, leaving all territory in China proper but excluding Kingdon Ward from most of Chinese controlled Eastern Tibet including the towns of Atuntze and Litang. In the event, according to the records of the India Office, Kingdon Ward was turned back by the Chinese on the Burma-Yunnan border on the ground that his papers were not in order – it was thought in the India Office that he was now paying the penalty for some of his published anti-Chinese opinions, notably in his *In Farthest Burma* (London 1921), which had apparently aroused the ire of important Chinese officials – and, on his return to Burma, he had to content himself with some energetic botanising in the extreme north of Burma beside the eastern end of the McMahon Line.[929]

There then followed what may well be the most peculiar feature of the whole episode. In early 1938 Kingdon Ward again turned up in India. The Calcutta *Statesman* newspaper reported on 27 March 1938 that he was once more bound for Tibet. Enquiries by the Government of India, alerted by Gould who was worried about the impact of further Kingdon Ward adventures on Tibetan opinion, revealed that

the Government of Assam, despite the prohibitions of 1937, had allowed Kingdon Ward to botanise in the Tawang tract provided that he did not try to enter Bhutan, cross the Se La or wander east of the Rupa-Bomdi La region (that is to say, go near the main track to Tawang from Assam, the Lhasa Road).[930] What the Assam Government did not emphasise at this time was that Kingdon Ward was actually joining up with Captain Lightfoot, bound on a most important political mission to Tawang proper. While it was clear that Kingdon Ward would not go himself to Tawang, his presence in Lightfoot's party was tantamount to giving him some measure of official status, a fact which was certain to come to the notice both of the Tawang authorities and of their masters in Tibet.

Kingdon Ward never again returned to British Indian favour, though he was able to undertake more travel in Burma. In 1946 the India Office and the Government of India managed to prevent him from visiting Tibet. He did, however, make one more journey up the Lohit to Rima in 1950 with the benevolent approval of the independent Government of India which did not inherit its predecessor's animosity towards this botanical gatherer of intelligence.[931]

The essence of the Kingdon Ward mystery can be detected in the 1938 episode. Here was a man who had been, in a manner of speaking, declared an outlaw by the Government of India while at the same being offered asylum by the Government of Assam. Reading between the lines a number of points can be established. It is reasonable to suppose that in 1935 Captain Lightfoot, and possibly some of his superiors in Shillong, knew exactly what Kingdon Ward was up to; and they were prepared to assist him without reference to Olaf Caroe and the Government of India. They continued to assist him right up to 1938, even though it was now clear that this was in direct opposition to the wishes of Caroe's Foreign and Political Department. During these years, moreover, Kingdon Ward retained close links with other elements in the British establishment, for example R.A. Butler (who was far more friendly to Kingdon Ward than he was to Olaf Caroe) and the Government of Burma. Learned Societies in England such as the Royal Geographical Society and the Royal Central Asian Society during this period of Indian disfavour continued to treat Kingdon Ward with great respect. His lectures, to the RGS in 1936 and the RCAS in 1938, on his 1935 adventures give no hint, either in their text or in their introduction, of the controversy to which they had given rise.[932]

Kingdon Ward's conclusions about the *de facto* geopolitical realities of the Tawang tract were of little comfort to Caroe. Kingdon Ward considered that, McMahon Line or no McMahon Line, the Se La marked the most northerly point here in the Assam Himalayas where the writ of the Government of India could conceivably be argued to run. Beyond it was Tibet. It was a Tibet, moreover, that was far from

static. It was, indeed, expanding steadily at the expense of the non-Buddhist hill tribes. As Kingdon Ward put it in his letter to R.A. Butler from Chayul (deep in Tibet) of 22 June 1935:

> there is one aspect of Tibetan civilization which has not received the attention it deserves, namely the amazing success with the hill tribes. Slow it may be, but it is sure enough. After all we have been in Assam for over a hundred years, but we have not done much with the Abors, Daphlas and other tribes of the Assam Himalaya yet; the Tibetans, thanks to their missionary zeal, have done a lot. In fact, our position in the Assam Himalaya seems rather anomalous. We pay the Tibetan Government – or rather the local power, Tawang – a considerable sum annually to administer territory for us which is, *de jure*, part of Assam, but *de facto* undoubtedly part of Tibet. That is to say it is, and has long been, Tibetanised, though inhabited by unassimilated tribes. I dare say this *posa* system dates from before the British occupation. And it is extremely good policy. The Assam Government thus keeps on excellent terms with Tawang (and through Tawang with Lhasa), keeps open the trade routes, and knows what is going on in the hills. The Tawang lamas are friendly and well disposed – it is to them that I owe my presence in Tibet – and undoubtedly relieve the Assam Government of great responsibilities. It is perhaps natural that the Tibetans should be more successful in taming wild tribes south of the Himalaya than we are, considering how much nearer to them – in the broad sense – and how much more in sympathy with them, they must be. Their influence is, in the first place, religious; they quickly get a financial hold over them, having once turned their eyes towards Lhasa. Also they control them by the simplest of all expedients; by giving them access to salt, and then, when they need to put the screw on, by withholding it. Any Himalayan hill tribe could be brought to its knees within six months by blocking every possible route by which it could obtain salt. So why these expeditions costing crores of Rupees!!.[933]

Kingdon Ward was extremely impressed by the force of what might be called Tibetan imperialism. In his book on his 1935 Tibetan journey (which also described his experiences in the Tawang tract south of the Se La in 1938) he reiterated views which he had advanced in a lecture to the Royal Central Asian Society in 1938. The Tibetans had their own idea of the whereabouts of their borders in the Himalayas, and it was an idea formed out of their own experience and no way in consultation with the Government of India. He described their policy, and its effects, thus: the Tibetans, ignorant of trigonometry and other geographical skills, yet knew exactly where their territory stopped. While the Government of India talked "high altitude about a natural frontier based upon the position of peaks in relation to one another and to remote astral bodies", the Tibetans simply flowed across the passes until they reached a point where certain crops would not grow, or trees of a certain kind where not found, or there were too many flies. There they stopped and marked

the spot not with a fort but a monastery. Thus, while it could be argued that "the Himalayan crest line is by treaty the Indo-Tibetan frontier", yet the outposts of the Tibetan cultural and political sphere of influence "are well down the Indian side of every eastern Himalayan pass which European travellers have crossed".[934] Difficult though it would be to push the tide of Tibetan imperialism back, Kingdon Ward was not in disagreement with Caroe that something ought to be done. He declared that

> the vast cold deserts which stretch northward from the Tsangpo valley may still be a major obstacle; the Himalayas never. Even a moderate power established in the Tsangpo valley would be a menace to India. Sooner or later India must stand face to face with a potential enemy looking over the wall into her garden – or fight to keep her out of the Tsangpo valley. With Monyül .. [the Tawang tract] .. a Tibetan province, the enemy would already be within her gates.[935]

In November 1935, shortly after Kingdon Ward's return from Tibet, the Government of Assam showed that it too was well aware of the ambiguities of sovereignty in the Assam Himalayas. In rather cautious words New Delhi was told that as

> regards the connection of Tawang with Tibet, the Governor in Council believes that Tawang is more or less independent territory, but owes some allegiance to Tibet. The position is partially explained at page 100 of Volume XII of Aitchison's *Treaties*. It may be that owing to indirect connection with Tibet the Dzongpens of Tawang considered that they had authority to grant Kingdon Ward permission to enter Tibet. So far as information goes there has been no change in recent years in the attitude of the Tibetan Government in respect this part of the Frontier.[936]

These remarks point to the central practical problem which the exploits of Kingdon Ward probably brought to Caroe's mind. It was clear that a more active British policy towards the Assam Himalayas was called for. Had it been already pre-empted by an explicit Tibetan assertion of sovereignty over Tawang, a territory notionally transferred from Tibet to British India by the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914? The action of the Tawang official in granting entry to Tibet to a non-Tibetan could well be construed to be an act implying sovereignty. An explicit, and overt, assertion of Tibetan sovereignty in the area between the McMahon Line and the old Outer Line might well be exploited one day by the Chinese to the great embarrassment for British frontier policy now gestating.

Out of tiny acorns do mighty oak trees grow. The journey to Tibet of Kingdon Ward in 1935, unsensational and, indeed, enigmatic as it was, yet can be described as the starting point for three main lines of British policy out of which was to emerge the structure of the new

dispensation for the Assam Himalayas, what was in time to turn in to the North-East Frontier Agency of India, and, in due course after the Transfer of Power, into a new Indian Province, Arunachal Pradesh. First: Caroe was convinced by the ambiguities in the published evidence as to the British Indian border in this region and its treaty basis of the need somehow to alter the record. One result was the publication in the pseudo-1929 Aitchison's *Treaties* of the text of the Simla Convention and the Anglo-Tibetan notes of March 1914, as we have already seen in an earlier Chapter. Second: the Government of India became aware of the desirability of obtaining, albeit with the minimum of publicity, a new Tibetan (and explicit) acknowledgement of the validity of whatever boundary and ancillary agreements might have in fact emerged in 1914. Finally: it was now obvious that some fresh British administrative measures should be undertaken to fill the power vacuum in the tract which lay between the old Outer Line and the still rather uncertain McMahon Line.

It was all very well to get the Simla Convention and the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes (but without the Anglo-Tibetan Declaration of 3 July 1914 and the maps) into the corpus of British Indian diplomatic engagements, Aitchison's *Treaties*, as Caroe now proceeded to do. How many people actually consulted Aitchison, however, and of those who did how many could visualise the geographical implications of the McMahon Line lacking the various 1914 maps? And what would they make of these documents when British cartographers persisted in showing an international border in Assam which ran along the old Outer Line? This was the case with the major British map publishers like Bartholomew's and it was so with *The Times Atlas*.[937] Such a border was also to be found in many of the maps included in books and articles by specialists in the affairs of Assam and the Assam Himalayas like Colonel Shakespear and F. Kingdon Ward.[938] As late as 1937 even the Government of Assam, in its Administration Report for 1935-36, reproduced a map showing the offending old Outer Line frontier, as K.P.S. Menon irritably pointed out.[939] Caroe could, of course, make sure that the Survey of India in the fullness of time published the doctrinally correct alignment; and this happened consistently after 1937. What was not so easy was to convince the British cartographers of the errors of their ways (Caroe probably did not lose much sleep over what non-British map makers did other than Chinese).

It seemed that the keystone of the cartographical arch was *The Times Atlas*, the top people's assemblage of maps. There is evidence that Caroe persuaded his friend Lionel Curtis, the founder of Chatham House, to approach Peter Fleming at *The Times* and suggest that the Thunderer might mend its ways as far as the old Outer Line was concerned. Peter Fleming, clearly a bit perplexed, sought clarification from Caroe. He noted that

> Mr. Lionel Curtis wrote to me a short time ago saying that you had some interesting information about the loss (on paper) of some 40,000 square miles of British Empire somewhere north of the Brahmaputra. It is, no doubt, a trifling loss; but the Editor . . [of *The Times*] . .feels that our readers would be interested in an accurate presentation of the facts regarding the cartographical lacuna.[940]

The India Office did not think it would be a good idea to go into too much detail about the history of the Assam Himalayan border for the press: Caroe was to tell Fleming that a new, and accurate, map was coming out shortly and that the relevant treaties upon which it was based would soon be published.[941] Caroe explained the situation personally to Fleming and with some difficulty dissuaded him from going public.[942]

The corrected map, "Highlands of Tibet and Surrounding Regions", was duly sent to the Royal Geographical Society, *The Times* and two publishing houses, Bartholomew's and Stanford, on 26 August 1938, with the request that the corrections be included in all subsequent maps without comment, a deficiency which mystified the Secretary of the Royal Geographical Society, A.R. Hinks.[943] Some comment, however, was unavoidable. *The Evening Standard*, for example, following Reuters, remarked upon the appearance of a new map of India where

> included for the first time on a map on this scale is a definite boundary between the tribal areas of Northern Assam and Tibet. Hitherto the frontier was undefined. The new demarcation shows that the Assam tribal tracts cover a much larger area than was generally imagined.[944]

Caroe had hoped that it might even be possible to put some pressure by way of the British Embassy in Peking on the Chinese Government to make sure that Chinese maps from henceforth also conformed with the new orthodoxy. Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, however, was under no illusion that the Chinese would be guided by the India Office's cartographical concepts, though he saw no reason why the Government of India should not modify their own maps as they saw fit and why such new maps should not be shown to the Chinese Government.[945] Needless to say, Chinese maps continued to depict a Sikang reaching down to the old Outer Line and a Tibetan Tawang tract extending right through the Assam Himalayas (as, indeed, they still do at the moment of writing, 1988).

The map question, both British sins of omission and Chinese sins of commission, was symbolic of a host of dangers great and small to British policy. It was not easy to convince politicians that there really was a serious situation involving the security of territory which was technically British but about which the rulers of the British Empire had somehow managed to forget for more than two decades. If it were so important, how was it that it had slipped the official memory?

Caroe did his best. As he put it to R.A. Butler, whom he had recently met while on leave in England:

> I ought to have mentioned rather an important point, when we were discussing the impact of Far Eastern Affairs on India. Owing mainly to our failure to publish the 1914 agreement with Tibet relative to the Indo-Tibetan frontier beyond Assam & Burma, Chinese cartographers have absorbed in China a slice of India some 500 miles long and 100 miles in depth, together with a large mass of territory which is really Tibet, in an imaginary Chinese South-Western province which they call Sikang. . . .
>
> They have also created an imaginary Chinese province out of what is really N.E. Tibet, & call it Kokonor or Chinghai. This does not immediately affect Indian territory, but it is in pursuance of the Chinese custom of pretending that a state of affairs exists, so persuading as many people as possible that it does exist. . . .
>
> This is not all: owing to our omissions you will even find that our own official cartographers, e.g. *The Times* and Bartholomew's Atlases, support the Chinese claims to hunks of India, and shew the international frontier right down to the Brahmaputra at the foot of the Himalayas. This is a typical result of British, or British Indian apathy in all matters affecting the North-East, as apart from the North West Frontier, & is an instance of the lack of contact between Whitehall, Delhi and Peiping in Far Eastern Affairs. After the Chinese, who?
>
> It is worth remembering too that the creation of a separate Burma, setting up as it is with two British authorities vis à vis China and Tibet, must complicate appreciation of future dangers, and will make it more than ever necessary to keep awake.[946]

What R.A. Butler made of all this we do not know. He can hardly have been impressed by an Imperial Government that had "lost" for two decades a tract of territory the size of England. In the event, however, no obstacles from London were placed in Caroe's way in his attempt to obtain maps to his liking.

There was another problem associated with the correcting of maps which derived from both the status of Outer Tibet and its limits. Should Tibet be shown as part of China or given a colour of its own; and where did Tibet end and China begin? After considerable discussion between the India Office and the Foreign Office in 1943 an official British policy of sorts on all this was devised. Tibet ought not to be shown as part of Metropolitan China, and a Sino-Tibetan border in the Marches (between Tibet and Sikang) was to follow more or less the Teichman line of 1918 or, perhaps, the line of the abortive Chinese boundary proposals of 1919. Caroe was not entirely happy with the outcome; but it was better than nothing.[947]

The Chinese, of course, took no notice whatsoever of this silent cartographical revolution. In 1943 the Chinese Commission in Calcutta, with the help of the Government of India in the provision of paper and facilities for printing, produced *The China Yearbook*

1943, which was formally published in 1944. This edition of the Kuomintang official yearbook, the appearance of which had been interrupted by the War, contained a map of China which showed exactly the same boundaries in the Assam Himalayas as had the *Shen Pao* Atlas of 1934. Caroe was furious, feeling betrayed by the Chinese in India whom he had helped. He resolved that there should be no paper made available for a 1944 edition.[948]

The map to the *China Yearbook 1943*, which was identical to the map appended to subsequent editions of that work produced by the Kuominatang after the War, in mainland China and then in Taiwan, is interesting in that it shows not only Chinese claims south of the McMahon Line but also along what was to become known as the Middle and Western Sectors of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute. Nilang is shown in China, as is Demchok and, more importantly, the whole Aksai Chin area. Caroe had those portions of the map which related to India carefully copied and enlarged by the Survey of India so that he could examine them in detail; but he made no comment on the boundary implications to the west of the Assam Himalayas.[949]

881. This is discussed in: Lamb, *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 325-327.

882. See: Lamb, *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, Vol. II. The story of the origins of the McMahon Line is related here in considerable detail.

883. The success with which the political motives behind Noël Williamson's last journey have been concealed is, perhaps, illustrated by the absence of any reference to them in a recent account. See: C. Allen, *A Mountain in Tibet. The Search for Mount Kailas and the Sources of the Great Rivers of India*, London 1982, pp.162-163.

884. The flags were not, as John Lall puts it, the result of "furtive" planting. They were placed in confirmation of what the evidence indicates was a well established boundary point. See: Lall, *Aksaichin, op. cit.*, p. 224. It was a boundary point, moreover, that hitherto had never been challenged by the Government of India.

885. L/P&S/10/352, O'Callaghan's Tour Diary of the Walong Promenade, 7 March 1914.

O'Callaghan had copies made of one of the markers, which bore a notice in Chinese and Tibetan to the effect that this was the "South Boundary of Chuan Tien Tsa Yü of the Chinese Republic established by Special Commissioner Chiang Fong Chi & . . [the] . . Magistrate of Tsa Yü . . [Zayul]". Later travellers up the Lohit could still see at this spot another boundary indication, a Chinese inscription carved in large rock which was locally referred to as "The Boundary Stone". This also bore an inscription in English saying "5th Coy. 1st Batt. K.G.O. Sappers and Miners. 1912", a relic of one of the immediate offshoots of the Abor Expedition. See: R. Kaulback, *Tibetan Trek*, London 1934, p. 54.

886. L/P&S/10/532, Crewe to Hardinge, 1 July 1913.

887. Yembang was only twenty or so miles as the crow flies to the north of the old Outer Line and a very long way south from the point where the McMahon line crossed the Dihang (Siang or Tsangpo).

888. Tawang came directly under the administration of the Tibetan district of Tsona, the seat of two Dzongpöns and situated some 20 miles to the north of the McMahon Line.

889. Sir Robert Reid, *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam from 1883-1941*, Shillong 1942, pp. 286-289. Reid quotes extensively from Nevill's report.

I am much indebted to Captain G.A. Nevill, whom I met in Winchester when he was a very old man indeed but whose memory was still excellent, for much information about Tawang and other aspects of the history of the Assam Himalayas as well as for letting me see a copy of his report on his 1914 visit to Tawang at a time when it was still technically restricted by the "50 year rule". Nevill's recollection was that when he visited Tawang he was not sure whether it had been decided to include it on the British side of the frontier or not.

Nevill did not inform the Tawang people that they might now be living on British soil. Indeed, from his talks with the chief Tibetan official there, whom Nevill referred to as the Guru Rimpoche, it became evident that the Tibetan authorities still regarded their territory as extending south to the old Outer Line; and Nevill said nothing to contradict this view. See: L/P&S/10/352, Nevill to Assam, 21 June 1914.

890. L/P&S/12/3113, W. Botham, Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, to India, 1 December 1921.

891. See: L/P&S/12/3113, India to Assam, 20 July 1922; Wakely, Memo on India to IO, 4 October 1922. As Wakely put it:

> with the disappearance of Chinese activity in these regions the chief justification of that policy has also disappeared, and so long as conditions remain as they are at present, the Government of India has no desire to make in these tracts any forward move which will entail increased outlay.

892. L/P&S/12/3113, India to IO, 17 May 1923.

893. L/P&S/12/3113, India to Assam, 9 August 1923.

894. This was the view of both Sir A. Hirtzel and Sir Charles Bell.

895. L/P&S/12/3113, Assam to India, 27 August 1923.

896. L/P&S/12/3113, IO minute, 12 July 1923.

897. L/P&S/12/3111, Assam to India 14 September 1928.

898. For the state of Pome, see: F.M. Bailey, *Report an the Exploration of the North-East Frontier 1913*, Simla 1914; F.M. Bailey, *No Passport for Tibet*, London 1957; F. Kingdon Ward, *The Riddle of the Tsangpo Gorges*, London 1926. These accounts all relate to Pome while it was still independent of Lhasa. For the flight of the Ruler of Pome to Sadiya and the events which followed, see: Reid, *Frontier Areas of Assam*, *op. cit.*, pp. 257-258.

899. L/P&S/12/3111, Assam to India, 10 September 1930.

900. The Diphu (Diphuk or Talok) Pass was considered to be a potentially strategic link between Assam and northern Burma.

901. It was a fact, however, that Burmese and Indian issues tended to be kept in separate compartments; and Burma was well on the way to being separated altogether from the direct concern of the Government of India. Formal separation took place on 1 April 1937.

For the Adung and Taron border see: L/P&S/12/2252, W.A. Hertz, Report on the North-East Frontier of Burma with suggestions for its demarcation, 1917; Burma to India, 17 August 1932; Burma to India, 10 July 1933.

The Taron question gave rise to one of the first explicit India Office comments on the McMahon Line since the days of the Simla Conference. On 17 March 1929 H.A.F. Rumbold minuted thus:

> at the Conference of Simla in 1914 Sir Henry McMahon and Lönchen Shatra agreed that the Indo-Tibetan frontier should run as they traced it on a map . . . according to this agreement the frontier crossed the Taron at its bend . . . It . . [the frontier] . . was not confirmed by His Majesty's Government or published, and was only communicated to the frontier officials demi-officially . . . Its definite adoption was withheld in order that Russia might be consulted upon it under the spirit rather than the letter of Article I of the 1907 Convention concerning Tibet. Nevertheless it would appear that in our relations with Tibet we are bound by the agreement, although, as Sir H. McMahon states in the concluding sentence of his Memorandum, . . . the frontier line as fixed was not a rigid one.

Rumbold concluded that it would be wise to bring back the border on the Taron to the McMahon Line even though at this point it marched not with Outer Tibet but with territory under Chinese control.

902. From time to time in the 1920s the Government of Assam had also maintained a small police post at Amatulla.

903. L/P&S/12/4188, Williamson to India, 10 June 1935.

904. L/P&S/12/4188, Assam to India, 20 September 1935. The valuable rights related to catching wild elephants and cutting the *agar* trees in the foothill forest.

905. In 1923 the Government of India appeared to believe that, whatever may have been decided in 1914, the whole Tawang tract was still in Tibet. See: L/P&S/12/3113, India to Assam, 24 October 1923, appended map.

The first tolerably accurate reference after 1914 to the McMahon Line alignment, based on the maps produced during the Simla Conference, which the present author has encountered in the India Office records, is in: L/P&S/12/3111, IO minute of 23 November 1928. The McMahon Line is treated here less as a valid international boundary than as an interesting historical curiosity. If it represented anything, it would be aspirations rather than administrative facts.

906. The "Red Line" on the map appended to both the April and the July 1914 texts of the Simla Convention, indicating the frontier of Tibet in the widest interpretation of that term, was extended on the bottom right-hand corner to cover a stretch of the border between Tibet and India which coincided with the border outlined in the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra Notes of March 1914. The rest of the border between India and Tibet was not shown in any way. It would be easy to interpret the "Red Line" as relating solely to the border between China and Tibet. The Indo-Tibetan border was in no way on the agenda of the Simla Conference. The Chinese side made no comment on the bottom right-hand end of the "Red Line" at the time, though their delegate, Chen I-fan, did "initial" (in the technical sense) the map bearing it. Following the repudiation of the Convention by the Chinese Government the matter of this final extension of the "Red Line" must have seemed academic to the Chinese if they had ever noticed it in the first place. The Simla Convention map, in any case, then to all intents and purposes disappeared. It was not included in the pseudo-1929 Aitchison Vol. XIV of 1938. It finally saw the light of day again in c. 1960 when the Government

of India decided to publish it in support of their argument that the Chinese had once agreed to the McMahon Line. See: Lamb, *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 549-551.

As an afterthought it might be worth considering that nothing in the Simla Convention map precluded the possibility of the existence of a tongue of Chinese territory stretching across northern Burma into the Assam Himalayas as far west as the edge of the Tawang tract and wedged between the "Red Line" and the old Outer Line. This possibility was never exploited, in fact, by the Chinese side in any phase of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute. The "Red Line" represented a border between a Tibet of some kind and somewhere else unspecified. In that, the Assam Himalayas apart, there is no line to indicate an Indo-Tibetan border, it could be construed to mean that the "Red Line" has nothing to do with India. The name India, for example, does not appear on the map in a significant position in relation to it. It would be quite possible, therefore, that there existed a Sino-Indian border south of the "Red Line" which was not shown on this map.

907. The Chinese Postal Atlas showed the Sikang-Tibet border running rather further to the east from Giamda down to the old Outer Line so as to put the entire right bank of the Tsangpo-Siang-Dihang on the Tibetan side. The *Shen Pao* Atlas of April 1934 moved the border westwards to the edge of Tawang tract; and this line has been shown on official Chinese maps, both Nationalist and Communist, ever since. See: L/P&S/12/4189, Teichman, 14 May 1943, and Caroe, 3 October 1943. Also, for *Shen Pao* Atlas: L/P&S/12/4182, D.J. Cowan, Peking, to Viceroy, 25 June 1936.

908. These borders were shown on the map in the *China Yearbook* from 1943 onwards; and as far as the border in the Assam Himalayas is concerned, they do not differ from maps produced by the People's Republic of China. Nationalist and Communist maps, however, have come to disagree over other stretches of Chinese international border in that the Nationalists have not accepted the borders negotiated by China since 1950, as for example those with Burma in 1960 and Pakistan in 1963.

909. The implications of the Sino-Indian boundary in the *Shen Pao* Atlas explain, for example, a great deal about the attitude of the Kuomintang towards the Rima Road during World War II. In Kuomintang eyes it had absolutely nothing to do with Tibet: Metropolitan China and British India were in direct territorial contact.

910. The Sherdukpen, also known in Assam as the Chardur Bhotias or the people of the Sat Rajas (The Seven Kings), were subject, in Tibetan theory at least, to the Tawang authorities; but they also enjoyed in practice a considerable degree of autonomy and had long been in receipt of *posa* from the Government of India. The Sherdukpen, moreover, possessed interests and rights on the Assam side of the old Outer Line. For an account of Bor's experiences among the Sherdukpen, see: E. Bor, *Adventures of a Botanist's Wife*, London 1952. Eleanor Bor makes it clear that the Se La Pass lay well north of the administrative range of the Political Officer, Balipara, which, to judge by the map on the front endpapers of her book, was deemed to stop at the Bomdi La. While the southern end of the main Tawang-Assam Road (which she calls the Lhasa Road) lay within the Political Officer's area, it was Government policy that the British should in no way interfere with the traffic on this route and the Political Officer had instructions not to try to travel along it.

The Sherdukpen are a small group of perhaps no more than 2,000 members confined to the neighbourhood of Rupa and Shergaon who differ in a number of important respects from the bulk of the Mönpas of the Tawang tract; and some authorities do not class them as Mönpas at all. The Sherdukpen had for long been

involved in the trade between Assam and Tibet. Their culture shows a number of features which antedate the introduction of Buddhism of the Tibetan pattern; and their social structure manifests elements which are not characteristically Tibetan. The Mönpas proper, often referred to as the Sherchokpa, can be classified in three sub-groups, those in the extreme south of the Tawang tract, those in the region of Dirangdzong to the south of the Se La, and those of Tawang proper. Tawang itself was under two Dzongpöns from Tsona. The Mönpas south of the Se La were administered by Dzongpöns at Dirangdzong and Kalaktang who appear to have been responsible to the monastic authorities in Tawang, who in turn reported to Drepung monastery in Lhasa. The direct influence of the Tsona Dzongpöns south of the Se La appears to have been confined to the Sengedzong region where there were estates which belonged to them *ex officio*. While N.L. Bor was in charge of the Balipara Frontier Tract it was still British policy of have as little direct dealing as possible with the Tawang Mönpas, as opposed to the Sherdukpen whose special relationship with the Government of Assam was admitted. The Sherdukpen relationship with Tibet, however nominal it might have been or was thought to have been by the British, seems to have been by way of the Dzongpöns at Kalaktang. See: C. von Fürer-Haimendorf, *Highlanders of Arunachal Pradesh. Anthropological Research in North-East India*, New Delhi 1982; R.R.P. Sharma, *The Sherdukpens*, Shillong 1961.

911. F. Kingdon Ward, *The Riddle of the Tsangpo Gorges*, London 1926, p. 285.

912. For the life and work of Ludlow and Sherriff, see: H.R. Fletcher, *A Quest of Flowers. The Plant Explorations of Frank Ludlow and George Sherriff told from their diaries and other occasional writings*, Edinburgh 1975.

913. L/P&S/12/4268, Caroe to IO, 1 June 1934. The Tawang visit is described briefly in: Anon., "Eastern Bhutan", *Himalayan Journal*, VII, 1935.

914. L/P&S/12/4268, Williamson to India, 28 September 1935.

915. Kingdon Ward's travels are as follows: Western China and South-Eastern Tibet, 1909-1913; Northern Burma, 1914 and 1919; Western China, 1921-1923; South-Eastern Tibet, 1924-1925; Northern Burma, 1926 and 1930-1931; Assam Himalayas, 1928; French Indochina, 1929; Assam Himalayas and South-Eastern Tibet, 1933 and 1935; Northern Burma, 1937 and 1939-1940 (with Suydam Cutting and Arthur Vernay); Assam Himalayas, 1938; Northern Burma, 1942; Assam Himalayas, 1943; and a number of post-War journeys including the Assam Himalayas (up the Lohit to Rima) in 1950 and Northern Burma in 1952-53. These journeys gave rise to a formidable array of books and articles, only a few of which reveal Kingdon Ward's acute understanding of political developments.

During the 1914-1918 War Kingdon Ward was involved, as an officer in the British Army (I.A.R.O), in survey work in the extreme north of Burma in connection with the Sino-Burmese border. He possessed a unique fund of knowledge concerning that eastern end of the McMahon Line which served as both the short stretch of the Burma-Tibet border and part of what was effectively the British claimed border between Burma and Yunnan. See: L/P&S/12/2252, *Memorandum on the North-East Frontier of Burma*, by Second Lt. F. Kingdon-Ward.

At various times in his writing career Kingdon Ward used a hyphen and called himself Kingdon-Ward; but in the majority of his books he was Kingdon Ward.

916. L/P&S/12/4262, IO minute, 29 August 1934: "Mr. Butler is anxious for every possible help to be afforded" to Kingdon Ward.

When Kingdon Ward first approached the India Office for help in his project the plan was for him to travel with Suydam Cutting and the Roosevelt brothers Theodore Jr. and Kermit. When the Roosevelts dropped out (largely because of

the Tibetan objection to the shooting of game, it would seem) Kingdon Ward persisted in his Assam Himalayan proposal while Cutting, now with Vernay, decided to visit Shigatse and Lhasa. It was almost certainly through Kingdon Ward that Cutting and Vernay established contact with R.A.Butler.

The original plans for the Tibetan expedition by the Roosevelts, Cutting and Kingdon Ward were communicated to Caroe.

See: L/P&S/12/4305, Rumbold minute, 10 October 1934; Walton to Caroe, 18 October 1934.

917. L/P&S/12/4262, Kingdon Ward to Lord Lloyd, 6 March 1937. Lord Lloyd, who had been a proconsul of Empire in Egypt and the Sudan, and who would take over the Colonial Office under Churchill, was not in office at this moment; but he was an enormously influential figure with fingers in many governmental pies.

918. Kingdon Ward was notoriously careful with his expenses, so there may have been some substance in the Tibetan case. On the other hand, the question of payment for transport (and the manner of exploitation of *ula*) was always being raised by the Tibetans, sometimes quite without foundation.

919. L/P&S/12/4262, Williamson to Caroe, 15 February 1935.

One reason why Williamson was not in favour of Kingdon Ward's project for 1935 was that it might interfere with plans for obtaining Kashag approval for another Everest expedition.

920. The Inner Line pass was a document granting permission to cross the Inner Line. It did not, of course, of necessity specify the precise geographical limits of travel beyond the Inner Line. Some sources give 26 April as the date on which Kingdon Ward left Charduar. The India Office records indicate 29 April.

921. Kingdon Ward's 1935 journey is described in a number of places. A good short account is: F. Kingdon Ward, "Across Southern Tibet", *Himalayan Journal*, VIII, 1936.

Kingdon Ward referred to the Tawang official as "Kenpo". He does not seem to have been one of the regular Dzongpöns in charge of Dirangdzong or Kalaktang but rather one of the monk adminstrators of Tawang.

922. It was later to transpire that the Tawang official was on his way to collect the annual *posa* (or subsidy paid by the British), and so no doubt Lightfoot knew of his coming. When Kingdon Ward reached Charduar towards the end of April 1935, Lightfoot had "gone out" from his Headquarters (reportedly on 4 April), either on tour or on leave. The documents for Kingdon Ward, the Inner Line pass and the letter relating to the Tawang official, were, however, ready at Charduar awaiting collection. It is very hard to escape the conclusion that Lightfoot knew exactly what Kingdon Ward intended to do.

923. L/P&S/12/4262, Assam to India, 13 November 1935.

924. See: Amar Kaur Jasbir Singh, *Himalayan Triangle*, London 1988, p. 111; H.K. Barpujari, *Problem of the Hill Tribes: North-East Frontier. Vol. III. Inner Line to the McMahon Line*, Gauhati 1981, p.237; P. Mehra, *The McMahon Line and After*, London 1974, 420-421; Karunakar Gupta, "The McMahon Line 1911-45: the British Legacy", *China Quarterly*, 47, 1971.

925. The papers on the Kingdon Ward affair in the India Office Library and Records are collected in: L/P&S/12/4262.

926. For Sven Hedin and Morley, see: Lamb, *McMahon Line*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 61-65.

927. L/P&S/12/4262, Rumbold to Burrell, 9 February 1937.

928. L/P&S/12/4262, India to IO, 8 March 1937.

929. Kingdon Ward's account of his 1937 adventures in Burma makes no mention of this little problem on the Sino-Burmese border. See: F. Kingdon-Ward, *Burma's Icy Mountains*, London 1949.
His 1937 journey in the north of Burma took him right up to the Burmese stretch of the McMahon Line about 20 miles to the north-east of the Diphuk or Talok Pass on the Lohit-Irrawaddy watershed.
In his *In Farthest Burma*, which is based on experience at the time of the Simla Conference just before the outbreak of the Great War, Kingdon Ward devotes a final Chapter to pointing to the threat posed by China to the North-East frontier of India by way of northern Burma. It is a most perceptive piece of writing which shows clearly the degree to which Kingdon Ward had his mind on political issues. In his later books he tended to avoid such matters.

930. L/P&S/12/4262, Gould to India, 1 April 1938; Assam to India, 4 April 1938.

931. See: F. Kingdon Ward, "The Lohit Valley in 1950", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 1951.

932. F. Kingdon Ward, "Botanical and Geographical Explorations in Tibet, 1935", *The Geographical Journal*, LXXXVIII, 1936; F. Kingdon Ward, "The Assam Himalaya: Travels in Balipara", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXV, 1938 & XXVI, 1939.

933. L/P&S/12/4262, Kingdon Ward to R.A.B. Butler, 22 June 1935.
Butler's first reaction on receipt of this letter was to wonder what on earth Kingdon Ward was doing in Tibet.
This was not the only letter which Butler received from Tibet bearing news of Kingdon Ward. On 28 August 1935 Arthur Vernay wrote to him from Shigatse to comment in passing on Kingdon Ward's presence in eastern Tibet and his ill health. It looks as if there were some means of communication between Kingdon Ward and Vernay and Cutting while they were travelling in Tibet.

934. F. Kingdon Ward, *Assam Adventure*, London 1941, pp. 111-112.

935. F. Kingdon Ward, "The Assam Himalaya: Travels in Balipara I", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXV, 1938.

936. L/P&S/12/4262, Assam to India, 13 November 1935.

937. L/P&S/12/4189, Caroe to Clauson, 7 April 1937. Maps produced by Cassels and G. Philip, on the other hand, met with Caroe's approval.

938. Colonel L.W. Shakespear, *History of the Assam Rifles*, London 1929, has maps which show the old Outer Line, including one map designed to plot the activities of the 2nd (Lakhimpur) Battalion of the Assam Rifles between 1859 and 1920. This illustrates a minor operation against the Chulikata Mishmis of 1920 extending beyond the international frontiers of the Indian Empire (on this map the old Outer Line). A more general map, while still following the old Outer Line, suggests that the international border to the east of the Dibang is subject to some uncertainty (as, indeed, it was: it did not, in fact, exist at all). F. Kingdon Ward, in a map used to illustrate a lecture to the Royal Central Asian Society in 1927, also shows the old Outer Line border in an area through which he had travelled himself. See: F. Kingdon Ward, "The Overland Route from China to India", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XIV, 1927.

939. L/P&S/12/4189, Menon to Assam, 25 March 1937. Menon was then serving as one of Caroe's staff in the Foreign and Political Department.

940. L/P&S/12/4189, Fleming to Caroe, 20 April 1937.

941. The replacement Vol. XIV of Aitchison, which would soon appear, of course contained no maps; and it would be indeed a clever man who could work out the correct alignment of the Assam Himalayan border on the mapless basis of the text of the Simla Convention and the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes.

942. Caroe saw Fleming on 18 May 1937. His instructions for this meeting were that he would

> make it clear that we . . [India Office] . .do not want the correct presentation of the facts "splashed", as the Foreign Office and the India Office are agreed as to the desirability of avoiding unnecessary publicity; and will ask . . [Fleming and other journalists] . . not to publish anything without consultation with the India Office.

943. L/P&S/12/4189, Hinks to IO, 5 September 1938.

944. *Evening Standard*, 19 January 1939.

945. L/P&S/12/4188, Knatchbull-Hugessen to FO, 12 October 1936.

946. L/P&S/12/4188, Caroe to R.A.B. Butler, Private, 4 March 1937.
Caroe's refusal to accept the reality of Sikang and Ch'inghai is interesting as an indication of his general approach to China. While it would be possible to question the legitimacy of Ch'inghai and Sikang, it would be absurd to doubt that they existed. It was simply not realistic to dismiss the realms of Liu Wen-hui and Ma Pu-fang as "imaginary"; and it is unlikely that Caroe really believed that they were.

947. The correspondence on this question is in L/P&S/12/4189. See, for example: FO minute, 15 February 1943; Caroe minute, 3 October 1943, commenting on the views of Sir E. Teichman.

948. The papers relating to the affair of the *China Yearbook 1943* are in L/P&S/12/4189 & 4190. See, for example: Caroe to Peel, 20 June 1944.

949. It can be argued, therefore, that the Chinese made public in India their claim to the Aksai Chin in 1944, at a time when most British maps either showed absurd advanced boundaries in which no one believed or, more usually, no boundary at all. The Indian side, therefore, have no reason for being surprised at the Chinese claims to Aksai Chin which received so much publicity in the 1950s.
This map, it may be of passing interest to note, also claimed as Chinese the whole of Outer Mongolia and a large tract of the Pamirs to the west of the Sarikol Range which had been Russian since the 1890s.

XIII

BOUNDARY QUESTIONS: THE GENESIS OF THE NORTH-EAST FRONTIER AGENCY, 1936-1945

The Kingdon Ward affair, whatever precisely it may have involved, came to a head while Williamson was on his second Mission to Lhasa. He was by this time a seriously ill man; and on 17 November 1935 he died. The Trade Agent at Gyantse, Captain R.K.M. Battye, took temporary command of the Mission; and it was Battye who reported the outcome of soundings of Tibetan opinion as to the implications of Kingdon Ward's journey in the context of the McMahon Line in general and the British claim to Tawang in particular. It is highly unlikely that at this point the Kashag had a clear idea of what actually had been agreed and signed in 1914; and there are good grounds for supposing that they were completely unaware of British claims to Tawang. To Battye's enquiries, doubtless through Norbu Dhondup, there seems to have come a bland reply to the effect that none of the essentials of Anglo-Tibetan relations had been modified. To the Kashag the only point at issue may well have been that Kingdon Ward had entered Tibet without the express blessing of Lhasa, which was true enough. Battye reported this back to Caroe in such a way that Caroe was able to declare (even if he may have had his doubts) that the Tibetans had "confirmed" the "Red Line" of 1914, that is to say, had confirmed that Tawang lay south of the Indo-Tibetan border.[950] In view of the subsequent history of the case, any such confirmation can only be described as improbable, as, indeed, Gould was soon to point out.[951]

In November 1936 during his Mission to Lhasa Basil Gould once more raised the Tawang issue with the Kashag, exploiting an opening provided by the Tibetans when they wanted to discuss the disputed border with Tehri-Garhwal. Gould told the Kashag that Tibet by virtue of the Simla Convention of 3 July 1914 and the Declaration of the same date had no claim to any territory south of the "Red Line" on the map appended to the Convention. He did not, interestingly enough, refer to the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes which were the true basis for the British claim to Tawang. The Kashag, though they

had received no advance notice that the matter would come up, were able to produce a coherent reply. They said that up to 1914 there had been no doubt that Tawang had been Tibetan. The adjustment of the Indo-Tibetan border in 1914, moreover, had been "part and parcel of the general adjustment and determination of boundaries contemplated in the 1914 Convention". This meant, in effect, that the validity of the "Red Line" (McMahon Line) depended upon the securing of a definite Sino-Tibetan border, which, of course, did not as yet exist. Finally, they pointed out that at no time since 1914 had the Government of India taken any steps to assert British authority or question Tibetan rights in the Tawang region. In reply, Gould told the Kashag that they did not understand the true position, which was that an Indo-Tibetan border had been agreed unconditionally in 1914 which placed Tawang on the British side of the "Red Line". The Kashag were clearly unconvinced; and it was "mutually agreed that, in view of urgent preoccupations, further discussion both of Tehri and the Tawang question might be deferred".

Gould was not entirely unsympathetic to the Tibetan point of view. Tawang had indeed been Tibetan up to 1914; and since then the British had done nothing to disturb Tibetan administration there. The problem, of course, was that if the Chinese should ever return to Outer Tibet they would surely take an interest in Tawang. "It is difficult", Gould observed out, "to imagine any method by which the Chinese, by a moderate amount of expenditure and effort, could cause us more embarrassment than by claiming that Tawang is Chinese and by locating Chinese troops, and a Chinese administration, in the Tawang area". Gould believed that if there were the slightest signs that Chinese troops might be allowed back into Tibet the Government of India would "be well advised to take the bull by the horns and time by the forelock" and proceed to extend British administration to Tawang and the rest of the Assam Himalayas up to the "Red Line".[952]

By this time, while there was no taking the bull by the horns, yet the British were making some first steps towards making their presence felt in Tawang; though anything approaching direct administration right up to the "Red Line" was still a long way off. In April 1936 Captain Lightfoot, the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract, visited Tawang proper, the first British official to do so on duty since Captain Nevill in 1914. This was certainly a consequence of the Kingdon Ward affair in that one of Lightfoot's objectives was to investigate the degree of direct Tibetan influence which Kingdon Ward had reported.

Lightfoot was able to produce an up to date account of exactly how Tawang was governed. He found that in Tawang proper, north of the Se La, there ran the writ of the two Tsona Dzongpöns appointed by Lhasa. In Tawang itself the monastery, with over 500 monks, also

exercised considerable authority through a monastic council which appointed lay officials to raise revenue and administer south of the Se La, the two Dzongpöns of Dirangzong and the two Dzongpöns of Kalaktang.[953] The monastery, in addition, sent its own monk officials to gather revenue from the inhabitants on the Assam side of the Se La. The British had since 1853 been paying a subsidy, *posa*, to Tawang of Rs. 5,000 per annum, which was handed over at Udalguri in Assam, usually to one or other of the Kalaktang Dzongpöns (whose base was nearest the old Outer Line). Out of this sum Rs. 1,122 were sent by way of the Tawang monastery to Lhasa where Rs. 600 went to Drepung monastery and the balance to the Tibetan Government. The remaining Rs. 3,878 were divided between the Tsona Dzongpöns and Tawang monastery.[954] Lightfoot was in no doubt that the people of Tawang proper considered themselves to be Tibetan subjects and that the direct administration of Tibetan authorities of one kind or another extended down at least to the Bomdi La. The Tibetans, he reported, raised more than Rs. 10,000 revenue each year in the Tawang tract in cash, kind or services from the local inhabitants who were, notionally, subjects of the Indian Empire. The assertion of British influence here, therefore, would involve more than the establishment of a few police posts in wild tribal areas: it would mean the occupation of a tract of territory over which there already existed an elaborate Tibetan administrative structure ultimately responsible to both the Kashag and Drepung Monastery.[955]

Lightfoot's conclusions were very much in the Government of India's mind when Gould made his approach to the Kashag about Tawang in November 1936. Caroe was now giving serious thought to the possibility of the British occupation of Tawang; but he felt it best to learn what the Tibetans had to say first.[956] As we have seen, the Tibetans gave no indication that they would acquiesce quietly in the loss of what they regarded as their possessions in Tawang, at least until some *quid pro quo* in the shape of a satisfactory agreement with China was provided. The situation was fraught with difficulties and further information would certainly be useful in any final policy decision.

In 1936 Ludlow and Sherriff embarked on another Tibetan journey, not only visiting Tawang but exploring along a considerable extent of the northern side of the McMahon Line. They passed through the administrative centre of Tsona, from which the Tibetans oversaw the government of Tawang, and they examined the region where two branches of the Subansiri tributary of the Brahmaputra, the Chayul Chu and the Tsari Chu, passed through the main range of the Assam Himalayas (and, incidentally, cut across the McMahon Line). We will return to their discoveries to the east of Tawang later in this Chapter. Ludlow and Sherriff set out from Assam via Eastern Bhutan in late February and were back, again via Bhutan, in

November. Their findings with respect to Tawang can only have confirmed those of Lightfoot.

An internal contradiction in British policy towards Tawang and the rest of the McMahon Line had already become apparent. Something had to be done to push the Indian border up from the old Outer Line as a precautionary move against a possible future return of China to Tibet. At the same time, the very process of implementing the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of 1914 might so upset Tibetan political opinion as actually to provide an opportunity for the rise of Chinese influence in Lhasa to the detriment of British Indian security.

Both the Government of India and the Government of Assam, the latter with direct responsibility for administration along and beyond the old Outer Line, were fully aware of the geopolitical dangers presented by the Tawang tract. As long ago as 1928 Captain Nevill, at that time one of two Political Officers in the service of the Indian Empire with personal experience of Tawang (the other being F.M. Bailey), had pointed out that

> there is no doubt that as soon as China settles down the Tibetan Frontier will become of great importance. China still has its eyes on Tibet and on Lhassa, the pro-Chinese party is growing in influence and should China gain control of Tibet the Tawang country is particularly adapted for a secret and easy entrance into India. Russia is also trying to establish her influence in Tibet, and, if successful, could safely and secretly send her emissaries into India by this route.[957]

Lightfoot's 1936 visit to Tawang only reinforced this conclusion, that "more impressive and permanent action is required if Tawang is to be effectively occupied and possible intrusion of China in that area forestalled".[958] The sort of action possible included regular tours by British officials right up to the McMahon Line and the collection by them of revenue in place of Tibetan officials. The mere reproduction of the McMahon Line on maps was hardly likely, on its own, to achieve anything.[959]

Was the time ripe, however, for proceeding to what would certainly be seen in Lhasa as the annexation of Tibetan territory? Both Caroe and the Government of Assam had their doubts. It was agreed, accordingly, that Lightfoot should go up to Tawang yet again to take a more careful look at the situation. This visit, planned originally for 1937, actually took place in 1938. Lightfoot's instructions were that he should "explore facts rather than . . . issue orders and make decisions". He was not to open any negotiations with the Tawang authorities and his "conduct in all things should be such as may be calculated to cause least shock to Tibetan susceptibilities". The assertion of British authority in the region was, therefore, to be made indirectly by the mere fact of Lightfoot's presence along with an

escort rather than by any formal declaration or pronouncement, though he was authorised if he felt it appropriate to suggest informally to any Tibetan officials he might encounter that Tawang was really part of British India despite the failure of the Indian Government so far to undertake any administrative measures there.[960]

Lightfoot reached Tawang on 30 April 1938. He had with him a detachment of Assam Rifles under the command of Major W.F. Brown. He was also accompanied for part of the way, as we have already seen, by none other than Kingdon Ward, who stayed behind at the foot of the Se La where he devoted himself to botanising while Lightfoot went on to Tawang proper to examine once more the state of Tibetan influence in the place.

Lightfoot's report confirmed his 1936 conclusion that Tawang was under the rule of Lhasa, either through the Tsona Dzongpöns or the officials appointed by Tawang monastery which was a daughter house of Drepung. The inhabitants of the tract, with the exception of the Sherdukpen of Rupa and Shergaon (who "may be said to be quite free from any control from Towang and the Tibetan Government"), were subject to an extremely complex and onerous burden of revenue collection by a host of officials monastic and lay. Their supply of both salt and rice was made artificially costly by a system of monopolies. Forced labour was exacted from them. The administration of justice was "brutal and unspeakably corrupt". Scant protection was offered against raids from the non-Buddhist tribesmen, such as the Akas, to their east. All in all the Mönpas of the Tawang tract were abominably misgoverned, a fate which nominal British Indian subjects did not deserve.

What could be done? Lightfoot advocated the ending of the power not only of the Tsona Dzongpöns but also of Tawang monastery. Instead, "some form of British administration, however simple, must be introduced", which should involve an improved system of taxation to be paid to the Government of India and the establishment of British Agents (who had to be officials with a good knowledge of the Tibetan language) in Tawang and at Dirangdzong. Monopolies should be abolished as well as all forms of revenue payment in kind, including forced labour. The work of the British Agents should be assisted by village councils (*panchayats*). The proposed British Agent in Tawang proper should be provided with a military escort, half a platoon ought to be enough to confer prestige and deter Tibet incursions. Thus, after a lapse of 24 years, would be implemented the proposals of Sir Henry McMahon and Charles Bell that British rule in the Tawang tract should be pushed right up to the McMahon Line border.[961]

While Lightfoot was in Tawang (the visit having been made, on the advice of Gould, without any prior reference to the Tibetans), the Kashag, informed of the presence of the British party by the Tsona

Dzonpöns and Tawang monastery, asked Gould in Gangtok what was going on. Gould replied that all that was happening was a normal tour in British territory by an official of the Assam Government.[962] Some further discussion of Tawang with the Tibetans, however, was now inevitable. Norbu Dhondup, who was then in Lhasa, raised the matter with the Kashag, protesting to them that Tibet was collecting illegal taxes in Tawang. The Kashag denied that this was the case. Tawang, they said, was Tibetan, and they could levy what taxes they liked there. If it had indeed been British, they added, why then did the Government of India not bring up the whole question while the 13th Dalai Lama was alive? Norbu Dhondup during the summer of 1938 discussed Tawang no less than nine times with the Kashag and thrice with the Regent; but there was no movement on the Tibetan side from this position.[963]

Norbu Dhondup urged through Gould that a firm Tawang policy now be followed by the Government of India. The whole area should be brought under British administration in such a way that the local people were in no doubt that the British were there to stay. The Rs. 5,000 *posa* paid to Tawang should be terminated. Norbu Dhondup was well aware that, unless something like this were done, the Tibetans would inevitably exploit the Tawang issue in their attempts to obtain British support against China. They would dangle Tawang as a diplomatic carrot, only to be handed over when a satisfactory arrangement with the Chinese was reached, which in practice might mean never. Gould saw much merit in this view.[964]

The Governor of Assam at the time of the Lightfoot visit, Sir Robert Reid, was far from hostile towards a forward policy in the Assam Himalayas. As he pointed out privately to the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, in January 1939, there were three options. The British could wash their hands of Tawang and just let things go on as they were; they could send further expeditions up to Tawang to keep up, as it were, the momentum; or they could go all the way and take Tawang at once under direct British administration. Reid rather favoured the last, the permanent occupation of Tawang.

At this juncture, however, Reid went on leave. The acting Governor, Henry Twynam, saw matters in a very different light. He cast doubt on the legal validity of the British claim to Tawang, pointing to a number of anomalies and contradictions in the various documents and maps which had emerged from the Simla Conference of 1914.[965] He then noted that to press the British claim to Tawang proper was probably not the best way to guarantee the preservation of Anglo-Tibetan friendship. His conclusion was that the British should forget about any project for extending their direct control to Tawang proper, that is to say to the north of the Se La. On the other hand, the Tawang tract from the old Outer Line up to the Se La, the districts of Dirangdzong and Kalaktang (as well as the Sherdukpen

area of Rupa and Shergaon which had already been absorbed to a considerable degree within the sphere of influence of the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract), might well be brought in due course under formal British control; and the abandonment of British claims to Tawang proper might, perhaps, be exploited as a diplomatic bargaining card in securing Tibetan assent to British acquisition of all rights in the southern part of the tract.[966]

Caroe, of course, refused for one moment to believe that the British should abandon their reliance on the 1914 documents. All the same, Lord Linlithgow agreed with Twynam that it would be prudent not to press the Tibetans too hard on the Tawang issue at this juncture. The main consideration in the Viceroy's mind was cost. He applied his veto, therefore, to any suggestion that a British control area should be extended right up to the Se La, let alone Tawang proper, or that Lightfoot be allowed to make further tours here accompanied by a small escort of Assam Rifles.[967] The Secretary of State, the Marquess of Zetland, however, evidently thought that the Viceroy was being excessively negative. In place of a permanent veto of any forward activity it was decided to postpone consideration of Tawang for a year or so.[968] This was the state of play when World War Two broke out.

While Lightfoot was making his two expeditions to Tawang it was becoming evident that there were also serious administrative problems along the McMahon Line further to the east. The potential existence of most of these had, in fact, been pointed out by Bailey after his 1913 journey; and considerable attention had been paid to them in the drafting of the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914. Since then, however, they had largely been forgotten by the Governments of India and Assam even though there had been some investigation on the spot by Kingdon Ward in 1924-25 and again during his controversial 1935 journey. The point that Bailey had made in 1913 was that there were a number of places along the main Assam Himalayan range between Tawang and the point where the Tsangpo, here called the Siang, made its great southward bend towards the Brahmaputra where Tibetan influence had expanded well to the south of anything like a line along the crest of the mountains. There were three main areas where this had occurred, in the region of Migyitun on the Tsari Chu (as the main tributary of the Subansiri was known in Tibet), in the headwater valleys of the Siyom tributary of the Siang or Dihang, and along the Siang valley itself. From 1936 onwards all three came to the notice of the British as sites of potential Tibetan challenge to the McMahon Line boundary.

Both Kingdon Ward in 1935 and Ludlow and Sherriff in 1936 visited Migyitun, which appeared to be the frontier point between Tibet and territory occupied by Lopas (the Tibetan name for the non-Buddhist tribal people like the Daflas, Miris and Abors – the last in

the post-British era generally referred to as Adis). Just south of Migyitun lay a sort of no man's land through which, in theory at least, ran the McMahon Line boundary between British India and Tibet. In practice, however, the presence of Tibet had extended well into Lopa territory. What lay southwards from Migyitun down the Subansiri was very much a mystery as no European traveller, let alone official of the Government of India, had managed to journey all the way up that river from the plains to the neighbourhood of the McMahon Line. The furthest the various exploring ventures of the 1911-13 period had reached was Tali, which was about 50 miles below the frontier outlined in the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes.

Ludlow and Sherriff confirmed Bailey's observation that one difficulty of this region from the point of view of boundary demarcation was that the Tibetans considered it holy.[969] It had become the site of two major pilgrimages, known as the Kingkor and the Ringkor. The Kingkor, or "Short Pilgrimage", took place annually. It involved the circuit of the holy mountain Takpa Shiri, just north of the McMahon Line. The Ringkor, or "Long Pilgrimage", which took place every twelve years, resulted in a movement of devout Tibetans south-east from Migyitun below the McMahon Line for over twenty miles along the Tsari Chu to the junction with the Yume Chu which was then followed upstream back across the McMahon Line into Tibet.[970] The preparation for the Ringkor gave rise to much Tibetan contact with the local Lopas (here Daflas or Miris) who had to be bribed with salt, swords, cloth and grain to restrain them from attacking the pilgrims. Bailey reported that as many as 100,000 pilgrims would make the Ringkor; and when the Pome state was still in being its ruler used to provide an armed escort of a hundred or so soldiers. There is no reason to suppose that the size of the pilgrimage had shrunk in the 1930s. The escort, however, with the end of Pome's independence, would now be provided by regular Lhasa troops equipped with weapons obtained from British India and, probably, commanded by British trained officers. Just to the east of the Tsari Chu was the sacred lake of Tso Karpo, somewhere on the British side of the McMahon Line. Special provision had been made in the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra Notes for both the Takpa Shiri mountain and Tso Karpo lake to be included in Tibetan territory.[971] Ludlow and Sherriff, therefore, undoubtedly confirmed what had been suspected from the time of Bailey's visit in 1913, that the establishment of an agreed Indo-Tibetan border here could well be fraught with political and theological difficulties.[972]

To the east of Migyitun lay the upper reaches of the Siyom River, one of the main tributaries of the Siang or Dihang. This was another region where Tibetan influence had extended well down the southern side of the mountain range. What had happened here, as Bailey noted in 1913, Kingdon Ward observed in 1924-25 and Ludlow and

Sherriff investigated in 1938 (when they followed up their 1936 journey by a reconnaissance to the north of the McMahon Line from the Tawang tract all the way to the great bend in the Tsangpo, where they got quite near the point where that river plunged across the McMahon Line), was that there had been over the years a flow of emigrants from eastern Bhutan, as well as Mönpas from the Tawang area, towards Pemakö (in the bend of the Tsangpo just east of the old Pome state).[973] The origins of this process of demographic movement would seem to date to at least the beginning of the 19th century; but it was still going on in the 1920s according to Kingdon Ward. Some of these migrants had been diverted into the upper Siyom valley where they settled under the protection of the great Lhalu family in Lhasa, to whom they paid revenue. They were known as Pachakshiripas and were considered to be Tibetan subjects. The main centre of Tibetan settlement, Lhatsa Gompa, was well over 20 miles on the Assam side of the McMahon Line.[974]

To the east of the Siyom lies that portion of the Assam Himalayas where the Tsangpo cuts through the mountains to become the Siang (and then the Dihang) tributary of the Brahmaputra. The actual point where the McMahon Line was supposed to cross the Siang had never been visited by a European traveller or British official though Bailey and Morshead, Kingdon Ward and Cawdor, Ludlow and Sherriff had got near enough to report on its essential political features. Here was that Pemakö where Bhutanese and Mönpas had been settling; and here, until 1928, had been the independent Tibetan state of Pome with its capital at Showa. In the 1930s the Tibetan officials at Showa were responsible to Lhasa by way of the Government of Kham at Chamdo. The settlers in Pemakö had over the years tended to overflow southwards down the Tsangpo-Siang; and by 1936 they had established themselves in a few villages a little to the south of where the McMahon Line would run, notably Geling on the right bank of the river opposite Korbo. The Pome authorities collected revenues from these settlers and had also in various ways established a connection with the non-Buddhist Abor tribesmen downstream of them in the villages on the Siang to perhaps as far south as Simong (on the left bank) and Karko (on the right bank). Karko, about half way between the McMahon Line and the old Outer Line, was some 40 miles as the crow flies from each. The relationship between the old Pome state and both Buddhist settlers (often referred to in the British records as Membas and today probably called Tsanglas) and non-Buddhist tribesmen (Lopas) seems to have been fairly amicable: at least, the British authorities in Assam did not constantly receive reports of crises and conflicts up the river. Following the Lhasa occupation of Pome, however, the situation changed. After the flight of the ruler of Pome to British territory, a clear warning to the Government of Assam that there was trouble

brewing on the upper reaches of the Siang, the new Tibetan authorities both oppressed the Buddhist (Memba) settlers and aroused the hostility of many of the Abor groups with whom Pome had been accustomed to trade.

Probably aware that a new instability was developing far beyond the old Outer Line, in 1936 the Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract, W.H. Calvert, accompanied by an escort of 25 men of the Assam Rifles, carried out a short reconnaissance into unadministered Abor country along the Siang north of Yembang, visiting the sites of the deaths of Williamson and Gregorson (where memorials had been erected more than twenty years before) and reaching Riu, some 20 miles as the crow flies north of the old Outer Line. This was the furthest penetration of this tract since 1913, but it was not far enough to have any effect upon the local situation, nor, it would seem, to enable Calvert to learn much about it.[975]

In March 1937 a party of some 30 Tibetans, some armed with modern rifles, came down to the Abor settlements of Karko and Simong. They were heading for Riga, less than ten miles upstream of Riu, when they were stopped by the Abors. They were trying to collect tribute from the tribesmen; and in this they had enjoyed some success nearer to the McMahon Line. They were also, it transpired, endeavouring to prevent any communication being established by the Buddhist settlers on the upper Siang (three of whose villages were certainly south of what the Assam Government considered to be the "undefined" McMahon Line) with the outside world. The settlers, whose leader was one Dhondup (from Geling on the British side of the McMahon Line), had become so disenchanted with Tibetan rule that they had been trying to send a messenger to the Maharaja of Bhutan to ask him to provide them with a Raja to rule over them in place of the representatives of Lhasa or Chamdo. The Maharaja did indeed receive a letter to this effect. His reply, however, was intercepted by the Tibetans who tore it up and, for good measure, flogged the Bhutanese courier. The Bhutanese Ruler was extremely angry; but he was reluctant to complicate his relations with Lhasa by formally protesting against what he could well consider a serious violation of diplomatic usage. He managed, however, to get a message through to Dhondup to tell him that if any of the settlers wished to move to Bhutan they would be welcome and he would ensure that they received land. One objective of the Tibetan armed promenade down the Siang in 1937 was to discourage such emigration.[976]

In early 1938 Dhondup and 70 followers made a run for it down the Siang, successfully evaded the Tibetans and arrived in Pasighat in June. They said that they would rather settle on British territory than go to Bhutan, but they were refused permission to stay. In March 1939, however, Dhondup and 52 companions turned up in Shillong, having left Bhutan where they had not been happy. They

asked the Assam authorities either to let them stay near Pasighat or provide them with an escort so that they could go back up the Siang to Geling. It soon transpired that Dhondup had no intention of returning to Geling. His plan was to conquer a little kingdom for himself somewhere in Abor country about half way between the old Outer Line and the McMahon Line to which all the other Bhutanese and Mönpa settlers from the McMahon Line region would be brought. The Government of Assam saw no merit whatsoever in this scheme. Dhondup and his companions were accordingly escorted back to Bhutan.[977]

By the beginning of 1939, therefore, it looked as if a quite serious situation was developing on the Siang, what with a threatened mass emigration of Tibetan subjects on to notionally British territory, probably pursued by Tibetan troops, combined with interruptions in trade up and down the Siang imposed by Abor tribesmen, which also might invite Tibetan intervention south of the McMahon Line. The Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract, R.W. Godfrey, was accordingly allowed to undertake a tour of inspection deep into Abor country. With an escort of 45 Assam Rifles and some 50 porters, and accompanied by J.H.F. Williams, the Assistant Political Officer, Pasighat, and M. Ahsan Ali, Medical Officer at Pasighat, Godfrey left Sadiya on 26 February 1939. He was back at the end of March, having covered some 230 miles and penetrated as far north as Simong on the left bank of the Siang about half way between the old Outer Line and the McMahon Line. It was by far the most profound British penetration of Abor country since the travels of W.C.M. Dundas in 1913.[978]

The situation which Godfrey found was in some respects more serious from the British point of view than that obtaining in the Tawang tract. In the latter district the presence of the Tibetans had been accepted for as long as the British had been in Assam. What Lightfoot found in 1936 and 1938 was exactly what had been happening in the 1850s. There was nothing like a Tibetan advance, merely the British discovery that a *status quo* was no longer desirable. In the Siang valley, however, the state of affairs was dynamic. Following the conquest of Pome the Lhasa Government had been actively extending its influence southwards. Here was an example of Tibetan expansionism at work in territory which it could be argued was technically British and which had never before, unlike Tawang, been an integral part of Tibet. Since 1928 Tibetan influence, in the form of trade, involvement in local Abor conflicts by the Membas (Mönpas and Bhutanese settlers), and revenue collection and other administrative activities by Tibetan officials from Showa, had been pushed down the Siang to a point some 70 miles south of the McMahon Line; and all this had taken place, it had to be remembered, many years *after* the

signature of the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914.

There was a barrier of sorts against the further extension southwards of Tibetan influence, but it was one quite independent of the policy of the Government of Assam. The Abor villages of Karko and Simong, respectively on the right and left banks of the Siang, both exceptionally large, with between 300 and 450 houses, and accordingly powerful, had imposed a blockade on all traffic along the Siang valley. This was not, as it was at first thought, a product of the current disturbances. Karko and Simong had for a very long time indeed maintained a monopoly of the interchange of goods coming from Assam for those from Tibet by preventing traders from passing all the way through the Himalayas in either direction. The economy of the Siang valley was further complicated by subsidiary blockades by tribesmen to the south of Karko and Simong, which villages accordingly had no direct access to Assam and were in many respects dependent upon Tibet. Karko and Simong, therefore, fell into the catchment area of the Tibetan officials from Showa; but their territory, which extended a few miles downstream from the two villages, at that time marked the effective limit to any attempt at revenue collection from Pome.

Godfrey, on his return, recommended the establishment of a British post at Karko, five marches up the Siang from the present outpost at Pangin (about 20 miles as the crow flies), which would be occupied each year during the cold weather. He advised that the Political Officer should make a tour in the region at least every other year so that the tribesmen be reminded of his existence and all that he represented. One task for the intensified administration of the Siang was to ensure that villages like Karko and Simong were not permitted to impose trade blocks, that is to say to take unto themselves the power to establish monopolies over trading patterns. All this increased activity, however, was not to be represented as an expansion of the territorial limits of the British Empire. It was merely the extension of the anti-slavery Control Areas which the Government of India had agreed in 1936, in accordance with the League of Nations Convention on Slavery of 1926, should be applied to unadministered territory. In 1938 the establishment of a Control Area of this kind was authorised for the country on the Dihang-Siang north of Pasighat; and there was no reason why British anti-slavery operations should not be extended all the way up to the McMahon Line. However justified, some kind of regular British presence was, Godfrey thought, essential to counter the spread of Tibetan influence and to keep a watch for potential crises. There was always the possibility, for example, of some future decision by the remaining Mönpa and Bhutanese settlers in southern Pemakö to migrate down to British territory; and there was a constant danger of intertribal conflict among the Abors of the Siang valley in which the

Tibetan authorities from Showa might choose to involve themselves.

In December 1939 Godfrey turned his attention to the Lohit valley, yet another sector of the Assam Himalayas where the alignment of the McMahon Line did not coincide with Tibetan boundary concepts. No British official had gone up the Lohit to Tibet since the time of O'Callaghan's Walong Promenade in 1914; though Kingdon Ward had passed that way on a number of occasions.[979] Godfrey took with him a substantial escort, 39 men from the Assam Rifles and a Gurkha officer, and 40 porters. He visited Rima, the Zayul capital, where he had friendly discussions with the Tibetan officials; and he was back in Sadiya on 1 February 1940.

The Rima Dzongpön, who was subordinate to the Tibetan authorities in Kham at Chamdo, was away during Godfrey's visit; but the rest of the Tibetan official establishment were extremely well disposed towards the British visitor. There was no trace whatsoever of Chinese influence in Zayul, though Godfrey did hear that Chinese arms smugglers were extremely active in the north of Burma not so far away. In Rima there was not the slightest inkling of the existence of the McMahon Line; and Godfrey was careful not to mention that such a boundary existed. While Tibetan boundary ideas were inclined to be vague, if a boundary point had to be indicated by the Rima authorities it would have been the site of the inscription and former Chinese markers by the Yepak stream near Menilkrai.[980] Godfrey thought that "the Chinese boundary stone at Menilkrai was placed there deliberately after a very careful survey of the valley had been made", largely because this was the point below which possibilities for agriculture in the Lohit valley disappeared. Upstream the valley was much wider, particularly around Walong, a few miles to the north. Here, Godfrey noted, was the best place for a permanent British outpost. There was room for an airfield, essential in view of the present absence of an adequate all weather road and the risk of damage to any line of communication up the Lohit from floods and landslides. A garrison here, moreover, could supplement its rations by growing its own food in plots created by clearing the undergrowth, impossible further downstream where the valley was narrow and its sides precipitous. There were also good military grounds for locating the outpost near Walong rather than further downstream. The Menilkrai position, just south of Walong, so dominated all traffic along the Lohit that whoever held it had effectively blocked this road. Walong protected Menilkrai. It also was in easy reach of Rima. A small British garrison at Walong could, in an emergency, take over Rima within 24 hours or so, thus gaining control over all of Zayul and denying it to any enemy. The population of the Walong area was very small, consisting, apart from a few Mishmis, of a handful of Tibetan families who had run away from the exactions of the Rima officials. They would certainly not resent a British presence.

Godfrey thought that, given sufficient investment, the road up the Lohit to Rima could become one of the major trans-Himalayan trade routes, tapping the wool resources of Kham and leading to the population centres of Szechuan and Yunnan in China. In 1940 the Lohit road, of course, still required a great deal of work. There was now (as a result of sporadic construction and repair by the Government of Assam during the last few years) a roadway of sorts capable of taking motor vehicles for 48 miles from Sadiya to Dening, then there was a bridle path for 24 miles to the Tiding River, after which came 67 miles of track (constructed by British military engineers before World War I) to Minzong, a few miles short of the boundary stone near Menilkrai, and finally there was another 60 miles of Mishmi track to Rima. Godfrey thought it would not be too difficult to turn all this into at least a route of good bridle path standard. One major suspension bridge was needed, and a certain amount of the debris from past landslides had to be cleared away.[981]

In April 1940 Godfrey undertook yet another tour, this time up the Siyom tributary of the Siang-Dihang; but he did not get anywhere near the headwaters where the Tibetan settlements subject to the Lhalu family, reported by Bailey and Ludlow and Sherriff, were situated. Nor during these years of activity did any British official tackle the problem of the upper reaches of the Subansiri where that great river, as the Tsari Chu, flows across the McMahon Line into that no man's land where the Ringkor pilgrimage took place and the sacred Lake Karpo was to be found. Indeed, no such journey had been achieved at the time of the Transfer of Power in 1947.

The upper Siyom and the Tsari apart, the tours of Lightfoot and Godfrey between 1936 and 1940 had explored to some extent at least all the major potential trouble spots in the Assam Himalayas. After more than two decades since the proliferation of ventures that had flowed from the Abor Expedition the Government of Assam was once more taking the initiative on the basis of accurate and up to date information concerning the state of the unadministered tribal tracts beyond the old Outer Line. It was now possible to formulate some line of policy for the future.

A seminal meeting was held at Government House, Shillong, on 1 August 1940, at which the major problems arising from the British failure in earlier years to make good the McMahon Line were discussed.[982] Present were the Governor of Assam, Sir Robert Reid, the Secretary to the Governor, J.P. Mills, Basil Gould, Captain Lightfoot, R.W. Godfrey and a Bhutanese representative, Raja Dorji. Mills, like Gould a Wykehamist, had become the specialist in the service of the Government of Assam in McMahon Line issues; and he was soon to be given executive control over that tract in the Assam Himalayas which was to evolve into the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and then, long after the Transfer of Power, into Arunachal

Pradesh. The Bhutanese representative, Raja Dorji, was there because also involved in the question of the Tawang tract were problems relating to the eastern Bhutanese borders. Gould, of course, was the man who actually had to deal with the Tibetans, the post of Political Officer in Sikkim also having some of the features of a British Embassy to the Government of Tibet; and between them Lightfoot and Godfrey possessed a unique fund of practical experience of the southern approaches to the McMahon Line.

The first conclusion which emerged from the meeting was that the McMahon Line had been made to follow a rather inappropriate alignment. In the Tawang region it included on the British side the Tawang monastery which was as Tibetan as anything in, for example, the Chumbi Valley. On the Siang it cut through a portion of the old state of Pome. On the Lohit it ignored the convenience of the established Tibetan boundary point near Menilkrai. However, there could be no question of attempting to renegotiate the whole alignment with the Tibetans. Even to propose the formal return to Tibet of Tawang north of the Se La seemed unwise. Any discussion of the McMahon boundary with the Kashag would be troublesome and should be avoided if at all possible. Thus in Tawang the suggested policy was that the British should resolve to limit their administrative activities to the south of the Se La, leaving Tawang proper as it always had been under *de facto* Tibetan rule. On the Siang it was agreed that British posts should be established at Karko and Riga. Gould thought they should be manned all the year round rather than just for the cold weather; but it was decided that there were practical difficulties in doing this at present. On the Lohit it was agreed that there should be a post at Menilkrai; and the road there from Sadiya should be repaired and restored. In all problems relating to the McMahon Line the meeting concluded that it would be prudent if some regular process of consultation be set up between the Government of Assam, the Political Officers responsible for the Frontier Tracts and the Political Officer in Sikkim.

During these discussions Gould raised what he clearly considered an important point. Through the Assam Himalayas somewhere there must lie a trade route of great potential, perhaps even as an alternative to or supplement for the Burma Road as a line of communication with China. The only route of significance actually in operation at present across these mountains was the "Lhasa Road" from Assam to Tibet through Tawang, with the Lohit route as a somewhat theoretical alternative.[983] Gould wondered whether a better road might not be opened up through eastern Bhutan by way of Tashigang Dzong and Tawang. If this prospered, then the Tibetans might lose interest in the southern part of the Tawang tract which would now become a commercial backwater. The idea was noted; but nothing was to be done to implement it.

In his report to Caroe, Gould summarised the main conclusions of the Shillong meeting thus:

> present complications in regard to the vindication of the McMahon Line are attributable to two main causes. The first is that it is only after the lapse of many years that the question of the vindication of the line has been taken up. The second is that in 1914 our representatives appear to have been more concerned with obtaining a frontier which would look well on a map, and would include the supposedly important Towang area, than with the establishment of a convenient ethnic and political boundary. They thus, in the Towang Dirang Dzong and Kalaktang area, included in India a region which is as Tibetan in character as the Chumbi valley; and in the Siang valley they cut in half the territories of the then King of Po; and in the Zayul Chu (Lohit) valley while leaving Rima in Tibet, they ran the frontier line through an area which appears naturally to come within the orbit of Rima.

The practical questions arising from all this were "what measures need to be taken with a view to vindicating the McMahon Line", and "how such action as may be necessary may be taken with least disturbance to Anglo-Tibetan relations". Gould thought that "it would be advisable to get well ahead in the Siang and Lohit areas before disturbing the *status quo* in the Towang Dirang Dzong and Kalaktang area".[984]

The immediate consequence of the Shillong meeting was the confirmation of establishment of the Karko and Riga posts, shortly followed by the decision to allow British officials to undertake from time to time tours right up the Siang to the McMahon Line itself. Of course, since the posts were occupied (by members of the Assam Rifles) in the cold weather only, they were scant deterrent to Tibetan tax collecting parties coming down at other times of the year. There was, moreover, a limit to what the Political Officer, Saidiya Frontier Tract, or his deputy the Assistant Political Officer, Pasighat, (at this time J.H.F. Williams) could do to demonstrate British supremacy when they were still debarred from laying formal claim to all territory up to the McMahon Line, from assuring the tribesmen of British protection, and from opposing by force the excursions of Tibetan officials. When the Governor of Assam, Sir Robert Reid, made a brief visit to the lower Siang, to Pangin, in December 1941, the first time such a senior official of the Indian Empire had ever crossed the old Outer Line, the position in the Assam Himalayas was still rather tentative.[985] The trend, however, was clearly forward. Reid's tour was cut short by the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour. War resulted in a temporary halt in the momentum of British advance into the Assam Himalayas; but soon it was to provide several powerful motives for a far more active policy.

By the time of the Shillong meeting one feature of the McMahon Line and the Tibetan attitude towards it must have been clear to all

with recent experience of the problem. The Tibetan Government was acting on the apparent assumption that the 1914 understandings, if they had ever existed, were no longer valid. When, from 1936 onwards, the proceedings of the Simla Conference were brought to the attention of the Kashag, it is not clear whether the distinction between the Simla Convention and the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes was made by Gould and his colleagues. The suspicion is that the emphasis was more on the Convention than the notes; and it may be that Gould knew that the notes did not really have any place in the working Tibetan diplomatic archive. If so, then Gould faced the same problem as has more recently the independent Government of India, namely how to extract a valid McMahon Line out of the text of the Simla Convention of 3 July 1914. As we have seen, Henry Twyman spotted the difficulties here in 1939; and, despite the declared disagreement of Caroe and the External Affairs Department (as the Foreign and Political Department now called itself), no British official dealing with the Tibetans was able to find a satisfactory solution. Whatever they might say, the Kashag regarded the whole McMahon Line business as invalid. They might make polite noises in the Tibetan manner and appear to be in complete agreement; but the fact of the matter was, as Gould for one appreciated, that the Tibetans would require some substantial *quid pro quo* in exchange for accepting the McMahon Line as a legitimate frontier. The result, moreover, would not really be a reaffirmation of something that had been signed and sealed in 1914: it would be a completely new agreement.

Here lay the essence of the problem. The Government of India was not after 1936 ever in a position to offer a suitable *quid pro quo* since only some Chinese acceptance of Tibetan autonomy with agreed boundaries would have done, and to obtain this was beyond British capabilities. Furthermore, even if some inducement to the Tibetans could have been found, the act of securing a fresh bilateral Anglo-Tibetan agreement would have been a diplomatic minefield. What would be the Chinese reaction? Would the British find themselves, having thus acknowledged Tibet's current treaty making powers, obliged to go to the great expense of trying to maintain those powers, perhaps even by military involvement on behalf of Tibet against China? It would be preferable, if this were at all possible, to sort the matter out somehow within the context of the 1914 instruments. And if this were not possible, there were strong arguments against securing any formal settlement at all.

From 1940 to 1943 Gould followed a policy of diplomatic inactivity vis à vis Tibet concerning the McMahon Line. The matter was not raised during Gould's 1940 visit to Lhasa at the time of the Installation of the 14th Dalai Lama; and it only became once more the subject of formal Anglo-Tibetan discussions in 1943.

The first major British penetration deep into the Assam Himalayas following the Shillong meeting took place between December 1941 and February 1942 when Captain W.E. Cross of the Royal Engineers with a military escort including Gurkhas made his way up the Lohit from Sadiya to Walong. Cross's objectives were to investigate the problems involved in building a motor road up to Rima and to look into the suitability of Walong, as Godfrey had suggested in 1940, as a site for an airfield. Cross's conclusions were that a road could be built; but that it would take at least a year of intense effort. An airfield near Walong was just possible – there was room in the valley for a single rather short runway – but it would be far from satisfactory. The Cross survey appears to have had little impact upon policy one way or another. Its report, well illustrated with maps, sketches and photographs, did not appear until 1944 when it was produced not in India but by the India Office in London (by which time Cross had attained the rank of Lt.-Colonel).

Cross made it abundantly clear that he considered that the Indo-Tibetan boundary was marked by the famous stone near Menilkrai; and included in the report are a photograph of the stone and sketches of the two inscriptions, one British and the other Chinese, carved into panels on it. Cross commented that this stone indicated the border "between Chinese Republic Territory and Unadministered Territory, Sadiya Frontier Tract". He evidently had not heard of the McMahon Line and accepted the Chinese claim that this bit of the Assam Himalayas lay in the Chinese Province of Sikang rather than Tibet.[986]

1943 was to be the crucial year in the history of the Indo-Tibetan border in the Assam Himalayas when the implications of the 1940 Shillong meeting began to take real effect in the process of "vindication" of the McMahon Line. There was a marked increase in British activity beyond the old Outer Line and the basic structure of the administration of the tribal areas was reorganised. The experience of 1942 in Burma convinced the Government of India that the mountains and jungles of the North-East Frontier were no secure protection against foreign invasion.[987] What the Japanese had achieved might be copied by the Chinese if they were ever in a geographical position to do so: the Chinese during the various projects for the creation of a link between India and China through Tibet, the Trans Tibet Transport saga, had indicated once more claims not only to eastern Tibet but also to adjacent Himalayan tracts beyond the old Outer Line in Assam. As Olaf Caroe put it in March 1943:

> main consideration which we have in mind is possibility of Chinese establishing effective sovereignty over Tibet at end of the war or, failing this, using Tibet as a stage to encroach on Indian territory. Chinese ambitions to absorb Tibet have been publicly stated as one of their post-war disiderata, and it may be supposed that there will be considerable support for the Chinese expansionist designs.[988]

Caroe felt that something should be done about Tawang as soon as possible. The Government of Assam had recently been receiving reports of a high Tibetan official with a military escort visiting the tract, and of Tibetan orders being issued to its inhabitants for his reception. The Tibetans were also making threatening noises towards Bhutan because of the presence in eastern Bhutan of refugees from Tawang and its neighbourhood whose repatriation was demanded. On 24 March 1943 the Government of India through the British representative in Lhasa protested against Tibetan activities in Tawang and reaffirmed (the first time since the matter was raised in Lhasa in 1938 by Norbu Dhondup) that the "Red Line" was the agreed Indo-Tibetan border.[989] While a Tibetan reply was being awaited it would do no harm to explore a bit more the theoretical shape of future British policy towards the McMahon Line.

Caroe's view was that the Tawang tract up to the Se La should be taken at once under direct British administration and all traces of Tibetan rule terminated. He was very critical of the dilatory approach to the administration of the Assam Himalayas shown by the new Governor of Assam (in succession to Sir Robert Reid), Sir Andrew Clow. On 25 March Caroe and Gould had a talk with the Viceroy, Lord Wavell, in which they explained what they felt was called for. Gould believed that a tribal Agency should be set up for the hills below the McMahon Line which was independent of the Governor of Assam and directly under Caroe's External Affairs Department (and, presumably, supervised by the Political Officer in Sikkim). Caroe was less radical. It would be indeed a drastic step to strip the Government of Assam of all responsibility for a region which had for so long been their concern. The best hope was that if greater authority over the affairs of the tribal tracts of the Assam Himalayas were handed over to J.P. Mills, who knew his business, then Sir Andrew Clow might show a bit more gumption. Wavell agreed.[990]

The Foreign Office in London were not happy at the prospect of any increase in British activity along the Tibetan border. They considered that British penetration into these tracts which had hitherto been left alone would only produce Chinese protests; and what the Chinese claimed would now most probably receive American support. This point was forcefully expressed in a minute of 3 April 1943 by Sir Alexander Cadogan, now Permanent Under-Secretary. On 6 April 1943 a meeting was held between representatives of the Foreign and India Offices where the question of what should be done in the Assam Himalayas was explored in considerable detail. The general conclusion was that extreme caution should be exercised in formulating any more active policy towards this sector of Indo-Tibetan borderland.

While the Secretary of State for India, L.S. Amery, agreed with the Foreign Office that caution was indeed called for and that nothing

should be done on the Assam frontier until the Tibetans had been given an opportunity to reply to the Indian Government's representations of 24 March, he did not reject out of hand the recommendations of the Governments of India and Assam.

The Tibetan reply, from the Tibetan Foreign Office (or, as it was sometimes referred to, Foreign Bureau) to Ludlow dated 9 April 1943, might at first sight have confirmed the British position in the Tawang tract; but close examination revealed that it was so full of ambiguities as to be quite without value.[991] By July 1943 Amery had been persuaded that it would be better, without making any further diplomatic approaches to Lhasa, to try to get the Assam border straightened out unilaterally before the Chinese had the opportunity to establish control over all of Tibet. While caution was still urged for the Tawang area in particular, where Amery and his advisers felt that no British action should be taken for the time being to the north of the Se La, authority was given for the gradual and cautious extension of British control right up to the McMahon Line (except in Tawang) provided that it were done in such a way as to give neither the Americans nor the Chinese too firm an impression that the Government of India were annexing Tibetan territory. Possibly some compromise might be worked out by which the Tibetans were permitted to continue to operate as they always had in Tawang north of the Se La but, as it were, with a British licence. This would almost certainly call in the future for some kind of Anglo-Tibetan agreement; but, until the time was ripe it was agreed that the programme of "vindicating" the McMahon Line should get under way without any prior consultation with the Tibetans.[992] It was emphasised that the new policy in the Assam Himalayas must not soak up troops who were needed for the war against Japan; and armed clashes with the Tibetans should be avoided at all costs.[993]

The Government of India were authorised by the India Office (with Cabinet approval) to go ahead on this basis on 15 July 1943; and on 20 July the Government of Assam were instructed to begin the reorganisation of the British presence in the Assam Himalayas which was a prerequisite for the new policy. The outcome was the creation of the North-East Frontier Agency, headed by J.P. Mills who had been appointed to a new post, Adviser to the Governor of Assam for Tribal Affairs.[994] Mills' brief was, after assessing the whole situation, to devise and then implement a new forward policy all along the frontier tract to the north of the old Outer Line. He formally started work on 23 October 1943; and progress from then on was rapid.[995]

It had been made clear to Mills from the outset that the most urgent task lay along the Lohit, the closest sector of the frontier to China and an area in which the Kuomintang had already expressed a great deal of interest with their proposals for a road from China to India through Rima. In May 1943, while the North-East Frontier Agency

was still gestating, the Government of Assam had already despatched what might perhaps be classed as an experimental venture up the Lohit; and the lessons learned from it were certainly not overlooked by Mills and his colleagues.

In May 1943 a detachment of the 2nd Assam Rifles under Lt. P.P. Hutchins made their way from Sadiya up the Lohit to Walong and back. The motives behind this venture are not entirely clear from the records in London. It is probable that one of Hutchins' objectives was to report on the value of the Lohit as a potential motor road to China by way of Tibet. Another aim, so the India Office minuted, was "presumably . . . in order to spy out the land preparatory to the Government of India's intended action to occupy the territory up to Rima in the next cold weather". Hutchins reported that the local people, both Tibetans and Mishmis, considered the international boundary to be somewhere near Menilkrai and certainly nowhere near the line of the Di Chu stream followed by the McMahon alignment. The villages of Walong (on the right bank of the Lohit) and Tinai (on the left bank) were inhabited by Tibetans who paid tribute to Rima. The last Mishmi villages, like Sati, were all downstream of Menilkrai. Hutchins did not form a high opinion of the Lohit valley as a potential line of communication with or through Tibet.

In his report on his Lohit journey Hutchins made a number of extremely interesting references to American activity in the Lohit region. He noted that the presence of U.S. radio beacons (intended to guide aircraft on the "Hump" route to China) interfered with local wireless communication. On the way back from Walong he encountered a small party of U.S. servicemen, one Captain Lax and two enlisted men, both airmen, Rosbert and Hammel, struggling with the problems of Lohit travel near the junction of that river with the Delei tributary. What they were doing in this remote spot is not clear. There is evidence that American survey parties were at this period undertaking, quite independently of the Government of India, an examination of the merits of the "Rima Road" which so fascinated the Chinese. There were also American parties wandering about in these hills along the India-Burma border ranges looking for crashed U.S. aircrew. Probably, among these various groups there were at least one or two O.S.S. representatives engaged on whatever business it was that General Donovan's men were about.[996]

Towards the end of 1943 the Lohit became the responsibility of the Lohit Valley Sub-Agency of the North-East Frontier Agency under F.P. Mainprice, the Assistant Political Officer. Despite Hutchins' report about the demography of the Walong region and the Tibetan ideas as to the whereabouts of the border, Mainprice was authorised to push up the valley with a force of Assam Rifles in January 1944 and establish a British post at Walong, an appreciable distance north

of the old boundary stone near Menilkrai. He then went on to call on the Tibetan authorities in Rima. Owing to the failure to bring the track up to standard in time, the Walong garrison was promptly withdrawn only to be reestablished on a permanent basis on 19 October 1944.[997]

The reconnaissance work carried out along the Lohit valley in 1943 and 1944 had revealed a great deal that was worrying to those, like Caroe and Mills, who were concerned about the security of the North-East Frontier if no firm action were taken. The Lohit valley had turned out to be, as a frontier barrier, surprisingly porous. It was not a major trade route; but hardly a week passed in the good weather when a party of Tibetan traders did not make their way along it between Sadiya and Tibet, and there was a constant traffic of Mishmi tribesmen. Added to the through route right up to Rima in Zayul there were a number of subsidiary approaches to the Lohit from Tibet down its tributaries, notably the Delei (which led to Tibet over the Glei Pass) and the Du (with the Tho Chu Pass, just below the McMahon Line, at its head). There were, it seemed, markets held from time to time near the southern foot of both the Glei Pass and the Tho Chu Pass where Tibetans came to trade by barter or cash with the Mishmis. Indian rupees earned by the Tibetans here were frequently reinvested in Sadiya.

In early January 1944, while at Hayuling (the British post on the right bank of the Lohit which commanded the junction of that river with its Delei and Du tributaries), Mainprice learned from Mishmi sources of the presence of a party of Chinese returning up the Lohit after a journey which may have extended to Sadiya. As he reported:

> they turned out to be a party of four, wearing Tibetan clothes, with a Tibetan servant and 10 Tibetan coolies, and under the leadership of Chang Tze Chen, and were ostensibly surveying the road from Kunming and Atuntze through Rima to Sadiya under the auspices of the new Sino-Indian Transportation Branch of the Chinese Ministry of Communications, though they said, strangely enough, that they had no maps of the country they were traversing. K.M. Khang, who had been 12 years in Lhasa and some years in India, seemed to be the brains of the party, and was most reticent. . . . They had no tent, slept out and lived on the country.[998]

This was, in fact, a more serious Chinese penetration of the Himalayas towards Assam than any of the exploits in the 1910-1912 era which had caused such British alarm. There could be no better argument for the need for British watchfulness along the Lohit.

The reoccupation of Walong was preceded by a great deal of discussion both by the Governments of Assam and India and by the India and Foreign Offices in London. McMahon Line or no McMahon Line, it involved an advance of the British Indian Imperial border beyond a point which had been known and accepted by all the

local people since at least the middle of the 19th century. Hutchins' report merely confirmed what had been established since the explorations of the Abor Expedition period on the eve of World War I, that Walong, insignificant place that it was, was none the less in Tibet. In some ways the occupation of Walong was as great a step as an advance over the Se La into Tawang proper. What would the Tibetan reaction be?

During the summer of 1944 reports had been reaching Sadiya from Mishmi tribesmen that soon after Mainprice had withdrawn from Walong the Tibetans had come down from Rima to impose their rule over the scant local population. They had also, it was said, destroyed two sentry posts erected by Mainprice and devastated a vegetable garden planted by the members of the Assam Rifles detachment. These acts of vandalism were sometimes attributed not to Tibetan officials but to a band of Tibetan traders passing through the Lohit valley and perhaps the worse for drink.[999] If, however, this were indicative of the prevailing attitude of the Rima authorities then there would be a definite possibility that a return to Walong would be opposed by force. The first Walong post might perhaps have been seen by the Tibetans as no more than a temporary camp set up by visitors to Tibet. What was now under contemplation, however, was the establishment of a permanent British presence in territory which the Tibetans unquestionably considered to be theirs. Caroe thought that the British officer in charge of the Walong operation should have full authority to do what he saw fit to put the post in place. This was the legitimate occupation of British territory. It was not a task for the faint hearted. As Caroe put it:

> it is important that the hands of the local Political Officer when he reaches Walong should not be unduly tied. The position he must assume is that there is no doubt that Walong is on the British side of the McMahon Line. If he should hear that the site of the walls which he constructed last season . . [in January-February 1944] . . is occupied by the Tibetan Government he should send word to the Tibetans that he is arriving at Walong to take over the site at a certain time. He should not wait for special instructions from the Government of India, nor should any attempt be made to coordinate local action with diplomatic conversations in Lhasa. The principle to be adopted in establishing our posts up to the McMahon Line is that they should be occupied in our own time and not after discussion with the Tibetan Government. The Political Officer should of course endeavour to avoid a clash with the local Tibetan authorities if he can, but his business is to occupy British territory and, if it is necessary, he may have to resort to force, employing the least degree of force that is required to attain his objective. If the post were attacked after occupation, it would of course be necessary to defend it. If the Political Officer shows firmness, it seems to the Government of India improbable that the use of force will be necessary either in the occupation of territory up to the frontier or in defence of any point occupied.[1000]

The Foreign Office in London, on the other hand, were convinced that the risk of Anglo-Tibetan armed conflict should at all costs be avoided. Any crisis of this kind in the Assam Himalayas would only give rise to Chinese protests, probably supported by the United States.[1001] The India Office agreed, informing Caroe that His Majesty's Government "view with some concern instructions to Political Officer to use force if necessary to establish post at Walong, and trust that utmost efforts will be made to prevent any such situation arising".[1002] Caroe replied that there was little likelihood of Tibetan opposition since there were no Tibetan troops reported in the Walong neighbourhood. He pointed out that with the difficulties of communication between the upper reaches of the Lohit and Sadiya, even if the wireless were operational, it would be extremely unwise to deprive the Political Officer on the spot of discretion to act as he considered the situation warranted. Sir Basil Gould, who was now in Lhasa, could of course consult the Tibetan Government on the Walong issue; but he would defer this if possible until after the Walong occupation had been completed.[1003]

The Foreign Office anxieties, however, were not allayed by Caroe's optimism. Their spokesman on this issue, J.C. Sterndale Bennett, explained their position at some length:

> in the present circumstances an armed clash with Tibetans in that disputed area would only too probably land us in serious embarrassment vis-à-vis both the Chinese and the Americans. Such an incident might, and almost certainly would, be greatly exaggerated and widely publicized, and held up as proof of the continued addiction of the British to "imperialism", even at a time when our energies should be bent on smashing Japan.
>
> Apart from the possible damaging results to general imperial relations we feel compelled to point out what seems to us to be the very serious risks from the point of view of the Government of India's own particular interests. An "incident" would inflame Chinese suspicions; both they and the less pro-British elements in Lhasa would make all possible capital out of it; and the prospect of an eventual solution of the Tibetan problem acceptable to the Government of India, either now or later on, might be permanently prejudiced. Moreover, apart from the reactions of the other two parties concerned in a solution to that problem, it seems important to remember that eventually it may be desired to seek outside support in securing a fair deal for India . . . [perhaps by a reference of the Tibetan question to the United Nations then in process of formation] . . ., and this seems to make circumspection particularly desirable at the present time.
>
> In short we do not feel that Walong is worth the risk of lining up the Tibetans, the Chinese and the Americans against us, and we hope that the India Office will feel able to take whatever steps may be practicable to ensure that the use of force is ruled out.[1004]

The Secretary of State for India, L.S. Amery, considered that he

had no option but to come down in support of the Government of India. As he pointed out to the Foreign Office, they were making "too much altogether out of what is after all a quite trivial assertion of our rights in an extremely remote part of the world on an extremely small scale".[1005] The Foreign Office continued to be unhappy. Sterndale Bennett, spokesman for the Far Eastern Department which was responsible for British policy towards China reiterated the essential point:

> the whole question is in itself very trivial, and you may be right in supposing that an armed clash is in any case unlikely. But we cannot do otherwise than point out that an armed clash, if it occurs in the present circumstances, will present the Chinese with material for damaging propaganda which will find a ready ear in certain circles in the United States of America busily looking out for anything of this sort. In short, the repercussions of an attempt to reassert our rights at Walong by force might easily be entirely disproportionate to the intrinsic importance of the question and detrimental to the best interests of the Government of India.[1006]

The Foreign Office still hoped that, if the Walong operation were not to be abandoned (the favoured solution), at least the Political Officer in charge would be instructed on no account to use force.

By this time a British official was already on his way up the Lohit armed with Caroe's instructions and out of touch with the higher echelon of British Imperial administration. Walong was duly re-occupied without trouble; and a patrol right up to the McMahon Line beyond Kahao some 10 miles north of Walong found all to be quiet. The damage to the post and its garden, it was now reported, had been entirely due to the action of weather and the rooting around of wild animals. Sooner or later, however, there would surely be some Tibetan reaction to the British return; and standing orders were prepared for the small garrison of Assam Rifles to cope with such an eventuality. If any Tibetan officials came south of the McMahon Line to protest at the British presence, they should be told, firmly but politely, that they were now on British territory and that any complaints they might wish to make would be referred back to the Political Officer at Sadiya. If, however, a Tibetan armed force were to appear, it should be asked to withdraw over the McMahon Line. If it attacked the Walong post, it was to be resisted by the garrison until the arrival of reinforcements from Sadiya.[1007]

It is an interesting question what did actually happen to the Walong post between January and October 1944. The reports of the alleged damage by Tibetans were extremely circumstantial and came from several sources. We will never know the truth. It is more than probable that some damage did take place which, when it seemed to suit the purposes of the Government of Assam was reported in every detail as the result of official Tibetan policy, and when it transpired

that such stories caused alarm and despondency in London were as promptly denied. One thing was certain. Sterndale Bennett and his Foreign Office companions were not going to journey up the Lohit to take a look for themselves.

Meanwhile, up the Siang, now under the Siang Valley Sub-Agency, the Assistant Political Officer, P.L.S. James, opened for the year 1944 the Karko and Riga posts and toured further up the valley, meeting a Tibetan tax collecting party which was turned back. The manning of the Karko and Riga posts in early 1944 was exceptionally brief owing to other demands upon the detachment of Assam Rifles concerned; but the British demonstrated a greater firmness while they were there than they had in earlier years. One interesting conclusion that emerged from the Siang operations was that the Tibetan presence below the McMahon Line did not only represent the Showa authorities who had taken over from the old Pome state: there was also an interest on behalf of the great Lhasa monastery of Sera.[1008] Thus two of the three great Lhasa monastic establishments, so powerful an influence in the politics of Outer Tibet, had a financial interest in the *status quo* below the McMahon Line, Drepung in Tawang and Sera on the Siang, a fact which did not suggest that a negotiated Tibetan reaffirmation of the McMahon border as outlined in the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of 1914 would be easy to secure.

In a completely new division, the Subansiri Sub-Area, a young anthropologist, Baron C. von Fürer-Haimendorf, was employed by the Assam Government in 1944 to try to make his way up the Subansiri as far as possible, hopefully until the area of Tibetan political or cultural influence was encountered. Fürer-Haimendorf, accompanied by his wife, entered the hills without an armed escort, a novel method of official travel across the old Outer Line. He explored the extraordinary plateau of the Apa Tanis, who had developed what might almost be described as a semi-urban civilization supported by elaborate agriculture in the midst of the jungles and hills of the lower Assam Himalayas, surrounded by not always friendly Dafla tribes. Fürer-Haimendorf's work has a prominent place in the annals of anthropology. It was, however, of marginal political importance in the immediate context of Anglo-Tibetan relations in that he did not manage to reach the edge of the Tibetan world. Indeed, he did not in fact venture significantly further into the Assam Himalayas than had the Miri Mission of 1911-12.[1009] His researches, however, did indicate that somewhere to the north of his furthest penetration of the Assam Himalayas there must lie a zone of Tibetan control which extended south of the McMahon Line into totally unknown territory.[1010]

In the Tawang tract the greatest moderation was exercised during 1944. The garrison at Rupa was augmented, and a new post, with a

platoon of Assam Rifles, was established at Dirangdzong to challenge the authority of the Dzongpöns there appointed from Tawang. The land to the north of the Se La was left strictly alone; and nowhere in the tract was there made a formal declaration of British sovereignty.

It seemed inevitable that all this British activity in the Assam Himalayas would lead both to some Tibetan resistance in the field and to protests from the Lhasa Government. In the event, actual opposition to the tours of the various Assistant Political Officers in early 1944 was extremely slight and produced no crises. We have already noted the report (which subsequently was declared to be false) in the summer of 1944 of Tibetan damage to the unguarded and unoccupied Walong post. Both Caroe and Gould concluded that this episode (before they discovered that it was possible to dismiss it as being a figment of the collective imagination of a group of Mishmi tribesmen) had been a demonstration of the need for the Political Officer in Sikkim on his forthcoming visit to Lhasa to explain exactly what the McMahon Line was: otherwise subsequent, and probably more serious, incidents could not be avoided.[1011] Gould had remarked in 1937 that his experience suggested that the Tibetan authorities in Lhasa were probably ignorant of the exact terms of the Simla Convention and the other instruments which had emanated from the Simla Conference of 1913-1914; and there was nothing to suggest that they were any better informed in the middle of 1944.[1012]

The original proposal of Caroe's External Affairs Department was that Gould should not only explain to the Tibetan Government during his forthcoming 1944 Lhasa mission the rights of the British case vis à vis the McMahon Line, so that they did not conclude that the Government of India were bent upon territorial aggression at Tibet's expense, but also that he should return from Lhasa to India by way of Tawang to investigate the situation there for himself (this was Gould's own idea). Further, it might be as well to arrange for another member of the Gould Mission to approach India from the upper Subansiri, that least understood sector of the McMahon Line. Finally, the Department view was that

> Tawang itself is likely to prove a stumbling block in our relations with Tibet . . . and we believe that our wider interests would be well served by considering a rectification of the McMahon Line in this area, leaving Tawang to Tibet and drawing the frontier along the range crossed by the Se La. We would ask for authority for Gould to hint to the Tibetan Government that provided he is enabled to visit Tawang from the Tibetan side in order to view this area for himself and provided Tibetan goodwill is evinced towards our operations elsewhere along the Line, there might be some prospect of a frontier rectification in Tibet's favour in the area.[1013]

The Foreign Office in London were prepared to agree to the proposed offer of a British return of Tawang north of the Se La to

Tibet; but they considered that it would be extremely unwise to make Tibetan permission for Gould's proposed visit to Tawang a precondition for settlement.[1014] The India Office and the Government of India concurred, and Gould was instructed accordingly.

The Kashag, when Gould informed them of it, do not appear to have been greatly impressed by the proposed Tawang concession.[1015] Their polite reply was that while they did not want to dispute the validity of the "Red Line" border, yet they had in fact for the last thirty years exercised authority and collected taxes in certain areas south of it; and they saw no reason why they should cease now. They made specific mention in this context of British activity in the Dirangdzong region below the Se La and in the Lohit valley to the north of Menilkrai.[1016] Gould was inclined to go along with the Tibetans to some extent. He saw no reason why the Walong post should not be pulled back to the old boundary on the Yepak near Menilkrai; and he was quite willing to consider that the British "turn a blind eye to Dirangdzong and Kalaktang for the time being". He added that

> within the McMahon Line there are large non-Tibet areas which are perhaps more in need of limited amount of attention available than Tibet areas. . [It is] . . my opinion that half hearted efforts in McMahon areas (and I believe present efforts to be inadequate) are worse than useless . . [as] . . you are already aware.

Gould had never made a secret of his belief that the Government of India should either go the whole hog and enforce the letter of the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914 or where possible leave the Tibetans to their own devices.

Faced with the evidence that the Tibetans were not going to accept the Se La modification, what Gould called the "Tawang Sop", the Government of India were authorised by the India Office on 12 November 1944 to propose yet another concession. Drepung monastery, which had financial interests south of the McMahon Line, would be offered some kind of pecuniary compensation if it ceased its revenue raising operations in what the Government of India considered to be British territory. There could be no question, of course, of any British withdrawal of posts already established in the Assam Himalayas, though the India Office at least saw no reason why the pace of the British advance into the tribal areas should not be slowed down if that might induce the Lhasa Government to take a more favourable view of British intentions.[1017]

In November 1944 Gould had several discussions with the officers of the Tibetan Foreign Office. The Tibetan side pointed out that the three major Lhasa monasteries, Sera, Ganden and Drepung, were at present in total ignorance of the terms of the Simla Convention, to which their representatives had bound them by adhering to the

Declaration of 3 July 1914. As far as the McMahon Line was concerned, they could only repeat the request that the Government of India refrain from disturbing the *status quo* which had prevailed for so many years since 1914. Continued British pressure, they pointed out, would probably create a situation which could only be resolved by a reference of the whole issue to the Tibetan National Assembly (Tsongdu). Gould's concession, that the British limit their influence to the Se La in return for Tibetan acquiescence in the rest of the McMahon Line alignment, had no apparent impact. Indeed, Ringang (the former Rugby boy) who was present at these talks in his capacity as Anglo-Tibetan intermediary, observed that it was his recollection that something like this had already been provided for in the original McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of 1914; so the concession was no more than a reversion to the original understanding.[1018]

When on 4 December 1944 Gould offered the further concession of financial compensation to Drepung monastery for loss of any revenue it might have been accustomed to raise below the "Red Line", the Tibetan reaction was muted to say the least. Whatever the Tibetan Foreign Office, which was in the final analysis no more than an organ for the transmission of the views of others, might say about Tibetan recognition of the "Red Line" as a legitimate border, in practice there persisted a lack of precision as to where that "Red Line" was. Moreover, the Regent and Kashag, to whom the Tibetan Foreign Office reported, represented but one element in the Tibetan body politic. They probably did not possess either the power or the will to overrule great monasteries like Drepung and Sera which certainly had their own ideas about what was Tibetan and what was not. It is doubtful whether they considered themselves able, both constitutionally and practically, to settle questions involving the transfer of Tibetan territory to a foreign power in the absence of an adult Dalai Lama. Hence their repeated queries as to why the Government of India had not raised the McMahon Line question while the 13th Dalai Lama was still alive.

In November 1944, while Gould was discussing the rights and wrongs of the "Red Line" with the Kashag and the Tibetan Foreign Office, a minor crisis developed which was to lead to what amounted to an explicit Tibetan challenge to the whole McMahon alignment. The Government of Assam had heard, presumably through the Se La Sub-Agency, that there was an epidemic raging in Tawang proper (? smallpox). The British at once offered to supply Tawang monastery with vaccine and other medical assistance. News of this gesture, when it eventually reached Lhasa, produced a series of vehement protests communicated to the British Mission by way of the Tibetan Foreign Office which culminated in a meeting with George Sherriff on 31 December 1944. No vaccines were needed, the Tibetan

Foreign Office announced. The Tibetans had already supplied no less than three loads of vaccine to Tawang. They hoped that the British did not propose to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet.[1019] The Regent and Kashag were so disturbed by all this that they had at last felt obliged to refer the whole matter to the Tibetan National Assembly. This, of course, was a body in which the monastic element in Tibetan politics was heavily represented; and anything to do with Tawang involved the interests of Drepung.

The opinion of the National Assembly was formally communicated to Sherriff in early 1945. It took the form of the following resolution:

> the Indo-Tibetan boundary which is marked with a red line on the map shows all the areas below TAWANG as within British territory. Occupation has also been affected south of SELA. We look upon the British Government with confidence and for assistance, but the British Government have occupied indisputable Tibetan territory by posting British officers and troops, and have said that they could not withdraw them from these areas. The Sino-Tibetan question which is being negotiated with the British Government as an intermediary, has not yet been settled, and the areas mentioned above have not been shown in the treaty as included within Indian territory. This question has never been raised since the Wood Tiger Year (1914) which is now 30 years ago. Considering this fact, we regret to say that we cannot agree with the Government of India's action in taking these Tibetan areas within British territory. If the officers and troops that are posted at KALAKTANG and WALONG are not withdrawn immediately, it will appear like a big insect eating up a small one, and the bad name of the British Government will spread like the wind. The feelings of the general public will also be much affected. The Government of India suspect that the Chinese may have political designs towards some areas in Tibet on the frontiers from the direction of Burma. If such is the case, we can assure the British Government that we will certainly put up a resistance and see to the defence of our own territory. You are well aware that the present war . . [World War II] . . was due to a bigger power trying to crush a smaller one. With a view to promoting friendly relations and also owing to the fact that Tibet is a small religious country, the British Government will very kindly consider the matter favourably and withdraw the officers and troops from the areas under occupation.[1020]

To this resolution the Tibetan Foreign Office, Gould reported, had added a hint that if the British did not withdraw as requested the Tibetan Government might decide to make a formal and public declaration that the 1914 Convention was invalid.

Gould, somewhat optimistically, observed that the National Assembly resolution did not actually dispute the existence of the Simla Convention, the map attached to it and the position of the "Red Line". It merely stated that the British Government had not moved right up to the "Red Line" for the last 30 years; and its major request

was that the Government of India should continue this self restraint. Gould concluded that:

> what is needed is that the Tibetan Government should realise fully and clearly that we mean to have and to hold the McMahon areas; and I do not think that anything short of extensive, effective, and beneficent occupation will remove from their minds doubts which may have been engendered by a somewhat wavery start, or lead them to appreciate at its value the offer of the Towang area. Until they are fully convinced that we are in earnest, they will, I believe, continue at least to flirt with the idea of diverting us from our purpose, and even to debate the comparative attractions of closer association with the Chinese Government.

It is probable that Gould underestimated the degree that the National Assembly resolution, if its rather imprecise wording were carefully analysed, reflected the realities of official Tibetan opinion. It seems likely that all members of the Tibetan ruling establishment who had any knowledge of what had happened in 1914 believed that the Simla Convention involved a bargain in which the Tibetans would confer certain benefits on the Government of India in return for certain British assistance vis à vis the Chinese. Since the British had not fulfilled their half of the bargain, the whole transaction was now null and void. It is further probable that even had the British arguments as to the territorial implications of the Simla Convention been valid in Tibetan eyes, no Tibetan authority after so long a period of British inactivity would have been prepared to take the responsibility for accepting territorial losses in the absence of an adult Dalai Lama. Finally, there is evidence in the resolution, as also in other communications between Gould and the Kashag and Tibetan Foreign Office during his Lhasa visit in 1944, of a lack of understanding by the Tibetans of the significance of the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes. It is these, not the Simla Convention, that provide the real basis for the McMahon Line. For reasons which have been touched upon elsewhere in this book, the British had preferred not to rely in their approaches to the Tibetans upon the notes but, rather, to exploit the bottom right hand end of the "Red Line" on the map appended to the Simla Convention. Had the Tibetans been in possession of all the facts relating to the Convention, they would still have found its use as a basis for British territorial claims somewhat puzzling. In fact, as it had become clear during Gould's Lhasa mission, the Tibetan understanding of the Simla Convention left a great deal to be desired. Even if the Tibetan Government had been fully conversant with the minutiae of the Simla Convention, they would still have agreed with Henry Twynam's view, to which reference has already been made, that this instrument was a rather feeble basis upon which to justify the loss of any territory which had traditionally been regarded as being under Tibetan control.

Gould still believed that with proper explanation the Tibetans could be made to see reason. He suspected that much of the trouble had come from the way in which the Government of Assam, despite the undoubted skills of J.P. Mills, had been handling the new policy in the Assam Himalayas: it would probably have been avoided had ultimate responsibility resided in Gangtok, with the Political Officer in Sikkim, rather than in Shillong. Caroe was not convinced. It seemed to him that the Tibetans had, in the National Assembly resolution, to all intents and purposes repudiated the treaty basis of the McMahon Line. Gould was instructed to send an *aide-mémoire* to the Tibetan Foreign Office in which, after reiterating the Tawang concessions, that the Government of India "would be willing to alter the frontier so as to run from the Se La, not to the north of Tawang but to the south of Tawang" and that the Government of India "will not for the present object to voluntary contributions for monasteries being collected even south of the Se La", he outlined the only other exceptions to the alignment of the "Red Line" claimed by the British for which provision had been made in 1914. These, which were contained not in the Simla Convention but in the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914, related to the Lhalu estates on the upper Siyom and the location of the sacred places Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa on the upper Subansiri (Tsari). Mention of such specific exceptions must have indeed mystified the Tibetan Foreign Office if it had not actually had to hand the original text of the 1914 Notes.[1021]

By August 1945, when the War with Japan at last came to an end, an event which coincided with the conclusion of Gould's time as Political Officer in Sikkim and his replacement by Arthur Hopkinson, the situation along the McMahon Line did not entirely represent a British triumph. While major advances of British administration had been made, along the Lohit and the Siang and in the Tawang tract up to the foot of the Se La, yet it was clear that not only did the Tibetan authorities still deny the legal validity of the British presence in many areas south of the "Red Line" but also that they had every intention of continuing to offer some kind of resistance to the British policy of "vindicating" the McMahon Line. The British push into the Assam Himalayas had not improved Anglo-Tibetan relations. It had, indeed, aroused intense feeling among the monasteries and other conservative forces in Tibetan politics. The Chinese in Lhasa, it seemed more than probable, had not lost this opportunity to point to the cost of too close a relationship with the Government of India. British observers were convinced that resentment against the British attitude towards the Tawang tract and Walong was the major factor in the fiasco of the short-lived British school in Lhasa which had suffered, but with far greater rapidity, the same fate as the Gyantse experiment of the 1920s. They also suspected that McMahon Line issues had turned many Tibetans to thinking again about the

possibility of a closer relationship with China, which could well seem more attractive now than it had in the past. Chiang Kai-shek, after all, had been declaring that he was really quite sympathetic to the idea of Tibetan autonomy, suitably defined; and he had even, it was reported, been providing the Tibetan Government with gifts of arms.[1022]

950. L/P&S/12/4188, Caroe to Battye, 28 November 1935. See also: Battye to India, 13 December 1935, quoted in Mehra, *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, p. 426.

951. Gould to India, 12 December 1936, from Lhasa, noted that "it appears on close examination that it is improbable that Kashag made any useful admission on the occasion of interview with Battye on Kingdon Ward case". Quoted in: K. Gupta, "McMahon Line", *loc. cit.*

952. L/P&S/12/4200, Gould to India, 15 November 1936.

953. These Dzongpöns were appointed for three year terms.

954. A further *posa* of Rs. 2,526 was paid annually to the Satrajas (Seven Kings) of the Sherdukpen of Rupa and Shergaon.

955. L/P&S/12/4200, Dawson, Chief Secretary to the Government of Assam, to India, 29 May 1936, summarising Lightfoot's report.

956. L/P&S/12/4200, Metcalfe to IO, 17 August 1936.

957. Nevill's Balipara Frontier Tract Annual Administration Report of 1927-28, quoted in Reid, *Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam, op. cit.*, pp. 292-293.

958. L/P&S/12/4200, Assam to India, 27 May 1937.

959. Reid, *Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam, op. cit.*, p. 295.

960. Reid, *Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam, op. cit.*, p. 296.

961. L/P&S/12/4200, Lightfoot's report on the Tawang Expedition, 1938, enclosed in Assam to India, 7 September 1938.

962. L/P&S/12/4200, Gould to India, 4 May 1938.

963. Norbu Dhondup to Gould, 26 August 1938, quoted in: K. Gupta, "McMahon Line", *loc. cit.*

964. L/P&S/12/4200. See, for example: Norbu Dhondup to Gould, 25 May 1938.

965. Twynam made a number of points, including the following. Was the Simla Convention of 1914 valid if one of the three parties to it had refused to ratify? Twynam was doubtful. Also, the map appended to the Simla Convention was on such a small scale that it was not really possible to say whether Tawang proper fell north or south of the "Red Line" which actually is superimposed upon the word "Tawang". The "Red Line" was so wide on the map that it would, if extrapolated on the ground, actually cover several miles. A better case, of course,

could be made on the basis of the maps attached to the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra Notes of March 1914; but, Twynam observed, these notes were "lacking in formalities associated with a treaty". He also made the point that nowhere in the Simla Convention text is there any reference either to the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes or to the maps associated with them.

Twynam had some first hand experience of Tibet. In 1929 he visited, along with his wife, Phari at the head of the Chumbi Valley.

966. Twynam to Linlithgow, 17 March 1939, quoted in: K. Gupta, "McMahon Line", *loc. cit.* See also: L/P&S/12/4200, Twynam to Linlithgow, 3 April 1939.

967. L/P&S/12/4200, Linlithgow to Twynam, 17 April 1939.

968. L/P&S/12/4200, Linlithgow to Twynam, 3 August 1939.

969. See: Bailey, *No Passport, op. cit.*, pp. 200-202.

970. There was a "Long Pilgrimage" in 1932 and another in 1944.

971. McMahon to Lönchen Shatra, 24 March 1914, states that "if the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a day's march of the British side of the frontier, they will be included in Tibetan territory and the frontier modified accordingly".

972. For the 1936 journey of Ludlow and Sherriff, see: Anon., "The Sources of the Subansiri and Siyom", *Himalayan Journal*, IX, 1937; F. Ludlow, "The Sources of the Subansiri and Siyom", *Himalayan Journal*, X, 1938; H.R. Fletcher, ed., *A Quest for Flowers. The Plant Explorations of Frank Ludlow and George Sherriff told from their diaries and other occasional writings*, Edinburgh 1975. See also: F.M. Bailey, *No Passport to Tibet*, London 1957.

973. See: F.M. Bailey, *Report on an Exploration of the North-East Frontier, 1913*, Simla 1914, p.18; Bailey, *No Passport, op. cit.*, p. 156; F. Ludlow, "Sources of the Subansiri and Siyom", *Himalayan Journal*, X, 1938; F. Ludlow, "Takpo and Kongbo, S.E. Tibet", *Himalayan Journal*, XII, 1940.

974. The presence of the Lhalu estates on the Siyom was also referred to rather obliquely in the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra Notes of March 1914 by the phrase "the Tibetan ownership of private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed".

975. For Calvert's tour, see: Reid, *Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam, op. cit.*, pp. 259-260. Calvert, just before he handed over to R.W. Godfrey as Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract, made another tour up the Siang in 1938, though not penetrating quite so far north as he had in 1936.

976. See, for example: L/P&S/12/4213, Mills to India, 13 October 1938.

977. For a summary of these events, see: L/P&S/12/4213, J.P. Mills to India, 4 April 1940.

978. L/P&S/12/4213, Assam to India, 29 May 1939, enclosing Godfrey's report.

979. For Kingdon Ward's adventures on the Lohit in 1926 and 1928, see: F. Kingdon Ward, *Plant Hunting on the Edge of the World*, London 1930. His 1933 venture is described in: F. Kingdon Ward, *A Plant Hunter in Tibet*, London 1934; R. Kaulback, *Tibetan Trek*, London 1934.

980. It is probable that the name Menilkrai means, in the Mishmi language, "boundary of Assam". See:L/P&S/12/4214, Tour Diary of Mr. F.P. Mainprice, . . . November 1943 to May 1945, p. 77.

981. L/P&S/12/4214, Godfrey's Report on his Tour up the Lohit Valley to Rima, 27 February 1940.

982. L/P&S/12/4200, J.P. Mills & B.J. Gould, Note on a discussion held at Government House, Shillong, on August 1st, 1940.

983. Tibetan, and even from time to time Chinese, traders did make their way to India down the Lohit, and there was a constant movement of Mishmis between Sadiya and Rima. The volume of traffic, however, seems to have been too small to be considered statistically significant. The route, difficult at all times, was frequently closed by floods and landslides and, even, earthquakes.

984. L/P&S/12/4200, Gould to Caroe, 2 August 1940.
The Indian side in the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute have consistently argued that the McMahon Line represents the traditional and historical boundary sanctified by thousands of years of tradition. Gould clearly did not think so. It was very much a British artifact, and a not very well designed one at that.

985. Reid, *Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam, op. cit.*, p. 264.

986. L/P&S/20/D223, Report of Lt.-Col. W.E. Cross . . . on the Lohit Valley. Reconnaissance through the Sadiya Frontier Tract, Assam, India. 15th December, 1941 – 6th February, 1942. India Office 1944.
It is not clear why the India Office should have gone to such expense and used such good quality paper at the height of the War to produce this particular report, which included a volume of maps, a volume of excellent sketches by Cross and a volume of photographs as well as a volume containing itinerary and comment.
Cross intended to take with him on his survey a RAF airfield expert who, at the last moment, was unable to come. The airfield part of the survey, therefore, was made by Cross himself. It was subsequently concluded that Walong was not really a good site for an airfield: it would be better to look a few miles north of the McMahon Line where the Lohit valley was much wider.

987. Even before the outbreak of war with Japan the General Staff of the Indian Army were becoming worried at the uncertain status of some of the districts beyond the old Outer Line. Could, for instance, the relatively wide stretch of the Lohit valley around Walong be put into use as a site for "a hostile aerodrome", presumably either by the Japanese or the Chinese under Japanese influence. See: L/P&S/12/4214, India to Assam, 5 November 1941.

988. L/P&S/12/4200, Caroe to IO, 11 March 1943.

989. See: L/P&S/12/4223, Memorandum on the McMahon Line by George V. Kitson, 19 July 1945.

990. L/P&S/12/4217, Wavell to Amery, 29 March 1944.
Gould's idea of an Agency supervised by the Political Officer in Sikkim echoed a proposal by Charles Bell in 1914 that such a body, supervised from Gangtok, should be created to deal with not only the Assam Himalayas but also British policy towards Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet. See: Eur MSS F80/5e, Bell's memorandum of 30 January 1914.

991. The letter from the Tibetan Foreign Office to Frank Ludlow, 9 April 1943, is quoted in: Mehra, *McMahon Line, op. cit.*, pp. 457-458, n. 12; also, but with rather different interpretation, in Barpujari, *North-East Frontier, op. cit.*, p. 276. The reply, in essence, states that the Tsona Dzongpöns have been instructed not to raise taxes in Rupa, Shergaon and Kalaktang, that is to say in those two

Sherdukpen areas which had effectively passed out of the Tibetan sphere and in the extreme south of the Tawang tract. It should be noted in this context that the Tsona Dzongpöns were not in the habit of visiting Kalaktang nor did they claim to exercise direct control over the Sherdukpen. The reply deliberately omitted Tawang and Dirangdzong from the list of regions which the Tsona Dzongpöns were not to visit; and, further, it was not clear whether the restrictions on operations applied also to other Tibetan officials in or from Tawang, as opposed to the Tsona Dzongpöns. With these ambiguities it was not a very helpful reply.

This Tibetan reply does not seem to have made any impact upon British policy making. In his survey of the McMahon Line situation of 19 July 1945, George Kitson either overlooked or dismissed this letter when he noted that "there is no record of the Tibetan Government having replied to our representation at Lhasa in March, 1943". The real implications of the letter of 9 April 1943 were illuminated by a conversation on the same subject between George Sherriff and the Tibetan Foreign Office on 18 June 1944, when the Tibetans objected to the way in which officials of the Assam Government were preventing the people of the Dirangdzong region from paying their taxes to the Tsona Dzongpöns, the Tibetan officials supervising the administration of the Tawang tract. Sherriff pointed out that Dirangdzong was below the "Red Line" of the 1914 Simla Convention. The Tibetan Foreign Office officials then indicated to Sherriff that they thought that the 1914 Convention was, in fact, invalid, because of the failure of the Chinese part. Sherriff thereupon drew the Tibetans' attention to the fact that the whole border question had been settled between Sir Henry McMahon and the Lönchen Shatra three months before the Simla Convention was accepted a binding on Tibet, and there was a map associated with this transaction. The Tibetans declared that they were surprised by this information: they had never heard of any map other than that appended to the Simla Convention. They told Sherriff they would go and see what they could find in their records. See: L/P&S/12/4214, Sherriff to Gould, 18 June 1944.

992. L/P&S/12/4200, Secretary of State to India, 17 April 1943.

993. The origins of the North-East Frontier Agency are discussed, on the basis of documents in the India Office Library and Records, in: H.K. Barpujari, *Problems of the Hill Tribes: North-East Frontier, 1873-1962. Volume III. Inner Line to McMahon Line*, Gauhati 1981, pp. 258-261. This is by far the most useful study by an Indian historian of this subject. See also: J.N. Chowdhury, *Arunachal Pradesh: From Frontier Tracts to Union Territory*, New Delhi 1983, Ch. 6.

994. The North-East Frontier Agency retained the two old divisions of Political Agencies for the Balipara and Sadiya Frontier Tracts (each under a Political Officer): these were subdivided into Sub-Agencies for the Lohit Valley, the Siang Valley and the Se-La (under Assistant Political Officers), as well as a Sub-Area for the Subansiri.

995. Mills has provided a most interesting brief account of his work in: J.P. Mills, "Problems of the Assam-Tibet Frontier", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 1950.

996. The papers relating to Lt. Hutchins' journey of May 1943 are in: L/P&S/12/4214.

At least one American aircraft on the "Hump" route crashed over Tibet. On 30 November 1943 Lieutenant Robert Crozier and 4 members of his crew baled out from a B24 transport near Samye and were evacuated by way of Lhasa where George Sherriff put them up at Dekyi Lingka.

See: L/P&S/12/1970, Sherriff to India, 19 December 1943; W.B. Sinclair, *Jump to the Land of God. The Adventures of a United States Air Force Crew in Tibet*, Caldwell,

Ohio, 1965; P. Hopkirk, *Trespassers on the Roof of the World. The Race for Lhasa*, London 1982, pp. 237-245.

997. L/P&S/12/3114, A brief general report on the North-East Frontier Agency for the period from October 23rd, 1943 to June 30th, 1944.

998. L/P&S/12/4214, Tour Diary of Mr. F.P. Mainprice, . . . November 1943 to May 1945, p. 9.
 It has often been asserted that the Tibetan authorities strenuously resisted any Chinese attempt to carry out survey work on the trace of the proposed Rima road. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the party reported by Mainprice was travelling without at least the tacit collaboration of Tibetan officials in Zayul and, probably, in Lhasa as well.

999. L/P&S/12/4214, Assam to India (Foreign), 3 July 1944.

1000. L/P&S/12/4214, Caroe to Assam, 15 August 1944.

1001. L/P&S/12/4214, J.C. Sterndale Bennett, FO, to R.T. Peel, IO, 17 September 1944.

1002. L/P&S/12/4212, IO to India (External), 22 September 1944.

1003. L/P&S/12/4214, India (External) to IO, 29 September 1944.

1004. L/P&S/12/4214, J.C. Sterndale Bennett (FO) to F.A.K. Harrison (IO), 6 October 1944.

1005. L/P&S/12/4214, F.A.K. Harrison, IO, to J.C. Sterndale Bennett, 10 October 1944.

1006. L/P&S/12/4214, Sterndale Bennett to Harrison, 11 October 1944. J.C. Sterndale Bennett was the member of the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department charged with the problem of the position of Tibet in Anglo-Chinese relations. He was made KCMG in 1950.

1007. L/P&S/12/4214, Williams to Mills, 27 October 1944.

1008. Tibetan agents of Sera collected from villages on the Siang below the McMahon Line annual tribute in the form of rice and cloth. The same agents operated a salt monopoly, disposing of this key commodity at an exorbitant rate. See: Barpujari, *North-East Frontier, op. cit.*, p. 265.

1009. See: C. von Fürer-Haimendorf, *Ethnographic Notes on the Tribes of the Subansiri Region*, Shillong 1947; *Exploration in the Eastern Himalayas. Diaries of Travel in the Subansiri Area, 1944 and 1945*, Shillong 1947; "The Tribes of the Subansiri Region, *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXXV, 1948; *Himalayan Barbary*, London 1955; *The Apa Tanis and their Neighbours. A Primitive Society in the Eastern Himalayas*, London 1962.

1010. Mills reported this conclusion about the upper reaches of the Subansiri in these words:

> here, though actual contact with Tibetans was not made, important information was collected which leaves little room for doubt that the *de facto* southern boundary of the area under Tibetan control in the Subansiri catchment area is not the McMahon Line, but roughly a line running from east to west along the subsidiary range due north of the Sippi river and then curving south-westwards across the Selu and Kamla. . . . It seems more than probable therefore that there is in the Subansiri catchment area a sphere of Tibetan control comparable in depth to that formerly existing in the Se La Subagency and, unfortunately, far more difficult to approach from the south.

See: L/P&S/12/3114, J.P. Mills, Report on the Assam Tribal Areas for the Year Ending June 30th, 1945.
This was, of course, the region of Migyitun and Longju which was to become so hotly contested during the course of Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute.

1011. See, for example: L/P&S/12/4214, Gould to Caroe, 16 July 1944.

1012. L/P&S/12/4197, Metcalfe to IO, 17 June 1937, quotes Gould on this point.

1013. L/P&S/12/4217, India (External) to IO, 3 April 1944.

1014. L/P&S/12/4217, IO minute, 26 May 1944.

1015. L/P&S/12/4217, Gould to India, 13 October 1944, reports that the Tawang concession has been communicated to the Kashag.

1016. L/P&S/12/4217, Gould to India, 1 November 1944, reporting discussion with Kashag of 29 October 1944.

1017. L/P&S/12/4217, Secretary of State to India (External), 12 November 1944.

1018. L/P&S/12/4217, India (External) to IO, 15 November 1944.
Gould was puzzled by Ringang's remark. He could find no trace of any reference to a Se La modification in 1914 in his files; but, "as I have pointed out before, there may be contemporary 1914 records which have not yet been traced". It is an interesting question. The McMahon Line was moved north from the Se La to include all of Tawang at a late stage in the 1913-1914 proceedings. It is not impossible that at some subsequent point its withdrawal back to the Se La was discussed. The detailed minutes of discussions between the Lönchen Shatra and McMahon and Charles Bell are not available in London.

1019. No vaccine was, in the end, sent by the Government of Assam.

1020. L/P&S/12/4223, Gould to India, 19 June 1945.
Sherriff reported this resolution in April 1945; but the Tsongdu decision in this respect may well date back to December 1944.

1021. See: Barpujari, *North-East Frontier, op. cit.*, pp.282-283, 290.

1022. A gift of arms for the Tibetan Government from Chiang Kai-shek took place in March or April 1945, at about the time that the Tibetan Foreign Office informed Sherriff of the National Assembly's resolution. Gould thought that this was no coincidence. See: L/P&S/12/4223, IO minute, ff. 155-158, 29 June 1945.

XIV

THE FINAL YEARS OF THE BRITISH INDIAN EMPIRE, 1945-1947, AND THE END OF THE OLD TIBET

The year 1945, during which the War came to an end, saw a marked stepping up of the tempo of British activity in the Tawang tract. A Tibetan Agent, one A.T. La, had been appointed by the Government of Assam to watch over the Se La Sub-Agency. At the same time, the Tawang monastery officials were prevented by the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract, Imdad Ali, from collecting any tolls at Amatulla from traders on the "Lhasa Road"; and the local Mönpas here were informed that while they could, if they wished, make voluntary contributions to Tawang monastery, the days of compulsory taxation by that institution had now ended. There was in consequence a remarkable reduction in the amount of monastic revenue raised.

The Tibetan authorities both in Tsona and Tawang were spurred by all these developments to seek a meeting with a suitably senior British official; and Mills decided that he would handle this in person. On 28 and 29 May 1945 he held discussions at Dirangdzong with one of the Tawang monastic officials and a representative of the Tsona Dzongpöns in which the whole revenue issue was thrashed out. The Tibetans made their position absolutely clear. They denied that there had ever existed any treaty or agreement by which Tibetan rights anywhere in the Tawang tract had been ceded to the British. It followed that their traditional revenue collecting activities should be allowed to go on as before. They did admit, however, that *de facto* the British were now in physical control all the way to the Se La: they requested, therefore, that Mills agree not to interfere, in those parts of the tract under effective British influence, with their perfectly legitimate task of raising customary revenues. Mills refused. The Tibetans also brought up the question of the rights of the Tsona Dzongpöns in Sengedzong (where the Tsona officials had estates south of the Se La and where they were accustomed to maintain flocks of sheep on land which did not lie within the bounds of these estates). Mills assured the Tibetans to their considerable relief that these rights

were guaranteed by treaty. After the meeting the Tibetans agreed to report back to their superiors. The whole affair, despite its implications, took place in an extremely friendly atmosphere.[1023]

From this meeting Mills derived a clear picture of the precise structure of Tibetan taxation in the Tawang tract. Tawang proper, north of the Se La, came under the full fiscal regime to be found elsewhere in Tibet. Below the Se La the Dzongpöns of Dirangdzong and the Talungdzong Dzongpöns (who hitherto had been referred to as the Kalaktang Dzongpöns) collected revenue not so much, as Lightfoot had thought in 1936, on behalf of Tawang monastery (which had its own revenue collection system) as for the Tsona Dzongpöns.[1024] There also existed a system of taxation of the Sherdukpen of Rupa which was paid directly to Tawang monastery. It had hitherto been assumed that the Tibetan fiscal burden on the Sherdukpen had virtually disappeared: it now transpired that it was still quite significant but that it assumed a form which had been difficult for previous British officials to detect.[1025]

Discussions with the Tibetans confirmed Mills in his views on the future pattern of British influence in the Tawang tract. He was convinced that the Se La range represented the natural geographical boundary of British India. To go beyond it to Tawang proper would involve the considerable cost of building a road north from Dirangdzong to Tawang. Politically, in 1945 the land north of the Se La was under full Tibetan administrative control; and the people there were, on the whole, far more involved with Tibetan Buddhism than were the populations to the south of the pass. The British hold on the Tawang tract south of the Se La had by now become so well established that locally, to the inhabitants both to its south and its north, the Se La was accepted as the international border. There remained no Tibetans (as opposed to local Mönpas) living permanently below the Se La. Even were Lhasa to agree to it, the people in Tawang would look upon a British advance beyond the Se La as nothing but an act of naked aggression. The present Se La Sub-Agency, Mills concluded, was a natural and coherent unit from the administrative point of view, easily managed by a single Assistant Political Officer: if Tawang proper were added to it an extra Assistant Political Officer would be required and problems of local government would multiply.[1026] The Se La frontier, so cogently supported by Mills, remained the declared policy of the North-East Frontier Agency right up to the Transfer of Power.

The most important immediate consequence of Mills's visit to Dirangdzong was the proposal that the North-East Frontier Agency should levy its own house tax throughout the Tawang tract up to the Se La, thus demonstrating British sovereignty beyond any shadow of doubt. This was approved by the Government of India in January 1946.[1027] When it was first collected during the course of 1946,

so Mills reported, the Mönpas paid up with great enthusiasm because they saw the new tax as a sign of the British intention to remain and protect them from both Tibetan oppression and raids by neighbouring non-Buddhist tribes. Mills thought that the house tax would prove to be the "*coup de grâce*" to Tibetan political claims south of the Se La. It had also resulted in a virtual cessation in the payment by the Mönpas there of monastic dues to Tawang.[1028]

Official Tibetan reaction on the ground to the imposition of the house tax was extremely mild. The Tawang monastic authorities resolved that the Political Officer, Balipara Frontier Tract, should he ever try to cross the Se La, would be denied all facilities for transport and travel. One or two half hearted attempts were made by Tibetan parties from Tawang to collect taxes in the Dirangdzong region, which yielded extremely meagre results. Mills observed in 1947 that in Tawang south of the Se La "Tibetan influence . . . can be said to be dead, and it will never be revived so long as we do not withdraw".[1029]

Apart from the house tax, Mills considered another administrative measure for the Tawang tract. The *posa* which had been paid by the Government of Assam since the middle of the 19th century might be discontinued. It was, after all, a most tangible symbol of Tibetan sovereignty. In the end, however, it was decided not to interrupt the by now traditional practice of paying *posa*. Its continuance had a pacifying effect on the Tibetan establishment all the way up the line from Tawang through Tsona to Lhasa; and its cessation would guarantee vigorous protest in Lhasa both from the Kashag and the powerful Drepung monastery, creating a propaganda bonanza which the Chinese could not fail to exploit. As long as *posa* continued, on the other hand, there would be a vested interest for those beneficiaries from it in Lhasa to restrict their opposition to British activity in the Tawang tract to the absolute minimum. With a little ingenuity it could be argued, moreover, that *posa* was something other than a payment from one sovereign body to another. It could, for instance, be interpreted as some kind of reward for service, an indication not of foreign sovereignty but of political subordination.[1030]

In the Subansiri Area Fürer-Haimendorf was not immediately replaced when his tour was completed in 1945. The zone of Tibetan influence had not been contacted and there appeared to be no urgency from the point of view of the McMahon Line to speed up the rate of British penetration. In the first half of 1946 Mills visited the Apa Tani plateau and some neighbouring Dafla villages. In May 1946 a new Political Officer, F.N. Betts was appointed. Together with his wife Ursula Graham Bower, herself with great experience of Assam tribal matters, he set out to implement a policy of consolidation. Mills wanted Betts to be given authority to push on northwards towards Tibet; but the Government of Assam felt that it

would be unwise to risk opening up a fresh arena of competition with Tibetan authority in an area where its exact nature and extent was as yet unknown. Betts, therefore, was unable to "vindicate" this particular sector of the McMahon Line by the time of the Transfer of Power.[1031]

By 1945 it was becoming all too apparent that the Siang sector of the North-East Frontier Agency was potentially as troublesome as the Tawang tract. The influence of Sera monastery, which had been quite unsuspected in the 1930s, was now known to be behind practically every aspect of Tibetan activity down the Siang valley. With the establishment of its posts at Simong and Karko during the course of 1945 the Government of Assam came into direct contact with the sphere of revenue collection of one of the great Lhasa monastic institutions, a truly powerful force in Tibetan political life. Shortly after the Simong and Karko posts were set up, in April 1945 a Tibetan tax gathering official had reached Simong from the north only to be confronted by British troops and warned off. He was prevented from collecting revenue beyond a point about ten miles north of Karko and Simong, and these two large settlements were spared his customary exactions. Not surprisingly, in December 1945 while the new Political Officer in Sikkim, Arthur Hopkinson, was in Lhasa he received a protest from Sera concerning this incident. All Hopkinson could do was to repeat what had already been said about the "Red Line" in the context of Tawang and to object to the presence of Tibetan officials anywhere below it.[1032] The conclusion which the Government of India drew from all this was that there was no alternative but to stand firm in the face of any Tibetan protests and continue steadfastly the policy of extending control up the Siang valley. There seemed no point, however, in bombarding the Tibetan Foreign Office with counter protests every time a Tibetan tax collector turned up on the British side of the "Red Line".[1033]

In early 1946 the main Tibetan functionary concerned with the Siang, whom the British often called the Tempo official (after a village of that name north of the McMahon Line) but was also known as the Ter Dzong, the Deba of Tempo (or Tompo), Tashi Dhondup by name, announced to the Assistant Political Officer, Siang Valley Sub-Agency, P.L.S. James, that he intended shortly to come down on duty to a point well below Karko and Simong. James moved rapidly up the Siang to meet the Ter Dzong at the Abor settlement of Pango, some 30 miles as the crow flies north of Karko and about 20 miles below the McMahon Line. The Ter Dzong, James reported, was accompanied by 300 or so Tibetan subjects, most of them armed with swords and a few with traditional Tibetan muzzle loader muskets with antler prong rests. An Anglo-Tibetan confrontation took place in the middle of February 1946. James managed to persuade the Ter Dzong, much impressed by the determination and fire power of

James' Assam Rifles escort, to return to Tibet, but not before he had managed to collect taxes from, and imposed forced labour on, all the villages between Pango and the McMahon Line. This must have been an interesting encounter, with James heavily outnumbered. The Ter Dzong was not particularly friendly. He told James somewhat brusquely that in future he would be obliged to seek his permission before venturing this far north up the Siang valley; and he declared, just before he withdrew, that he intended to return the following year.

G.E.D. Walker, Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract, recommended to the Government of Assam that the Ter Dzong's threat be taken seriously. He urged that by the beginning of 1947 the area of direct British control should be pushed north beyond Karko and Simong to Tuting and Jido, villages on either bank of the Siang about ten miles below the McMahon Line. This would, of course, involve the creation of a number of supporting posts along the line of communication, each of which, Walker advised, should be manned by at least a platoon of Assam Rifles equipped with automatic weapons.[1034] The Government of Assam, while agreeing in principle that the Ter Dzong and his ilk could no longer be permitted to roam at will below the McMahon Line, decided to wait a bit longer before committing themselves to a forward policy as extensive as that being advocated by the Political Officers on the spot.[1035] When 1947 opened, therefore, the advanced British posts on the Siang were still at Karko and Simong.

In January 1947 the commander of the Assam Rifles detachment at Karko heard that two Tibetan officials were about to descend below the McMahon Line with an escort of no less than 1,000 armed men. The objective was tax collection down to below Karko and Simong, which the Ter Dzong persisted in claiming was the southern limit of Tibetan jurisdiction. The Government of Assam, while suspecting that there was a measure of exaggeration in the estimated size of the forthcoming Tibetan invasion, yet considered it essential that British resistance be offered, preferably no further south than Pango where the Ter Dzong had been turned back the previous year. If need be, armed force should be used to repel the Tibetans. It was, unfortunately, still not possible to block the Tibetans at the McMahon Line itself: British administration had yet to expand quite that far to the north.[1036] The Government of India supported this active policy and even suggested that aircraft might be used both for reconnaissance and, following the pattern well established on the North-West Frontier, to overawe the intruders.[1037]

James, accordingly, hastened up the Siang with a small escort of Assam Rifles and on 17 February 1947 met the Ter Dzong and his party at Tuting, some 15 miles north of Pango where the 1946 confrontation had taken place.[1038] The Tibetan entourage, while not

quite the size that had been rumoured, was considerably larger than it had been the year before. The Ter Dzong declared that he was on his way, as usual, to collect taxes right down to below Karko and Simong; and he demanded to be allowed to pass. James, as in 1946, stood firm; and on 4 March all the Tibetans made their way back across the McMahon Line: their sheer numbers, no doubt, greatly reduced their ability to survive for long off the limited resources of the countryside in the Siang valley.[1039] Unlike the previous year, the Ter Dzong on this occasion was forced to return to Tibet before he had the opportunity to collect any taxes at all.[1040] In 1947, therefore, a few months before the British departure, it can be said that the McMahon Line on the Siang had in practice been "vindicated". What had not been achieved, however, was to persuade the Ter Dzong and his masters in Lhasa, notably Sera monastery, to abandon Tibetan claims to the right to collect revenue and exercise other forms of administration right down to below Karko and Simong. That they were so entitled remained the formal Tibetan position which faced the new rulers of independent India.

Immediately to the east of the Dihang or Siang valley lies the basin of another of the major tributaries of the Brahmaputra, the Dibang (or Dibong). This has its sources on the southern side of the main Assam Himalayan watershed between the Siang and the Lohit. In the North-East Frontier Agency as organised in 1943 the Dibang was assigned to the Lohit Valley Sub-Agency. Relatively little attention was paid to it because of the demands of policy on the Lohit. It was known, however, that on the upper reaches of the Dibang system, on its main tributaries like the Dri and the Adeon, there were a number of settlements that owed allegiance to Tibet. Further down, in the country of the Chulikata Mishmis, there was a long history of blood feud and inter-tribal warfare. Plans for tours by a Political Officer in this area in 1944-45 and 1945-46 aborted for various reasons. In the 1946-47 season G.T. Allen, then in charge of the Lohit Valley Sub-Agency, finally toured up the Dihang to the Dri-Matun confluence. He failed, however, to reach the zone of Tibetan influence along the McMahon Line (including Mipi); and by the time of the Transfer of Power this sector of the Indo-Tibetan border in process of "vindication" was as yet inadequately explored from the Assam side.[1041]

On the Lohit, the Walong post soon attracted the attention of Lhasa by way of the Tibetan authorities in Chamdo. The two Dzongpöns of Zayul were instructed to point out to the Assistant Political Officer, Mainprice, that he was setting up house in undoubted Tibetan territory. In early January 1945 they were given an opportunity to do this when Mainprice invited them to visit the British post. The two Tibetan officials and their rather modest retinue reached Walong on 12 January 1945 and called on the Assistant Political Officer on the

following day.[1042] Mainprice told the Dzongpöns that the British were here to stay. Walong was now in British India and Tibet must give up all claims to it. The Tibetans replied that the true boundary was still, as it always had been, near Menilkrai, and they had received orders from the Kashag in Lhasa in November 1944 that they must stop the British going beyond that point. To agree to the British border proposals, they said, would be to incur the wrath of Lhasa and risk fearful punishment. They would, of course, be perfectly happy to accept the new border if the British Mission in Lhasa or the Political Officer in Sikkim could persuade the Tibetan Government to instruct them to this effect. Without the approval of Lhasa, moreover, it would be very difficult for the Walong post to obtain supplies of rice and other foodstuffs from Zayul.[1043]

Mainprice felt that it would be as well if the Zayul Dzongpöns were in possession of an accurate description of the legal status of the new border. He declared that

> early in 1914 a conference was held at Simla between the representatives of the British Government, Sir Henry McMahon and Sir Charles Bell, of the Tibetan Government, Lonchen Shatra, and of the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government refused to come to an agreement, but the British and Tibetan representatives signed an Agreement approved by their Governments on a number of matters, including the boundary between East Tibet and India and Burma. This Agreement signed and sealed by the Lonchen Shatra and Sir Henry McMahon laid down the boundary between Sadiya Frontier Tract and Zayul should run along the crest of the Di Chu and Tho Chu crossing the Nyi Chu (Tellu) at Paiti. Thus the small . . . villages of Kahao, Dong, Tinai and Walong are under the sole authority of the Sadiya officers, while Samar, Sangu, Lattan and any Mishmi villages north of this boundary are under the sole control of the Tibetan authorities. The Walong post is 20 miles inside British territory, and no taxes or labour are to be taken by Tibetan officers from any of the villages south of the boundary agreed upon in 1914, and these villages must be allowed to go to Zayul to trade according to their previous custom, just as Tibetan traders and their men are allowed and encouraged to go down to Sadiya and India and are helped on their way.[1044]

Duly translated into Tibetan, this statement was handed to the Zayul Dzongpöns and no doubt found its way rapidly enough to Lhasa. It is an interesting blend of the Simla Convention and the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914 in which by some sleight of hand the notes have been transformed into a part of the Anglo-Tibetan Declaration of 3 July 1914. Perhaps Mainprice really thought that this represented the facts; and his superiors in the North-East Frontier Agency did not contradict him.

The confirmation of a permanent British presence at Walong at once revealed a number of potential stresses and strains in Anglo-Tibetan relations. Given the refusal of the Rima authorities to accept

the right of the British to be there at all, it was evident that the victualling of the Walong post from Tibetan sources might prove difficult, as would any attempt to exploit Tibetan labour either to upgrade the structure of the post or, more importantly, to improve the road along this upper stretch of the Lohit where the manpower resources on the British side of the McMahon Line were limited to say the least. It also became apparent very quickly that the extension of British rule into this remote tract where the Tibetan writ had hitherto run would invite a demographic movement of sorts from the Tibetan to the British side. The following incident reported by Mainprice indicated the kind of thing that could happen:

> on the 6th . . [of February 1945] . . a refugee from Zayul appeared before me . . [in Walong]. . . He was a youth from Rima who said his wife had recently committed suicide by hanging herself. The Dzongpön had heard of it, had him arrested and flogged with 100 strokes of the lash to make him admit he had murdered her, and on his maintaining it was suicide had put him in wooden stocks. Mishmis who know Rima say he is innocent and that the Dzongpön had imprisoned him to extort ransom from his relatives. After a fortnight in the Dzongpön's dungeon he had managed to cut himself free from the stocks and fled down to Tinai, whence, as the people would not help him or let him have a slide to cross the rope bridge . . [to Walong] . . he had returned secretly to Rima, managed to cross the river by raft with the help of another villager and came on here. As he cannot return to Zayul and there is no food to spare at present for him to remain at Walong, I am giving him some food and will take him down the Valley carrying one of my loads and see what employment could be found for him. He could probably return and settle here next harvest.[1045]

Within a few weeks more than 20 refugees from Tibetan misgovernment had turned up at Walong; and the inevitable demands from Rima for their return were to hand. The Zayul Dzongpöns accused Mainprice of "enticing" these people away from their lawful rulers in breach of treaty.

The Government of Assam supported Mainprice and Mills in advocating that at least some Tibetans should be permitted to settle around Walong, if only to augment the coolie strength available to the British post. It was argued that many of these potential settlers were not really Tibetans, but some kind of traditional border people, half way between Tibetan and Mishmi: they had the advantage over the pure Mishmis in that they possessed a far greater agricultural sophistication which would make them better suppliers of produce for the Walong garrison. Caroe, however, after visiting Sadiya on a tour of inspection in April 1945 decided that it would be extremely unwise to encourage any Tibetan emigration into those stretches of the Lohit under British control. The original refugees could stay; but the practice should now be firmly discouraged.[1046] There was, as one

official in the India Office noted, a real danger of creating a "Sudeten" problem by letting too many Tibetans in.[1047]

If the Government of India were reluctant to encourage large scale Tibetan emigration to the newly occupied territory on the Lohit, though in practice they could not stop a trickle of Tibetans coming across the McMahon Line to escape the Zayul Dzongpöns, they were quite prepared to see a much expanded trade route develop along the valley. This would be an inevitable consequence of the road building programme called for in order to maintain an all weather line of communication with the Walong post. The reports of Hutchins and Mainprice over the period 1943 to 1945 leave one in no doubt that the flow of traffic up and down the valley between Sadiya and Rima was increasing, probably as a by-product of the Trans Tibet Transport boom.[1048] More Tibetans were coming down to Sadiya in quest of consumer goods which could either be sold in Tibet or taken to China.[1049] The existence of a line of posts up to Walong, and the consequent demand for porters, provided Tibetans with employment. When Kingdon Ward made his last journey up the Lohit in 1950 he was able to recruit as porters no less than 41 Tibetans in the Sadiya bazaar. These had all come down from Tibet to trade and welcomed what amounted to a paid return journey.[1050]

Mainprice's tour of duty in charge of the Lohit Valley Sub-Agency came to an end in April 1946. Before he was replaced by Major G.T. Allen, however, he made one last recommendation of great interest. The McMahon Line border had been run, largely upon the basis of information obtained by O'Callaghan in the beginning of 1914, some 18 miles north of Walong. The precise alignment had been selected not because of any dominant political, traditional or, even, geographical features but because Sir Henry McMahon was persuaded that it would be as well to keep the Di Chu valley, along which ran a route by way of the Talok Pass (Diphu or Diphuk La) into the extreme north of Burma, in British hands. The choice was arbitrary; and Mainprice found that in practice it was unsatisfactory. The Lohit valley between Walong and the McMahon Line at Kahao was still too narrow to make a suitable air supply dropping zone, let alone to provide a site for an airfield; and the best place for a bridge across the Lohit was certainly a little north of the McMahon Line. Mainprice urged that the McMahon Line be pushed northwards a few miles so as to include the villages of Samar and Sangu.[1051]

The proposal, of course, involved not only the British acquisition of yet more former Tibetan subjects but also the negotiation of some kind of formal Anglo-Tibetan border agreement which Mills suspected was unobtainable. He did agree that if there were ever to be genuine Anglo-Tibetan discussions on the question of modifying the McMahon Line, then a small British advance along the Lohit might be included as part of a general package in which the Tibetans

secured the retrocession of Tawang north of the Se La; but he was not very hopeful that this would ever come about.[1052]

By the middle of 1945 the Tibetans had made it clear enough that they did not regard the McMahon Line as a valid border. The boundary had been denied by the Zayul Dzongpöns in their discussion with Mainprice in January 1945; it had to all intents and purposes been rejected by the Tibetan National Assembly; and it had once more been challenged by the Tibetan officials whom Mills met at Dirangdzong in May 1945. The Government of India believed that it was probably worth making one more effort to persuade the Kashag to come to some kind of boundary agreement, though with little hope of success. By May 1945 Caroe, for one, had become convinced that the only practicable policy was the gradual extension of British administration up to the McMahon Line without any reference to the Tibetans.[1053] However, with a new Political Officer in Sikkim anxious to undertake his own Mission to Lhasa, the subject could hardly be avoided.

Arthur Hopkinson, who took over from Gould in August 1945, was in Lhasa from 21 September 1945 to 31 January 1946.[1054] His agenda included three major items. First: there was growing evidence of a very close relationship between the Chinese representative in Lhasa, Shen Tsung-lien, and a number of leading figures in Tibetan politics including Surkhang Dzasa of the Tibetan Foreign Office. Shen had been trying to bring about some bipartite Anglo-Chinese conference in which a basically Chinese solution to the Tibetan problem would be agreed.[1055] This meant the Chinese acceptance, as Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had recently suggested, of a rather limited Tibetan autonomy qualified by a formal Tibetan acknowledgement of membership of the family of Five Races which constituted the Chinese Republic. There were Tibetans who were attracted by this plan, which they saw as flowing logically enough from the failure of the 1914 Simla Convention. Hopkinson should do his best to persuade the Kashag of the dangers inherent in succumbing to Chinese temptations or believing what Shen told them. Second: some leading Tibetans – and again Surkhang Dzasa must be named – had been seeking something like sovereign representation for their country abroad.[1056] There had been talk at one time of Tibet being given a seat at the Peace Conference after World War II; but this had come to nothing in the face of the fact that Tibet was not a belligerent.[1057] There had also been discussion about the possibility of the Tibetans establishing their own Mission in India, if not in New Delhi then at least in Gangtok. If the British could have a Mission in Lhasa, why could not the Tibetans have a representative in India? In view of all the diplomatic problems (with China and the United States) inherent in any British acknowledgement of anything like a sovereign Tibet, there were good reasons why this project, once rather favoured

by the Government of India, should now be put quietly on one side.[1058] Third: of most immediate importance to the Government of India was the question of the McMahon Line. Could the Kashag be persuaded that all the recent British activity in the Assam Himalayas was no more than the implementation of a policy agreed by Tibet in 1914? If not, would it be possible to isolate the situation in the Assam Himalayas such that it was not capable of diplomatic exploitation by the Chinese?

Hopkinson was instructed to take with him to Lhasa photographic copies of the maps and documents which together made up the corpus of 1914 instruments upon which the British based their title to the McMahon Line.[1059] He was to try to ascertain whether the Tibetans were challenging the validity of the "Red Line" as indicating a valid boundary, or were simply protesting against the pace and scale of British operations in the Assam Himalayas. If the "Red Line" were under challenge, then Hopkinson should produce his various photographic copies, and in particular that of the map appended to the Simla Convention, so that the Tibetans could see that there really was a "Red Line". He was then to offer, without prejudice, adjustments of the "Red Line" in Tawang, leaving all north of the Se La in Tibet, and "any other minor modifications that subsequent exploration may show to be justified". He was also at this point to offer a compound payment for the loss of any "monastic" dues collected south of the McMahon Line, the term "monastic" being a deliberate euphemism for any Tibetan revenue collection, lay as well as clerical. Hopkinson was not authorised to admit that Tibetan state revenue had ever been collected below the "Red Line": the official British view was that all that had been gathered there was some kind of religious tithing. Nor was he authorised to make major concessions elsewhere along the McMahon Line such as a British withdrawal from Walong to Menilkrai, an idea which Gould had found interesting.[1060]

Hopkinson had a number of discussions in Lhasa on the McMahon Line issue, notably with Surkhang Dzasa who was rapidly turning himself into a form of Tibetan Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1061] The Tibetan view as expressed by Surkhang Dzasa was crystal clear. The McMahon Line was not really a suitable subject for discussion at all after more than 30 years neglect by the Government of India. In any case, the original Tibetan agreement in 1914 had been conditional upon the British securing terms from China; and this the British had been unable to achieve. What the British were now doing in those parts of the Assam Himalayas where the Tibetans had claims was no better than aggression, "big insect devouring a small insect". All British posts, in Tawang below the Se La, on the Siang and on the Lohit above Menilkrai, should be withdrawn. If the Government of India might at this late date yet manage to bring the Chinese to come to some settlement of the Tibetan question congenial to Lhasa, then

as a reward certain Tibetan territorial concessions in the Assam Himalayas might be made.[1062]

Just before he left Lhasa in late January 1946 Hopkinson repeated his McMahon Line proposals, including the "Tawang Sop" and the composition payments to Drepung, in an *aide mémoire* to the Tibetan Foreign Office, that is to say to Surkhang Dzasa.[1063] The Tibetan position, however, did not alter.[1064] In April 1946 Surkhang Dzasa relayed to Hugh Richardson, then in charge of the British Mission in Lhasa, a request from the Kashag that the Government of India would return any Tibetan territory that it was currently occupying. Richardson denied that the British were in fact occupying any Tibetan territory whatsoever.[1065]

Hopkinson did not visit Lhasa again.[1066] He stayed on in Gangtok over the transition period of the Transfer of Power and in the summer of 1948 handed over to Harishwar Dayal thus bringing to an end an apostolic succession of British Political Officers in Sikkim extending back to J.C. White's appointment in the late 19th century.

On the eve of the Transfer of Power in 1947 Hopkinson, on the instructions of the Government of India, made a final approach on the McMahon Line question through the British Mission in Lhasa to the Tibetan Foreign Office when he protested about the Tibetan tax gathering foray down the Siang early that year (which has been described above). There was no direct reply. However, in October 1947 Surkhang Dzasa informed the British High Commission in New Delhi through Hugh Richardson that his Office was discussing with the new Government of India the "return of excluded Tibetan territories gradually included into India", that is to say what in the jargon of the day would be called the "McMahon areas".[1067] In his report on the Lhasa Mission for 1947 Richardson pointed out that when the time came for the new India to negotiate some agreement with Tibet it would find that Tibetan claims in the McMahon areas were still strong. Richardson's advice was that

> it is therefore of great importance that the Government of India shall maintain and improve its already strong position . . [in the Assam Himalayas] . . and that there should be no slackening now. The Tibetans . . . have shown that they have not given up hope of regaining influence in the Tribal Areas . . [the North-East Frontier Agency] . . but if they see the new Government of India as determined as its predecessor, and still willing to make concessions in Tawang and perhaps in smaller areas elsewhere it is to be hoped that they will gradually accept the inevitable.[1068]

Hopkinson, while in entire agreement with Richardson, in his final report as Political Officer in Sikkim did not show much faith in the will of the post-British Government of India to do anything very positive in this respect. It was more likely that in matters relating to Tibet there would be a policy of appeasement of China from which

the process of continued "vindication" of the McMahon Line would suffer. Tibet, he felt, was now the "Cinderella" of the Indian External Affairs Ministry.[1069]

From all this one conclusion is inescapable. The British did not leave to their successors in the Indian subcontinent a border in the Assam Himalayas to which the Tibetans had agreed. Indeed, right up to the end of the British period the Tibetans were both protesting diplomatically about British aggression in these border tracts and challenging the British position, albeit in a more or less passive manner, on the ground. In other words, there was here a very real Indo-Tibetan boundary dispute. There was also, in that the Chinese too objected to the activities of the British in the North-East Frontier Agency by virtue of their claims both to be the ultimate repository of Tibetan sovereignty and to be entitled to absolute possession of the western portion of Sikang Province actually under Lhasa control, an embryonic Sino-Indian boundary dispute.

In late 1944 Shen in Lhasa had hinted to Gould that the Assam border problem could be settled easily enough once there was a comprehensive Anglo-Chinese agreement over Tibet. Gould had refused to rise to this particular bait and the matter was then dropped. It was clear at this time, however, that the Kuomintang was well aware that the British were beginning to become very active in the Assam Himalayas; and it should cause no surprise to discover that they continued to keep a close watch on British progress in "vindicating" the McMahon Line.

On 2 July 1946 the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, drew the attention of the British Ambassador in Nanking, Sir Ralph Stevenson, to reports of British activity on the Lohit around Walong since 1943. He pointed out that there had been much road construction. Aircraft frequently flew over the area.[1070] There were plans for the construction of an airfield. Military barracks had been put up and boundary pillars erected. A garrison of some 40 soldiers was now stationed there despite the protests of the local officials. All this was taking place in two *hsien* of Sikang Province, Ch'a-yü and K'o-mai, which were part of China. Dr. Wang concluded that

> the Chinese Government are anxious, in consonance with the traditional friendly relations between China and Great Britain, to maintain the present position in respect of the boundaries between Tibet, Sikang, Yunnan, India and Burma, and, believing that the British Government will also approve this attitude, assume that the above acts of aggression on Chinese territorial sovereignty are not the intention of the British Government and are presumably acts of over-zealous British Indian frontier officials. Accordingly I have the honour to request you to communicate to the British Government the request that speedy instructions may be issued for the immediate withdrawal of the above British officers and men, . . . for the removal of the irregularly erected

> boundary pillars, barracks, wireless stations and other constructions, for the restoration, as far as possible, of the original position and for the strict prohibition of flights over Sikang or Tibetan territory by aircraft; and that a guarantee may be given that there will in future be no recurrence of such incidents.[1071]

Sir Ralph Stevenson had some difficulty working out exactly what the Chinese were talking about; but the balance of probabilities was that the territory in question lay on the British side of the McMahon Line. If so, then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were taking an interest in territory "which can not properly be regarded as part of China". Why? Stephenson doubted whether the Ministry, which he considered to be notoriously vague about geography, knew exactly where Ch'a-yü or K'o-mai were. The Chinese might well be making a "demarche to sustain their claim to suzerainty over Tibet". It was also probable, Stevenson thought, that the Chinese had been put up to making this protest by members of the Tibetan Goodwill Mission (of which more below) then in China. It looked to him as if the information in Dr. Wang's communication could only have come from Tibetan sources.[1072] In his reply to Dr. Wang, Stevenson contented himself with a request for clarification. Where exactly were Ch'a-yü and the other places he had mentioned?

Far from being geographically vague, Dr. Wang on 11 September 1946 sent Stevenson two excellent sketch maps, one showing the *hsien* (magistrate's districts) of Sikang currently still under Tibetan occupation but claimed by China, and the other giving Chinese names for places along the Lohit valley below Rima all the way to Sadiya. Dr. Wang also noted that since his communication of 2 July 1946 he had received further reports that in March 1946 there had been a supply drop by four aircraft over the British post at Walong, which was, of course, on Chinese territory. The Minister concluded rather curtly that

> the Chinese Government are paying close attention to the matter and very much hope that the . . [British] . . Embassy will speedily request the British Government to take early notice of the various points set forth in . . [the Foreign Ministry's] . . Note of 2nd July. The Chinese Government further declare that they reserve the right to claim compensation for any losses suffered by them as a result . . [of British encroachment].[1073]

Stevenson debated the wisdom of pointing out to Dr. Wang Shih-chieh the facts of the case as he saw them, that the McMahon Line was a valid border and that the Government of India had every right to be in Walong. On reflection, however, he decided to play for time and, perhaps, pass the whole matter on to the Government of India which would shortly be independent and which already had its own representative with the Chinese Government.[1074] He replied in this

sense to the Minister on 30 October 1946. Dr. Wang's observations had been communicated to New Delhi, Stevenson said, and the Government of India would in due course send instructions to their representative in Nanking from whom the Chinese Government could accordingly expect to receive a reply.[1075]

The Chinese were not prepared to be fobbed off in this way. On 15 November Dr. Wang returned to the charge that British and Indian troops were encroaching on Chinese territory in Sikang, and

> I have the honour to state that these unfortunate incidents have been going on for a long time and have aroused profound suspicion and uneasiness among the local inhabitants as well as among the people of the various provinces along the Chinese western frontier. The Chinese Government is extremely concerned over this and eagerly hopes that the British Government will restore the situation to the *status quo ante* as speedily as possible and guarantee that no similar incidents will occur in future.

Further, Dr. Wang wanted to know whether the British Government had "conferred on the Government of India full powers to discuss and settle all questions in connection with Tibet outstanding between China and Great Britain".[1076] The Chinese were evidently trying to use the Walong post as an excuse to realise Shen's ambition of a bilateral Sino-Indian conference to sort out the Tibetan question over the heads of the Kashag.

Stevenson could only reply that the British Government were not prepared at present to enter into the complexities of the Tibetan problem as a whole. All he could advise was that the Chinese Government, if they were really worried about Walong, should get in touch with the Government of India (now an Interim Government headed by Jawaharlal Nehru as Vice-President of the Executive Council) and discuss the problem with them direct.[1077]

Dr. Wang, on 28 January 1947, told Stevenson that this was simply not good enough. The encroachment at Walong was under the command of British officers and, moreover, the British Government still retained ultimate responsibility for India. The Chinese had no objection to the prospect of entering into direct discussions with the representatives of the Government of India; but the fact of the matter was that since Stevenson's communication of 30 October 1946 reporting his intention to refer back to New Delhi not a word had emerged from the Indian Mission. The Chinese Government, therefore, had no option but to reopen negotiations with the British Government. Since Dr. Wang's last communication on this subject (in November 1946) more evidence of British violations of Chinese sovereignty both on land and in the air had come to light. There had, for example, been an overflight of Ch'a-yü (Zayul) by a British reconnaissance aircraft on 10 November 1946. Would the British Government please withdraw all its troops from the Walong region

and in future make sure that no British aircraft wandered over Chinese airspace in Sikang.[1078]

The British reply was, on 14 February 1947, to confirm to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wai-chiao-pu) that in future all discussion of alleged British encroachments on the territory of China or Tibet would be handled not by the British Embassy but by the Embassy of India. In fact, on 5 February 1947, the Chinese had already sent a memorandum, couched in the same sort of language as used in communications to the British Embassy, to the Indian Chargé d'Affaires (who duly sent a copy to the British Embassy). The Indian Embassy, which had been waiting for at least three months for instructions on the Walong question from New Delhi, made a rather bland reply that "the only activities with which they have been concerned" in the Walong region "have been on the Indian side of the long recognised India-Tibet border". Now that a Sino-Indian dialogue appeared to have at last been established. L.H. Lamb (then in charge of the British Embassy in Nanking) reported that he hoped that "the Chinese Government have discontinued addressing us on the subject and the correspondence has thus been successfully diverted, at least for the time being, into a direct India-China channel". He was optimistic that the British Embassy would henceforth be "entirely relieved" of "this awkward case".[1079]

The nature of subsequent Sino-Indian exchanges one can only guess since the records are not available. There is no evidence either that the Chinese ceased to protest about the Walong post or that they were convinced by any arguments as to the validity of the McMahon Line border on the Lohit which the Government of India might have supplied their Nanking Embassy. By the time of the Transfer of Power, of course, the Kuomintang was facing an increasingly dangerous situation in its civil war with the Communists; but this would probably not have sufficed to make the Ministry of Foreign Affairs forget all about Zayul. In due course its attitude was inherited by the new Communist regime. Neither Kuomintang nor Communist Governments were prepared to permit the change of regime in India to give rise to a *de facto* extinction of potential or actual territorial claims.

The authorities in Lhasa were perfectly aware that the era of British rule in India was coming rapidly to an end. This presented grave dangers in that there was no guarantee that the new rulers of India would be as sympathetic towards Tibetan aspirations as had been some British officials. The change of regime in India, of course, also provided a unique opportunity, which might never recur, for change in the situation in Tibet. As a parting gift, for example, the British might just possibly be induced to come up with better terms for the McMahon Line, such as a withdrawal from Walong to Menilkrai in

addition to those concessions already on offer, the "Tawang Sop" and composition payments; or, failing that, they might at the last moment persuade the Chinese to provide a satisfactory, and legally binding, guarantee to Tibetan autonomy. On the other hand, the British might have nothing at all to give, in which case the Tibetans could well find that they had to look out for themselves. Such considerations suggested three main thrusts for a Tibetan policy which at first sight might seem far from coherent. There could be professions of the closest of relations with the British Government in London whoever might be ruling in New Delhi. At the same time there could be vigorous expressions of opposition to the McMahon Line policy, which, in any case, after the Transfer of Power was the direct concern of India rather than the United Kingdom; and this could be part and parcel of a concerted effort to assert in every possible way that Tibet was an independent sovereign state and not just a rather eccentric part of what had once been the Chinese Empire. Finally, there could be no harm in seeing what was now on offer in Nanking and exploring the possibilities of a new, and far closer, Sino-Tibetan relationship.

In some ways the Chinese enjoyed a more influential position in Lhasa at the end of World War II than they had since the days of Chao Erh-feng. Shen Tsung-lien (in British official eyes "a sinister figure") had managed to influence many leading personalities in Tibetan politics, and by a judicious mixture of persuasion and bribery he had established a very close relationship with Drepung and at least one part of Sera. He was able to exploit the positive elements of Chiang Kai-shek's declaration of 24 August 1945 which offered to Tibet "a very high degree of autonomy". He could argue on this basis that the Chinese in this postwar world had changed their attitude from apparent malevolence to obvious benevolence towards the current rulers in Lhasa. The Kuomintang, he might have pointed out, were certainly no worse than the British, who were nibbling away at Tibetan possessions in the Assam Himalayas like the proverbial big insect consuming the small. Finally, there had emerged once more the perennial problem of the Panchen Lama under Chinese protection which caused all leading Tibetans to take Chinese policy rather more seriously than they might otherwise have done; and this fact was exploited both by Shen and by his successor in Lhasa, Chen Hsi-chang.

Three possible successors to the 9th Incarnation (who had died in 30 November 1937, it will be recalled, just on the Chinese side of the Outer Tibet-Ch'inghai border) had been found by 1944. Two had been discovered in Kham by the Tashilhunpo authorities after an extensive and highly traditional search, and one, who was clearly the "Chinese" candidate, had been announced by the old Panchen Lama's followers in Ch'inghai.[1080] The Regent and the Tsongdu wanted the

final choice to be made in Tashilhunpo (which, of course, they considered could be kept under the influence of Lhasa), but the Ch'inghai faction refused. For a while Shen tried to secure for himself the right to make the final choice in Lhasa, exploiting the Republican equivalent of the old ceremony of the Golden Urn to which the Chinese had since the Manchu period attached such importance. In the end, about the time that Shen had left Lhasa in the latter part of 1945, the two "Tibetan" candidates were brought to Tashilhunpo to undergo suitable religious training preparatory to the final selection, while the "Chinese" candidate was taken to Kumbum for the same purpose. So long as the "Chinese" candidate remained in the field, under Chinese protection, there was always the prospect of a repetition of the situation during the final years of the 9th Incarnation's existence when it looked as if he would be brought back to Tibet by a Chinese army. This appeared all the more likely when in the summer of 1947 the Ch'inghai faction declared that their candidate was the only true Incarnation and that as far as they were concerned, the selection process was at an end. Their choice of Panchen Lama was formally enthroned at Kumbum in the presence of representatives of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission on 10 August 1949, one of the final official acts of the Kuomintang in Chinese Central Asia. Sining, the Ch'inghai capital, fell to the Communists three weeks later. During the last years of direct Anglo-Tibetan contact, at all events, the problem of the Panchen Lama hung once more like a sword of Damocles over the political life of Tibet.[1081]

In the new climate of world politics following the conclusion of World War II one of the chief architects of Tibetan foreign policy was Surkhang Dzasa. His diplomatic career extended back to the early 1930s when, as a Depon or General (Depon Surkhang Surpa), he had been involved with the negotiations with the Ch'inghai warlord Ma Pu-fang; and subsequently he was part of a Tibetan team trying to arrange the conditions for the Panchen Lama's return. He was one of the two officials who were in 1942 placed in charge of the new Tibetan Foreign Office, the other being a monk, the Ta Lama. By 1944 he had emerged as the major point of contact between the British Mission in Lhasa and the Tibetan authorities (with Ringang often acting as a kind of intermediary). In the final years of Tibetan autonomy before the "peaceful liberation" by the Chinese Communists, Surkhang Dzasa turned himself into something like a Tibetan Foreign Minister. His power was greatly reinforced by the presence of his son, Surkhang Shape, as a member of the Kashag.[1082] He also enjoyed both the friendship and the confidence of Tsarong who in the final years of Tibet before Chinese "liberation" was once again a figure of enormous influence. Writing in January 1947, Richardson had this to say of the man:

> Surkhang Dzasa is the dominant figure .. [in the Tibetan Foreign Office].[1083] .. He is an opium addict and a man of moods. Generally, he appears self-seeking and to some extent under the influence of the Chinese with whom he appears to have concerted the Tibetan Goodwill Mission to China. He is clever and, quite possibly he is convinced of his ability to outsmart everyone. To me .. [Richardson] .. he always expresses his zeal for Tibetan independence but I fear he is capable of anything.[1084]

Shen and Surkhang Dzasa seem to have got on very well; and between them they concocted one part of the scheme for the Tibetan Goodwill Mission. The idea was to send a Tibetan Mission first to India and then to China to congratulate two of the major combatants against Japan on their victory. *En passant*, the Mission could attend the proposed National Assembly in Nanking as Tibetan representatives. Surkhang Dzasa, however, appears to have concluded that he could play what amounted to a double, if not triple, game. The Goodwill Mission would also be the first step in establishing a sovereign Tibetan representation abroad (which was certainly not what the Chinese wanted) and it could even, in the process of offering congratulations to the Allies on victory, be turned into a substitute of sorts for the desired Tibetan attendance at the Peace Conference (which, of course, never took place).

The Mission, headed by Thubten Samphel Dzasa and Khemedse (Khemey) Dzasa (otherwise known as Kusangtse or Sonam Wangdi, and who was a brother of Surkhang Dzasa) arrived in New Delhi towards the end of February 1946, where they attended victory celebrations and called on the Viceroy, Lord Wavell.[1085] They then travelled to Calcutta to prepare for their journey by air to China.

The Tibetan Goodwill Mission, before it left New Delhi for Calcutta and China, performed yet another task. The Mission were provided with letters from both the 14th Dalai Lama and the Kashag to President Truman of the United States which they handed to the American Chargé in New Delhi, George R. Merrell, upon whom they called, to send on to Washington.[1086] The letters were of ceremonial import only; but they served to continue a link between Lhasa and Washington which had been founded by Suydam Cutting in the 1930s and reinforced by Brooke Dolan and Ilya Tolstoy in 1942-43. Merrell believed that it would be politic to return the call of the Goodwill Mission by making a visit to Lhasa; and he sought, unavailingly, for permission from the State Department.[1087] Even without going to Lhasa, however, Merrell was now in touch with Tibetan officialdom: this was to have important consequences in 1947 in connection with the Tibetan Trade Mission, as we shall see.

In Calcutta the Mission put up not at the Great Eastern Hotel as had originally been planned for it by the Government of India but at "China House", a hostelry owned and patronised by Chinese. Here a

variety of intrigues took place, not all of them welcome to the Government of India. Also staying at "China House" were the Dalai Lama's brother, Gyalo Dhondup, and his brother-in-law, Püntso Trashi, both of whom were then living in a somewhat dissolute manner financed by a Rs. 10,000 subvention from Shen Tsung-lien. It transpired that these two, along with Shen (who was now in Calcutta undergoing medical treatment), planned to fly to China in company with the Goodwill Mission.[1088] Indeed, Shen had evidently made it seem as if the Mission were travelling under his direct supervision. While in Calcutta the Mission were visited by Pangdatsang and another great Tibetan trader, Sadustshang, as well as by the former favourite of the late 13th Dalai Lama, Kunphel La. Quite what was afoot was not clear to the Government of India: probably, it was thought, some trading venture in China was being planned.

The Goodwill Mission, Shen, the Dalai Lama's brother and brother-in-law, all set out together by air for China on 4 April 1946. The Mission's arrival on the following day in Nanking was widely reported in the Chinese press as that of a Tibetan delegation to the Chinese National Assembly escorted by Shen Tsung-lien.[1089] There were delays in the opening of the Assembly; but when it finally met in November 1946 the Tibetans duly took their place. Thubten Samphel Dzasa was even elected a member of the Presidium of the Assembly; and he took part on 1 January 1947 in the approval of the new Chinese Constitution which provided for subsequent Tibetan representation in the Assembly as a Chinese Border Province. The Goodwill Mission was back in Tibet by May 1947.

The Government of India were rather disturbed by the presence of the Tibetans in the Chinese National Assembly, which Richardson was instructed to point out to the Tibetan Government constituted a breach of the Simla Convention of 1914.[1090] Surkhang Dzasa claimed that orders had been issued to the Mission in June 1946 simply to present a letter to Chiang Kai-shek, allegedly outlining Tibetan demands vis à vis China, and then return home; but that the Lhasa commands had been ignored. The Tibetan delegation, denying that they had been told to come back, yet maintained that they had been tricked by the Chinese. They had merely intended to pay a visit of courtesy, as it were, to the National Assembly, and were most surprised when they found themselves formally seated amidst other delegates and announced as the elected representatives of Tibet.[1091] They also argued that the Tibetan delegation had been virtually kidnapped by the Chinese and held in Nanking against their will pending the much delayed opening of the National Assembly. Tibetan specialists like Richardson, however, who knew their Surkhang Dzasa, must have suspected that the Tibetans had been putting out a great deal of smoke to conceal the reality of their dealings with the Kuomintang. The balance of probabilities, there-

fore, suggests that while they were in China the Tibetan Goodwill Mission pursued two apparently equal and opposite objectives. They acted as representatives of their country in what amounted to a Chinese Parliament. At the same time, they delivered a demand from the Tsongdu that China surrender territory improperly taken from Kham and Amdo, in other words return to Outer Tibet Sikang and the bulk of Ch'inghai.[1092] Of course, in Tibetan eyes these two actions were not really contradictory at all. The Tibet represented in the Assembly, enjoying the kind of autonomy which Chiang Kai-shek had indicated in August 1945 was on offer, could perfectly well include all of Kham and Amdo.[1093]

Unlike the Government of India, some members at least of the British Embassy in Nanking were not particularly perturbed by the Tibetan presence in the Chinese National Assembly. As L.H. Lamb put it in a letter to George Kitson of the Foreign Office Far Eastern Department in London, while the evidence concerning the behaviour of the Tibetan Goodwill Mission in China "certainly suggests that these Tibetans were rogues rather than innocents at large" and that they were carrying on a variety of intrigues with the Chinese authorities (while at the same time investigating their attitudes and policies), yet

> I wonder if we are not taking the matter too seriously. The Chinese love of self deception is well known (and their own public can have few illusions as to the fiction of their boasted suzerainty over Tibet), while the rest of the world can scarcely be taken in by such pretension, whether aired in the press or more solemnly in the National Assembly. And the effect or significance of the presence of Tibetan representatives in the Assembly must be appreciably discounted by the fact that delegates also came from the United Kingdom and other parts of the world which no one is likely to credit as being part of China.[1094]

The Dalai Lama's brother and brother-in-law, while not formally part of the Mission, yet proceeded to carry out what appeared to be political functions. Gyalo Dhondup was reported to have been given an official position by Chiang Kai-shek.[1095] The two relatives of the Dalai Lama also embarked at this time on discussions with the ruler of Ch'inghai, Ma Pu-fang, both in Nanking and in Sining.

Just before the Goodwill Mission's return from China, there was held in New Delhi between 23 March and 2 April 1947 an Inter-Asian Relations Conference convened by the Indian Council on World Affairs with the active support of the Congress Party. Tibet sent a delegation of eight plus one observer to join delegates from Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, China, Egypt, India, Indo-China, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Malaya, Mongolia, Nepal, Palestine, the Philippines, Thailand, and the USSR, and observers from the Arab League, Bhutan, Turkey, Australia and the United States in what might be described as in some respects a trial run for Bandung.[1096]

The Tibetan delegation endeavoured to demonstrate their special status by disassociating themselves entirely from the Chinese delegation, and by displaying their own flag at the opening session. The organisers of the Conference had also indicated that Tibet was quite distinct from China on a map of Asia on show in the Conference hall. Chinese protest, however, resulted in both the withdrawal of the offending map and the Tibetan delegation agreeing not to use their flag.[1097] While the Tibetans were treated with great courtesy by leading Indians (they met both Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru), they were not formally acknowledged as representatives of a sovereign state by the successor statesmen to the British Indian Empire. It cannot be said that the Tibetan presence at the Inter-Asian Relations Conference either demonstrated or did not demonstrate Tibetan independence. What it did show, however, was that the Chinese did not accept such a status and that Jawaharlal Nehru and his colleagues were not going to go out of their way to contradict the Chinese on this point.[1098]

The Tibetan Goodwill Mission and the Tibetan presence at the Inter-Asian Relations Conference represented facets of a new trend in Tibetan policy which, in the context of the way things had been managed in Lhasa ever since the death of the 13th Dalai Lama, was revolutionary. The pressures of change in India with the impending departure of the British and of even more profound change in China with the war with Japan over and the Kuomintang-Communist conflict rapidly nearing its crisis had stirred up Tibetan politics in a way for which there was no precedent. As in any polity, change in Tibet was expressed through the available channels of political activity and involved the main participants in the political process. In Outer Tibet in 1946 and 1947 there were probably three main parties to any political development. First: there was the traditional Lhasa establishment, still dominated to a formidable degree by the great monasteries and the nobility. Second: there was an emigré Tibetan community in Kalimpong containing a number of refugees from Lhasa including some who had once enjoyed great power, like Kunphel La, the favourite of the late 13th Dalai Lama, which had something of the potential of a government in exile. Finally: there were Tibetan factions with their roots not in Lhasa but in the east, either in Kham or in Sikang. Each of these groups was divided within itself; and it was virtually impossible for all three to act in a concerted way. In Lhasa there was a pro-Chinese faction, with considerable support in Drepung monastery and, it seemed, in one of the four main colleges of Sera, Che College.[1099] This was inclined towards some kind of accommodation with China in which it was hoped the traditional Tibetan way of life would be protected in exchange for a renunciation of a close relationship with the ruling power in India. It was a very powerful faction, its importance generally underrated by

outside observers whose Tibetan contacts usually came from a pro-British elite, what one might perhaps call the Tsarong set. The pro-British modernisers in Tibet, however, including some leading personalities like Tsarong, a small number of people educated abroad in Darjeeling and elsewhere, some officers in the army and the like, while close to the British Mission in Lhasa, were not united behind a single line of policy. Nor were they strong enough, even had they so wished, to seize control of the conduct of Tibetan policy both external and internal and prepare realistically for defence against a possible Chinese onslaught. The best the modernisers could do was to wait for something to turn up.

The Kalimpong expatriate Tibetans, likewise, did not represent anything like a united force. Tibetans were not really by culture a political people; and the majority of them who lived outside Tibet devoted their energies, often extremely efficiently, to making money. There was more sound than substance, therefore, in Kalimpong intrigues.

Also interested in commerce and profit were many of the leaders of Tibetan society in Kham and Sikang. Many prominent Khampas had long ago made their peace with the Chinese and, provided their freedom of action was not interfered with, were more concerned with keeping Lhasa at bay than with the overthrow of Chinese control. Both the Kuomintang and the Sikang overlord Liu Wen-hui had established close links with powerful figures in eastern Tibet, not least the Pangda family from near Batang. The Pangda, indeed, spread themselves across much of the spectrum of Tibetan politics. The head of the family, Yangpel Pangdatsang, was probably the richest man in Outer Tibet and a financial adviser to the Kashag as well as occupying a dominant position in Tibet's trade with India. He was closely associated with the kind of foreign policy, enigmatic and contradictory though it was, that Surkhang Dzasa was endeavouring to implement. One of his brothers, Pangda Topgye, was at this period resident in Sikang where he had a rapport both with Liu Wen-hui's regime and Chiang Kai-shek (from whom he held the honorary rank of Colonel in the Chinese Army). Another brother, Pangda Rapga, was living in exile in Kalimpong.

In the first half of 1946 the Government of India became aware of some kind of conspiracy in Kalimpong involving a number of Tibetan residents who had become associated with what was described as a "Tibet Revolutionary Party" or, rather less dramatically, "Tibet Improvement Party". The precise objectives of this body, if it indeed existed, were never very clear; but police evidence indicated the following. There was some measure of Chinese involvement, either from the Chinese representative in Lhasa, Chen Hsi-chan and Shen Tsung-lien before him, or from the Chinese Consulate-General in Calcutta. The leading figures in Kalimpong associated with this

intrigue were Pangda Rapga, Kunphel La, and Changlo Chen, a former colleague of Kunphel La's of Kung (Duke) status who had also fled from Tibetan rustication to Kalimpong. These three had some connection with Pangda Rapga's brother, the great trader Yangpel Pangdatsang (who at that time acted as Tibetan Trade Agent in Yatung), and with the former Regent, Reting, now in retirement in his monastery. Both Pangdatsang and Reting had extensive commercial interests. Reting had been deeply involved in the trade across Tibet between India and Likiang in Yunnan which had so greatly expanded during the War; and he was, accordingly, in frequent touch with Kalimpong which was Tibet's main external commercial centre in India.[1100]

Pangda Rapga, whom Indian police intelligence saw as the leader, had been deeply involved with the Kuomintang for many years. He first came to India in 1935 and then went on to Chungking whence, soon after entering the service of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, he returned to India. In 1943 he left for Chungking again, coming back to India the following year equipped with a Chinese official passport. In 1939 he was one of the founders in Kalimpong of the "Tibet Improvement Party". Pangda Rapga, it appeared, had been provided with funds by Shen Tsung-lien for setting up a printing press in Kalimpong. The "Tibet Improvement Party" produced in 1945 a manifesto which was redolent with Kuomintang rhetoric, supporting the *San-min-chu-i* (Three People's Principles) of Sun Yat-sen. "Recently", the manifesto proclaimed, "President Chiang has declared to allow autonomy for Tibet. According to this we must exert our efforts mainly for Liberation of Tibet from the existing tyrannical Government". Perhaps this "Liberation" was to coincide with the presence of Tibetan representatives at the Chinese National Assembly; but we do not know. Pangda Rapga arranged, probably with funds provided by the Chinese, for Thacker Spinks of Calcutta to print no less than 4,000 forms of application for membership of the "Tibet Improvement Party", written in both Tibetan and Chinese.[1101] There was evidence that these were intended for circulation not only among Tibetans in India but also in both Outer Tibet and Sikang.

Pangda Rapga's activities were carefully watched by the Indian police, who showed much greater efficiency now than they had in the days of the comings and goings of Dorjiev between Lhasa and Russia at the turn of the century. His correspondence was systematically intercepted, including that with the Chinese Consulate-General in Calcutta; and in July 1946 a deportation order was served on him. The Chinese Consulate-General intervened on his behalf, seeking a delay of deportation for three months so that he could wind up his business in Kalimpong, which was refused. Surkhang Dzasa requested that he be returned to Tibet for trial there on a charge of

treason; but this too was refused. Pangda Rapga left Calcutta for Shanghai by air on 19 July 1946 and he then joined his brother Pangda Topgye in Sikang.[1102] One of his associates in Kalimpong, a certain Jampa Wosel (whose Chinese name in the Indian Police records was Chang Fang Kun) was arrested on grounds of illegal presence in India and eventually ordered to be deported at the very end of 1946. Kunphel La, because of his involvement with Pangda Rapga, was "externed" (a British euphemism for a form of internal exile) from Bengal so as to remove him from future political temptations; but there was no question of his being extradited to Tibet.

Throughout the unravelling of the Pangda Rapga affair Hopkinson and Richardson kept Surkhang Dzasa informed of what was going on including hints as to the names of persons suspected of being associated with the "Tibet Improvement Party". What Surkhang Dzasa did with this information, which cast suspicion on both Pangdatsang and the former Regent, Reting, is not known. Chen of the Chinese Mission in Lhasa was also in frequent touch with Surkhang Dzasa over the affair; and it may well be that Surkhang Dzasa was not entirely hostile to some features at least of whatever schemes were afoot. Some of Pangda Rapga's contacts in Tibet were either rounded up or driven into hiding. Pangdatsang, however, remained free and powerful: he was clearly too big a man to handled on the basis of this kind of evidence. Nor was Reting touched; but it could be that the exposure of the Pangda Rapga conspiracy, whatever exactly it may have been, was the prelude to the next act in the drama.[1103]

In 1944 there had been rumours that Reting, who had retired not long after the installation of the 14th Dalai Lama, intended to return to power in place of the elderly Regent Taktra. In December 1944 Reting came to Lhasa and resided at Che College of Sera monastery. There immediately followed a crisis in the relations between Che College and the Kashag, the ostensible cause being the College's refusal to surrender some monks who had been responsible for the killing of a tax collector. Troops in the end had to be sent in to restore order. The Abbot of Che College was variously reported as having been executed and his head and hands brought to the Kashag for their inspection or having been obliged to flee to some unknown refuge (the head and hands belonging to the corpse of one of his servants). Reting, meanwhile, prudently withdrew from Lhasa for a while.

There matters rested until 14 April 1947 when Reting's Lhasa residence was put under seal by the Kashag; and on the following day two quite senior officials believed to have been associated with him were arrested. The monks of Che College of Sera promptly went on the rampage. Troops were thereupon sent to arrest Reting himself on

the grounds, the Tsongdu (by now in emergency session) was told, that he had tried to murder the Regent Taktra by means of a parcel bomb (a box containing a hand grenade which was opened by a servant).[1104] News of Reting's arrest only served to further inflame the Che College monks. The Kashag were obliged to use two guns (of British origin) against the College as well as virtually all the troops then in Lhasa. By 29 April the College had fallen and was in the process of being systematically looted and then destroyed. Considerable damage was also inflicted on Reting monastery, apparently as a consequence of a violent search for the former Regent's treasure.

Meanwhile Reting had been brought before the Tsongdu, sitting in the Potala, to be tried for crimes which included active collaboration with the Chinese and the attempted murder of the Regent Taktra. He was found guilty. On 8 May 1947 he died in prison after, it was said, having made a full confession. It was widely believed that he had been murdered. On 18 May punishment was handed out to some of the late Reting's associates. His brother received 250 lashes and Kartho Rimpoche, an important Incarnation from Che College of Sera, no less than 260 lashes, and both men were then confined in great discomfort in a specially constructed prison. Some 30 monks and a minor lay official were also flogged and placed in a variety of forms of custody.

This was a major crisis in Tibetan political life, far more serious than that which had attended the fall of Lungshar in 1934, perhaps equal only to the monastic outbreak in Lhasa in 1921 during Bell's Mission. It was extremely violent. Over 200 monks from Che College, for example, were killed. What was it all about? The various accounts are not clear on this point.[1105] It is reasonable to suppose, however, that the Kashag's claim that Reting had been in contact with the Chinese, including a correspondence with Chiang Kai-shek, was correct, and that his plan had been to establish a new regime in Lhasa prepared to negotiate some kind of special relationship with the Kuomintang involving the kind of autonomy within the family of Five Races which the Generalissimo had indicated to be on offer in August 1945.

It was in the shadow of the Reting affair that, on 15 August 1947, the British Mission in Lhasa became the Indian Mission. The full impact of this change was somewhat blunted by the decision to keep Richardson *en poste* as the Mission's Head, now representing a Government in New Delhi presided over by Jawaharlal Nehru and in no way responsible to Whitehall. What was British policy towards Tibet in these altered circumstances?

The speed with which after the end of the War the British pulled out of India must have surprised many officials both in India and in London; but there could be no doubt that a withdrawal would take place, if not in 1947 then in 1948 or 1949. It was only a matter of

time; and the essential questions of policy were the same. The process of reassessing policy, as we have seen in an earlier Chapter, can be said to have begun at least as early as January 1945. The problem as perceived in London was that on the one hand the Tibetans had made it clear that they wished some form of international recognition of their freedom from direct Chinese rule (by, perhaps, being represented at the Peace Conference) and that they wanted an assurance from the British that they would see them through in their efforts to get the Chinese to accept their autonomy. On the other hand, the Chinese had of late committed themselves to making provision for Tibetan representation in their People's Political Council, the embryonic form of a Kuomintang Parliament. Moreover, in the draft Constitution, published in 1936, Tibet had been specifically included within the territory of the Republic of China. Given these divergent views, the Tibetan and the Chinese, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, wondered whether

> it may now be desirable for His Majesty's Government to review their Tibetan policy once more with the object of determining the degree and nature of autonomy which they consider it essential, in the interests of India, that Tibet should enjoy; how far they are prepared to go in pursuit of this aim; what line they would propose to take in any international discussion on the subject; and, in fact, whether or not they wish to encourage such international discussion.[1106]

The review of Tibetan policy involved the consideration of three main factors. First: what role did Tibet now have to play in the defence of the Indian Empire which would shortly become the fully independent Indian Dominion? Was the Tibetan buffer still essential, or had recent developments in the art of war made it superfluous? Second: what, now, was the international status of Tibet? Did the expression "suzerainty", describing Chinese interests and rights there, mean that Tibet should now be dealt with by the British Government through China rather than through Lhasa as had been the case hitherto *de facto* if not *de jure*? Finally: if Tibet were indeed sufficiently sovereign to carry on its own foreign relations, should these with the United Kingdom not be executed through the independent Government of India rather than by a process of direct Anglo-Tibetan diplomacy? Between 1945 and 1947 there was considerable discussion of these questions and debate between various branches of the British Government, both civil and military, in India and in London.

The Indian military view was clear enough. The War had shown that deserts, mountains and jungles were not very effective barriers to hold off determined invaders. The northern borderland of India marked by the Himalayas, therefore, still required the additional protection of a Tibetan buffer behind it enjoying at least the same

degree of autonomy at present demonstrated by the Lhasa Government. If China took over Tibet it might sooner or later attempt some military penetration of the mountains towards the Himalayan States and India; and one day Russia might take the place of China to pose a far more serious threat. One obvious danger was in Nepal where the presence of such a menace to the north would create a demand for the retention for Nepalese use of Gurkha soldiers, thus depriving the British of their services. Tibet, on its own, was probably unable to hold off any invader for very long though the nature of the terrain and the primitive state of Tibetan communications would certainly delay a hostile advance sufficiently for help to be supplied from India. There was no immediate danger; but the problem could not be ignored. The conclusion was that

> if either China or Russia gained control of Tibet then India would immediately have to provide adequate forces to maintain "watch and ward" along her northern frontiers, with the prospect of these forces having to be substantially increased as time went on. It is, therefore, most desirable from the military point of view that the autonomy of Tibet should be maintained and potential aggressors kept at a distance for as long as possible. Tibetan autonomy can harm no one; it has been in existence for the last 34 years and the Tibetans themselves wish it to continue. We should support this desire for autonomy by diplomatic action and encourage Tibet to preserve her integrity by the supply of arms and ammunition.

There was a proviso, however, that such a supply of war material should only be made if the Tibetans specifically requested it.[1107]

In 1946 the General Staff of the Indian Army explored the practical problems of military assistance to Tibet. A hostile power in control of Tibet could not only threaten India with physical invasion but also with attack from the air either by manned aircraft or missiles. It would be as well, therefore, if some contingency plans were worked out. The first requirement was that the Tibetans made some preparations themselves. It was considered that an extra brigade group (some 3,000 men) with its officers and NCOs trained in India and supplied by the British with modern weapons might hold for a time the main approaches to Lhasa: such a force, of course, did not at present exist and needed to be created. The best that the British could offer in way of support would be one division transported and supplied by air plus, perhaps, some strategic bombing of enemy lines of communication. Plans would have to be made to cover either a Chinese or a Russian attack. In either case airfields would be required at Tuna (just north of Phari at the head of the Chumbi Valley), Lhasa, Chamdo and Nagchuka. Given adequate preparation, British reinforcements could be in place in about three weeks from the outbreak of hostilities.[1108]

By 1947 most of this must have seemed pure fantasy. With the Transfer of Power there was no way that British troops could be deployed in Tibet even if the British Cabinet were to consider for one moment such a step. All that could be done in the real world was to supply arms and ammunition if requested by the Kashag. In March 1947 the Tibetans asked for 42 two inch mortars with 63,000 bombs, 144 Brens with 5,000,000 rounds, 168 Stens with 3,000,000 rounds, and 1,260 rifles with 2,000,000 rounds. The supply of these was approved, with the quantity of ammunition doubled except for the mortar bombs which were in short supply in India. Jawaharlal Nehru, head of the Interim Government, was consulted; and he agreed to continue the supply of ammunition to Tibet after the Transfer of Power.[1109] This was the last of a series of direct British arms consignments to Tibet which had begun with the 5,000 rifles supplied after the Simla Conference in 1914.[1110] In the past British arms had served Tibet well, particularly in 1918 and again in the early 1930s; and it may be that without them the Chinese would have returned to Lhasa in force in the lifetime of the 13th Dalai Lama. The 1947 consignment, however, was sufficient for only one very weak brigade. There was no additional artillery. Even if efficiently deployed it was totally inadequate to beat off one of the better Kuomintang units; and against the might of the People's Liberation Army it would indeed be pathetic.

The Foreign Office proposal in January 1945 that British policy towards Tibet be reviewed aroused considerable suspicion in both the India Office and the Government of India. As R. Peel of the India Office put it in a letter to Caroe:

> I imagine that it .. [the proposed review] .. arises from the general desire of the Foreign Office, with an eye to the future, to keep on good terms with China and to abolish if possible causes of friction of which Tibet is definitely a major one. I rather fear that Teichman's defeatist view that China was bound to absorb Tibet sooner or later and that we might as well be prepared to accept that situation, may find some acceptance in the Foreign Office and one can see that it might be convenient for H.M.G. to be able to use Tibet as a bargaining counter over the question of Hong Kong.[1111]

There was going to be a struggle to keep Tibet included in that list of regions which were of strategic interest to the British Government. The best arguments were called for. Would Caroe please oblige?

Caroe answered such calls with a very long review of the Tibetan problem in September 1945, one of his last efforts as Indian Foreign Secretary. He went over all the old familiar ground. The Chinese were making a mess of things in Eastern Tibet: what reasons were there for supposing that they would do any better in Outer Tibet? Any change in the status of Tibet, or the structure of power there,

would affect Nepal and disturb the tranquility of the Himalayas elsewhere, in Bhutan for instance.[1112] Tibet was full of all sorts of valuable minerals, gold and perhaps oil, that might one day be exploited by or through India. Its trade was far from negligible: why let the Chinese grab it? The idea of Chinese "suzerainty", Caroe concluded, was really nonsense. Tibet had been to all intents and purposes independent since 1912. "Chinese suzerainty", he wrote, "is a relic to be recognized by no more than the observance of ceremonial formalities". If the Chinese were happy with this kind of "suzerainty", then they should be allowed to continue to enjoy it. The real issue, Caroe stated, was that

> from the point of view of defence ... the maintenance of the autonomous position of Tibet with its vast desert areas and great altitudes, is no less important now than it has been in the past in spite of modern military and scientific developments.

What could the British do? Caroe laid down a number of possible courses of action. The British could use their diplomatic facilities all over the world, and particularly in the United States of America, to make public the facts about the real position of Tibet, that it was not just another rather quaint corner of China. They could, perhaps, also bring the question of Tibet before the newly founded United Nations, even if the Chinese, with their veto in the Security Council (of which China was one of the five permanent members), would probably block any decision.[1113] At least the issue would get an airing. The most useful act, however, would be for the British Government to make "an open declaration to the Powers . . . stating that it was their definite policy as well as that of the Government of India to maintain Tibetan autonomy and that they intended to do all in their power to do so".[1114]

Caroe's arguments arrived in the India Office at a moment when, towards the end of September 1945, it seemed as if in possible forthcoming discussions between T.V. Soong and Ernest Bevin (Foreign Secretary in the Labour Government which had come to power in July 1945) in London the question of Tibet might come up. The India Office, which on the whole were not unsympathetic to Caroe's outlook, devoted a great deal of effort to keeping the Foreign Office in line at least with the decisions made during the Soong-Eden encounters of 1943. The problem was what should be said if Soong referred to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's offer of a "very high degree of autonomy" (made in his speech to China's National Defence Council and Central Executive Committee on 24 August 1945 already referred to above). The Foreign Office were persuaded that the best reply would be a non-committal one but that the Foreign Secretary could say that he did not object to any arrangement concerning Tibet which did not alter "the *status quo* between India and Tibet, under

which the latter country is entitled to maintain direct relations with India".[1115] In the event the opportunity to discuss the subject did not arise.

After a thorough scrutiny of Caroe's letter of 19 September by the India Office, and a debate on the Tibetan issue between that Office and the Foreign Office, all of which generated much paper, a policy of sorts was agreed to which was put up to the Cabinet in November 1945. The mountain, however, had eventually brought forth nothing but a mouse. After reviewing the history of the status of Tibet since 1911, it was noted that

> the factors governing the Tibetan question are that –
> (a) Tibet has, in practice, regarded herself as autonomous and has maintained her autonomy for over thirty years;
> (b) His Majesty's Government's attitude is that we recognize Chinese suzerainty, but only on the understanding that Tibet is regarded as autonomous by China.

From these axioms the following lines of policy were deduced:

> in any discussion with the Chinese Government affecting the status of Tibet His Majesty's Representatives should –
> a) avoid committing His Majesty's Government to recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet unconditionally and independently of Chinese acceptance of Tibetan autonomy; and
> b) if necessary add a warning that if the Chinese attempted to upset Tibetan autonomy His Majesty's Government would have to consider the withdrawal of their recognition of Chinese suzerainty.[1116]

This was a policy which made no provision for British military action. If the Chinese occupied Tibet by force, all the British would do would be to announce that they no longer recognised Chinese suzerainty. It was not very likely that the Chinese would be so terrified by this that they would immediately pull out from the roof of the world. Of course, it was always possible that an Indian army and air force might come to Tibet's aid; but not, the policy made clear, from an India for whose actions the Government of the United Kingdom took direct responsibility. The contingency plans of the Indian Army in 1946, for example, would certainly never be implemented so long as Whitehall was at the helm.

By the beginning of 1946 the Foreign Office had decided that it did not want its representatives in China, if they could possibly avoid it, to raise the question of Tibet at all with the Kuomintang. The India Office, in response to Caroe's proposals of 19 September 1945, had reported that there should be increased British diplomatic pressure on China to coincide with the visit of the Tibetan Goodwill Mission, the aim being to obtain an amplification of the definition of autonomy which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had offered on 24 August 1945. Perhaps the British Embassy in Nanking and the Tibetan

Goodwill Mission could act in concert in bombarding the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs with questions on this point? If nothing else, the appearance of British diplomatic activity in China might persuade Lhasa to adopt a more helpful approach to Indian policy in the McMahon areas. Ernest Bevin, however, thought otherwise. The Foreign Office told the India office that

> as regards the Government of India's proposal that support for Tibetan autonomy should be given by the strongest and most outspoken diplomatic pressure, if only to satisfy the Tibetans that our action in the McMahon area is not in any way designed to break up the state of Tibet, Mr. Bevin considers that our action in the McMahon area should be allowed to stand on its own merits. He feels that the moment is inopportune for His Majesty's Government to take the initiative in raising the question of Tibetan autonomy, and that it is preferable that the Tibetans should be left to initiate the matter themselves, should they wish to do so.[1117]

By the eve of the Transfer of Power in 1947 the Foreign Office had decided that the British would now to all intents and purposes cease to have anything to do with Tibet. The Government of India, despite the voices of the Tibetan specialists in its service, had more or less come to terms with the view in London. As L.A.C. Fry, Deputy Indian Foreign Secretary soon to be translated to the U.K. High Commission in New Delhi, put it somewhat ponderously:

> the conditions in which India's well-being may be assured and the full evolution be achieved of her inherent capacity to emerge as a potent but benevolent force in world affairs, particularly in Asia, demand not merely the development of internal unity and strength but also the maintenance of friendly relations with her neighbours. To prejudice her relations with so important a Power as China by aggressive support of unqualified Tibetan independence (for which, whatever may have been the situation earlier, there has been in the past year or so been little positive sign of ardour in Lhasa) is therefore a policy with few attractions. It follows that while the Government of India are glad to recognise and wish to see Tibetan autonomy maintained, they are not prepared to do more than encourage this in a friendly manner and are certainly not disposed to take any initiative which might bring India into conflict with China on this issue. The attitude which they propose to adopt may best be described as that of a benevolent spectator, ready at all times – should opportunity occur – to use their good offices to further a mutually satisfactory settlement between China and Tibet. It should be added, recollecting in particular the participation of the Tibetan Goodwill Mission in the recent session of the Chinese National Assembly, that the Government of India would not for a moment consider objection to or interference with any arrangement that Tibet might come to directly with China.

Even on the McMahon Line issue the Government of India was now advocating a new spirit of conciliation. As Fry wrote:

> in regard to the Indo-Tibetan boundary, the Government of India stand by the McMahon Line and will not tolerate incursions into India such as that which recently occurred in the Siang valley. They would however at all times be prepared to discuss in a friendly way with China and Tibet any rectification of the frontier that might be urged on reasonable grounds by any of the parties to the abortive Simla Conference of 1914.[1118]

The departures here from the Caroe doctrine are startling. Caroe would have shuddered at the idea of the British being merely benevolent spectators in the arena of Sino-Tibetan relations. He would not have accepted for one moment that the Government of India were obliged to acquiesce in the acceptance by the Tibetan authorities of a subordinate position vis à vis China in contravention of the Simla Convention. He would have objected violently to the proposal that the alignment of the McMahon Line could be discussed with the Chinese who, he would have argued, had nothing to do with the case. He would not have been amused to see his beloved Simla Convention, which he had with such ingenuity and effort managed to smuggle into the corpus of Aitchison's *Treaties*, described as "abortive": at least it should be no worse than "semi-abortive".

Caroe and his disciples had always assumed that when the British withdrew from India they would retain some form of representation in Lhasa. In June 1947, however, in the light of this fresh approach of masterly non-involvement with Tibet characteristic of benevolent spectators, it was resolved that all the matters which made up the British relationship with Tibet should at the moment of Transfer of Power be assumed by India (but not, interestingly enough, Pakistan). Accordingly, in July 1947 Richardson informed the Tibetan Foreign Office that he would shortly be replaced by an Indian. When it transpired that no suitable Indian was available, and Richardson was asked to continue in Lhasa for a while, he was instructed to tell the Tibetan Government that from 15 August 1947 onwards he was representing the Government of the Dominion of India only, and was in no way the accredited representative of the United Kingdom.[1119] He was, however, authorised to ask the Tibetan Government whether they would be prepared from time to time to accept visits to Lhasa by the British High Commissioner in New Delhi or a member of his staff, thus keeping alive in a modest way those friendly Anglo-Tibetan contacts which had extended back to 1910 when the 13th Dalai Lama sought refuge under the protection of British India.[1120]

Anglo-Tibetan relations now were focussed on whether the British High Commissioner or one of his staff would actually visit Lhasa. In October 1948, when Hopkinson was giving advice to the High Commission on the subject while waiting to leave India (having recently retired from his post as Political Officer in Sikkim), no visit had been decided upon. Hopkinson saw no reason why it should not

take place though he did feel that the new Government of India would not be too happy at the prospect of a permanent British presence in Lhasa. There was, in any case, no pressing need for it. Outer Tibet, Hopkinson reported, was governed by an extremely weak regime, albeit strongly anti-Communist. If it fell, however, it would not be replaced by anything "revolutionary" (that is to say, pro-Chinese) like the sort of party which had been supported by Pangda Rapga: another faction with views identical to those held by the Regent Taktra and his colleagues would take over. Hopkinson thought that Jawaharlal Nehru was really quite sympathetic to Tibet, and the Tibetans no longer feared that he would sell out their interests in a deal with Chiang Kai-shek (whom Nehru greatly admired). There seemed to be no Tibetan crisis at all events, though news of events in Lhasa now reaching the High Commission was slight and fragmentary. Hopkinson thought that he might be a suitable person to represent the High Commission on a visit to Lhasa, perhaps in 1949 or 1950.[1121]

L.H. Lamb, acting in charge of the Embassy in Nanking and writing in August 1948, considered that a British visit to Lhasa in 1949 or 1950 (preferably while Richardson was still there) would do no harm though it would certainly give rise to Kuomintang protest. The Chinese Government were still extremely sensitive about foreign pressure on Tibet. They had never ceased protesting to the Indian Embassy in Nanking concerning "encroachments" in the Sadiya region and they had been very disturbed by the reception of the Tibetan Trade Mission (of which more shortly) in the United States. L.H. Lamb felt that, whatever was decided about the Lhasa visit, it would be unwise for the British to depart from their previous support for Tibetan autonomy (as it had been outlined in the Eden statement of July 1943); and he evidently dissented from some recent trends in Foreign Office thinking on this point. Finally, he thought that a British visit to Lhasa might well be explained as a courtesy reply to the Tibetan Trade Mission soon to visit London: this would at least be an argument which could be used in response to the inevitable objections from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[1122]

The independent Government of India were also consulted about the proposed British High Commission visit to Lhasa. While they did not declare themselves to be opposed to the idea in principle, they objected to it for the 1949 season because that was when the new Indian official in Sikkim, Harishwar Dayal, would himself be in Lhasa; and the Government of India clearly did not want the glory of their representative to be dimmed by the brilliant light of the former imperial regime.[1123]

1948 was, however, probably the last year in which a British mission to Lhasa was a matter of practical politics. While as late as November 1949, with the remnants of the Kuomintang rapidly disappearing

from the face of mainland China (the establishment of the People's Republic of China was formally proclaimed by Chairman Mao Tse-tung in October 1949), the U.K. High Commission in New Delhi was still suggesting that a British visit to Lhasa in 1950 might have a beneficial effect on Tibetan morale and inspire the Kashag to stand up to the Chinese Communists whose occupation of Tibet was not inevitable, the view in London was that while the British ought to "discourage a defeatist attitude on part of Government of India" and, if possible, "stiffen Tibetan Government's determination to resist", yet all this should happen without "provoking Chinese Communists" by such gestures as an official visit to Lhasa. The desire not to alienate the regime which was clearly going to replace the Kuomintang in China had become paramount. The British were not going to risk their future relations with China (and the possibility of retaining their vast economic stake in that country) by overt aid and comfort to the Tibetans. It might be appropriate for the new Government of India to take some action, of course; but London had observed that the Government of India had ruled out direct military assistance to Tibet. What then could be done? If the Government of India ever had to make a statement to the Chinese Communists on the status of Tibet, it would be as well if they adhered to the language used by Antony Eden in 1943 about suzerainty and autonomy in his memorandum to T.V. Soong; but the Indian recognition of Tibetan *independence* was quite out of the question. The Tibetans, however, could well be supplied with small arms in "an unobtrusive manner": this should be done through the Government of India rather than directly either by the United Kingdom or the United States (which might provoke the Chinese Communists to invade Tibet). Finally,

> as regards proposal to send a British Mission to Lhasa in 1950, we consider that unless India is likely to give active support to Tibet in case of Chinese aggression, advantages which might result from the Mission would be outweighed by its provocative effect in China.[1124]

The mission, therefore, never took place; and, with the withdrawal from Lhasa of Hugh Richardson in August 1950 the era of an official British presence in the Tibetan capital, intermittent at first and then permanent, which had started with the Bell Mission in 1920 finally came to an end.[1125] It is unlikely that the Tibetans ever really believed that since 15 August 1947 Richardson had been representing India and not Great Britain: the Chinese both Nationalist and Communist continued until the end to look on him as an agent of British imperialism; but his departure was final enough for all to see.

Among those Tibetan statesmen who appreciated that in August 1947 the British really were leaving India for good, that profound changes might well take place shortly in China, and that the international position of Tibet would never be the same again, was

Surkhang Dzasa. His scheme for the Goodwill Mission of 1946 had been pointed in two directions, towards the Kuomintang and towards the non-Chinese world in general and British India and the United States in particular. He now advocated a more ambitious scheme for establishing what can only be described as sovereign Tibetan links outside the restrictions on Tibetan foreign relations which had resulted from the combined influences of the newly independent Government of India and the Government of China. A Tibetan Mission would not only visit India and China, but would also go to the United States and the United Kingdom and, if possible, to other countries as well, Japan, Switzerland and so on.

There were a number of objectives, but among them were four designed to indicate in some way or other that Tibet was fully independent. First: the Mission would travel on Tibetan passports, those symbols of sovereign power. Second: the Mission would try to purchase gold from the Government of the United States, a commodity only made available to sovereign Governments by the U.S. Treasury. Third: the Mission would try to meet Heads of State in the countries visited without the chaperoning presence of the Chinese. Fourth: the Mission would endeavour to establish patterns of trade between Tibet and the outside world which bypassed those restrictions of the Government of India by which Tibet had been paid in rupees and the hard currency went into the coffers of the Indian monetary authorities. The scheme was ingenious; and it enjoyed a limited success.[1126]

The key members of the Mission were its leader, Tsepon Shakabpa, one of the Tibetan ministerial officials (of the 4th rank) in charge of finances and a man of considerable ability, and the great Khampa trader Pangdatsang. The other two principal members were Khenchung Changkhyim (a monk) and Depon Surkhang (one of the sons of Surkhang Dzasa). There was also an English interpreter, Ratna, of Nepalese origin but described by Shakabpa as a Tibetan subject. The Mission reached India in October 1947. It called on Prime Minister Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi and Lord Mountbatten. It also established contact with the United States Embassy in India over the question of entry into the United States.[1127]

The American Embassy faced an immediate problem. The State Department had laid down a guide for policy towards Tibet in that

> Great Britain has long manifested a special interest in Tibet, and has exercised a considerable political influence there. As the U.S. and China both regard Tibet as an integral part of China, British attempts to prevent the exercise of Chinese sovereignty over that area or change its political status would constitute a source of friction in Sino-British relations and could not fail to be of concern to the U.S.[1128]

It had not, of course, been anticipated when this was drawn up that

the United States would be confronted with the prospect of itself interfering with the exercise of Chinese sovereignty vis à vis Tibet. The Tibetan Trade Mission, however, asked it to do just this in granting entry visas to the United States on Tibetan passports. The moment that the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi heard of the Trade Mission's arrival they called on the American Embassy to announce that while they had no objection to Tibetans visiting the United States they felt that they should travel on Chinese passports.[1129] The State Department, after some reflection, adopted a compromise between declared policy and a desire to assist the Tibetans, who clearly had a powerful lobby in Washington in their support.[1130] Loose visitors visas could be issued to the members of Trade Mission on Form 257. It did not matter, then, what passports were held. The Mission were told to apply for such U.S. visas from the U.S. diplomatic representation in China, either in Nanking or Shanghai, at the end of the Chinese part of their tour.

The Mission then went on to China, apparently travelling now on Chinese passports. They reached Nanking on 31 January 1948. They were treated with a mixture of public respect and secret suspicion by the Chinese authorities who tried to watch their every move. They were granted an audience with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and they met members of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission as well as the former Chinese representative in Lhasa, Shen Tsung-lien. They were also asked to attend the Chinese National Assembly, but, unlike the Goodwill Mission in 1946, they refrained from doing so. Members of the Mission called on John Leighton Stuart, the U.S. Ambassador to China, and his British and Indian colleagues, Sir Ralph Stevenson and K.M. Panikkar. The Mission's experiences in China probably convinced them that the days of the Kuomintang were numbered and that the sort of ambivalent policy towards China demonstrated by the Goodwill Mission in 1946 would be of little value. What Tibet needed was a good western ally like the United States.

In June 1948 the Mission left China for Hong Kong. From here they had hoped to go on to Japan; but this proved impracticable. In Hong Kong they put away their Chinese passports and sought visas from the U.S. Consulate on their specially prepared Tibetan passports, each one a large single sheet of paper. The Consulate issued them with visas on Form 257; but it also stamped visas in the actual passports.[1131] The Chinese were very annoyed at the American willingness to overlook the Tibetans' Chinese nationality. Protests were conveyed to the U.S. Embassy in Nanking by no less a personage than George Yeh, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; and there was also an expression of outrage in Washington by the Chinese Ambassador, Dr. Wellington Koo.[1132] In July the Mission were in Washington, having flown across the Pacific by way of Honolulu; and

in November they were in London, whence they made visits to France, Switzerland and Italy. While in England they were received by King George VI, entertained by the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and saw the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin.[1133] They were back in India at the very end of December 1948.[1134]

The main effort of the Tibetan Trade Mission was made in America. Apart from the passport affair, in which the Mission may perhaps be said to have scored a few useful points, Shakabpa and his colleagues were determined to demonstrate Tibetan independence in as many ways as possible to the one Power which they now appreciated could compensate for lost British support against China. They tried to see the President, Harry Truman, without the presence of the Chinese Ambassador: when this could not be arranged they preferred not to meet the President at all rather than do so under Chinese supervision. They did, however, manage to call on the Secretary of State, General Marshall, without a Chinese escort. They also enjoyed partial success in the matter of gold purchase.

The United States sold gold to other sovereign governments in exchange for dollars: it did not sell gold to private individuals. During the course of their American visit the Tibetan Trade Mission persuaded the United States Treasury that they were qualified candidates for such a transaction.[1135] Tibet's problem, however, was that it did not have any dollars, the proceeds of all its external sales (mainly Tibetan wool of which the bulk was destined for the United States) being converted into rupees banked on its behalf by the Government of India, a fact which Shakabpa not unreasonably pointed out caused the Tibetans a great deal of unfair hardship. The Mission, therefore, were not only seeking permission to buy gold (which, they said, was required for purposes of currency stablisation) but were also looking for American help in the shape of a loan to Tibet ($2,000,000 was the sum mentioned to cover the cost of 50,000 ounces of gold) and in persuading the Indian monetary authorities to release dollars in exchange for rupees held on the Tibetan account. A U.S. loan to the Government of Tibet, of course, would be another sovereign symbol. The Americans declined to make the loan and the Government of India were rather reluctant to release dollars. The Indians seem to have agreed in the end to let Shakabpa have a portion of his requests, $250,000 out of about $2,000,000, but preferably for the purchase of machinery and other capital goods rather than gold. Some Indian officials told the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi that they doubted the sincerity of the Tibetans. They suspected that all that would happen would be that the gold would be sold on the Indian black market at an enormous profit for Pangdatsang and his cronies.[1136]

The main achievement of the Tibetan Trade Mission was perhaps that which Surkhang Dzasa had most hoped would result. In

American eyes Tibet had now made what amounted to an unqualified declaration of independence from China. In the recent literature on the status of Tibet efforts have been made to date the initial Tibetan declaration of independence back to 1912. The subject is complicated; but it will have been clear from the account of Sino-Tibetan relations in this book that the Tibetan attitude towards China was neither constant nor unambiguous; and, moreover, the Simla Convention itself, to which Tibet had adhered by the Declaration of 3 July 1914, ruled out a total Tibetan independence from China. There was always, if only latent, Chinese "suzerainty". In early 1949, in the aftermath of the Tibetan Trade Mission, Miss Ruth Bacon of the Far Eastern Affairs Office of the State Department could note that "Tibet, according to the leaders of the Tibetan Trade Mission, is completely independent and the Chinese Government has no control whatsoever over the internal and external affairs of the country".[1137] So long as the Kuomintang was around the State Department found it inexpedient to agree in public with this view; but increasingly they were prepared to act in private as if it were the case. The very treatment of the Tibetan Trade Mission from the moment it received its loose visas in Hong Kong (and some helpful Consular official also put a visa on Shakabpa's highly novel passport) indicated a degree of covert support, as did the decision to permit gold sales, whether or not gold was actually bought.

As the Kuomintang regime became weaker so did it seem to some American diplomats concerned with Asian affairs that it would certainly do no harm to try and keep Tibet out of the hands of the Chinese Communists: with China rapidly falling under Communist rule, Tibet could become an extremely useful bastion of the free world in the middle of Central Asia. This was the background logic behind the proposal of the U.S.Embassy in New Delhi to send a small mission to Lhasa in the summer of 1949.[1138] There was a good excuse in the delivery of gifts and compliments in exchange for those sent by the Dalai Lama and Kashag to President Truman by way of the Tibetan Goodwill Mission in 1946. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart in Nanking thought this was an excellent idea.[1139] Secretary of State Acheson also agreed; but he insisted that the mission adopt as low a profile as possible. He proposed either that a fairly junior member of the New Delhi Embassy (J. Jefferson Jones), perhaps even in the company of a British representative from the office of the U.K. High Commission, go up to Lhasa in an unobtrusive way or, and this was to be preferred, that an expedition be organised to be "headed by experienced explorer-scholar", with the U.S. Embassy member (J. Jefferson Jones again) going along while technically on leave. As explorer-scholar Acheson nominated Schuyler Cammann of the University of Pennsylvania (author of *Trade Through the Himalayas* which was published in 1951).[1140] By the time that all the various

views had been collected, however, it seemed to Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi that it was too late to send the American mission to Lhasa in 1949. He suggested that the spring of 1950 would be more suitable. In the event, it was not.

1949, however, did see an American presence in Lhasa in the shape of the veteran journalist, lecturer and broadcaster Lowell Thomas, the man who played such a part in the creation of the myth of Lawrence of Arabia, and his son, Lowell Thomas, Jr. The Lowell Thomas visit was another byproduct of the contacts between the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi and the Tibetan Government that had been established by the Tibetan Goodwill Mission in 1946 and reinforced by the Tibetan Trade Mission in 1947-1948.[1141] Its immediate political consequences were very slight; but as a public relations exercise it probably achieved a great deal in bringing the idea of an independent Tibet before an American public which for so long had been told that Tibet was but a remote part of China upon which the covetous eyes of the British imperialists had been cast. Lowell Thomas wrote about his journey for *Colliers* magazine and made broadcasts for CBS. His son, Lowell Thomas, Jr., also produced a book about the adventure which was widely read. The Kashag, however, who had given Lowell Thomas and his son every facility, were greatly disappointed to find that their guests enjoyed no United States official status whatsoever and possessed no diplomatic powers.

During the course of 1949 it became increasingly obvious to western observers that sooner or later, and probably sooner, the Chinese Communists would turn their attention to Tibet. What would the Government of India do? At the end of the day it was the only authority, other than China, in direct territorial contact with Tibet (with the exception of Burma); and it could say yea or nay to any projects by others to come to Tibet's assistance. Without access to the Indian records it is not possible to describe in detail the evolution of the Indian attitude towards the Tibetan problem after the Transfer of Power. One can, however, draw some reasonably reliable general conclusions from the available evidence.

When in 1949 the likelihood of a Chinese re-occupation of Tibet could not be ignored, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was on record that he stood by the concept of Chinese "suzerainty" in Tibet, whatever that might mean. One interpretation was that it was not Nehru's intention to take any active steps such as sending Indian troops beyond the Himalayas to prevent the Chinese from transforming "suzerainty" into "sovereignty". There were, of course, a number of hotheads in the service of the Government of India who argued that India must fight for Tibetan independence. For example, the Maharajkumar of Tehri-Garhwal, an Under Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, declared in May 1949 to a member of the U.S. Embassy that "if the Chinese tried to invade Tibet, they

would find themselves opposed by Indian military forces".[1142] Ambassador Henderson, however, did not believe it. He thought that while

> it is true that the policy of the British Government of India was to strive to prevent any major power from controlling Tibet and that, in the time which has elapsed since Indian indpendence, the Indian Government's policy towards Tibet has tended to fall into the grooves already marked out by the British. Nevertheless, the obstacle with which the Indian Government would be confronted in obtaining support for such far-flung military operations from a people imbued with the Gandhian principles of pacifism, the logistic difficulties in the way of such operations, the incalculable consequences of an Indian military challenge to Communist forces in Southeast Asia, and the failure of the Indian Government leaders to acquaint the Indian people with the threat of world Communism,

all this would indicate that the Indians would not fight for Tibet whatever individual officials might say. Ambassador Henderson, of course, could have added that the Indian military were already fully occupied, Gandhian principles notwithstanding, in conflict with their fellow Dominion, Pakistan, over Kashmir.

In 1948 the second Indian Ambassador to China, K.M. Panikkar, produced a long paper on the future of Tibet and its role in Indian policy. In that Panikkar has been accused of leading Jawaharlal Nehru astray over the nature of Chinese interests in Tibet and the correct policy for India to adopt, this document is of some interest.[1143] Panikkar accepted that Tibet was of great importance to Indian security. He agreed that India had inherited from the British certain rights in relation to Tibet concerning trade, the preservation of Tibetan autonomy, the McMahon Line and the presence of a political mission in Lhasa. Provided these rights were maintained, "there is no desire", Panikkar wrote, "to encroach on Tibetan or Chinese authority and it has been made clear that subject to her rights and interests being safeguarded, India has no desire to gain political ascendancy in Lhasa". He believed that eventually the Chinese Government might become Communist (but, from the viewpoint of 1948, the prospect did not seem to alarm him unduly); and he thought that it would take up to 10 years before a Chinese Government could repeat the exploits of Chao Erh-feng and occupy Lhasa. The Tibetans would resist any Chinese advance and, exploiting the physical difficulties of the terrain, make the invasion "an arduous affair". Faced with a Chinese threat to Tibet, what could India do? Panikkar thought it had to do something "to support . . [Tibet] . . diplomatically in the maintenance of her autonomy: to supply her with arms and equipment: to train her officers". This should suffice to keep the Chinese out.

Because Panikkar was optimistic about the ability of the Tibetans to

keep the Chinese out, given the minimum of Indian help, he was not too alarmist about the implications, of which he was well aware, of an eventual Chinese occupation. There were two main reasons why China should be excluded from Tibet. First: once in Tibet the Chinese, as in 1910, would reassert claims to Nepal and Bhutan as vassal states. Second: "the McMahon Line is what India has negotiated with Tibet. If the doctrine is accepted that Tibet is under the sovereignty of China and its autonomy is not recognised by China then China will be fairly entitled to say that the demarcation of the boundary in agreement with Tibet was a violation of Chinese sovereignty. In fact", Panikkar concluded, "to bring China to the actual border of India will be to unsettle all that boundary and to create major problems for India". All this was quite perceptive. Panikkar understood what the Chinese felt about the McMahon Line. What he did not appreciate at this point was quite how weak in military terms Tibet was. He had no conception of the formidable might of the People's Liberation Army. This was something which was to startle the western world when the Chinese struck south across the Yalu into Korea in the winter of 1950.

Panikkar's paper, on analysis, is really somewhat confused. If the presence of China, and Communist China at that, in Lhasa would constitute a serious threat to Indian interests, then it ought to be resisted. Resistance could hardly be offered without the physical involvement of Indian troops just as UN troops would have to be pushed into Korea to keep the North out of the South. This was probably understood at an intellectual level by Jawaharlal Nehru and other Indian leaders. They, however, were influenced by a number of other considerations of which three are outstanding. First: the idea of Indian intervention in Tibet looked awfully like a re-run of the 19th century Afghan Wars which anyone with any knowledge of history would know were "Imperialist" and, therefore, a bad thing. Second: however beastly the Chinese in general and the Chinese Communists in particular might seem, they were, after all, Asians. Jawaharlal Nehru for one firmly believed that the dialogue between Asians free of imperial influence would follow lines quite different from the diplomatic conversations of the past. In other words, in his heart of heart's Jawaharlal Nehru believed that he could do business with the Chinese. Finally: the British, who after all had had considerable experience of the problem, continually advised him and his colleagues not to get bogged down in a Tibetan campaign against China: no good would come of it. Such advice could not fail to reinforce his reluctance at this time to become involved in armed adventures over and above Kashmir.

From these three considerations a certain line of policy evolved. Limited aid to Tibet in the shape of training and the supply of certain categories of arms was possible. What was not possible was direct

Indian military involvement: this would create a state of Sino-Indian confrontation which would bring dialogue to an abrupt end. At the end of the day the situation would probably be settled by dialogue rather than arms. Jawaharlal Nehru was certainly convinced that he, as an Asian leader, could talk with other Asian leaders including those of China with an effectiveness which had been denied to the British.

There seemed to be nothing in this policy to prevent the Government of India from acceding to Tibet's request for further arms and ammunition. By March 1950 the Tibetans had asked for 38 two inch mortars with 14,000 bombs, 63 three inch mortars with 14,000 bombs, 150 Brens and 1,000,000 rounds of rifle calibre ammunition. This material, sufficient for a single brigade, would be shipped to Lhasa when transport was available. Its delivery involved at least 7,000 mule loads and, owing to the shortage of pack animals, it could well take some time for all of it to reach Lhasa. The Government of India, however, were reluctant to expand their existing commitment to provide Tibet with military advice. They refused to supply demolition experts whose services might be required to help create obstacles in the way of any Chinese advance. There were clearly not going to impose a strategic discipline on the Tibetan army which at the moment was virtually without plans to combat a Chinese invasion, even though they still maintained a training establishment of some size at Gyantse.[1144] The Government of India, moreover, were reluctant to be seen to collaborate with either the British or the Americans in the supply of military material to Tibet: this would look too much like joining the cold war against China.[1145]

By the end of 1949 the Tibetan Government, having at last expelled the Kuomintang Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission officials and their families from Lhasa (in July 1949), really stood alone for the first time since 1934. The British had gone. The Indian Mission was no outpost of colonial rule. The six Europeans in Outer Tibet, Richardson, Fox and Ford, Harrer and Aufschnaiter, and a strange Russian called Nedbailoff, hardly constituted a massive imperialist presence.[1146] At the same time, the Chinese Communists had made it abundantly clear that they gave a high priority to the "liberation" of Tibet. In these circumstances the Tibetan Government endeavoured with a new urgency to develop a foreign policy which would serve to ward off or mitigate the Chinese menace. There were, really, only three options. First: they could seek active assistance from an outside power, which meant in practice India, Great Britain and the United States, the last two having to operate through Indian territory and with Indian consent. Second: there always remained the possibility of some direct settlement between Tibet and the new rulers of China. Third: there was the United Nations. If the UN were to accept Tibetan independence and to brand the Chinese as aggressors,

then something might happen (as it did in Korea). During 1949-50 the Tibetan Government tried to exploit all three options.

In December 1949 the Tibetan Foreign Office proposed the despatch of a mission to the United States to seek aid. Secretary of State Acheson was not very welcoming. He thought that such a mission would only accelerate Chinese Communist ("Chi Commie") action against Tibet. Moreover, any U.S. aid for Tibet might conflict with Indian interests. It would be best if there were to be a Tibetan mission of this kind that it remained in India and held discussions with the U.S. Embassy there. K.P.S. Menon, now Foreign Secretary (in Caroe's former position more or less), agreed that a Tibetan mission to the U.S. would not be desirable: no more desirable, moreover, would be a visit to Lhasa by an American diplomat.[1147] The idea of a Tibetan mission to London was also discouraged at this time.

The Tibetan Foreign Office, however, had another scheme in reserve. In the spring of 1950 Shakabpa informed some of his American contacts that his Government were considering sending him to Hong Kong, and thence perhaps to Peking, to negotiate with the new Chinese regime. There was also a hint at the same time that there might be a Tibetan overture to Moscow.[1148] The Tibetans, however, found themselves up against serious obstacles. When Shakabpa called on Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi on 9 June 1950, he reported that he had effectively been prevented from leaving India for Hong Kong by the Government of India acting at the request of the British. He was very anxious to contact the Chinese on the most favourable terms, either on "neutral" territory like Hong Kong, or by approaching China from outside. What the Tibetans did not want to do was to send a mission to China by the overland route: they could foresee all sorts of humiliations along the way, not least at the actual Tibet-Sikang or Tibet-Ch'inghai border crossings. Shakabpa told Henderson that the Tibetans were very doubtful now concerning the friendship both of the British and the Indians. Jawaharlal Nehru, he said, had publicly announced that India accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet; and he considered that the Government of India were prepared to hand Tibet over to the Chinese Communists without a struggle. China had promised Tibet autonomy, Shakabpa agreed; but Tibet wanted to stay as it was, totally independent. Henderson had little to offer beyond an improved wireless set in which Shakabpa evinced little interest.[1149]

The British indeed did show themselves to be singularly unco-operative. It was evident that they had no wish to risk to the slightest degree whatever they could salvage out of the collapse of the old regime in China by appearing to support Tibet. The British view was that they no longer had any responsibility for the matter since they had ceased to be in direct territorial contact with Tibet. The torch

had been handed on to the Government of India. Since the Indians had made it clear that they were not prepared to provide any direct military support for Tibet, and the odd packet of Bren guns and mortars was not going to win the day, Tibet was a lost cause. The British Government, therefore, were determined not to let the touchy subject of Hong Kong get mixed up with the doomed issue of Tibet by allowing Tibetans with Tibetan passports (hotly repudiated by China) to pass through their Colony. If Shakabpa and his colleagues wanted to talk with China, then they could meet with the Chinese Ambassador in India.[1150]

During the summer of 1950 Shakabpa kept in close touch with the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, which seemed to be far more sympathetic to the Tibetan cause than were either the Government of India (despite their agreeing to strengthen the military training unit at Gyantse) or the British. In the published documents there is little of precision but a hint or two that some contingency arrangements were already being made between the U.S. intelligence community and Tibetan leaders in Sikang (Kham) including, one presumes, members of the Pangdatsang family.[1151] Shakabpa believed that with adequate foreign aid, that is to say aid from India, the United Kingdom and the United States, some general Outer Tibet-Kham collaboration might be arranged. He considered that Tibet should prepare airfields at Lhasa, Gartok and Chamdo to receive military equipment; and he was thinking about air supply routes starting in Burma, East Pakistan (Dacca) and West Pakistan (Rawalpindi) as alternatives to those from India should the Government of India not prove co-operative. He told Ambassador Henderson that his proposed negotiation with the Chinese was merely to play for time while these various military projects were maturing.

As the Chinese invasion of Tibet seemed more and more likely during the summer of 1950 so the Government of India through its Ambassador in Peking, K.M. Panikkar, was bombarding the Chinese with notes and memoranda on the Tibetan question. Panikkar had been authorised to go as far as to hint that if the Chinese were excessively aggressive over Tibet the Government of India might not be very helpful in securing for the People's Republic of China the Chinese seat on the Security Council of the United Nations currently still held by the Nationalists. The Indians were also looking into the possibility, should China actually invade, of themselves raising the Tibetan issue in some form at the Security Council.

When the Chinese eventually got around to replying to Panikkar, they left him in no doubt that it was their policy to maintain their "sovereignty" over Tibet. They did not, however, wish for war if it could be avoided. They were, therefore, instructing their Ambassador when he eventually arrived in New Delhi to start discussions with Shakabpa to see what could be arranged.[1152]

In early September 1950 Shakabpa, now about to be reinforced by two colleagues from Lhasa including that son of Surkhang Dzasa who had accompanied him on the Trade Mission, called on the Chinese chargé in New Delhi, who told him that any useful negotiations would have to take place in Peking, not New Delhi. Shakapba thought that the Chinese Ambassador, when he arrived shortly, would probably say the same. The situation was somewhat Kafkaesque in that the Chinese had so far made no formal demands of the Tibetan Government, so it was difficult to know quite what any negotiations would be about.[1153] In any case Shakabpa and his colleagues, he told Ambassador Henderson, were really as much concerned with talking to the Government of India as they were with any discussions with the Chinese whose overtures they were still determined to resist.

By the middle of September the State Department had come belatedly to a most important decision. It would "assist procurement and financing milit (sic) matériel" for the Tibetans. In this context the establishment of a line of communications between Lhasa and Washington (with the offer of an American wireless set to Lhasa) by way of the American diplomatic establishment in either New Delhi or Calcutta became very important. The policy was still to deal with Tibet either through or in consultation with the Government of India; but the possibility of the United States going it alone in Tibet was certainly latent from this moment onwards.[1154]

At this point, in early October 1950 (7 October is the official date), Chinese armies finally crossed the *de facto* Sino-Tibetan border from Ch'inghai and Sikang (and, according to some sources, from Sinkiang into Western Tibet as well, across the baleful Aksai Chin). After a few days the Governor of Kham, Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, surrendered to the Chinese, in the process consigning to their tender mercies the British wireless operator in Chamdo, Robert Ford.[1155]

The invasion began just as Shakabpa and his colleagues had started talking with the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi; though it must be admitted that they had no high hopes for these discussions. The Chinese move served to initiate a number of reactions. In Lhasa full temporal power was conferred at once by the Tsongdu on the 14th Dalai Lama even though he was still but fifteen years of age. In the outside world a great deal of effort was devoted to exploring the possibility of raising the Tibetan issue at the United Nations. Shakabpa's party promptly turned themselves into a Tibetan Delegation to the United Nations; but they were unable to make their way to New York for the same reasons which had prevented Shakabpa from going to Hong Kong earlier on.[1156]

On 11 November 1950 Shakabpa, then in Kalimpong, cabled an appeal in the name of the Kashag (and dated Lhasa, 7 November) to the United Nations protesting against the Chinese invasion. He declared that

> the armed invasion of Tibet for the incorporation of Tibet in Communist China is a clear case of aggression. As long as the people of Tibet are compelled by force to become part of China against their will and consent, the present invasion of Tibet will be the grossest instance of the violation of the weak by the strong. We therefore appeal through you to the Nations of the world to intercede in our behalf and restrain Chinese aggression.[1157]

There followed a sad story. The Tibetan case was raised formally by El Salvador (a country which had not hitherto figured prominently in the history of Tibetan foreign relations) and it was effectively suppressed by India, the United Kingdom and the United States. A debate on the matter was adjourned while the Indians and Chinese sorted things out; and there the matter rested for many years.

This was really the end of the old Tibet, though the ritual of its demise took a while longer yet: it was not completed until 1959. In May 1951, after a brief period of negotiation in Peking, a Tibetan delegation headed by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme signed a Sino-Tibetan Agreement "for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet".[1158] This document of 17 points contained the essence in Point 1: "the Tibetan people shall be united and drive out the imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; that the Tibetan people shall return to the family of the motherland – the People's Republic of China". No flirtation with "suzerainty" here.

The independent Government of India now had a major Power perched all along the northern edge of the Himalayas from Assam to Kashmir. Faced with the mere hint of such a possibility Lord Curzon had sent an army to Lhasa in 1904. Confronted with such a situation, Lord Hardinge had permitted the strange process of exploitation of Williamson's murder by the Abors to lay the foundations for the McMahon Line. What did the independent Government of India do in 1950? It must be admitted, initially it did very little indeed.[1159] No army came to Tibetan aid. The weapons and ammunition which it did supply proved in the short term to be quite useless in Tibetan hands.[1160] It did not support the Tibetan case in the United Nations. It did make a gesture by leaving its Mission in Lhasa and its military training establishment in Gyantse for the time being; and it did protest to Peking against what had happened. In the end, however, it accepted the Chinese position without too much heart searching; and in 1954 it finally acknowledged in a formal agreement with China over Tibet, duly signed and sealed and the first such fully valid instrument, indeed, between China and India on this subject since the Tibetan Trade Regulations of 1908, that Tibet was "the Tibet Region of China". No vestige of the concept of "suzerainty" and "autonomy" was to be detected in this document which stood in place of the abortive Simla Convention as the definitive Indian statement on the international status of Tibet.[1161]

1023. L/P&S/12/4200, ff.38-58, papers on Mills' visit to Dirangdzong and taxation questions.

1024. Thus Mills found an even greater degree of direct Lhasa Government involvement in the administration of the Tawang tract below the Se La than had been reported by Lightfoot.

1025. The Sherdukpen, who were in receipt of their own *posa* from the Government of Assam, were evidently reluctant to reveal the degree of their commitment to the Tawang authorities lest their British subsidy be stopped.

1026. L/P&S/12/4188, Mills to Assam, 29 May 1945.

1027. L/P&S/12/4200, India to Assam, 28 January 1946.

1028. L/P&S/12/3114, Report on the Assam Tribal Areas for the Year ending June 30th, 1946, by J.P. Mills, . . . Adviser to the Governor of Assam for Tribal Areas.

1029. L/P&S/12/3114, Report on the Assam Tribal Areas for the year ending June 30th, 1947, by J.P. Mills, . . . Adviser to the Governor of Assam for Tribal Areas.

1030. An argument which was to be used by the Indian side in the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute.

1031. See: L/P&S/12/4219, for papers on the Subansiri Area. The Betts' time with the Apa Tanis is superbly described in: Ursula Graham Bower, *The Hidden Land*, London 1953.

In the winter of 1947-48 the Betts hoped to press on towards the McMahon Line up the valley of the Khru branch of the Kamla, one of the main tributaries of the Subansiri. Unfortunately, one of the consequences of the Transfer of Power was a that some of tribes, in the belief that an Indian presence in their country would now be removed, resorted to traditional patterns of warfare; and the Khru venture was a victim of the unsettled situation. The Betts finally left the Subansiri area in March 1948. See: U. Betts (Ursula Graham Bower), "The Daflas of the Subansiri Area", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 1949.

1032. L/P&S/12/4213, Hopkinson to Assam, 7 December 1945.

1033. L/P&S/12/4213, Richardson to Hopkinson, 7 May 1946; India to IO, 10 July 1946.

1034. L/P&S/12/4213, Memo by G.E.D. Walker, Political Officer, Sadiya Frontier Tract, 4 April 1946.

1035. L/P&S/12/4213, R.W. Godfrey, Secretary to the Governor of Assam, to India, 15 April 1946.

1036. L/P&S/12/4213, Assam to India, 8 January 1947.

1037. L/P&S/12/4213, IO minute, 1 February 1947.

1038. Tuting was on the right bank of the Siang, opposite Jido on the left bank to which it was connected by a rope bridge.

1039. L/P&S/12/4213, Assam to India, 21 February 1947; Assam to India, 4 March 1947; Assam to India, 6 March 1947; Assam to India, 11 March 1947.

1040. L/P&S/12/3114, Report on the Assam Tribal Areas for the year ending June 30th, 1947, by J.P. Mills, . . . Adviser to the Governor of Assam for Tribal Areas.

1041. By 1947 it had become obvious that the Lohit Valley Sub-Agency was too large for one Political Officer to supervise. It was proposed to create another Sub-Agency, that of the Mishmi Hills, centred on the Dibang river system.

1042. For a detailed account of this meeting, see: L/P&S/12/4214, Tour Diary of Mr. F.P. Mainprice, . . . November 1943 to May 1945, p. 70.

1043. L/P&S/12/4214, Mainprice to P.O., Sadiya, 16 January 1945.
Zayul was probably the only rice growing district in the whole of Outer Tibet; and an abundant supply of this cereal so close to hand would have made life very much easier for the garrison of the Walong post, particularly when the route back to Sadiya was interrupted by landslides and the like.

1044. L/P&S/12/4214, Assam to India, 21 March 1945.

1045. L/P&S/12/4214, Tour Diary of Mr. F.P. Mainprice, . . . November 1943 to May 1945, p. 76.

1046. L/P&S/12/4214, Caroe to Assam, 9 June 1945.

1047. L/P&S/12/4214, IO minute Ext. 2647/45, 11 June 1945.

1048. During the whole of 1943 some 100 Tibetan traders and about 600 porters availed themselves of the Lohit route between Sadiya and Rima. See: L/P&S/12/3120, Mills' Tour Notes, 1944.

1049. By 1946 Tibetan traders were using the Lohit route for the export of silver from Tibet to India in defiance of official Tibetan prohibition. Much of the silver was in the form of Tibetan coins with a face value below their bullion content. Silver sales financed much of the purchase of consumer goods in India. See: L/P&S/12/3120, Mills' Tour Notes, 1946.

1050. F. Kingdon Ward, "The Lohit Valley in 1950", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 1951.
By this time the Walong post had become quite an impressive establishment with barracks, guest houses and gardens. G.N. Patterson passed through Walong on his way from Po (near Batang) to India while Kingdon Ward was there. See: G.N. Patterson, *Tibetan Journey*, London 1954, pp.197-206.
In the summer of 1950 the Lohit valley route was greatly disturbed by a massive earthquake which had its epicentre in Eastern Tibet. Among those affected was Robert Ford at Chamdo who found his escape to India in the face of the advancing Chinese forces thereby interrupted.

1051. L/P&S/12/4214, Political Officer, Sadiya, to Assam, 12 September 1945.

1052. L/P&S/12/4214, Assam to India, 18 April 1946.

1053. L/P&S/12/4200, Caroe to Cleary, 2 May 1945.

1054. Hopkinson, unlike his predecessors in the post, had little previous experience of Tibetan affairs. He had been Trade Agent at Gyantse and Assistant to the Political Officer in Sikkim from January 1927 to November 1928. Most of his career had been in the North-West of India.
Hopkinson had been selected to take over from Gould in 1942. Gould, who was then 59 years old and set to retire, had his appointment extended several times; and in 1945 he would have been given a further extension had it not been for the state of his health. There had been requests from both the Tibetan Government and the Bhutanese that Gould be kept on; and the Government of India considered that his presence would greatly help the implementation of the new McMahon Line policy that was evolving from 1943 onwards.
With the appointment of Hopkinson the Sikkim post was raised in status to that of a 2nd Class Residency. It was considered by the Government of India that this increase in prestige was called for both because of the high rank of the Chinese representative in Lhasa and in view of the increased responsibilities arising from the new policy in the Assam Himalayas.

The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, sent a formal letter to the Dalai Lama and Regent, dated 20 August 1945, announcing Hopkinson's appointment; and on 28 September 1945 Hopkinson made a formal call on the Dalai Lama and Regent in Lhasa to do the equivalent of presenting his letters of credence.

For the Gould retirement and Hopkinson appointment, see: L/P&S/12/4207.

1055. Shen's ideas were not all that far removed from those of the Wai-chiao-pu in the 1915-1919 period, except that now the balance of power rather favoured the Chinese. The British Foreign Office would probably have been quite happy to see something like this happen: it would remove Tibet once and for all as an irritant in the course of Anglo-Chinese relations.

The Government of India would have welcomed the revival of the Chinese proposals of 1919 *provided* that the British side were represented by India rather than the British Embassy in China or the Foreign Office. This is what Shen said he had in mind ever since he first raised the matter with Gould in December 1944 and January 1945. There were signs, however, that this particular outcome was not on the cards. Shen had been careful to put Tibet in the same category as Hong Kong as representing major problems in Anglo-Chinese relations; and the implication was that any conference would probably have to deal with both issues. There was no way that the Government of India were going to be allowed by London to take the leading part in any attempted solution to the Hong Kong problem. This consideration may go far to explain the very hostile reaction in London to Shen's original proposal. See, for example: L/P&S/12/4218, Secretary of State to India (External), 20 January 1945.

1056. That there was a contradiction between this approach and that advocated by Shen did not worry the Tibetans at all. They had long been accustomed to the simultaneous pursuit of what appeared to be equal and opposite objectives. This contradiction, as we shall see below, was very much a feature of the Tibetan Goodwill Mission of 1946 which was really a direct consequence of Shen's proposals as they were interpreted by Surkhang Dzasa.

1057. The idea had first been mooted by Ilya Tolstoy and Brooke Dolan in 1942-43.

1058. The idea of a Tibetan Agent in India had been of great interest to the Government of India at the time of the third Gould Mission to Lhasa in 1944. It seems to have been abandoned.

1059. The maps, of course, were very important. Hopkinson was certainly provided with a copy of the small scale map appended to the Simla Convention upon which was drawn the "Red Line". Did he also have copies of the map in two sheets, at a scale of eight miles to the inch, which had accompanied the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes of March 1914? These two sheets, with the McMahon Line also marked as a red line, are the real cartographic basis for the McMahon Line. They were first published by the Government of India c. 1960. Up to 1944, when British officials referred to the Simla Conference map with the "Red Line" on it, one has the distinct impression that they were only aware of the small scale map appended to the Convention, which, of course, was not directly concerned with the McMahon Line at all.

The records rather suggest that Hopkinson did *not* have with him copies of the maps associated with the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes. What he showed Surkhang Dzasa were the following: the Simla Convention map and a map produced recently by the Government of Assam showing the North-East Frontier Agency. See: L/P&S/12/4223, Hopkinson to India, 8 December 1945.

It is extremely unlikely that many Tibetans had access to the two sheets of the map included with the McMahon-Lönchen Shatra notes. Tibet had no means of reproducing such documents. The original maps would certainly have been filed

away with the original notes, probably somewhere deep inside the Potala. In that the cession of Tawang by the Lönchen Shatra was extremely badly received in Lhasa, it is certain that these documents would have been carefully hidden away. While there might well have been a limited circulation of copies of the Tibetan text of the notes, this could not have been the case for the maps. Without these maps it would not have been possible to work out the detailed alignment of the McMahon Line (the "Red Line" on the Simla Convention map was on far too small a scale).

1060. L/P&S/12/4223, India (External) to Hopkinson, 26 July 1945.

1061. The Tibetan Foreign Office (or Bureau) over which Surkhang Dzasa presided seemed to Hopkinson to be a body designed expressly to prevent the British from having easy access to the Kashag. Hopkinson concluded that the Kashag were now very reluctant to enter into direct communication with the British and hoped to avoid the responsibility for any Anglo-Tibetan negotiations on any topic. See: L/P&S/12/4223, Hopkinson to India, 31 October 1945.

1062. In particular, the meeting between Hopkinson and Surkhang Dzasa, 19 December 1945. The papers on Hopkinson's visit to Lhasa are in: L/P&S/12/4223.

1063. The *aide mémoire* was delivered on 22 January 1946.

1064. Even the British agreement to relax restrictions upon the supply from India of textiles to Tibet failed to secure any movement on the Tibetan side over the McMahon Line issue.

1065. The background to this request was interesting. Surkhang Dzasa reported that the Tsongdu had just (April 1946) written to the Chinese Government asking China to return all Tibetan territory it had occupied and to withdraw all Chinese officials both civil and military from such territory. This message was intended to coincide with the arrival in China of the Tibetan Goodwill Mission, of which more will be said below. The Kashag through Surkhang Dzasa commented that if the Chinese were withdrawing then the British ought to as well. See: L/P&S/12/4223, India to British Embassy, Chungking, 20 April 1946.

1066. This was Hopkinson's assessment of the state of Tibet in general and Anglo-Tibetan relations in particular at the time of his mission:

> in Tibet the same factors as before persist; the weakness and general supineness of the present Tibetan Government; the un-popularity of the present Regent; the removal by death of our best friends; the trans-Tibet trade boom; general corruption and venality.
>
> Various observers including Mr. Richardson recently have been satisfied that the old desire for independence persists, coupled with a respectful attitude, tinged with fear, towards China and simultaneously a desire to keep on friendly terms with us.

See: L/P&S/12/4226, Hopkinson to Crichton, 2 May 1946.

1067. L/P&S/12/4197, L.A.C. Fry, U.K. High Commission, New Delhi, to E.P. Donaldson, Commonwealth Relations Office, 7 November 1947. Fry was First Secretary at the High Commission.

1068. FO China 66, Annual Report for 1947 of the Indian Mission, Lhasa, by H.E. Richardson, 8 January 1948.

1069. FO China 66, Review: August 1945 to August 1948, by A.J. Hopkinson, 1 August 1948.

1070. The timing of this reference to overflights is interesting. The British started making extensive use of air supply in both the Se La and Walong regions in March 1946. See: L/P&S/12/3120, Mills' Tour Notes, 1946.

1071. L/P&S/12/4223, Wang Shih-chieh to British Embassy, Nanking, 2 July 1946.
This document has a good claim to first place in any collection of papers relating to the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute. It is interesting that the first published Note in the post-independence Sino-Indian exchange relating to the Assam Himalayas also concerns Walong. See: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China 1954-1959. White Paper*, New Delhi 1959, p. 33, Note of the Indian Government, 17 January 1959.

1072. L/P&S/12/4223, Stevenson to Bevin, 20 August 1946.
Stevenson evidently was unaware of the presence of Chinese exploring parties on the Lohit such as that encountered by Mainprice in January 1944. There also were other ways that the Chinese could find out what was happening at Walong than through the Tibetan Goodwill Mission. There were many people in Lhasa reporting to them; and it is more than probable that they had an extensive intelligence network operating in the country adjacent to Sikang. Chinese traders, moreover, undoubtedly from time to time travelled down the Lohit to Sadiya.

1073. L/P&S/12/4223, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 September 1946.

1074. The Government of India had an Agent-General with the Government of China since 1942 when the first incumbent was Sir Zafarulla Khan (who disliked being in Chungking and rapidly moved on to other things) who was succeeded by K.P.S. Menon. The post of Agent-General was raised to the status of Ambassador in September 1946, in which capacity as the first appointment Menon presented his credentials in March 1947.

1075. L/P&S/12/4223, Note to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 October 1946.

1076. L/P&S/12/4223, Wang Shih-chieh to Stevenson, 9 November 1946, in Stevenson to Chargé, Indian Embassy, Nanking, 15 November 1946.

1077. L/P&S/12/4223, Note to Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 December 1946.

1078. L/P&S/12/4223, Wang Shih-chieh to Stevenson, 28 January 1947.

1079. L/P&S/12/4223, L.H. Lamb to G.V. Kitson, 2 May 1947.

1080. The "Chinese" candidate was discovered as early as 1941.

1081. Papers on the 10th Panchen Lama are in: L/P&S/12/4212. See also: Jasbir Singh, *Himalayan Triangle, op. cit.*, pp. 131-132; Shakabpa, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 306; Li, *Tibet, op. cit.*,pp. 191-192.

1082. Surkhang Shape was to become the last Chief Minister of Tibet, a post which he was occupying during the crisis of 1959 which ended the attempts of the People's Republic of China to co-exist with the old Lhasa establishment. Surkhang Shape's father, Surkhang Dzasa, died in May 1952.

1083. Or Tibetan Foreign Bureau.

1084. L/P&S/12/4197, Lhasa Mission Report 1946 by H.E. Richardson, 16 January 1947.

1085. Sonam Wangdi was to be one of the Tibetan signatories of the 17-point Agreement of 23 May 1951 by which Outer Tibet accepted that it was once more joined with China.

1086. The text of these letters is printed in: United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1947. Volume VII. The Far East: China*, Washington 1972, pp. 592-593.

1087. The ostensible purpose of such a visit would be to deliver President Truman's reply to the letters from the Dalai Lama and the Kashag.

1088. L/P&S/12/4226, Hopkinson to India, 2 April 1946.

1089. Papers on the Tibetan Goodwill Mission are in: L/P&S/12/4226. They have been used by: van Walt, *Status of Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 81-84; Jasbir Singh, *Himalayan Triangle, op. cit.*, pp. 129-131. See also: Shakabpa, *Tibet, op. cit.*, pp.290-291. The social behaviour of the Mission while in India seems to have left a great deal to be desired.

1090. Note 4 to the Convention (both texts) reads "Outer Tibet shall not be represented in the Chinese Parliament or in any other body".

1091. See, for example: Amaury de Riencourt, *Roof of the World. Tibet, Key to Asia*, New York 1950, p. 55. De Riencourt was in Tibet in the summer of 1947. He met Thubten Samphel Dzasa in Gyantse, where the former leader of the Goodwill Mission had "vast estates"; and this was the story that he was told.

1092. This, moreover, was exploited to provide the occasion for a similar request to the British to withdraw from the McMahon areas.

1093. It is hard to escape the conclusion that had the Kuomintang looked likely to emerge victorious from the civil war with the Communists the Tibetan Government, guided by the likes of Surkhang Dzasa, would have made some settlement with it the moment that it had become clear that the new India was not going to reverse British policy *vis à vis* the McMahon Line areas.

1094. L/P&S/12/4226, L.H. Lamb to G.V. Kitson, 28 February 1947.

This passage is quoted by van Walt, *Status of Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 84; but van Walt omits the reference to the Tibetans as "rogues" which somewhat modifies the implications of L.H. Lamb's letter.

L.H. Lamb thought it possible that the among the concerns of the Tibetan Goodwill Mission in China was the new British policy towards the McMahon Line and the Chinese reaction to it. The Goodwill Mission was, in this respect, either trying to secure Chinese support or ascertain Chinese attitudes.

1095. Gyalo Dhondup went to Taiwan after the fall of the Kuomintang. He eventually made his way to the United States to join other members of his family.

1096. See: N. Mansergh, "The Asian Conference", *International Affairs*, XXIII, 1947; L/P&S/12/4630, where is filed a copy of Anon, *Asian Relations, being the Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference New Delhi, March-April 1947*, New Delhi 1948.

Of course, it did not have the full anti-western flavour of Bandung, from which both the United States and the United Kingdon were excluded.

The leader of the Tibetan delegation was reported to be Sampho Theiji; and among the members were Khenchung Losang Wangyal, Sampho Sey and Letsen Kunga Gyaltsen.

1097. The map was spotted by the extremely experienced Chinese diplomat George Yeh.

At the moment of writing (1988) some of the papers from the India Office Records on the Inter-Asian Affairs Conference have been taken away from the India Office Library and Records by the FCO and are not available for inspection. The key file is: L/P&S/12/4637.

1098. Some papers on the Inter-Asian Relations Conference are in: L/P&S/12/4636. See also: Jasbir Singh, *Himalayan Triangle, op. cit.*, p. 131; van Walt, *Status of Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

1099. Sera was not, like Drepung, traditionally pro-Chinese. One wonders whether the posture of Che College was influenced by British pressure on the Siang in the Assam Himalayas, where Sera had a significant financial interest.

1100. Reting, it seems, lost a great deal of money when the ending of the War and the opening of Chinese ports like Shanghai resulted in a virtual collapse of the Likiang trade.

1101. According to Patterson, Pangda Rapga was very interested in political theory and had translated into Tibetan a number of political tracts into Tibetan including Sun Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People" (*San-min-chu-i*), various articles and pamphlets on matters of international law, and some of the writings of Karl Marx. In 1946 Pangda Rapga still seems to have been impressed by Chiang Kai-shek; but disillusionment soon followed. By 1949 he had freed himself from any sense of obligation to the Kuomintang. See: G.N. Patterson, *God's Fool*, London 1956, pp. 188-189.

1102. Pangda Rapga eventually returned to Kalimpong in 1955 and occupied once more his old house. Pangdatsang and Pangda Topgye also maintained houses in Kalimpong.

1103. Papers relating to the Pangda Rapga affair are to be found collected in: L/P&S/12/4211.

1104. According to Lowell Thomas, Jr., Reting was arrested in Sera by Surkhang Sewong Chempo, the son of Surkhang Dzasa, who also claimed to have put down the insurrection of the Sera monks virtually single handed. See: Lowell Thomas, Jr., *Out of this World to Forbidden Tibet*, New York 1954, p. 180.

1105. On the Reting affair, see: H.E. Richardson, "The Rva-sgreng Conspiracy of 1947", in M. Aris & Aung San Suu Kyi, eds., *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*, Warminster 1980; H.E. Richardson, *Tibet and its History*, London 1962; H. Harrer, *Seven Years in Tibet*, London 1953; Rinchen Dolma Taring, *Daughter of Tibet*, London 1970. These are all accounts based on first hand experience. None of them really explain all the mysteries of the affair.

1106. L/P&S/12/4194, J. Thyne Henderson, Foreign Office, to India Office, 2 January 1945.

1107. L/P&S/12/4195A, Government of India War Department Memorandum, 18 May 1945.

1108. L/P&S/2175, CoS (46) 736 – Aid to Tibet; India to India Office, 19 July 1946. See also: L/WS/1/1042, File WS 17058.

1109. L/P&S/12/2175, British Mission, Lhasa, to India, 27 March 1947.

1110. In July 1943 the Kashag sought from the Government of India 16,000,000 rounds of .303 rifle ammunition and 50,000 rounds for Vickers or Lewis guns as well as 2,000 rounds for the 19 pieces of artillery which the Tibetans then seem to have had in service. Caroe, interestingly enough, opposed the supply of this ammunition on the grounds that it might be exploited by China for propaganda attacks. He was, however, overruled by the India Office in consultation with the Foreign Office. In November 1943 the Kashag were informed that the ammunition would soon be on its way. In March 1944 it was still being transported in batches to Lhasa from Kalimpong.

In July 1944 the Government of India agreed to supply the Tibetans with improved mountain guns in place of the old 2.75 inch weapons.

Papers on the supply of British arms to Tibet are in: L/P&S/12/2175.

1111. L/P&S/12/4194, Peel to Caroe, 6 February 1945.

1112. The Nepalese argument was much used on the eve of the Younghusband Expedition of 1904. It contains a number of distinct elements, not all of them compatible with each other. First: Nepal, disturbed by a change in the politics of Tibet, might revert to its past aggressive policy and attack Tibet. Second: either because of the needs of a Tibeto-Nepalese War, or because of fear of invasion from Tibet, the Nepalese Government would absorb large numbers of Gurkhas who would otherwise be recruited for British service. Third: the Chinese, once in Tibet, might establish their influence over Nepal and turn that country from being a good British friend into the threat that it had once been to the peace of the northern frontier of India. Finally: another Power in Tibet, be it China or Russia, might start recruiting Gurkhas for itself, thus gaining in strength at the expense of the British, who would be deprived of these superb fighting men.
It is interesting to note that since the Chinese took over Tibet in the 1950s none of these things have happened. The Indians have all the Gurkhas they need. A problem of the British Army is how to run down its Gurkha strength.

1113. The India Office did not like the idea of a reference to the UN. See: L/P&S/12/4195B, India Office to India, 8 January 1946.

1114. L/P&S/12/4195A, Caroe to IO, 19 September 1945.

1115. L/P&S/12/4194, Donaldson to Sterndale Bennett, 14 September 1945.

1116. L/P&S/12/4195A, The Status of Tibet, Cabinet Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit, 5 November 1945.

1117. L/P&S/12/4195B, India Office to India, 8 January 1946; Sterndale Bennett to India Office, 23 February 1946.

1118. L/P&S/12/4210, Fry to Hopkinson, 8 April 1947.

1119. L/P&S/12/4197, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 10 July 1947; Viceroy to Secretary of State, 23 July 1947.

1120. L/P&S/12/4210, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 16 July 1947.

1121. L/P&S/12/4195B, J.S.H. Shattock, U.K. High Commission, New Delhi, to L.B. Walsh-Atkins, Commonwealth Relations Office, 27 October 1948.

1122. L/P&S/12/4195B, L.H. Lamb to Bevin, 18 August 1948.

1123. United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949. Volume IX. The Far East: China*, Washington 1974, p. 1074, H. Donovan to Acheson, 21 May 1949. Donovan, Counsellor at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, is reporting what he was told by a member of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and by the U.K. High Commission.

1124. L/P&S/12/4232, Commonwealth Relations Office to U.K. High Commission, New Delhi, 26 November 1949.

1125. By 1950 there were three British subjects remaining in Tibet, Richardson and two wireless operators on contract to the Tibetan Government, R. Fox in Lhasa and R. Ford in Chamdo. Fox withdrew about the time of Richardson's departure. Ford was captured by the Chinese Communists while endeavouring to get away from Chamdo.

1126. The idea of the Mission was opposed by Hopkinson. See: United States, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1947. Volume VII. The Far East: China*, Washington 1972, pp. 598-599, Ambassador Grady to Secretary of State, 21 August 1947.

1127. The Tibetan Foreign Office had been in correspondence with the U.S. Embassy on this since June 1947. See: State Department, *Foreign Relations 1947 VII, loc. cit.*, pp. 596-598.
The Mission called on the U.S. Embassy on 30 December 1947, and again on 5 January 1948.

1128. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1947 VII, loc. cit.*, p. 600, Policy and Information Statement, 1 October 1946.

1129. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1947 VII, loc. cit.*, p. 603, Donovan to Secretary of State, 22 December 1947.
The Government of India provided special facilities for Tibetans to travel to and in India which got round the passport problem; and these could be extended, it seemed, to travel from India to the United Kingdom.

1130. Including Suydam Cutting.

1131. The Tibetans attached enormous importance to the passport question. In Shakabpa's book, *Tibet, op. cit.*, a full size facsimile of the passport is reproduced.

1132. The *aide-mémoire* of the Chinese Embassy in Washington to the State Department puts the Chinese position clearly enough:

> Tibet is a part of the Territory of the Republic of China and, under the Constitution of the Republic, has no authority to conduct diplomatic negotiations with foreign governments; and its relations with the outside world are subject to the direction and approval of the Central Government of China.
> The travel papers which the members of the Tibetan Trade Mission, headed by Mr. Shakabpa, hold, cannot replace the necessary passports issued by the Chinese Government for travel abroad. It is a matter of surprise that the United States' Consul-General in Hongkong visaed these unusual travel papers without first notifying or consulting the Waichiaopu in Hongkong. Presumably he acted without first reporting to his Government for instructions.
> Mr. Shakabpa and other members of the said Mission have no authority to enter into direct relations with the United States Government, but the Chinese Embassy . . [in Washington] . . will be glad to facilitate the purpose of their visit which is understood to be in the interest of trade.
> The Government of the United States has always recognized the sovereignty of the Chinese Republic over its territory. The Chinese Government therefore believes that the action of the Consul-General in visaing the travel papers of the Tibetan Trade Mission in place of the regular Chinese Government's passports was an inadvertence and not intended to signify any departure on the part of the United States Government from its traditional policy of respecting the territorial integrity of the Republic of China.

State Department, *Foreign Relations 1948 VII, loc. cit.*, pp. 761-762, Chinese Embassy to State Department, 15 July 1948.

1133. This was the second time that a Tibetan official party had visited the United Kingdom, the first being when Lungshar had escorted the four Tibetan boys to England in 1913. The 1948 visit, however, had absolutely no effect upon the prevailing British policy towards Tibet.
The Commonwealth Relations Office saw no reason why the Tibetans should not have direct relations with the British Government without Chinese participation. This, after all, had been going on for over 30 years. See: van Walt, *Status of Tibet, op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

1134. The India Office file on the Tibetan Trade Mission, L/P&S/12/4230, is not at the time of writing (1988) available for inspection.

1135. Marshall came up with rather an odd argument here: "the State Department perceives no objection to sale of gold to the Government of Tibet and does not

believe that such sale would in any way constitute an impairment of United States recognition of China's *de jure* sovereignty over Tibet, since the State Department does not intend that such a sale would affect the continuation of this Government's recognition of China's *de jure* sovereignty over Tibet". State Department, *Foreign Relations 1948 VII, loc. cit.*, p. 780, Marshall to Snyder, 27 August 1948.

1136. This was the view of V.M.M. Nair, Deputy Indian Foreign Secretary, expressed to Ambassador Henderson. United States, State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1949. IX. The Far East: China*, Washington 1974, p. 1064, Henderson to Acheson, 17 February 1949.

1137. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1949 IX, loc. cit.*, pp. 1065-1071, Memorandum by Ruth E. Bacon, 12 April 1949. This is an extremely interesting document in which Miss Bacon, albeit indirectly, disposes of the absurdity of the "suzerainty" versus "sovereignty" issue.

1138. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1949 IX, loc. cit.*, pp. 1076-1077, Henderson to Acheson, 2 July 1949.

1139. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1949 IX, loc. cit.*, p. 1078, Leighton Stuart to Acheson, 8 July 1949.

1140. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1949 IX, loc. cit.*, pp. 1078-1079, Acheson to Henderson, 28 July 1949.

1141. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1949 IX, loc. cit.*, p. 1080, Henderson to Acheson, 5 August 1949. Apparently Lowell Thomas had long wanted to visit Tibet. In the spring of 1949 he had written to his friend Loy W. Henderson, U.S. Ambassador in New Delhi, to enquire if there was any possibility of a Lhasa visit. Henderson, perhaps aided and abetted by Sir G.S. Bajpai, Secretary General of the Indian External Affairs Ministry, seems to have fixed up the visit with Shakabpa, no doubt with the approval of Surkhang Dzasa. The account of the Lowell Thomas visit is to be found in: Lowell Thomas, Jr., *Out of This World. Across the Himalayas to Tibet*, London 1951. A slightly different version of this is *Out of This World to Forbidden Tibet*, New York 1954.

1142. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1949 IX, loc. cit.*, p. 1074, Henderson to Acheson, 21 May 1949.
The Maharajkumar of Tehri-Garhwal, of course, by virtue of the boundary dispute between Tibet and his State had a vested interest in keeping the Chinese out of Tibet.

1143. L/P&S/12/1340, Sir Ralph Stevenson to Foreign Office (Esler Dening), 9 June 1948, enclosing paper by Panikkar dated Nanking, 21 May 1948. For a severe critique of Panikkar's role in the history of Sino-Indian relations, see: Karunakar Gupta, *Sino-Indian Relations 1948-52. Role of K.M. Panikkar*, Calcutta 1987.

1144. Richardson says that from 1948 onwards a number of senior Indian military men visited Gyantse where they discussed with the Tibetans what needed to be done. The Tibetans, Richardson reports, refused to subject themselves to the kind of training advocated by the Indians. See: Richardson, *Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 178.

1145. United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950. Volume VI. East Asia and The Pacific*, Washington 1976, pp. 317-318, Henderson to Acheson, 8 March 1950. Henderson acquired this information from officials in the U.K. High Commission in New Delhi.

1146. By 1949 Richardson was in the employ of the independent Government of India; Fox and Ford were contract employees in the service of the Government of Tibet; Harrer and Aufschnaiter, who had come to Tibet as escaped POWs from a camp in British India, were performing various functions for the Dalai Lama and the Kashag; Nedbailoff, a White Russian, was working for George Tsarong (Tsarong's son) as an electrical engineer. Grunfeld (*Modern Tibet, op. cit.*, p. 78) includes Geoffrey Bull in this select list but does not mention Nedbailoff. In fact, Bull was never in Outer Tibet; he worked as a missionary in Sikang. George Patterson, another missionary in Sikang, passed through Kham in January 1950 on his way to Assam.

1147. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1950 VI, loc. cit.*, pp. 275-276, Acheson to New Delhi Embassy, 12 January 1950; Henderson to Acheson, 20 January 1950.

1148. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1950 VI, loc. cit.*, pp. 330-331, Acheson to Embassy, New Delhi, 19 April 1950.

1149. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1950 VI, loc. cit.*, pp. 361-362, Henderson to Acheson, 9 June 1950. There was a slight stress in U.S.-Tibet relations at that moment in that a small group of American diplomats (Mackiernan and Bessag) and White Russian friends fleeing from Sinkiang via Tibet were fired upon by Tibetan guards and Mackiernan and two White Russians were killed.

1150. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1950 VI, loc. cit.*, pp. 365-366, Ambassador Douglas, London, to Acheson, 20 June 1950.
The Government of India gave *de jure* recognition to the People's Republic of China on 30 December 1949.

1151. In 1949-1950 Pangda Topgye and Pangda Rapga, along with Geshi Sherap Gyaltso and Lobsang Tsewong (a leading Tibetan from Amdo) were preparing what amounted to a move both to free Sikang (Kham) from China and to overthrow the existing Lhasa regime and replace it by some kind of pan-Tibetan national movement. They had managed by trading with the remnants of the Kuomintang forces in the region to acquire a considerable stock of arms and ammunition.
The Lhasa Government saw no merit whatsoever in abdicating in favour of the Pangdatsang and their allies in Kham and Amdo; and it may well be that they preferred some settlement with China to facing the prospect of a Tibet in which power had been handed over to the likes of Pangda Topgye and Pangda Rapga. The attitude of Lhasa contributed to the frustration of the plans of the Eastern Tibetan party. In the short term this meant that there was no united resistance to China; and in the long term it guaranteed both the failure of rebellion in Eastern Tibet and, in 1959, in the end of the old Lhasa Government.
The fascinating story of the course of Tibetan politics after 1950 lies beyond the scope of this book. The available records, moreover, are insufficient for a narrative of adequate detail and acceptable reliability. We cannot, for example, be sure of the nature and extent of foreign involvement, notably that of the United States and Taiwan. The rivalry between the Lhasa establishment and the centres of power in Eastern Tibet, of course, had existed long before 1950.

1152. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1950 VI, loc. cit.*, p. 449, Henderson to Acheson, 24 August 1950.

1153. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1950 VI, loc. cit.*, pp. 493-495, Henderson to Acheson, 10 September 1950.

1154. State Department, *Foreign Relations 1950 VI, loc. cit.*, 9. 503, Acting Secretary of State Webb to Henderson, 15 September 1950.

1155. See: R. Ford, *Captured in Tibet*, London 1957. There is something strange about the way in which Ngabo allowed Ford to be captured, almost as if he had been betrayed to the Chinese.

1156. Shakabpa and his party, now a Delegation to the UN, were really the old Tibetan Trade Mission minus Pangdatsang.

1157. K. Jain, ed., *China South Asian Relations 1947-1980*, Vol. 1, New Delhi 1981, p. 38.

1158. See: van Walt, *Status of Tibet*, *op. cit.*, pp. 337-338, prints the text of the Agreement, dated 23 May 1951.

1159. One action the Government of India did take was, as has already been noted, to seize the opportunity to bring about the Indian occupation of Tawang north of the Se La. This was achieved in February 1951. It could hardly have done much to raise Tibetan morale; and the Chinese doubtless interpreted it as evidence that Jawaharlal Nehru was probably no more than a British imperialist in a new incarnation. It was certainly a milestone in the genesis of the Great Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute.

1160. For a first hand account of the ineffectual Tibetan defence of Chamdo, see: Ford, *Captured in Tibet*, *op. cit.*, Chapter 9.

1161. For the text of the Agreement Between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India, see: Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged and Agreements Signed Between the Governments of India and China 1954-1959. White Paper*, New Delhi 1963, pp. 98-101. The Agreement, which was valid for eight years, was signed in Peking on 29 April 1954 and ratified by the Government of India on 3 June 1954.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acharya, B.K., *India and China. A Brief Survey*, New Delhi 1965.

Addis, J.M., (Sir J.), *The India-China Border Question*, Centre for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963.

Addy, Premen, *Tibet on the Imperial Chessboard*, Calcutta 1984.

Adshead, S.A.M., *Province and Politics in late Imperial China. Viceregal Government in Szechwan, 1898-1911*, London and Malmö 1984.

Ahmad, N., "China's Himalayan Frontiers: Pakistan's Attitude", *International Affairs*, 1962.

Ahmad, Z., *China and Tibet, 1708-1959; a resumé of facts*, Oxford 1960.

Aitchison, C.U., ed., *Collection of Enagagements, Treaties and Sanads etc.*, Vols. 12 & 14, Calcutta 1929.

Alder, G.J., *British India's Northern Frontier 1865-1895*, London 1963.

Alder, G.J., *Beyond Bokhara. The Life of William Moorcroft, Asian Explorer and Pioneer Vetinerary Surgeon 1767-1825*, London 1985.

Allen, B.C., *Assam District Gazetteers, Vol. IV, Darrang*, Allahabad 1905.

Allen, B.C., *Assam District Gazetteers, Vol. VII, Lakhimpur*, Calcutta 1905

Allen, C., *A Mountain in Tibet: the Search for Mount Kailas and the Sources of the Great Rivers of India*, London 1982.

Ambekar, G.V., & Divekar, V.D., eds., *Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia 1949-1962*, Bombay 1964.

Ambolt, N.P., & Norin, E., *Sven Hedin Central Asia Atlas. Memoir on Maps. Vol. I. Records and Surveys*, Stockholm 1967.

Andrews, G.Findlay, *The Crescent in North West China*, London 1921.

Anon, *Asian Relations being the Report of the Proceedings and Documentation of the First Asian Relations Conference New Delhi, March-April, 1947*, New Delhi 1948.

Anon, *The Boundary Question Between China and Tibet. A Valuable Record of the Tripartite Conference Between China, Britain and Tibet Held in India, 1913-1914*, Peking 1940.

Anon, "Eastern Bhutan", *Himalayan Journal*, VII, 1935.

Anon, "Flights over Everest", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXI, 1934.

Anon, *Selection of Papers Regarding the Hill Tracts Between Assam and Burmah and the Upper Brahmaputra*, Calcutta 1873.

Anon, *Sikkim. A Concise Chronicle.*, Gangtok 1963.

Anon, "The Sources of the Subansiri and Siyom", *Himalayan Journal*, IX, 1937.

Anon, *The Status of Tibet. A Brief Summary*, Bureau of H.H. the Dalai Lama, New Delhi n.d.

Anon. *Tibet the Sacred Realm*, with preface by His Holiness the Dalai Lama & Chronicle by Lobsang P. Lhalungpa, New York 1983.

Anon, *Who's Who in Tibet, corrected with a few subsequent additions up to 30th September, 1948*, Calcutta 1949.

Appadorai, A., ed., *Chinese Aggression and India*, special double issue of *International Studies*, Bombay 1963.

Aris, M., & Aung San Suu Kyi, eds., *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*, Warminster 1979.

Atkinson, E.T., *The Himalayan Districts of the North-Western Provinces of India*, 3 vols., Allahabad 1882-1886.

Auden, J.B., "A Season's Work in the Central Himalaya", *Himalayan Journal*, XII, 1940.

Austen, H.H. Godwin, "Notes on the Panggong Lake District of Ladakh", *The Geographical Journal*, 1867.

Avedon, J.F., *In Exile from the Land of Snows*, London 1984.

Bacot, J., *Dans les Marches Tibétaines autour du Dokerla*, Paris 1909.

Bacot. J., *Le Tibet Revolté*, Paris 1912.

Bacot, J., *Introduction à l'Histoire du Tibet*, Paris 1962.

Bailey, F.M., *Report on an Exploration on the North-East Frontier 1913*, Simla 1914.

Bailey, F.M., "Travels in Bhutan", *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, 1930.

Bailey, F.M., *China – Tibet – Assam. A Journey, 1911*, London 1945.

Bailey, F.M., *Mission to Tashkent*, London 1946.

Bailey, F.M., *No Passport for Tibet*, London 1957.

Bajpai, S.C., *The Northern Frontier of India, Central and Western Sector*, Calcutta 1970.

Bajpai, S.C., *Kinnaur in the Himalaya*, New Delhi 1981.

Bajpai, S.C., *Lahaul-Spiti. A Forbidden Land in the Himalayas*, New Delhi 1987.

Barber, N., *From the Land of Lost Content. The Dalai Lama's fight for Tibet*, London 1969.

Barkataki, M.S., *British Administration in North East India (1826-1874). A Study of their Social Policy*, Delhi 1985.

Barpujari, H.K., *Assam in the Days of the Company (1826-1858)*, Gauhati 1980.

Barpujari, H.K., *Problem of the Hill Tribes North-East Frontier, 1873-1962. Volume III. Inner Line to McMahon Line*, Gauhati 1981.

Barua, T.K.M., *The Idu Mishmis*, Shillong 1960.

Batten, J.H., "Note of a visit to the Niti Pass of the Grand Himalayan chain", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, VII, 1838

Batten, J.H., ed., *Official Reports on the Province of Kumaon*, Agra 1951.

Bawden, C.R., *The Modern History of Mongolia*, London 1968.

Beckwith, C.J., *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia. A History of the Struggle for Great Power among Tibetans, Turks, Arabs and Chinese during the Early Middle Ages*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1987.

Bedi, R.K., *Kailas and Manasarovar: after twenty-two years in Shiva's domain*, New Delhi 1984.

Bell, Sir C., "The Dalai Lama; Lhasa 1921", *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, XI, 1924.

Bell, Sir C., "A year in Lhasa", *The Geographical Journal*, 63, 1924.

Bell, Sir C., *Tibet Past & Present*, Oxford 1924.

Bell, Sir C., *The People of Tibet*, Oxford 1928.

Bell, Sir C., "The North-Eastern Frontier of India", *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, XVII, 1930.

Bell, Sir C., *The Religion of Tibet*, Oxford 1931.

Bell, Sir C., *Portrait of the Dalai Lama*, London 1946.

Bell, Sir C., "China and Tibet", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXXVI, 1949.

Bentinck, A., "The Abor Expedition: Geographical Results", *The Geographical Journal*, XLI, 1913.

Bernard, T., *Penthouse of the Gods: a pilgrimage into the heart of Tibet and the sacred city of Lhasa*, New York 1939.

Betts, U., "The Daflas of the Subansiri Area", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXXVI, 1949.

Bista, D.B., *Report from Lhasa*, Katmandu 1979.

Bleichsteiner, R., *L'Eglise Jaune*, Paris 1927.

Bogle, G., ed., Wolf-Dieter Grün, *Im Land der lebenden Buddhas. Entdeckungsreise in das verschlossene Tibet 1774-1775*, Stuttgart 1984.

Bonavia, D., & Bartlett, M., *Tibet*, London 1981.

Boorman, H.L., & Howard, R.C., *Biographical Dictionary of Republican China*, 4 vols., New York and London 1967-71.

Bor, E., *Adventures of a Botanist's Wife*, London 1952.

Bose, M., *British Policy in the North-East Frontier Agency*, New Delhi 1979.

Bosshard, W., *Hazards of Asia's Highlands & Deserts*, London 1932.

Boulnois, L., *Poudre d'Or et Monnaies d'Argent au Tibet (principalement au XVIIIe siècle)*, Paris 1983.

Bower, U. Graham (U. Betts), *The Hidden Land*, London 1953.

Brauen, M., *Heinrich Harrers Impressionem aus Tibet*, Frankfurt-am-Main 1974.

Bull, G.T., *When Iron Gates Yield*, London 1955.

Bull, G.T., *Tibetan Tales*, London 1966.

Burman, R.B., *Religion and Politics in Tibet*, New Delhi 1979.

Burrard, S.G., ed., *Records of the Survey of India, Vol. IV, Explorations on the North-Wast Frontier during 1911-12-13*, Calcutta 1914.

Byron, R., *First Russia, then Tibet*, London 1933.

Camman, S., *Trade Through the Himalayas. The Early British Attempts to Open Tibet*, Princeton 1951.

Carey, W., *Travel and Adventure in Tibet. Including the diary of Miss Annie R. Taylor's remarkable journey from Tau-Chau to Ta-Chien-Lu through the heart of the forbidden land*, London 1902.

Caroe, Sir Olaf, "The Geography and Ethnics of India's Northern Frontiers", *The Geographical Journal*, 126, 1960.

Caroe, Sir Olaf, *Englishmen in Tibet from Bogle to Gould*, (Tibet Society), London 1960.

Caroe, Sir Olaf, "The Indian-Chinese Boundary Dispute", *The Geographical Journal*, 127, 1961.

Caroe, Sir Olaf, "The Sino-Indian Question", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, L, 1963.

Caroe, Sir Olaf, "The Sino-Indian Frontier Dispute", *Asian Review*, April 1963.

Caroe, Sir Olaf, "The India-China Frontiers", *The Geographical Journal*, 130, 1964.

Carrasco, P. *Land and Polity in Tibet*, Seattle, Washington, 1959.

Cassinelli, C.W., & Ekvall, R.B., *A Tibetan Principlaity: the Political System of Sa-sKya*, New York 1969.

Chakravarti, P.C., *The Evolution of India's Northern Borders*, New York 1971.

Chakravorty, B.C., *Britain's Relations with the Hill Tribes of Assam since 1858*, Calcutta 1964.

Chand, A., *Tibet Past and Present: a Select Bibliography with Chronology of Historical Events*, New Delhi 1982.

Chang, Y.C., "The organization of the Waichiaopu", *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, I, 1916.

Chapman, F. Spencer, *Lhasa the Holy City*, London 1938.

Chaube, S.K., *Hill Politics in North-East India*, Bombay 1973.

Ch'en, J., *Yuan Shih-k'ai 1859-1916*, London 1961.

Ch'i Hsi-sheng, *Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928*, Stanford, California, 1976.

Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny and Chinese Economic Theory*, ed. P. Jaffe, London 1947.

China, People's Republic of, *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, Peking 1960.

China, People's Republic of, *The Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, Peking 1962.

Choudhury, D.P., *The North-East Frontier of India 1865-1914*, Calcutta 1978.

Chowdhury, J.N., *Arunachal Pradesh. From Frontier Tract to Union Territory*, New Delhi 1983.

Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement: Intellectual Revolution in Modern China*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960.

Christie, C.J., "Great Britain, China and the Status of Tibet, 1914-21", *Modern Asian Studies*, 10, 1976.

Christie, C.J., "Sir Charles Bell: a Memoir", *Asian Affairs*, February 1977.

Churchill, R.P., *The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907*, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1939.

Clark, G., *Tibet, China and Great Britain*, Peking 1924.

Clark, L., *The Marching Wind*, New York 1954.

Clubb, E.O., *20th Century China*, New York 1972.

Clubb, E.O., *The Witness and I*, New York 1974.

Coales, O.R., "Eastern Tibet", *The Geographical Journal*, LIII, 1919.

Coales, O.R., "Economic Notes on Eastern Tibet", *The Geographical Journal*, LIV, 1919.

Collister, P., *Bhutan and the British*, London 1987.

Combe, G.A., *A Tibetan on Tibet. Being the Travels and Observations of Mr. Paul Sherap (Dorje Zödba) of Tachienlu: with an Introductory Chapter on the Devil Dance*, London 1926.

Conze, E., *Buddhism, its Essence and Development*, Oxford 1951.

Cooper, T.T., *Journal of an Overland Journey from China towards India*, Calcutta 1869.

Cooper, T.T., *Travels of a pioneer of commerce in pigtail and petticoats: or, An overland journey from China towards India*, London 1871.

Cooper, T.T., *The Mishmee Hills*, London 1973.

Cordier, H., *Histoire Generale de la Chine*, Vol. IV, Paris 1921.

Cunningham, A., "Correspondence of the Commissioners deputed to the Tibetan Frontier; communicated by H.M. Elliot", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XVII, 1848.

Cunningham, A., "Memorandum detailing the boundaries between the territories of Maharaja Gulab Singh and British India as determined by the Commissioners, P.A. Vans Agnew, Esq. and Capt. A. Cunningham, of Engineers", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XVII, 1848.

Cunningham, A., "Journal of a trip through Kulu and Lahul, to the Chu Mureri Lake, in Ladak, during the months of August and September 1846", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XVII, 1848.

Cunningham, J.D., "Notes on Moorcroft's Travels in Ladakh, and on Gerard's Account of Kunawar, including a general description of the latter districts", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XIII, 1844.

Cunningham, J.D., *Ladak, Physical, Statistical and Historical*, London 1854.

Cutting, S., *The Fire Ox and Other Years*, New York 1947.

Dainelli, G., "A journey to the glaciers of the Eastern Karakoram", *The Geographical Journal*, LXXIX, 1932.

Dainelli, G., "My expedition in the Eastern Karakoram, 1930", *Himalayan Journal*, IV, 1932.

Dainelli, G., *Buddhists and Glaciers of Western Tibet*, New York 1934.

Dainelli, G., *La esplorazione della regione fra l'Himalaja Occidentale e il Caracorum*, Bologna 1934.

Dalai Lama, 14th, see: Ngawang.

Dalton, D.T., *Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal*, Calcutta 1872.

Dalvi, J.P., *Himalayan Blunder*, Bombay 1969.

Danziger, N., *Danziger's Travels. Beyond Forbidden Frontiers*, London 1987.

Das, S.C., *Journey to Lhasa and Central Tibet*, London 1902.

Das, T., *British Expansion in Tibet*, Calcutta 1929.

Datta, C.L., *Ladakh and Western Himalayan Politics*, New Delhi 1973.

Datta-Ray, S.K., *Smash and Grab. Annexation of Sikkim*, New Delhi 1984.

Davies, H.R., *Yün-nan. The Link between India and the Yangtze*, Cambridge 1909.

Davis, Sir J.F., *China, During the War and since the Peace*, 2 vols., London 1852.

David-Neel, Alexandra, *My Journey to Lhasa*, London 1927.

David-Neel, Alexandra, *With Mystics and Magicians in Tibet*, London 1931.

David-Neel, Alexandra, *Grand Tibet: au pays des brigands gentilshommes*, Paris 1933.

David-Neel, Alexandra, *Tibetan Journey*, London 1936.

David-Neel, Alexandra, *A l'Ouest Barbare de la Vaste Chine*, Paris 1947.

David-Neel, Alexandra, *Le Vieux Tibet face à la Chine Nouvelle*, Paris 1953.

Desgodins, C.H., *Le Thibet d'après la corresponsence des missionaires*, Paris 1885.

Dessirier, J., *A Travers les Marches Révoltées. Ouest-Chinois Yun Nan-Se-Tchouen-Marches Thibétaines*, Paris 1923.

Dhanalaxmi, R., *British Attitude to Nepal's Relations with Tibet and China (1814-1914)*, New Delhi 1981.

Dolkar, Tseten, *Girl from Tibet*, Chicago 1971.

Douglas, William O., *Beyond the High Himalaya*, New York 1952.

Drew, F., *The Jummoo and Kashmir Territories*, London 1875.

Drysdale, H., *Alone through China and Tibet*, London 1986.

Dunbar, G., *Abors and Gallongs*, Calcutta 1915.

Duncan, M.H., *The Yangtze and the Yak: adventurous trails in and out of Tibet*, Alexandria, Virginia, 1952.

Dupuy, T.N., & Hammerman, G.M., eds., *A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament*, New York 1973.

East, W.G., Spate, O.H.K. & Fisher, C.A., *The Changing Map of Asia*, London 1971.

Edgar, J.H., *The Marches of the Mantze*, London 1908.

Eekelen, W.F. van, *Indian Frontier Policy and the Border Dispute with China*, The Hague 1964.

Egerton, P.H., *Journal of a Tour Through Spiti*, London 1864.

Ekvall, R.B., *Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border*, Chicago 1939.

Ekvall, R.B., *Tibetan Skylines*, New York 1952.

Ekvall, R.B., *Religious Observances in Tibet*, Chicago 1964.

Ekvall, R.B., *Fields on the Hoof. Nexus of Nomadic Pastoralism in Tibet*, New York 1968.

Elvin, V., "The North-East Frontier Agency of India", *Geographical Magazine*, XXIX, 1956.

Elvin, V., "The Dalai Lama Comes to India", *Geographical Magazine*, XXXII, 1959.

Elvin, V., ed., *India's North-East Frontier in the Nineteenth Century*, Bombay 1959.

Elvin, V., *A Philosophy for NEFA*, Shillong 1960.

Enders, G.B., *Nowhere else in the World*, London 1936.

Enders, G.B., *Foreign Devil: an American Kim in Modern Asia*, London 1945.

Epstein, I., *Tibet Transformed*, Beijing 1983.

Fairbank, J.K., & Teng, S.Y., "On the Ch'ing Tributary System", *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, 6, 1941.

Fairbank, J.K., ed., *The Cambridge History of China. Volume 12. Republican China 1912-1941, Part 1*, Cambridge 1983.

Farrer, R., *On the Eaves of the World*, 2 vols., London 1917.

Filchner, W., *Sturm über Asien. Erlebnisse eines diplomatischen Geheimagenten*, Berlin 1924.

Filchner, W., *Quer durch Ost-Tibet*, Berlin 1925.

Filchner, W., *A Scientist in Tartary from the Hoang-ho to the Indus*, London 1939.

Filippi, F. de, *Storia della Spedizione Scientifica Italiana nel Himalaia Caracorum e Turchestan Cinese (1913-1914)*, Bolgona 1923.

Fisher, M.W., Rose, L.E., & Huttenback, R.A., *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh*, London 1963.

Fitzgerald, C.P., *The Chinese View of their Place in the World*, London 1964.

Fleming, P., *News from Tartary*, London 1936.

Fleming, P., *Bayonets to Lhasa*, London 1961.

Fletcher, H.R., *A Quest of Flowers: the plant explorations of Frank Ludlow and George Sherriff*, Edinburgh 1976.

Florinsky, M.T., *Russia. A History and an Interpretation*, 2 vols., New York 1968.

Forbes, A.W., *Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia. A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949*, Cambridge 1986.

Ford, R., *Captured in Tibet*, London 1957.

Foreman, H., *Through Forbidden Tibet. An Adventure into the Unknown*, London 1936.

Francke, A.H., *A History of Western Tibet*, London 1907.

Fraser, J.B., *Journal of a Tour through part of the Snowy Range of the Himala Mountains and to the Sources of the Rivers Jumna and Ganges*, London 1820.

Friel, R., *Assam District Gazetteers, Supplement to Vol. VIII, Lakhimpur*, Shillong 1916.

Friters, G.M., *Outer Mongolia and its International Position*, London 1951.

Fürer-Haimendorf, C. von, *Ethnographic Notes on the Tribes of the Subansiri Region*, Shillong 1947.

Fürer-Haimendorf, C. von, *Exploration in the Eastern Himalayas. Diaries of Travel in the Subansiri Area, 1944 and 1945*, Shillong 1947.

Fürer-Haimendorf, C. von, "The Tribes of the Subansiri Region", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXXV, 1948.

Fürer-Haimendorf, C. von, "Anthropology and Administration in the Tribal Areas of the North-East Frontier", *Eastern Anthropologist*, 1949.

Fürer-Haimendorf, C. von, *Himalayan Barbary*, London 1955.

Fürer-Haimendorf, C. von, *The Apa Tanis and their Neighbours. A Primitive Society of the Eastern Himalayas*, London 1962.

Fürer-Haimendorf, C. von, *A Himalayan Tribe: from Cattle to Cash*, Delhi 1980.

Fürer-Haimendorf, C. von, *Highlanders of Arunachal Pradesh*, New Delhi 1982.

Gait, Sir E., *A History of Assam*, Calcutta 1926.

Gelder, S. & R., *The Timely Rain. Travels in New Tibet*, London 1964.

Gerard, A., "Narrative of a Journey from Soobathoo to Shipke, in Chinese Tartary", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XI, 1842.

Gerard, A,: see Lloyd, G.

Getty, A., *The Gods of Northern Buddhism*, Oxford 1928.

Ghosh, S., *Tibet in Sino-Indian Relations 1899-1914*, New Delhi 1977.

Gilbert, M., *The Road to Victory. Winston S. Churchill 1941-1945*, London 1986.

Gill, W., condensed by E.C. Baber and ed., H. Yule, *The River of Golden Sand: being the narrative of a Journey through China and Eastern Tibet to Burmah*, London 1883.

Gillard, D., *The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914. A Study in British and Russian Imperialism*, London 1977.

Gopal, R., *India-China-Tibet Triangle*, Lucknow 1964.

Gopal, Sarvepalli, *Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography, Volume Three 1956-1964*, Delhi 1984.

Gopalachari, K., "The India-China Boundary Question", *International Studies*, V, Nos. 1-2, 1963.

Goré, F., *Trente Ans aux Portes du Thibet Interdit 1908-1938*, Hong Kong 1939.

Goullart, P., *Forgotten Kingdom*, London 1953.

Gould, B.J., *Report on the Discovery, Recognition and Installation of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama*, New Delhi 1941.

Gould, B.J. (Sir Basil), *The Jewel in the Lotus. Recollections of an Indian Political*, London 1957.

Govinda, L.G., *Tibet in Pictures. A Journey into the Past*, 2 vols., Berkeley, California, 1979.

Green, L.C., "Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute", *China Quarterly*, 3, 1960.

Greenhut, F.A., *The Tibetan Frontier Question from Curzon to the Columbo Conference (An Unresolved Factor in Indo-Sinic Relations)*, New Delhi 1982.

Gregory, J.W., & Gregory, C.J., *To the Alps of Chinese Tibet. An account of a journey of exploration up and to the snow-clad mountains of the Tibetan frontier*, London 1923.

Grunfeld, A. Tom, *The Making of Modern Tibet*, London 1987.

Guibaut, A., *Tibetan Venture in the Country of the Ngolo-Setas*, London 1947.

Gupta, Karunakar, "The McMahon Line 1911-45: The British Legacy", *The China Quarterly*, 47, 1971.

Gupta, Karunakar, *The Hidden History of the Sino-Indian Frontier*, Calcutta 1974.

Gupta, Karunakar, "Distortions in the History of Sino-Indian Frontiers", *Economic and Political Weekly*, xv, 30, 1980.

Gupta, Karunakar., *Spotlight on Sino-Indian Frontiers*, Calcutta 1982.

Gupta, Karunakar, *Sino-Indian Relations 1948-1952. Role of K.M. Pannikar*, Calcutta 1987.

Gupta, S., *British Relations with Bhutan*, Jaipur 1974.

Hall, J.C.S., *The Yunnan Provincial Faction, 1928-1937*, Canberra 1976.

Hambly, G., ed., *Central Asia*, New York 1969.

Hamilton, A., *In Abor Jungles, being an account of the Abor Expedition, the Mishmi Mission and the Miri Mission*, London 1912.

Hamilton, W., *A Geographical, Statistical, and Historical Description of Hindostan*, 2 vols., London 1820.

Hamsa, Bhagwan Shri, *The Holy Mountain, being the Story of a Pilgrimage to Lake Manas and of Initiation on Mount Kailas in Tibet*, with an introduction by W.B. Yeats, London 1934.

Hanbury-Tracy, J., *Black River of Tibet*, London 1938.

Harcourt, A.F.P., *The Himalayan Districts of Kooloo, Lahoul and Spiti*, London 1871.

Harrer, H., *Seven Years in Tibet*, London 1954.

Harrer, H., *Return to Tibet*, London 1984.

Hay, W.C., "Report on the valley of Spiti; and facts collected with a view to a future revenue settlement", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XIX, 1850.

Hayden, H.H., "The geology of Spiti, with parts of Bashahr and Rupshu", *Memoirs of the Geological Survey of India*, 36, 1904.

Hayden, H.H., & Cosson, C., *Sport and Travel in the Highlands of Tibet*, London 1927.

Heber, A.R., & Heber, K.M., *In Himalayan Tibet*, London 1926.

Hedin, S., *Trans-Himalaya. Discoveries and Adventures in Tibet*, 3 vols., London 1909-1913.

Hedin, S., *Big Horse'e Flight: the Trail of War in Central Asia*, London 1936.

Hedin, S., & Bergman, F., *History of the Expedition in Asia 1927-1935*, 3 Pts., Stockholm 1943-44.

Herbert, J.D., "An Account of a Tour made to lay down the Courses and Levels of the River Sutlej", *Asiatic Researches*, XV, 1825.

Herbert, J.D., "Journal of Captain Herbert's Tour from Almorah in a N.W.W., and S.W. direction, through parts of the Province of Kemaon and British Gurhwal", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XIII, 1844.

Hermanns, M., *Die Nomaden von Tibet*, Vienna 1949.

Hertslet, G.E.P., ed., *Treaties, etc., between Great Britain and China; and between China and Foreign Powers, etc.*, 2 vols., London 1908.

Hewlett, Sir M., *Forty Years in China*, London 1943.

Hicks, R., & Ngakpa Chogyam, *Great Ocean. An Authorised Biography of the Buddhist Monk Tenzin Gyatso His Holiness The Fourteenth Dalai Lama*, Shaftsbury 1984.

Hicks, R., *Hidden Tibet. The Land and its People*, Shaftesbury 1988.

Hilton, R., *Nine Lives: the autobiography of an old soldier*, London 1955.

Holdich, Sir T., *Tibet the Mysterious*, London 1908.

Holdich, Sir T., "The North-Eastern Frontier of India", *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, 60, 1912.

Holdich, Sir T., *Political Frontiers and Boundary Making*, London 1916.

Hopkinson, A.J., "The Position of Tibet", *Royal Central Asian Journal*, XXXVII, 1950.

Hopkirk, P., *Trespassers on the Roof of the World*, London 1982.

Hopkirk, P., *Setting the East Ablaze. Lenin's Dream of an Empire in Asia*, London 1984.

Hsü, I.C.Y., *The Rise of Modern China*, Oxford 1983.

Hu Sheng, *Imperialism and Chinese Politics*, Peking 1955.

Hudson, G.F., "The Frontier of China and Assam", *China Quarterly*, 12, 1962

Hudson, G.F., "The Aksai China", *St Antony's Papers*, 14, London 1963.

Hummel, A.W., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644-1912*, 2 vols., Washington, DC, 1943-44.

Hunter, W.W., *A Statistical Account of Assam*, 2 vols., London 1878.

Hunter, W.W., ed., *The Imperial Gazetteer of India*, vol. 5, London 1885, & vol.12, London 1887.

Husain, Asad, *British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal*, London 1970.

Hutchinson, J., & Vogel, J.P., *History of the Punjab Hill States*, 2 vols., Lahore 1933.

Hutheesing, R., *Window on China*, London 1953.

Hutton, T., "Journal of a Trip through Kunawar, Hungrung, and Spiti, undertaken in the year 1838, under the patronage of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, for the purposes of determining the geological formation of those districts", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, VII, 1839.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Prime Minister on Sino-Indian Relations. Vol. I: In Parliament*, New Delhi 1959.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged, and Agreements Signed between the Governments of India and China 1954-1959. White Paper*, New Delhi 1959.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Government of India and China September-November 1959 and a Note on the Historical Background of the Himalayan Frontier of India. White Paper No.II*, New Delhi 1959.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and of the Chinese People's Republic on the Boundary Question*, New Delhi 1961.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India*, New Delhi 1961.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memorand and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China November 1959-March 1960. White Paper No.III*, New Delhi 1962.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China March 1960-November 1960. White Paper No. IV*, New Delhi 1962.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China November 1960-November 1961. White Paper No.V, New Delhi 1962.*

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China November 1961-July 1962. White Paper No.VI*, New Delhi 1962.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *The India-China Border Problem*, New Delhi 1962.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Nehru's Letter to Chou En-lai (November 14, 1962)*, New Delhi 1962.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *World Press on Chinese Aggression*, New Delhi 1962.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Indian Communists Condemn Chinese Aggression*, New Delhi 1962.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Leading Events in India-China Relations*, New Delhi 1962.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Prime Minister on Sino Indian Relations. Vol II: Press Ceonferences: Part II*, New Delhi 1962

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Prime Minister on Chinese Aggression*, New Delhi 1963.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China July 1962-October 1962. White Paper No.VII*, New Delhi 1963.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China October 1962-January 1963. White Paper No.VIII*, New Delhi 1963.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China January 1963-July 1963. White Paper No.IX*, New Delhi 1963.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China July 1963-January 1964. White Paper No.X*, New Delhi 1964.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *India-China Conflict*, New Delhi 1964.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Governments of India and China January 1964-January 1965. White Paper No.XI*, New Delhi 1965.

India, Ministry of External Affairs, *Documents on China's Ultimatum to India*, New Delhi 1965.

India, Ministry of Information, *Chinese Aggression in War and Peace. Letters of the Prime Minister of India*, New Delhi 1962.

India, Ministry of Information, *China's Fraudulent Peace Offensive*, New Delhi 1962.

India, Ministry of Information, *The Chinese Threat*, New Delhi 1965.

Inlow, E.B., "The McMahon Line", *Journal of Geography*, 6, 1964.

International Commission of Jurists, *Tibet and the Rule of Law*, Geneva 1959.

Irwin, J. *The Kashmir Shawl*, London 1973.

Isono, Fujiko, "The Mongolian Revolution of 1921", *Modern Asian Studies*, 10, 1976.

Jacquemont, V., *Letters from India*, 2 vols., London 1834.

Jacquemont, V., *Voyage dans l'Inde, Vol.II.*, Paris 1841.

Jain, G., *Panchsheela and After: a re-appraisal of Sino-Indian relations in the context of the Tibetan insurrection*, London 1960.

Jain, R.K., ed., *China-South Asian Relations 1947-1980, Vol. 1: India 1947-1980*, London 1981.

Johnson, W.H., "Reort on his Journey to Ilchi, the Capital of Khotan",*The Geographical Jouenal*, 1867.

Johnston, G.H., *Journey Through Tomorrow*, Melbourne 1947.

Johnston, R.F., *From Peking to Mandalay. A Journey from North China to Burma through Tibetan Ssuch'uan and Yunnan*, London 1908.

Johnston, R.F., *Twilight in the Forbidden City*, London 1934 (reprinted, with an introduction by P. Atwell, by Oxford in Asia, Hong Kong 1985).

Johri, S.R., *Where India China and Burma Meet*, Calcutta 1962.

Johri, S.R., *Dark Corner of India*, Lucknow 1970.

Kahn, E.J., Jr., *The China Hands. America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them*, New York 1975.

Kapp, R.A., *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic. Provincial Militarism and Central Power 1911-1938*, New Haven & London 1973.

Karan, P.P., & Jenkins, W.M. Jr., *The Himalayan Kingdoms: Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1963.

Karnik, V.B., ed., *China Invades India*, Bombay 1963.

Kaul, B.M., *Confrontation with Pakistan*, New Delhi 1971.

Kaulback, R., "Zayul and the Eastern Tibet Border Country", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 1934.

Kaulback, R., "The Assam border of Tibet", *The Geographical Journal*, 83, 1934.

Kaulback, R., *Tibetan Trek*, London 1936.

Kaulback, R., *Salween*, London 1938.

Khosla, G.D., *Himalayan Circuit. The Story of a Journey in the Inner Himalayas*, London 1956.

King, Louis Magrath, *China in Turmoil. Studies in Personality*, London 1927.

King, Louis Magrath, "A frontier incident", *Blackwood's Magazine*, 221, 1927.

King, W.H., "The telegraph to Lhasa", *The Geographical Journal*, 63, 1924.

King, Wunsz, *China at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919*, New York 1961.

Kingdon-Ward, Frank, see: Ward, F. Kingdon.

Kipling, R., *Kim*, London 1901.

Kirk, W., "The Sino-Indian Frontier Dispute. A Geographical Review", *The Scottish Geographical Magazine*, 76, 1960.

Kirk, W., "The Inner Asian Frontier of India", *Institute of British Geographers*, No. 31, 1962.

Klein, I., "British imperialism in decline: Tibet 1914-1921", *Historian*, 34, 1971.

Klein, I., "The Anglo-Russian Convention and the Problems of Central Asia, 1907-1914", *The Journal of British Studies*, XI-XII, 1971-73.

Kling, K., *Tibet*, London 1985.

Knight, G.E.O., *Intimate Glimpses of Mysterious Tibet and Neighbouring Countries*, London 1930.

Koli, M., *India and Bhutan. A Study in Interrelations 1772-1910*, New Delhi 1982.

Kolmas, J., *Tibet and Imperial China: a survey of Sino-Tibetan relations up to the end of the Manchu dynasty in 1912*, Canberra 1967.

Kolmas, J., "The McMahon Line: the further development of the disputed boundary", in Aris & Aung San Suu Kyi, *Tibetan Studies*, *op. cit.*

Korostovetz, J.J., *Von Cinggis Khan zur Sowjetrepublik*, Berlin & Leipzig 1926.

Kumar, M., "Sino-Indian Relations 1950-59", *International Affairs*, V, Nos. 1-2, 1963.

Lahiri, R.M., *The Annexation of Assam (1824-1854)*, Calcutta 1955.

Lakhanpal, P.L., *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute*, Delhi 1965.

Lall, J., *Aksaichin and Sino-Indian Conflict*, New Delhi 1988.

Lamb, A., "The Spiti Valley Today", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, October 1956.

Lamb, A., *Britain and Chinese Central Asia: the Road to Lhasa 1767-1905*, London 1960.

Lamb, A., "The Indo-Tibetan border", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, 6, 1960.

Lamb, A., *The China-India Border: the origins of the disputed boundaries*, R.I.I.A., London 1964.

Lamb, A., "The Sino-Pakistani Boundary Agreement of 2 March 1963", *Australian Outlook*, December 1964.

Lamb, A., *The McMahon Line*, 2 vols., London 1966.

Lamb, A., *Crisis in Kashmir*, London 1966

Lamb, A., *Asian Frontiers. Studies in a Continuing Problem*, London 1968.

Lamb, A., "War in the Himalayas. *India's China War* by Neville Maxwell", *Modern Asian Studies*, 5, October 11971.

Lamb, A., *The Sino-Indian Border in Ladakh*, Canberra 1973.

Lamb, A., *British India and Tibet 1766-1910*, London 1986.

Landor, A.H. Savage, *In the Forbidden Land: Tibet*, 2 vols., London 1898.

Lattimore, O., *Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, Boston 1950.

Lattimore, O., *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, New York 1951.

Launay, A., *Histoire de la Mission du Thibet*, 2 vols., Paris 1903.

Lee, W.K., *Tibet in World Politics*, New York 1931.

Lesdain, Count de, *From Peking to Sikkim through the Ordos, the Gobi Desert and Tibet*, London 1908.

Levenson, C.B., *The Dalai Lama. A Biography*, London 1988.

Lhamo, Rinchen, (with an introduction by Louis M. King) *We Tibetans*, New York 1985.

Li Chien-nung, *The Political History of China, 1840-1928*, Stanford, California, 1956.

Li Tieh-tseng, *The Historical Status of Tibet*, New York 1956.

Liu, F.F., *A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949*, Princeton 1956.

Liu, Shengqi, "The Making of Modern Tibet", review article, *Beijing Review*, Vol. 31, No. 1, January 1988.

Lloyd, G., ed., *Narrative of a Journey from Caunpoor to the Boorendo Pass in the Himalaya Mountains etc., by Major Sir W. Lloyd, and Captain Alexander Gerard's Attempt to Penetrate by Bekhur to Garoo and the Lake Manasarowara, etc.*, 2 vols., London 1840.

Lloyd, G., ed., *Account of Koonawur in the Himalaya, by Captain Alexander Gerard*, London 1841.

Lloyd, G.T., *Census of India 1921, III, Pt. I, Assam*, Shillong 1923.

Lo Hui-min, *The Correspondence of G.E. Morrison, Vol. II, 1912-1920*, Cambridge 1978.

Lohia, R., *China, India and Northern Frontiers*, Hyderabad 1963.

Longford, E., *Jameson's Raid. The Prelude to the Boer War*, London 1960

Longstaff, T., *This My Voyage*, London 1950.

Louis, W.R., *British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939*, Oxford 1971.

Loup, R., *Martyr au Thibet. Maurice Tornay, Chanoine régulier du Grand-St-Bernard 1910-1949*, Fribourg 1950.

Ludlow, F., "The sources of the Subansiri and Siyom", *Himalayan Journal*, X, 1938

Ludlow, F., "Takpo and Kongbo, S.E. Tibet", *Himalayan Journal*, XII, 1940.

Luthra, P.N., *Constitutional and Administrative Growth of the North-East Frontier Agency*, Shillong 1971.

Lyall, Sir A., *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*, London 1920.

M., R.L.N., "A Story of Struggle and Intrigue in Central Asia", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XIV, 1927 & XV, 1928.

Macdonald, D., *The Land of the Lama. A description of the country of contrasts & and of the cheerful happy-go-lucky people of a hardy nature & curious customs; their religion, ways of living, trade & social life*, London 1929.

Macdonald, D., *Twenty Years in Tibet. Intimate & Personal Experiences of the Closed Land among all Classes of its People from the Highest to the Lowest*, London 1932.

Macdonald, D., *Tibet*, Oxford 1946.

M'Cosh, J., *Topography of Assam*, Calcutta 1837.

McGovern, W.M., *To Lhasa in Disguise: an account of a secret mission through mysterious Tibet*, London 1924.

MacGregor, J., *Tibet. A Chronicle of Exploration*, London 1970.

MacIntyre, Maj.-Gen. D., *Hindu-Koh: Wanderings and Wild Sport on and Beyond the Himalayas*, London 1889.

Mackenzie, A., *History of the Relations of the Government with the Hill Tribes of the North-East Frontier of Bengal*, Calcutta 1884.

McMahon, Sir H., "International Boundaries", *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, 84, 1935-36.

MacMurray, J.V.A., *Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894-1919*, 2 vols., New York 1921.

McNair, H.F., *China in Revolution. An Analysis of Politics and Militarism under the Republic*, Chicago 1931

McNair, H.F., & Lach, D.F., *Modern Far Eastern International Relations*, New York 1955.

Malmesbury, Susan, Countess of, *The Life of Major-General Sir John Ardagh*, London 1909.

Mansergh, M., "The Asian Conference", *International Affairs*, 1947.

Maraini, F., *Secret Tibet*, London 1952.

Markham, C.R., ed., *Narratives of the Mission of George Bogle to Tibet, and the Journey of Thomas Manning to Lhasa*, London 1876.

Marshall, J., *Britain and Tibet 1765-1947. The background to the India China Border Dispute. A select annotated bibliography of printed material in European languages*, Bundoora 1977.

Mason, K., "In Memoriam. Frederick Williamson 1891-1935", *Himalayan Journal*, VIII, 1936.

Mason, K., *Abode of Snow. A History of Himalayan Exploration and Mountaineering*, London 1955.

Maxwell, N., *India's China War*, London 1970.

Maxwell, N., "China and India: the Un-negotiated Dispute", *China Quarterly*, July-September 1970.

Mehra, Parshotam, "Tibet and Russian Intrigue", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XLV, 1958.

Mehra, Parshotam, "Kazi U-gyen: 'a paid Tibetan spy'?", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 1964.

Mehra, Parshotam, *The Younghusband Expedition. An Interpretation*, London 1968.

Mehra, Parshotam, "A forgotten chapter in the history of the Northeast Frontier: 1914-36", *Journal of Asian Studies*, 31, 1972.

Mehra, Parshotam, *The McMahon Line and After*, Delhi 1974.

Mehra, Parshotam, *Tibetan Polity, 1904-37. The Conflict between the 13th Dalai Lama and the 9th Panchen*, Wiesbaden 1976.

Mehra, Parshotam, *The North-Eastern Frontier of India. A Documentary Study of the Internecine Rivalry between India, Tibet and China, 1906-1914, 1914-54*, 2 vols., Delhi 1979-80.

Mehta, Ved, "A Reporter at Large. Indian Journal, V, The Himalayas: toward the Forest of Arden", *The New Yorker*, 19 July 1969.

Menon, K.P.S., *Delhi-Chungking*, Oxford 1947.

Menon, K.P.S., *Many Worlds*, London 1961.

Menon, K.P.S., "The Sixties in Retrospect", Address to The Indian School of International Studies, New Delhi, 13 Decmber 1969.

Menon, K.P.S., *Twilight in China*, Bombay 1972.

Migot, A., *Tibetan Marches*, London 1955.

Millard, T.F.F., *Conflict of Policies in Asia*, New York 1924.

Millington, P., *On the Track of the Abor, London 1912.*

Mills, J.P., "Tours in the Balipara Frontier Tract, Assam", *Man in India*, 27, 1947.

Mills, J.P., "Problems of the Assam-Tibet Frontier", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXXVII, 1950.

Mills, J.P., "Mishmis of the Lohit Valley", *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 1952.

Mitter, J.P., *Truth about McMahon Line*, Calcutta 1962.

Mitter, J.P., *Betrayal of Tibet*, Bombay 1964.

Moorcroft, W., & Trebeck, G., *Travels in the Himalayan Provinces of Hindustan*, ed. H.H. Wilson, 2 vols., London 1841.

Moraes, F., *The Revolt in Tibet*, New York 1960.

Morgan, G., "Myth and Reality in the Great Game", *Asian Affairs*, February 1973.

Morgan, G., *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia 1810-1895*, London 1981.

Morshead, H.T., "The topographical results of Sir H.Hayden's expedition to Tibet in 1922, compiled from the verbal narrative of the Surveyor, Gujar Singh", *Records of the Survey of India*, 18, 1924.

Mullik, B.N., *My Years with Nehru. The Chinese Betrayal*, New Delhi 1971.

Nair, P. Thankappan, *Tribes of Arunachal Pradesh*, Guwahati 1985.

Nanda, N., *Tawang Land of Mon*, New Delhi 1982.

Nathan, A.J., *Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Functionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism*, Berkeley, California, 1976.

Neame, P., "Tibet and the 1936 Lhasa Mission", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, XXVI, 1939.*

Neame, P., *Playing with Strife: the autobiography of a soldier*, London 1947.

Needham, J.F., "Journey along the Lohit Brahmaputra between Sadiya in Upper Assam and Rima in South-Eastern Tibet", *Royal Geographical Society Supplementary Papers*, II, 1889.

Ngawang Lobsang Yishey Tenzing Gyatso, 14th Dalai Lama, *My Land and my People*, New York 1962.

Ngawang Thutob, *Tibet Today*, New Delhi 1965,

Noel, J.B.L., "A Journey to Tashirak in Southern Tibet, and the Eastern Approaches to Mount Everest", *The Geographical Journal*, LIII, 1919.

Noel, J.B.L., *Through Tibet to Everest*, London 1927.

Noorani, A.G., "The Sino-Indian Border Question", *The Indian Express*, New Delhi, 20-23 May 1964.

Noorani, A.G., "The McMahon Line", *Opinion*, 28 February 1967.

Norbu, Dawa, *Red Star Over Tibet*, London 1974.

Norbu, Thubten Jigme, & Harrer, H., *Tibet is my Country*, London 1960.

Norbu, Thubten Jigme, & Turnbull, C., *Tibet, its history, religion & people*, London 1969.

Norin, E., *Geological Explorations in Western Tibet*, Stockholm 1946.

Normanton, S., *Tibet: The Lost Civilisation*, London 1988.

Nyman, Lars-Eric, *Great Britain and Chinese, Russian and Japanese Interests in Sinkiang, 1918-1934*, Malmö 1977.

Ottley, J.F.S., "The Jadh Ganga Valley and the Nela Pass", *Himalayan Journal*, XII, 1940.

Pakistan, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, *Kashmir in Maps*, Rawalpindi 1954.

Pallis, M., *Peaks and Lamas*, London 1939.

Pandey, B.B., *The Hill Miris*, Shillong 1974.

Panikkar, K.M., *Founding of the Kashmir State*, London 1953.

Panikkar, K.M., *In Two Chinas*, London 1955.

Pares, Sir B., *A History of Russia*, London 1962.

Patterson, G.N., *Tibetan Journey*, London 1954.

Patterson, G.N., *God's Fool*, London 1956.

Patterson, G.N., *Tragic Destiny*, London 1959.

Patterson, G.N., *Tibet in Revolt*, London 1960.

Patterson, G.N., "Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and towards the Himalayan States", *China Quarterly*, 12, 1962.

Patterson, G.N., *Peking versus Delhi*, London 1963.

Peissel, M., *Cavaliers of Kham. The secret war in Tibet*, London 1972.

Pemberton, R.B., *Report on the Eastern Frontier of British India*, Calcutta 1835.

Pemble, J., *The Invasion of Nepal. John Company at War*, Oxford 1971.

Pereira, C., "Peking to Lhasa (from the diaries of the late Brig.-Gen. George Pereira)", *The Geographical Journal*, 64, 1924.

Pereira, G., see: Younghusband, Sir F.

Perrin, J.M., "Recent Russian Studies on Tibetology. A Bibliographical Survey", *Bulletin of Tibetology*, I, No.2, Gangtok, October 1964.

Perry-Ayscough, H.G.C., & Otter-Barry, R.B., *With the Russians in Mongolia*, London 1913.

Petech, L., *China and Tibet in the Early Eighteenth Century*, Leiden 1950.

Petech, L., *Aristocracy and Government in Tibet 1728-1959*, Rome 1973.

Petech, L., *The Kingdom of Ladakh c.950-1842 A.D.*, Rome 1977.

Peter, Prince of Greece and Denmark, *The Aristocracy of Central Tibet: a Provisional List of the Names of the Noble Houses of U-Tsang*, Kalimpong 1954.

Peters, W., "The Unresolved Problem of Tibet", *Asian Affairs*, XIX Pt. II, June 1988.

Phillimore, R.H., "Survey of Kashmir and Jammu, 1855 to 1865", *Himalayan Journal*, 1959-60.

Phillips, G.D.R., *Dawn in Siberia: the Mongols of Lake Baikal*, London 1942.

Pinck, D., "Getting to Mrs. Nestor's Farm. A Secret Agent in Wartime China", *Encounter*, July/August 1988.

Poppe, N.N., "The Destruction of Buddhism in the USSR",(in Russian), *Bulletin, Institute for the study of the USSR*, Munich, July 1956.

Powell, R.L., *The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895-1912*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1955.

Pranavananda, Swami, *Kailas-Manasarovar*, Calcutta 1949.

Pratt, A.E., *To the Snows of Tibet through China*, London 1892.

Prescott, J.R.V., *Map of Mainland Asia by Treaty*, Melbourne 1975.

Price, E.B., *The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 concerning Manchuria and Mongolia*, Baltimore 1933.

Rahul, R., *The Government of Tibet, 1912-1933*, New Delhi 1962.

Rahul, R., *The Government and Politics of Tibet*, New Delhi 1969.

Rahul, R., *The Himalayan Borderland*, New Delhi 1970.

Rahul, R., *The Politics of Central Asia*, London 1974.

Rahul, R., *The Himalaya as a Frontier*, New Delhi 1978.

Randhawa, M.S., *The Kumaon Himalayas*, New Delhi 1970.

Rao, G. Narayan, *The India-China Border. A Reappraisal*, Bombay 1968.

Rao, K. Krishna, "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question and International Law", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, April 1962.

Rao, P.R., *India and Sikkim (1814-1970)*, New Delhi 1972.

Rawling, C.G., *The Great Plateau, being an Account of Exploration in Central Tibet, 1903, and of the Gartok Expedition, 1904-1905*, London 1905.

Razvi, M., *The Frontiers of Pakistan*, Karachi 1971.

Reid, Sir R., *History of the Frontier Areas Bordering on Assam from 1883-1941*, Shillong 1941.

Reid, Sir R., "The excluded areas of Assam", *The Geographical Journal*, 103, 1944.

Reid, Sir R., "India's North-East Frontier", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 1944.

Reid, Sir R., *Years of Change in Bengal and Assam*, London 1966.

Rhodes, N., "The development of currency in Tibet", in Aris & Aung San Suu Kyi, *Tibetan Studies*, *op. cit.*

Richard, L., trans. and ed. by M. Kenelly, *Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire and Dependencies*, Shanghai 1908.

Richardson, H.E., *Tibetan Précis*, Calcutta 1945.

Richardson, H.E., "The State of Tibet", *Journal of the Royal Central Society*, XXXVIII, 1951.

Richardson, H.E., "Recent Developments in Tibet", *Asian Review*, 40, 1959.

Richardson, H.E., *Tibet and its History*, London 1962. (Revised edition, Boulder & London 1984).

Richardson, H.E., "Review of *The China-India Border*", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, 1964.

Richardson, H.E., "The Rva-screng Conspiracy of 1947", in Aris, M., & Aung San Suu Kyi, *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*, Warminster 1980.

Riencourt, A. de, *Roof of the World. Tibet, Key to Asia*, New York 1950.

Rijnhart, S.C., *With the Tibetans in Tent and Temple*, London 1901.

Rinchen Lhamo: see Lhamo, Rinchen.

Robins, K., *Sir Edward Grey. A Biography of Lord Grey of Fallodon*, London 1971.

Robinson, W., *A Descriptive Account of Assam*, London 1841.

Rock, J.F., *The Amnye Ma-Chhen Range and Adjacent Regions. A Monographic Study*, Rome 1956.

Rockhill, W.W., *Land of the Lamas. Notes of a Journey through China, Mongolia and Tibet*, London 1891.

Rockhill, W.W., "Tibet. A Geographical, Ethnographical, and Historical Sketch, derived from Chinese Sources", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XXIII (NS), 1891.

Rockhill, W.W., *Notes on the Ethnology of Tibet, based on the collections in the U.S. National Museum*, Washington, DC, 1895.

Rockhill, W.W., "The Dalai Lamas of Lhasa and their Relations with the Manchu Emperors of China", *T'oung Pao*, XI, 1910.

Ronaldshay, Earl of, *On the Outskirts of Empire in Asia*, London 1904.

Ronaldshay, Earl of, *Lands of the Thunderbolt. Sikhim, Chumbi and Bhutan*, London 1923.

Ronaldshay, Earl of, *The Life of Lord Curzon*, 3 vols., London 1928

Roosevelt, T. & K., *Trailing the Giant Panda*, New York 1929.

Rossabi, M., *China and Inner Asia from 1368 to the Present Day*, London 1975.

Rowland, J., *A History of Sino-Indian Relations. Hostile Co-existence*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1967.

Roy, S., *Aspects of Padam-Minyong Culture*, Shillong 1960.

Rubin, A.P., "The Sino-Indian Border Disputes", *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 1960.

Rubin, A.P., "Tibet's Declaration of Independence",*The Americal Journal of International Law*, 60, 1966.

Rubin, A.P., "Review of *The McMahon Line*", *The American Journal of International Law*, 61, 1967.

Rustomji, N., *Enchanted Frontiers. Sikkim, Bhutan and India's North-Eastern Borderlands*, Delhi 1973.

Rustomji, N., *Imperilled Frontiers. India's North-Eastern Borderlands*, New Delhi 1983.

Ruttledge, H., "Notes on a visit to Western Tibet in 1926", *The Geographical Journal*, LXXI, 1928.

Sarma, S.N., "Assam's relations with NEFA", *United Asia*, Vol. 15, No. 5, May 1963.

Schäfer, E., *Berge, Buddhas und Bären. Forschung und Jagd in geheimnisvollem Tibet*, Berlin 1933.

Schäfer, E., ed., *Tibet und Zentralasien*, Stuttgart 1965.

Schrecker, J.E., *Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism: Germany in Shantung*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971.

Schulemann, G., *Geschichte der Dalai-Lamas*, Leipzig 1958.

Scott, Sir G., *Burma*, London 1924.

Scott, J., "A Short Journey through North-Western Kansu and the Tibetan Border Country", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXI, 1934.

Seagrave, S., *The Soong Dynasty*, London 1985.

Seaver, G., *Francis Younghusband: explorer and mystic*, London 1952.

Sen, C., ed., *Tibet Disappears*, Bombay 1960.

Seth, V., *From Heaven's Lake: Travels through Sinkiang and Tibet*, London 1983.

Shabad, T., *China's Changing Map. National and Regional Developments, 1949-71*, London 1972.

Shakabpa, Tsepon W.D., *Tibet. A Political History*, New Haven & London, 1967.

Shakespear, L.W., *History of the Assam Rifles*, London 1929.

Shakya, Tsering, "Tibet and the League of Nations with reference to letters found in the India Office Library, under Sir Charles Bell's Collections", *The Tibet Journal*, X, 3, 1985.

Shakya, Tsering, "Making of the Great Game Players. Tibetan Students in Britain Between 1913 and 1917", *Tibetan Review*, January 1986.

Sharma, R.R.P., *The Sherdukpens*, Shillong 1961.

Sharma, S.P., "The India-China border dispute: an Indian perspective", *American Journal of International Law*, 1965.

Shelton, Albert L., *Pioneering in Tibet*, New York 1921.

Shelton, Flora B., *Shelton of Tibet*, New York 1923.

Shelvankar, K.S., "China's Himalayan Frontiers: India's Attitude", *International Affairs*, 38, 1962.

Shen, T.S. & Liu, S.C., *Tibet and the Tibetans*, Stanford, Calfornia, 1953.

Sheridan, J.E., *Chinese Warlord. The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang*, Stanford, California,, 1966.

Sherring, C.A., *Western Tibet and the British Borderland: the Sacred Country of Hindus and Buddhists with an Account of the Government, Religion and Customs of its Peoples*, London 1906.

Shieh, Milton T.J., *The Kuomintang: Selected Historical Documents, 1894-1969*, New York 1971.

Shukla, B.K., *The Daflas of the Subansiri Region*, Shillong 1959.

Sinclair, W.B., *Jump to the Land of God. The Adventures of a United States Air Force Crew in Tibet*, Caldwell, Ohio, 1965.

Singh, Amar Kaur Jasbir, *Himalayan Triangle*, London 1988.

Singh, Amar Kaur Jasbir, *A Guide to Source Materials in the India Office Library and Records for the History of Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan 1765-1950*, London 1988.

Singh, Raghubir, "A Rare Visit to a World Unto Itself", *National Geographic*, 174, 5, November 1988.

Sinha, N.C., *Tibet: considerations of Inner Asian history*, Calcutta 1967.

Sinha, N.C., *How Chinese was China's Tibet Region? Essays & Notes on Tibet & Neighbouring Countries*, Calcutta 1981.

Sinha, R., *The Akas*, Shillong 1962.

Skrine, C.P., *Chinese Central Asia. An Account of Travels in Northern Kashmir and Chinese Turkestan*, London 1926 (reprinted by Oxford in Asia, Hong Kong 1986, with an introduction by Alastair Lamb).

Skrine, C.P., & Nightingale, P., *Macartney at Kashgar. New Light on British, Chinese and Russian Activities in Sinkiang, 1890-1918*, Hong Kong 1987.

Snellgrove, D., *Buddhist Himalaya*, Oxford 1957.

Snellgrove, D., *Himalayan Pilgrimage*, Oxford 1961.

Snellgrove, D., *Nine Ways of Bon*, London 1967.

Snellgrove, D., & Richardson, H.E., *A Cultural History of Tibet*, 1968.

Snellgrove, D., "An Appreciation of Hugh Richardson", in Aris, M. & Aung San Suu Kyi, *Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson*, Warminster 1980.

Snellgrove, D., *Indo-Tibetan Buddhism. Indian Buddhists and their Tibetan Successors*, London 1987.

Snelling, J., *The Sacred Mountain: Travellers and Pilgrims at Mount Kailas in Western Tibet*, London 1983.

Spate, O.H.K., *India and Pakistan*, London 1954.

Spector, Ronald H., *Eagle Against the Sun. The American War with Japan*, London 1985.

Srivastava, L.R.N., *The Gallongs*, Shillong 1962.

Statens Etnografiska Museum, Stockholm, *Sven Hedin Central Asia Atlas*, Stcokholm 1966.

Stein, Sir Aurel, "Johnson's Map and the Topography of the K'un-lun South of Khotan", *Alpine Journal*, 39, 1921.

Stein, R.A., *Tibetan Civilization*, London 1972.

Stevens, H., *Through Deep Defiles to Tibetan Uplands. The Travels of a Naturalist from the Irrawaddy to the Yangtse*, London 1934.

Stevenson, P.H., "The Chinese-Tibetan Borderlands and its Peoples", *Bulletin of the Peking Society of Natural History*, II, 2, 1927-28.

Strachey, H., "Narrative of a Journey to Cho Lagan (Rakas Tal), Cho Mapan (Manasarowar), and the valley of Pruang in Gnari, Hundes, in September and October 1846", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XVII, 1848.

Strachey, H., *Physical Geography of Western Tibet*, London 1854.

Strachey, R., "Notice of a Trip to the Niti Pass", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, XIX, 1850.

Strachey, Sir R., "Narrative of a Journey to the Lakes Rakas-Tal and Manasarowar in Western Tibet, undertaken in 1848", *The Geographical Journal*, XV, 1900.

Sullivan, M., *The Great Adventure in Washington: the story of the Conference*, New York 1922.

Sutton, D.S., *Provincial Militiarism and the Chinese Republic: the Yunan Army, 1905-1925*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1980.

Suyin, Han, *Lhasa, the Open City: a Journey to Tibet*, London 1977.

Swinson, A., *Beyond the Frontiers: the biography of Colonel F.M. Bailey, explorer and secret agent*, London 1971.

Tang, P.S.H., *Russian and Soviet Policy in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia 1911-1931*, Durham, North Carolina, 1959.

Taring, Rinchen Dolma, *Daughter of Tibet*, London 1970.

Teichman, E., *Travels of a Consular Officer in North-West China*, Cambridge 1921.

Teichman, E., "Journeys through Kam (Eastern Tibet)", *The Geographical Journal*, 59, 1922.

Teichman, E., *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet, together with a history of the relations between China, Tibet and India*, Cambridge 1922.

Teichman, (Sir) E., *Journey to Turkistan*, London 1937.

Teichman, (Sir) E., *Affairs of China. A Survey of the Recent History and Present Circumstances of the Republic of China*, London 1938.

Terra, H. de, "On the world's highest plateaus: through an Asiatic no man's land to the deserts of Ancient Cathay", *National Geographic Magazine*, LIX, January-June 1931.

Thatcher, M., compiled and ed., *Cambridge South Asian Archive. Records of the British period in South Asia relating to India, Pakistan, Burma, Nepal and Afghanistan held in the Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge*, London 1973.

Thimayya, K.S., "Chinese Aggression and After", *International Studies*, V., Nos. 1-2, 1963.

Thomas, Lowell Jr., *Out of this World: Across the Himalayas to Tibet*, London 1951.

Thomas, Lowell Jr., *Out of this World to Forbidden Tibet*, New York 1954.

Thomas, Lowell Jr., *The Silent War in Tibet*, New York 1959,

Thomas, Lowell Jr., *The Dalai Lama*, New York 1961.

Thomson, T., *Western Himalaya and Tibet*, London 1852.

Thuillier, H.R., *Report on the explorations of Lama Serap Gyatsho, explorer K-P, Lama U-G, explorer RN, explorer PA, in Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet*, Dehra Dun 1889.

Tichy, H., *Tibetan Adventure*, London 1938.

Tilman, H.W., *When Men and Mountains Meet*, Cambridge 1946.

Tolstoy, I., "Across Tibet from India to China", *National Geographic Magazine*, 90, 1946.

Traill, G.W., "Statistical Sketch of Kamaon", *Asiatic Researches*, XVI, 1828.

Traill, G.W., "Statistical Report on the Bhotia Mehals of Kamaon", *Asiatic Researches*, XVII, 1832.

Trinkler, E., "Notes on the Westernmost Plateau of Tibet", *Himalayan Journal, III, 1931.*

Trinkler, E., *The Stormswept Roof of Asia. By Yak, Camel and Sheep Caravan in Tibet, Chinese Turkestan & over the Kara-Koram*, London 1931.

Trotter, H., "Account of the Pundit's Journey in Great Tibet from Leh in Ladakh to Lhasa, and of his Return to India via Assam", *The Geographical Journal*, 47, 1877.

Trungpa, Chögyam, *Born in Tibet*, London 1966.

Tsering Dorje Gashi, *New Tibet. Memoirs of a Graduate of the Peking Institute of National Minorities*, Dharmsala 1980.

Tsybikoff, G.T., *Tibet: Land of Snows*, trans. J.E. Stapleton Driver, New York 1967.

Tu Jung-yuan, "Premininary investigations of geomorphic features of the Chinghai-Tibet Highway (from Kunlun Mts to Tangla Range)" *Acta Geographica Sinica*, 30, 1964.

Tucci, G., & Ghersi, E., *Secrets of Tibet*, London 1935.

Tucci, G., *To Lhasa and Beyond. Diary of an expedition to Tibet in the year MXMXLVIII*, Rome 1956.

Tucci, G., *Tibet: land of snows*, London 1967.

Tucci, G., *Transhimalaya*, London 1973.

Tucci, G., *The Religions of Tibet*, London 1980.

Tuchman, B.W., *Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-45*, New York 1971.

Tuker, Sir F., *While Memory Serves*, London 1950.

Tung, R., *A Portrait of Lost Tibet*, London 1980.

Turner, S., *An Account of an Embassy to the Court of the Teshoo Lama in Tibet*, London 1800.

United States of America, Department of Commerce, *China: Provisional Atlas of Communist Administrative Units*, Washington 1959.

United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1942, China*, Washington 1956.

United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1943, China*, Washington 1957.

United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1944, Vol. VI. China*, Washington 1967.

United States of America, Department of State, *The China White Paper, August 1949*, (reissue of *United States Relations with China with Special Reference to the Period 1944-49, Washington 1949*) with an introduction by Lyman P. Van Slyke, Stanford, California, 1967.

United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. VII. The Far East: China*, Washington 1972.

United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. VII. The Far East: China*, Washington 1973.

United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. IX. The Far East: China*, Washington 1974.

United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. VI. East Asia and the Pacific*, Washington 1976.

United States of America, Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol. VII. Korea and China, Pt.II*, Washington 1983.

Uprety, P.R., *Nepal-Tibet Relations 1850-1930. Years of Hopes, Challenges and Frustrations*, Katmandu 1980.

van Walt van Praag, M.,*The Status of Tibet: History, Rights and Prospects in International Law*, Boulder, Colorado, 1987.

Varma, S.P., *The Struggle for the Himalayas (A Study in Sino-Indian Relations)*, New Delhi 1965.

Vertzberger, Y.Y.I., *Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959-1962*, Boulder, Colorado, 1984.

Visser, P.C., "The Karakoram and Turkistan Expedition of 1929-30", *The Geographical Journal*, LXXXIV, 1934.

Waddell, L.A., "The Tribes of the Brahmaputra Valley", *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1900.

Waddell, L.A., *The Buddhism of Tibet or Lamaism*, London 1895.

Wakefield, (Sir) Edward B., "A Journey to Western Tibet, 1929", *Alpine Journal*, 66, 1961

Wakefield, Sir Edward B., *Past Imperative. My Life in India 1927-1947*, London 1966.

Walsh, E.H.C., "The Coinage of Tibet", *Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 2, Calcutta 1907.

Ward, F. Kingdon, *The Land of the Blue Poppy. Travels of a Naturalist in Eastern Tibet*, Cambridge 1913.

Ward, F. Kingdon, *Memorandum on the North-East Frontier of Burma*, Rangoon 1916.

Ward, F. Kingdon, *In Farthest Burma. The Record of an Arduous Journey of Explorations and Research through the Unknown Frontier Territory of Burma and Tibet*, London 1921.

Ward, F. Kingdon, *The Mystery Rivers of Tibet*, London 1923.

Ward, F. Kingdon, "Through the Gorges of the Tsangpo", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XIII, 1926.

Ward, F. Kingdon, *The Riddle of the Tsangpo Gorges*, London 1926.

Ward, F. Kingdon, "The Overland Route from China to India", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XIV, 1927.

Ward, F. Kingdon, "The Seingkhu and Delei Valleys, North-East Frontier of India", *The Geographical Journal*, 75, 1930.

Ward, F. Kingdon, *Plant Hunting on the Edge of the World*, London 1930,

Ward, F. Kingdon, "Explorations on the Burma-Tibet frontier", *The Geographical Journal*, 80, 1932.

Ward, F. Kingdon, *A Plant Hunter in Tibet*, London 1934.

Ward, F. Kingdon, "Across Southern Tibet", *Himalayan Journal*, VIII, 1936.

Ward, F. Kingdon, "Botanical and Geographical Explorations in Tibet, 1935", *The Geographical Journal*, LXXXVIII, 1936.

Ward, F. Kingdon, "The Assam Himalaya: Travels in Balipara – I", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXV, 1938.

Ward, F. Kingdon, "The Assam Himalaya: Travels in Balipara – II", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXVI, 1939.

Ward, F. Kingdon, *Assam Adventure*, London 1941.

Ward, F. Kingdon, *Burma's Icy Mountains*, London 1949.

Ward, F. Kingdon, "The Lohit Valley in 1950", *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, XXXVIII,1951.

Ward, F. Kingdon, *Return to the Irrawaddy*, London 1956.

Ward, G.L.S., *Military Report on the Mishmi Country*, Simla 1901.

Watson, F., *The Frontiers of China*, London 1966.

Webber, T.L., *Forests of Upper India*, London 1902.

Whistler, H., *In the High Himalayas*, London 1929.

White, J.C., *Sikhim and Bhutan*, London 1909.

Whittam, D.E., "The Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty", *Pacific Affairs*, 34, 1961.

Whiting, A.S., & Sheng Shih-t'sai, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?*, East Lansing, Michigan, 1958.

Wignall, S., *Prisoner in Red Tibet*, London 1957.

Wilcox, R., "Memoir of a Survey of Assam and Neighbouring Countries in 1825-6-7-9", *Asiatic Researches*, XVII, 1832.

Williams, E.T., *Tibet and her Neighbours*, Berkeley, California, 1937.

Williamson, Margaret D., with John Snelling, *Memoirs of a Political Officer's Wife in Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan*, London 1987.

Willoughby, M.E., "The relation of Tibet to China", *Journal of the Central Asian Society*, XI, 1924.

Wilson, A. *The Abode of Snow*, London 1876.

Wilson, D., "Where the World's Roof Ends", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 12 March 1965

Wilson, D., "Who's Right in the Himalayas?", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 18 March 1965.

Wilson, D., "Himalayan Honour", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 25 March 1965.

Wilson, E.H., *A Naturalist in Western China with Vasculum, Camera and Gun; being some account of eleven years' travel, exploration, and observation in the more remote parts of the Flowery Kingdom*, 2 vols., London 1913.

Winnington, A., *Tibet. Record of a Journey*, New York 1957.

Wong Ching-wai, *China and the Nations*, London 1927.

Woodcock, G., *Into Tibet. The Early British Explorers*, London 1971.

Woodman, D.,*The Making of Burma*, London 1962.

Woodman, D., *Himalayan Frontiers, A Political Review of British, Chinese, Indian and Russian Rivalries*, London 1969.

Wu, Aitchen W., *Turkistan Tumult*, London 1940.

Yakhontoff, V.A., *Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far East*, London 1932.

Young, E.P., *The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai. Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China*, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1977.

Younghusband, Francis, *The Heart of a Continent*, London 1896. (Reprinted in 1894 by Oxford in Asia with an introduction by Peter Hopkirk).

Younghusband, Sir Francis, *India and Tibet. A History of the Relations which have subsisted between the two Countries from the time of Warren Hastings to 1910, with a Particular Account of the Mission to Lhasa of 1904*, London 1910. (Reprinted in 1986 by Oxford in Asia with an introduction by Alastair Lamb).

Younghusband, Sir F., "Our position in Tibet", *Proceedings of the Central Asian Society*, November 1910.

Younghusband, Sir Francis, ed., *Peking to Lhasa: the narrative of the journeys in the Chinese Empire made by the late Brigadier-General George Pereira*, London 1925.

Yule, H., & Burnell, A.C., *Hobson-Jobson. A Glossary of Anglo-Indian Colloquial Words and Phrases*, London 1903.

Zhuravliov, Y.I., "The Ethnography of Tibet", *Central Asian Review*, X, 1962.



2. Sino-Tibetan Borders 1914-1919. The borders shown are: (1) border of Outer Tibet ("Blue Line") 1914; (2) border of Inner Tibet ("Red Line") 1914; (3) Chinese proposed Outer Tibet border 1915 and 1919; (4) Chinese proposed Inner Tibet border 1915; (5) Chinese proposed Inner Tibet border 1919; (6) effective Sino-Tibetan military border 1913-1917; (7) Chamdo and Rongbatsa Truce Line 1918.



3. The Western Sector of the Sino-Indian border showing the location of the Aksai Chin, the Chinese road from Sinkiang to Tibet, and Demchok. British maps show a border to the west of Demchok. The general line of the Sino-Indian border here is as shown on Indian maps from 1954. The 1899 Line, which was communicated to the Chinese Government by Sir Claude Macdonald, British Minister in Peking, followed the Lokzung Mountains dividing the Aksai Chin from the Lingzitang.



4. The Dopko Karpo disputed sector on the Ladakh-Tibet border. The Tibetans claimed possession of both Nyagzu and Khurnak Fort: this was challenged by Kashmir. No settlement was reached in the 1924 discussions; but the Government of India were inclined to favour the Tibetan case.



5. The border between Tehri-Garhwal and Tibet. Shown are: (1) Indian border as shown from 1954, incorporating the Tehri-Garhwal claim; (2) Tibetan claim since 1914; (3) a sector of the Bashahr border with Tehri-Garhwal as settled in 1936; (4) the border surveyed by Herbert and Hodgson in 1817; (5) the Kinney survey as published in 1879.



6. The Indo-Tibetan border in the Barahoti region showing the Tibetan claim assumed by the Chinese in 1954.



7. The extreme northern sector of the Sikkim-Tibet border showing the Giaogong region which was occupied by the Tibetans in the late 19th century and claimed, once more, in 1934.



8. The Tawang tract. The extreme southern sector between Bhutan and Amatulla was also claimed by Bhutan in 1924. The Se La boundary was originally considered by McMahon in 1914 and was again proposed to Tibet in the 1940s.



9. The Subansiri sector of the Assam Himalayas. Tali marked approximately the furthest north reached by the British up to 1947. Also shown is the route of the Ringkor pilgrimage. Lhatsa Gompa on the upper Siyom was an estate belonging to the Tibetan Lhalu family.



10. The Siang-Dihang sector of the Assam Himalayas. In the 1930s and 1940s the Tibetans maintained claims to jurisdiction down to a point below Karko and Simong. Geling, on the upper Siang, and Mipi, on the upper Dibang, were areas of Tibetan settlement below the McMahon Line.



11. The Lohit sector of the Assam Himalayas showing the location of the McMahon Line north of Walong. The traditional boundary point was at Menilkrai. In 1946 there is a British proposal to advance the McMahon Line to include Samar.

INDEX

Abors, 404, 410, 411, 445, 447, 448, 449, 450, 480, 523.

Abor Expedition, 408, 431, 452, 461.

Acheson, Dean, 515, 520.

Achuk Tsering, 134, 135.

Acton, T.C., 368, 369, 370, 371, 373, 374, 395, 396.

Addis, Sir John, 295.

Adeon River, 482.

Adis, 446.

Adung River, 412, 413, 433.

Affleck, J.B., 128, 139, 140.

Afghanistan, 10, 17, 26, 34, 45, 51, 241, 322, 339, 386, 407, 497, 518.

Agnew, P.A. Vans, 392.

Ahsan Ali, 449.

Air Force, Royal, 249, 305.

Air Ministry, 305.

Air Transport, 173, 249, 276, 307, 309, 313, 315, 327, 338, 339, 451, 456, 459, 473, 474, 481, 485, 491, 492, 496, 504, 521, 527.

Aircraft, B24, 474; DC2, 338; Westland Wapiti, 266.

Aitchison's *Treaties*, 17, 18, 25, 279, 280, 291, 304, 352, 387, 390, 402, 415, 427, 428, 433, 438, 509.

Akas, 443.

Aksai Chin, 3556, 357, 358, 361, 385, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 400, 431, 438, 522.

Alaknanda River, 377.

Allen, G.T., 482, 485.

Allied Invasion of Europe, 1944, 32.

Almora, 366, 380, 386.

Alston, Sir Beilby, 101, 112, 118, 119, 120, 130, 131, 132.

Amatulla, 413, 433, 477.

Amban, and Chinese Representative, Lhasa, 3, 5, 32, 118, 171, 188, 197, 234, 236, 240, 242, 250, 266, 273, 283, 285, 347, 466.

Ambolt, N., 386, 400.

Amdo, 32, 42, 50, 105, 142, 146, 157, 170, 191, 262, 282, 283, 497. See also: Ch'inghai.

America. See: United States of America.

Amery, L.S., 457, 458, 462.

Amherst, Lord, 363.

Amitabha (Amida), 152.

Ampthill, Lord, 18.

Amritsar, Treaty of, 1846, 392.

Amu Chu, 353.

Anch'in. See: Ngachen Rimpoche.

Anfu Clique, 48, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96.

Anglo-Chinese Convention, 1906. See: Treaties.

Anglo-Nepalese War 1814-16, 2. See also: Nepal; Gurkhas.

Anglo-Russian Conventtion 1907. See: Treaties.

Anning River, 58.

Ansbach, 75.

Anwhei, 92.

ANZAC, 44.

Apa Tanis, 464, 479.

Arab League, 497.

Arabia, 516.

Ardagh, Sir John, 356.

Arms Control Convention. See: Treaties.

Armstrong Whitworth, 155.

Artillery, 43, 57, 68, 11, 111 116, 121, 135, 137, 162, 179, 197, 199, 202, 214, 216, 221, 228, 262, 274, 275, 292, 317, 343, 505, 530.

Arunachal Pradesh, 428, 452.
Ashkhabad, 339.
Assam, 13, 16, 24, 166, 176, 275, 289, 293, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 319, 327, 339, 355, 387, 402, 442, 444, 447, 450, 523.
Assam, Government of, 409, 412, 414, 417, 423, 424, 425, 427, 428, 442, 447, 450, 452, 454, 457, 459, 460, 463, 481, 484.
Assam Himalayas, 10, 12, 13, 19, 83, 201, 281, 288, 291, 293, 300, 302, 306, 307, 333, 350, 355, 385, 401-438, 440, 441, 444, 445, 452, 453, 454, 456, 457, 458, 462, 464, 465, 466, 470, 487, 488, 489, 493.
Assam Rifles, 437, 443, 445, 448, 449, 451, 454, 459, 461, 464, 465, 481.
Astor, Lord, 293.
Astrakhan, 154,
Atcheson, G. Jr., 342.
Atlantic Charter, 320, 321.
Atlases, 302, 415, 416, 428, 434.
Atlee, Clement, 514.
Atuntze, 48, 305, 311, 220, 424, 460.
Auden, J.P., 397.
Aufschnaiter, P., 294, 519, 534.
Austen, Godwin, 358, 359, 392.
Austin Seven, 227, 276.
Australia, 111, 337, 344, 497.
Avalokitesvara, 25, 152.

Bacon, Ruth, 515, 533.
Bacot, J., 152.
Badmaev, P.A., 46.
Badrinath, 365, 373.
Baghirathi River, 366, 367, 368, 369, 373, 377, 396, 397.
Bahamas, 266.
Bailey, F.M., 24, 75, 121, 123, 124, 138, 147, 149, 152, 153-161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 272, 365, 368, 371, 372, 413, 419, 420, 442, 445, 446, 447, 452.
Bajpai, Sir G.S., 533.
Baker, H., 49.
Baker, Mr., Wireless Operator in Lhasa, 342.
Balcha Dura Pass, 378.
Balfour, Arthur, 44, 127, 129, 136.
Balipara Frontier Tract, 409, 417, 421; 434, 435, 440, 474, 477, 479.
Balnar Singh, Major, 154.
Bandung, 497, 529.
Barahoti, 378, 379, 380, 385, 398, 399.
Baroda, 210.
Bartholomew's Atlas, 428, 429, 430.
Barton, S., 70, 85.
Bashahr, 361, 363, 369, 370, 371, 374, 375, 376, 394, 397.
Batang, 35,40, 44, 49, 50, 54, 57, 58, 60, 63, 65, 70, 71, 72, 75, 79, 81, 86, 89, 137, 146, 165, 182, 183, 194, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 206, 215, 220, 221, 252, 262, 302, 303, 305, 308, 309, 311.
Batten, J.H., 398.
Battye, Captain R.K.M., 247, 249, 250, 439, 471.
Beijing. See: Peking.
Bell, Sir Charles, 11, 12, 15, 20, 23, 34, 25, 26, 27, 33, 37, 43, 44, 48, 50, 75, 76, 99, 102, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113-128, 129, 130, 133, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 147, 149, 150, 151, 153, 154, 159, 163, 170, 173, 176, 180, 185, 188, 189, 202, 216, 232, 245, 247, 262, 278, 379, 407, 409, 417, 443, 473, 476, 483, 502, 511; *Tibet Past and Present*, 134.
Bell, Lady, 117.
Benares, 161.
Bengal, 2, 4, 138, 398, 501.
Benn, Wedgwood, 132, 184, 185.
Bennett, J.C. Sterndale, 462, 463, 464.
Bentinck, C.H., 112.
Beri, 67, 68, 143, 193, 194, 195, 198, 205, 218, 219, 221, 352, 419.
Berkshire, Chief Constable of, 424.
Berle, A.A., 345.
Bernard, Theos, 217.
Bessag, Mr., 534.
Betts, F.N., 479, 480, 524.
Bevin, Ernest, 506, 508, 514.
Beyu, 68.
Bhotias, 364, 365, 366, 378, 379, 380, 382, 397, 398.

Bhutan, 2, 9, 107, 113, 115, 125, 174, 185, 190, 203, 214, 228, 237, 242, 285, 286, 289, 293, 297, 322, 337, 346, 355, 381, 387, 401, 402, 409, 410, 413, 414, 418, 419, 441, 447, 449, 450, 452, 453, 457, 497, 506, 518, 525.

Blackburn, A.D., 209, 307.

Blunt, A.P., 238.

Bo Tsering, Dr., 185, 205, 247.

Bodhgaya, 161.

Bodhisattva, 152.

Bogle, George, 21, 145.

Bolshevik Mission to Lhasa 1922, 153, 174.

Bolsheviks, 45, 46, 51, 89, 117, 125, 128, 147, 152, 153, 154, 157, 158, 164, 165, 168, 174, 178, 181, 183, 186, 187, 188, 245, 290.

Bombay, 161, 420.

Bomdi La, 425, 441.

Bön, 80, 191, 192, 218.

Bonga, 220.

Bor, E., 434.

Bor, N.L., 417, 434, 435.

Borisov, 153.

Borodin, 163.

Bosshard, W., 390.

Bower, Ursula Graham, 479, 524.

Brahmaputra, 10, 165, 302, 304, 337, 353, 355, 387, 401, 403, 421, 422, 429, 430, 445, 447.

Bren Guns, 317, 505, 519, 521.

Brest-Litovsk, 45, 51.

British Buddhist Mission, 173.

British Embassy in China from 1935, 128, 245, 246, 247, 252, 253, 255, 256, 287, 288, 303, 305, 306, 307, 310, 325, 43, 429, 489, 490, 491, 492, 494, 497, 507, 510, 511, 526.

British Legation in Peking, 3, 4, 5, 11, 20, 25, 30, 35, 39, 40, 43, 44, 53, 58, 68, 72, 73, 75, 76, 85, 86, 89, 94, 95, 96, 97, 102, 107, 108, 110, 113, 116, 125, 128, 129, 154, 167, 168, 195, 197, 202, 204, 206, 208, 209, 212, 215, 222, 238, 406; Memorandum on Tibet 1916, 39-43, 76.

British Museum (Natural History), 419, 420, 422, 423.

British policy towards Tibet, 1884, 185, 245, 246, 318, 320, 321, 322, 455, 457, 462, 63, 503-521.

Brown, Major W.F., 443.

Bruce, Brigadier-General, 141, 170.

Brussels, University of, 285.

Buchanan, Sir George, 45.

Buddhists, 7, 30, 42, 50, 54, 79, 95, 141, 143, 144, 145, 151, 152, 170, 187, 188, 191, 241, 253, 315, 356, 365, 412, 426, 435, 445, 447, 448, 478.

Bulandshar, 368.

Bull, G.T., 171, 262, 534.

Bum La, 49, 220.

Bumgara, F.J., 160.

Buriat Noyon, 165, 178, 183, 187, 214.

Buriats, 7, 28, 46, 115, 153, 158, 164, 165, 174, 189, 398.

Burma, 3, 4, 25, 78, 115, 253, 300, 301, 305, 307, 308, 309, 311, 320, 331, 402, 404, 405, 409, 412, 413, 414, 415, 419, 421, 423, 424, 425, 430, 432, 433, 434, 437, 451, 459, 483, 485, 489, 497, 516, 521, 456, 468.

Burma, Government of, 412, 413, 423.

Burma Road, 299, 304, 305, 307, 309, 311, 336, 339, 340, 453.

Burma-Tibet Convention 1886. See: Treaties.

Burrell, J.H., 424.

Bushire, 339.

Butler, R.A., 420, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 430, 435, 436, 437.

Byans, 380.

Cabinet Mission 1946, 386.

Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 238, 246, 251, 252, 265, 457.

Calcutta, 2, 5, 32, 47, 50, 93, 107, 119, 156, 161, 162, 167, 181, 190, 215, 264, 286, 288, 312, 313, 386, 417, 430, 495, 496, 499, 500, 501, 522.

Calcutta *Statesman*, 286, 424.

Calvert, W.H., 448, 472.

Camborne, 135.

Cambridge, 70, 74, 419.

Cammann, S., 515.
Campbell, J.S., 379.
Campbell, Major W.L., 107.
Canada, 85, 111, 215, 344.
Canton, 2, 93, 104, 363.
Caroe, Sir Olaf, 132, 135, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 252, 253, 254, 255, 265, 268, 270, 272, 276, 278, 279, 280, 282, 289, 290, 291, 292, 299, 303, 309, 310, 314, 317, 318, 320, 322, 326, 327, 328, 332, 333, 334, 346, 348, 349, 352, 356, 362, 375, 376, 383, 384, 385, 387, 390, 416, 417, 418, 419, 422, 423, 425, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 437, 438, 439, 454, 455, 456, 457, 460, 461, 462, 463, 465, 484, 486, 505, 506, 507, 509, 520.
Cassels, Mr., 380.
Catholics. See: Roman Catholics.
Cavagnari, Sir L., 118.
Cawdor, Lord, 165, 420, 422, 447.
Cecil, Lord Robert, 45.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 313.
Ceylon, 497.
Chabrang, 366, 371, 372, 374, 376, 378.
Chakravarti, P.C., 393.
Chala, 7, 36, 54, 55, 66, 57, 75, 79, 100, 191, 192, 218.
Chamberlain, Austen, 25, 30, 33, 128.
Chamberlain, Neville, 293.
Chambers of Commerce, British, 4.
Chamdo, 20, 26, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 43, 44, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 78, 80, 86, 89, 100, 130, 137, 181, 193, 197, 200, 205, 207, 266, 302, 305, 308, 309, 342, 447, 448, 451, 482, 504, 521, 522, 525, 531.
Chamdo Agreement 1918. See: Treaties.
Chandra Shumsher, Prime Minister of Nepal, 179, 214.
Chang Ching-wu, 349.
Chang Ch'un, 251.
Chang, Colonel, 56.
Chang Fang Kun, 501.
Chang Hsüeh-liang, 169.
Chang Kuo-t'ao, 252.
Chang Tang, 298, 356.
Chang Tso-lin, 169.
Chang Tze Chen, 460.
Chang Wei-pei, 282.
Chang Wu-lan, General, 58.
Chang Yin-tang, 42.
Changchenmo River, 356, ,357, 359, 388, 390.
Changlam (North) Road, 67, 150, 198, 311, 315, 332.
Changlo Chen, 261, 500.
Changra Magtsi, 248.
Changtreng, 36.
Channer, Major-General G.L., 380.
Chantui. See: Nyarong.
Chao Erh-feng, 9, 21, 33, 35, 36, 38, 40, 48, 49, 54, 79, 83, 94, 142, 163, 165, 191, 193, 243, 302, 303, 326, 332, 415, 493, 517.
Chaplin, Charlie, 227.
Chapman, F. Spencer, 78, 271, 292.
Charduar, 421, 436.
Charterhouse, 75.
Chatham House, 428.
Chaudans, 380.
Chayul Chu, 441.
Chayul Dzong, 421, 422, 426.
Che College, Sera, 498, 501, 502, 530.
Chefoo Convention 1876. See: Treaties.
Chekiang, 38.
Chelmsford, Lord, 88, 107, 122.
Chen, Dr., 275.
Chen Ho Industrial Corporation, 312.
Chen Hsi-chang, 336, 493, 499, 501.
Ch'en Hsia-ling, 39, 49, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 78, 79, 80, 81, 94, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 126.
Ch'en I, 38, 47, 48, 95.
Chen I-fan (Ivan), 11, 12, 85, 292, 302, 332, 415, 433.
Ch'en Lu, 84, 85, 86, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 103, 133.
Chengtu, 38, 47, 49, 63, 65, 72, 74, 76, 77, 80, 127, 128, 139, 140, 169, 233, 249, 303, 342.

Ch'eng Yun, 250.
Chiang Chi-yu, 236, 237, 247, 248, 264, 273, 275, 281, 282, 286, 292, 298.
Chiang Fong Chi, 431.
Chiang Kai-shek, 164, 177, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 214, 220, 226, 232, 237, 262, 272, 278, 287, 299, 300, 302, 303, 305, 308, 309, 310, 313, 316, 317, 318, 327, 328, 329, 331, 332, 333, 335, 338, 344, 347, 348, 349, 471, 476, 486, 493, 497, 499, 500, 502, 506, 507, 510, 513, 530.
Chiang Kai-shek, *China's Destiny*, 329.
Chicago *Daily News*, 332.
Ch'ien Lung Emperor, 141.
Chihli, 79, 96.
China Consular Service, 27, 52, 64, 65, 74, 75, 102, 108, 125, 167, 325.
China, Five Races of, 182, 215, 234, 304, 328, 335, 486, 502; Ministry of Communications, 305, 312, 460; Occupation of Central Tibet, 10, 11, 16, 29, 40, 403, 405; Ordinance on Maps and Charts, 416; Representative in Lhasa, 248, 272, 275, 282, 284, 286, 301, 307, 328, 329, 330, 335, 486, 489, 493, 495, 519;
"China House", 495, 496.
China Inland Mission, 44, 49, 109, 128, 139.
China National Aviation Corporation, 313.
China National Defence Council, 335, 506.
China, North-South talks 1919, 93.
China, supply routes to, 339.
China Yearbook, 430, 431.
Chinda, Viscount, 91.
Chinese Central Bank, 329.
Chinese Commission in Calcutta, 430.
Chinese Communists, 177, 181, 193, 200, 214, 237, 242, 244, 246, 252, 253, 255, 267, 270, 290, 316, 318, 323, 326, 329, 331, 335, 336, 349, 350, 353, 364, 400, 416, 420, 492, 511, 515, 516.
Chinese Constitution, 177, 334, 496, 503.
Chinese Consulate-General, Calcutta, 430.
Chinese "Cultural Revolution", 142.
Chinese Dollars, 100, 169, 233, 283, 289, 296.
Chinese Embassy, New Delhi, 521, 522.
Chinese Labour Corps, 133.
Chinese Legation (Embassy), London, 92, 119, 120, 125, 202, 275, 283.
Chinese Moslems (Tungans), 105, 162, 164, 191, 218, 316, 329, 252, 349. See also: Mahommedan General; Ma Pu-fang; Ma Ch'i.
Chinese Parliament or National Assembly, 41, 42, 50, 131, 132, 219, 336, 470, 495, 496, 497, 503, 508, 513, 515.
Chinese Postal Atlas, 415, 434.
Chinese proposals on Sino-Tibetan border in 1913, 30, 31; in 1915, 34, 35, 86, 95; in 1919, 47, 86-99, 112, 118, 120, 122, 130, 131, 132, 206, 279, 526; considered in 1924, 132, 133.
Chinese Revolution 1911, 11, 20, 38, 41, 53, 93, 95, 192, 197, 302.
Chinese surveyors, 307, 460.
Ch'ing Dynasty, 1, 10, 16, 20, 21, 25, 28, 36, 39, 49, 70, 74, 96, 141, 144, 145, 170, 171, 172, 177, 231, 324, 283, 285, 287, 311, 319, 322, 323, 348, 350, 494.
Ch'inghai, 32, 177, 191, 199, 200, 207, 218, 225, 234, 235, 240, 249, 251, 253, 254, 258, 262, 268, 278, 282, 283, 284, 288, 289, 296, 297, 300, 303, 304, 311, 315, 316, 326, 331, 344, 430, 438, 493, 497, 520, 533, 534.
Chitral, 22.
Chokhorgyal Monastery, 282.
Chorgad, 368, 275.
Chou En-lai, 398.
Chu, Colonel, 78.
Chu Hsiu, 106.
Chu Teh, 252.
Chulikata Mishmis, 437, 482.
Chumbi Valley, 5, 6, 22, 141, 155, 161, 179, 311, 353, 382, 401, 453, 454, 472, 504.
Chung Ying, 40, 58, 78.

Chungking, 49, 75, 128, 176, 178, 194, 214, 219, 220, 233, 282, 287, 288, 291, 299, 301, 302, 303, 305, 306, 308, 309, 314, 317, 321, 323, 324, 325, 327, 328, 329, 331, 339, 340, 341, 342, 345, 346, 347, 387, 500.
Chungrang Depon, 67.
Churchill, Winston, 321, 324, 344, 345, 436.
Chushul, 155.
Clark, Grover, 170.
Clark Kerr. See: Kerr, Sir A. Clark.
Clarke, Ashley, 320, 325, 326, 345, 347.
Clements, J., 39, 44.
Clive, Lord, 1.
Clow, Sir Andrew, 457.
Clubb, E.O., 327, 343, 347.
Coales, O.R., 37, 43, 44, 52, 53, 54, 74, 102, 128, 143, 170, 219.
Colliers, 516.
Colonial Office, 280, 436.
Columbia University, 104.
Combe, G.A., 139, 140, 172.
Commonwealth Relations Office, 532,
Congress Party, 497
Constantinople, 33, 44.
Cook, T., 39.
Cooper, T.T., 304, 338.
Copyright Libraries, 280.
Cosson, C., 139.
Cotton Cloth, 337.
Cotton Yarn, 312, 313.
Cozens-Hardy, Lord, 154.
Cranbrook, Lord, 420.
Crewe, Lord, 15, 408,
Cross, W.E., 456, 473.
Crowe, Sir Eyre, 71.
Crozier, Lt. R., 474.
Cunningham, A., 392.
Cunningham, R., 128, 139.
Curtis, Lionel, 428, 429.
Curzon, Lord, 6, 7, 8, 22, 46, 91, 92, 109, 110, 118, 119, 120, 121, 132, 133, 137, 242, 246, 320, 381, 382, 403, 423, 523.
Cutting, Suydam, 189, 190, 217, 248, 261, 265, 266, 277, 313, 314, 341, 435, 436, 437, 495, 532.
Daba, 378, 379, 380.
Dacca, 521.
Daflas, 445, 446, 464, 479.
Dagg, Lt. S.G., 271, 275.
Daily Telegraph, 162.
Dalai Lama, 144-148, 151, 152.
Dalai Lama, 5th, 192, 194.
Dalai Lama, 8th, 171.
Dalai Lama, 9th, 171.
Dalai Lama, 10th, 151.
Dalai Lama, 11th, 171.
Dalai Lama, 12th, 171.
Dalai Lama, 13th, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 16, 20, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 42, 43, 47, 48, 50, 61, 65, 67, 74, 77, 84, 90, 99, 100, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 113, 115, 121, 122, 123, 124, 138, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 155, 157, 161, 163, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 174, 177, 178, 180, 181, 182, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 195, 196, 201, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 284, 444, 467, 496, 497, 498, 505, 509; relations with Kuomintang, 178, 182, 183, 188, 210; Foreign Policy experiments of, 189, 190; offers to accept British protection, 99, 190, 203; death of, 148, 166, 189, 216, 217, 229, 232, 238, 262, 498.
Dalai Lama, 14th, 151, 221, 234, 235, 240, 255, 276, 282, 283, 284, 285, 297, 299, 300, 314, 341, 328, 455, 469, 495, 501, 515, 522; Family of, 300, 301, 496, 497, 529.
Dane, Sir Louis, 390.
Dangma River, 401.
Darali, 368.
Darchin Monastery, 228.
Dardanelles, 33, 44.
Dargye, 65, 68, 143, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 205, 218, 219, 221, 233, 235, 302, 352, 418.
Darjeeling, 4, 139, 190, 336, 337, 381.
Darma Pass, 380.
Dartsendo. See: Tachienlu.
Das Ahnenerbe, 293.
Das, Sarat Chandra, 134.
David-Neel, A., 151, 173, 215, 220.

Dawu, 197.
Dayal, Harishwar, 488, 510.
Dehra Dun, 398.
Dekyi Lingka, 134, 175, 185, 205, 217, 227, 247, 271, 273, 297, 474.
Delei River, 408, 409, 459, 460.
Delhi, 13, 131, 181, 208, 234, 238, 288, 289, 291, 334, 376, 420, 422, 430, 486, 488, 491, 492, 493, 495, 497, 502, 508, 513, 515, 516, 521, 522, 533.
Demchok, 304, 358, 360, 361, 392, 393, 431.
Dengko, 233, 258, 259.
Dening, 452.
Deodar trees, 366, 369, 370, 371, 372.
Deosham River, 413.
Derge, 57, 62, 64, 68, 79, 80, 86, 87, 90, 130, 192, 200, 233, 235, 252, 278, 302.
Derge Gönchen, 44, 62.
Dhansiri River, 413.
Dhondup from Geling, 448, 449.
Di Chu, 459, 483, 485.
Dibang, 402, 237, 482, 524.
Diesel fuel, 342.
Dihang, 10, 15, 166, 404, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 432, 446, 447, 450, 452, 482.
Diphu Pass, 412, 432, 485.
Dirangdzong, 409, 414, 422, 425, 436, 441, 443, 444, 454, 465, 466, 476, 477, 478.
Dodge Trucks, 163.
Dogras, 2, 357, 392.
Dokpo Karpo, 358, 359, 361, 392.
Dolan, Brooke, 217, 293, 314, 315, 316, 329, 330, 341, 342, 343, 495.
Domsing, 411.
Domville, Sir Barry, 293.
Dong, 483.
Donkhya Pass, 382, 384.
Donovan, H., 531.
Donovan, Major-General W.J., 314, 315, 327, 342, 459.
Dorje Phakmo, 170.
Dorjiev, Aghvan, 7,8, 16, 22, 25, 26, 46, 115, 147, 152, 165, 174, 189, 398, 500.
Dote, 154, 183, 228.
Drango, 194, 197.
Draya, 57.
Drenton Depon, 67.
Drepung Monastery, 14, 20, 24, 33, 123, 145, 164, 165, 178, 180, 183, 187, 231, 233, 259, 337, 355, 441, 443, 464, 466, 468, 479, 488, 493, 498, 530.
Drew, F., 391.
Dri River, 482.
Dring Drak Makhar, 230.
Drummond, Hon. R., 399.
Du River, 408, 410, 460.
Dum Dum, 162.
Duncan, M.H., 194, 195, 218, 219, 221.
Dundas, W.C.M., 409, 449.
Durand, Sir Mortimer, 5.
Dza Chu, 52.
Dzongong Monastery, 199.

East Bengal and Assam, 403.
East India Company, 2, 363, 381.
Eastern Tibet. See: Kham.
Eden, Anthony, 251, 257, 293, 318, 319, 320, 321, 323, 345, 503.
Eden Memorandum, 323, 324, 325, 326, 334, 345, 346, 510, 511.
Edgar, J.H., 75, 76, 195.
Edward VIII, King, 365.
Egypt, 221, 436.
El Salvador, 523.
Elgin, Lord, 6.
Empire Exhibition, Wembley, 160.
Enders, G.B., 151, 173.
England, 12, 43, 160, 176, 189, 420, 430.
English Schhol at Gyantse, 123, 138, 153, 155, 163, 227, 418, 470.
English School in Lhasa, 301, 330, 336, 337, 470.
Enta, 55, 57, 74.
Erh Hai, 340.
Eton, 49.
Eustace, E.A.R., 375.
Evening Standard, 429.

Everest, Mt., 114, 122, 141, 152, 160, 173, 204, 266, 273, 436; *Epic of Everest*, 160.

Executive Yuan, 213, 284, 313.

Fairley, J., 137.

Faizullah, Khan Sahib, 165, 176.

Feng Yü-hsiang, 163, 164, 175, 176, 181, 214, 215.

Filippi, F. de, 389.

Fitzmaurice, N., 135.

Fleming, Peter, 252, 428, 429, 438.

Flynn, Captain F.C., 239.

Ford, R., 81, 342, 519, 522, 525, 531, 534, 535.

Foreign Office, British, 23, 33, 44, 45, 46, 53, 69, 71, 72, 75, 84, 97, 107, 112, 113, 118, 120, 125, 127, 129, 132, 153, 154, 170, 204, 206, 212, 222, 241, 257, 275, 276, 280, 308, 309, 317, 320, 321, 323, 325, 326, 334, 335, 349, 352, 430, 438, 457, 460, 461, 463, 464, 465, 505, 506, 507, 508, 510.

Foreign Office, Tibetan, 295, 315, 321, 341, 458, 466, 467, 468, 470, 473, 474, 476, 480, 486, 487, 488, 494, 495, 520, 527, 532.

Fort Hertz (Putao), 307, 308.

Fowler, 321.

Fox, Reginald, 272, 342, 519, 531, 434.

France, 49, 90, 102, 110, 143, 149, 192, 218, 220, 278, 293, 514.

Franklin, Vice Consul, 303.

French Alpine Club, 293.

Fry, L.A.C., 508.

Fu Manchu, 298.

Fu Sung-mu, 48.

Fukien, 92.

Fürer-Haimendorf, C. von, 464, 479.

Furze, T.E., 411.

Ganden, 14, 33, 101, 123, 145, 230, 233, 259, 466.

Gandhi, Mahatma, 498, 512, 517.

Ganges, 353, 368, 377.

Gangotri, 366, 367, 368, 369, 372, 373, 377, 395, 396.

Gangtok, 108, 114, 125, 165, 166, 168, 170, 196, 225, 226, 229, 233, 234, 271, 277, 282, 285, 286, 328, 330, 371, 381, 420, 444, 470, 473, 486, 488.

Ganpo, 358, 359.

Gar Dzong, 392.

Garhwal, 354, 363, 369, 371, 373, 378, 379.

Garpons, 359, 360.

Gartok, 9, 35, 42, 89, 185, 357, 359, 360, 392, 393, 399, 521.

Gaumukh, 366, 368, 369, 395, 396.

Gauss, Ambassador C., 340, 345.

Gedund, L., 316.

Geling, 412, 446, 447, 448, 449.

Gelugpa Sect, 79, 143, 144, 170, 178, 192, 193, 194, 195, 218.

Geographical Journal, 44.

George V, King, 138, 167, 239.

George VI, King, 268, 514.

George, Prince (Duke of Kent), 167.

Gerard, A., 394.

Germany, 30, 45, 51, 84, 92, 93, 97, 134, 278, 293, 294, 298.

Geshi Sherap Gyaltso, 534.

Giamda, 33, 50, 94, 301, 302, 311, 332, 415.

Giaogong, 6, 382, 383, 384, 406.

Gilbert, Martin, 344.

Gilgit, 339.

Gillett, Sir Michael, 388.

Giraudeau, Father, 49.

Ghagra River, 377.

Glei Pass, 460.

Godfrey, R.W., 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 456, 472.

Godwin Austen. See: Austen, Godwin.

Gold, 139, 172, 173, 313, 506, 514, 532.

Golden Urn, 283, 294, 494.

Golok, 101, 105, 126, 191, 218.

Gönchen, 200.

Gongkar Lama, 199, 221.

Gopal, S., 387, 388.

Goriganga River, 377.

Gould, Sir Basil, 114, 147, 148, 175, 248, 252, 253, 254, 256, 257, 260, 265, 267, 270-278, 279, 281, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 292, 293, 296, 297, 299, 310, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 342, 348, 349, 376, 377, 384, 424, 439, 440, 443, 452, 453, 454, 455, 457, 462, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 473, 476, 486, 489, 525.

Goullart, P., 312, 313.

Government of India Act 1858, 405, 407.

Graham, Lt.-Colonel J.M., 387, 413.

Great Eastern Hotel, Calcutta, 495.

Great War. See: World War I.

Gregorson, Dr., 404, 448.

Grey, Sir Edward, 34.

Grimethorpe Colliery, 135.

Grunfeld, A.T., 27.

Gumgum Nala, 366, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 3674, 375, 377, 385, 395, 396.

Gupta, Dr. Karunakar, 24, 27, 295, 400.

Gurkhas, 111, 231, 304, 363, 369, 370, 379, 381, 451, 456, 504, 531. See also: Nepal.

Guthrie, Captain J., 247.

Gyade, 32, 33, 35, 47, 52, 55, 86, 90, 268,

Gyalam Road, 36, 48, 66, 67, 197, 308, 309, 311, 332.

Gyalchok Chophel. See: Kesang Tsering.

Gyalo Dhondup, 300, 496, 497, 529.

Gyalpo of Pome, 411.

Gyantse, 9, 18, 22, 26, 27, 29, 31, 35, 37, 42, 46, 56, 63, 70, 88, 89, 99, 116, 117, 122, 124, 134, 137, 138, 147, 148, 155, 160, 161, 163, 173, 175, 182, 185, 188, 205, 217, 223, 233, 243, 247, 260, 264, 271, 274, 285, 301, 372, 397, 439, 519, 521, 523, 533.

Halifax, Lord, 283, 293, 307.

Hambro, Charles, 293.

Hami, 304.

Hammel, Pt., 459.

Han Kuang-chung, 66, 67, 100.

Hanbury-Tracy, J., 47.

Hankow, 238.

Harding, H., 85.

Harding, President W., 119, 136.

Hardinge, Lord, 15, 34, 404, 523.

Hardy, Dr., 49.

Harnett, Lt.-Colonel, 262.

Harrer, H., 294, 519, 534.

Harsil, 368, 397.

Harvard University, 295, 328, 341.

Hastings, Warren, 2, 145, 304.

Hayden, Sir Henry, 124, 139, 161, 175, 197.

Hayuling, 408, 409, 410, 460.

Hearsey, H., 398.

Heber, A.R. & K.M., 392.

Hedin, S., 385, 389, 393, 423.

Henderson, A., 184.

Henderson, Ambassador L., 516, 517, 520, 521, 522, 533.

Herbert, J.D., 363, 370, 396.

Hertz, W.A., 413, 433.

Himachal Pradesh, 361.

Himmler, Heinrich, 293.

Hindus, 152, 367, 368, 369, 373.

Hindustan-Tibet Road, 364, 394.

Hinks, A.R., 429.

Hirtzel, Sir Arthur, 33, 112, 117.

Hislop, Major I.H., 154.

Hitler, A., 294, 298.

Hkamtilong, 402.

Hodgson, B.H., 363, 370, 396.

Hodgson, H., 399.

Holman, Adrian, 204, 206, 222.

Home Office, 424.

Hong Kong, 313, 331, 334, 335, 352, 505, 513, 515, 520, 521, 522, 526, 532.

Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, 283.

Honolulu, 513.

Hoo, Victor, 345.

Hoover, President H., 217.

Hopkinson, A., 294, 335, 349, 365, 470, 480, 487, 488, 501, 509, 510, 525, 526, 527.

Hor States, 67, 192, 193, 194, 199, 218.

Hornbeck, Dr. S.K., 324, 325, 345, 346.
Hoti. See: Barahoti.
House of Commons, 280.
House of Lords, 280.
Houston Everest Expedition, 266.
Howe, R.G., 255, 260.
Hsi Luen, 286.
Hsiakuan. See: Siakwan.
Hsiangch'eng, 36, 48, 65.
Hsiung Yao-wên, 336.
Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, 252.
Hsü Mo, 204, 206, 207, 222, 251, 256, 257, 258.
Hsü Shih-ch'ang, 48, 91.
Hsü Shu-tseng, 95, 96, 104.
Huang Mu-sung, 321, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 243, 244, 248, 249, 251, 263, 271, 272, 336, 420.
Hull, Cordell, 300, 314.
"Hump", 309, 339, 459, 474.
Hunan, 54, 73.
Hunza, 339, 388.
Hurley, General, 347.
Hutchins, Lt. P.P., 459, 461, 474, 485.
Hyderbad, 304.
Hydroelectric projects, 141, 153, 154, 155, 161, 186, 228.

Ichigo, 327.
Iggulden, Major, 382.
Ili, 115, 135.
Imdad Ali, 477.
Imperial Defence College, 280.
Imperial Gazetteer of India, 385.
Imperial General Staff, 386.
Incarnations, 25, 48, 143, 144, 152, 170, 171, 188, 194, 226, 230, 286.
India, Department of External Affairs, 362, 376, 388, 455, 457, 465; Dominion of, 509; External Affairs Ministry, 489, 516, 531, 533; Great Trigonometrical Survey of, 357, 358, 370, 398, 431; Transfer of Power 1947, 185, 277, 350, 352, 360, 361, 362, 377, 380, 381, 385, 400, 417, 428, 452, 478, 480, 482, 488, 492, 493, 508, 509, 516.
India Office, 23, 42, 53, 69, 72, 89, 112, 127, 132, 150, 202, 203, 212, 223, 237, 241, 245, 250, 252, 253, 256, 266, 276, 280, 309, 317, 320, 323, 325, 334, 385, 390, 410, 414, 420, 422, 424, 425, 429, 430, 433, 435, 438, 456, 457, 462, 466, 485, 505, 506, 507, 508.
India Office, Political Committee, 112, 237, 256, 266, 267, 291.
India Office Library and Records, 24, 104, 175, 264, 529.
Indian Agent-General in China, 528.
Indian Army, 249, 275, 309, 379, 380, 435, 473, 503, 504.
Indian Civil Service, 102.
Indian Council on World Affairs, 497.
Indian Educational Service, 418.
Indian Embassy in China, 492, 513, 517, 521. See also: Menon, K.P.S., and Panikkar, K.M.
Indian Forest Department, 242, 289, 334.
Indian Geological Survey, 139.
Indian Independence Act 1947, 393.
Indian Medical Service, 113, 154, 185, 205, 226, 247, 270, 285.
Indian Ocean, 299, 353.
Indian Police, 499, 500, 501.
Indian Political Service, 8, 260.
Indochina, 346.
Indus River, 356, 357, 358, 360, 392.
Ingram, E.M.B., 202, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 221, 222, 223, 232, 238.
Inner Line, 402, 403, 410, 421, 423, 436.
Inter-Asian Relations Conference, 497, 498, 529.
Irrawaddy, 412.
Irwin, Lord, 288, 289.
Isu Razi Pass, 331.
Italy, 514.

Jacquemont, V., 364.
Jadhang, 354, 364, 365, 370, 371, 373, 374, 378, 381, 382, 385, 395.
Jadhganga River, 367, 368, 370, 375, 376, 377, 396, 397.

Jadhs, 364, 365, 366, 367, 370, 371, 373, 374, 376, 396.
Jala. See: Chala.
James, P.L.S., 464, 480, 481, 482.
Jameson Raid, 22.
Jammu. See: Kashmir.
Jangla Forest Rest House,' 366, 368, 397.
Jampa Wosel, 501.
Jangtashang Family, 311.
Jao Meng-jen, 132.
Japan, 19, 26, 27, 28, 30, 38, 40, 54, 74, 84, 91, 92, 93, 94, 97, 115, 116, 117, 118, 121, 136, 137, 173, 177, 178, 198, 207, 212, 214, 216, 222, 225, 242, 243, 253, 255, 256, 257, 259, 289, 290, 291, 299, 300, 301, 305, 308, 309, 313, 317, 318, 326, 327, 330, 335, 336, 340, 344, 347, 454, 456, 562, 470, 473, 495, 498, 513.
Jardines, 312.
Jido, 481, 524.
Johars, 398.
Johnson, W.H., 357, 361, 391, 392.
Joint Military Council, Chungking, 309.
Jones, J. Jefferson, 515.
Jordan, Sir John, 11, 30, 34, 35, 36, 44, 53, 58, 59, 60, 69, 70, 71, 72, 78, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96, 99, 101, 112, 115, 133, 264.
Julius II, Pope, 141.
Jyade. See: Gyade.
Jyekundo, 61, 66, 86, 90, 100, 101, 109, 126, 127, 181, 200, 201, 252, 258, 259, 260, 268, 270, 271, 272, 276, 282, 311, 314, 315, 316, 326, 331, 332, 340.

K2, 358.
Kahao, 405, 463, 483, 485.
Kailas, Mt., 228, 365, 367, 377, 380, 395, 399.
Kalaktang, 409, 435, 436, 441, 444, 454, 466, 468, 473, 474, 478.
Kali River, 377, 386.
Kalimpong, 155, 162, 182, 213, 216, 217, 226, 239, 261, 266, 310, 311, 312, 316, 319, 329, 336, 499, 500, 501, 522, 530.
Kalmuks, 154, 159, 164.
Kalon Lama, 20, 21, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 37, 49, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 71, 72, 73, 78, 79, 80, 87, 99, 100, 101, 106, 113, 126.
Kameng River, 401.
Kamla River, 475.
K'ang Hsi Emperor, 141.
Kangra District, 361.
Kangting. See: Tachienlu.
Kansu, 20, 21, 42, 53, 74, 94, 95, 97, 100, 105, 107, 108, 109, 125, 128, 133, 135, 150, 164, 167, 181, 187, 207, 253, 303, 304, 315.
Kansu Mission to Lhasa, 96, 100, 101, 106-115, 133, 182, 296.
Kantze, 44, 57, 61, 64, 65, 66, 67, 74, 86, 100, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 218, 219, 223, 260, 302.
Kantze, Truce of, 197.
Karakash River, 361, 391.
Karakoram, 339, 354, 356, 357, 385, 391, 400, 405, 406.
Karko, 411, 448, 450, 453, 454, 464, 480, 481, 482.
Kartho Rimpoche, 502.
Kashag, 77, 138, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 162, 173, 179, 185, 205, 216, 223, 227, 228, 229, 231, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 241, 248, 249, 251, 253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 264, 266, 270, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 284, 285, 287, 288, 300, 301, 307, 308, 309, 310, 314, 315, 329, 332, 333, 336, 337, 341, 342, 348, 368, 372, 274, 375, 376, 377, 381, 383, 384, 419, 420, 421, 436, 439, 440, 441, 443, 444, 453, 455, 466, 467, 468, 469, 471, 479, 483, 486, 487, 488, 495, 501, 502, 505, 515, 516, 522, 527, 530.
Kashgar, 135, 260, 277, 298, 339, 388, 418.
Kashmir, 2, 304, 350, 354, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 394, 517, 518, 523.
Katmandu, 161, 174, 186, 387.

Kaulback, R., 47, 305, 306.
Kazaks, 218, 304.
Kenching. See: Derge Gönchen.
Kenching Lama, 67.
Kennedy, Lt.-Colonel R.S., 113.
Kent, Duke of, 167.
Kerr, Sir Archibald Clark, 287, 288, 305, 306, 308, 310.
Kesang, Louis King's Interpreter, 127.
Kesang Tsering, 182, 198, 199, 215, 220.
Keys, Major, 285.
Khachchara, 174, 178, 216.
Kham, 9, 11, 19, 20, 21, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 43, 44, 50,52-74, 78, 85, 86, 100, 101, 102, 127, 171, 190, 191, 192, 193-201, 208, 210, 262, 270, 344, 410, 411, 450, 497, 498, 499, 523, 534.
Khambadzong, 147, 168, 190, 383, 384.
Khang, K.M., 460.
Khating, Major R., 387.
Khemedse Dzasa, 495, 528.
Khenchung Changkhyim, 512.
Khotan, 357, 361,
Khurnak Fort, 358, 360.
Kiachta, 34, 95, 103.
Killearn, Lord. See: Lampson, Sir Miles.
King, Louis M., 27, 36, 37, 49, 53, 54, 56, 57, 73, 76, 77, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 112, 125, 126, 127, 128, 133, 140, 142, 167, 176, 222; *China in Turmoil*, 27, 102.
King, Mrs., 27, 77, 102, 125; *We Tibetans*, 27.
King, W.H., 138.
Kingdon-Ward, F. See: Ward, F. Kingdon.
Kingkor (Short Pilgrimage), 446.
Kinney, T., 370, 373.
Kirei Kazaks, 304.
Kitson, Sir George, 474, 497.
Knatchbull-Hugessen, Sir Hughe, 256, 257, 258, 429.
Knight, G.E.O., 173.
Kokonor, 3, 32, 40, 42, 47, 50, 53, 55,. 61, 64, 68, 86, 87, 90, 94, 95, 100, 101, 143, 164, 191, 197, 199, 201, 207, 210, 235, 430.
Kolar Gold Mine, 135.
Kongbo, 23, 230.
Koo, Dr. Wellington, 34, 43, 86, 119, 120, 129, 130, 132, 136, 513.
Korbo, 414, 447.
Korea, 346, 518, 520.
Ko-sang-tse-jen. See: Kesang Tsering.
Kowloon, 335.
Kuhi-tsi-ta, 165.
Kulang Tsang, 109.
Kulu, 370.
Kumaon, 363, 370, 377, 379, 380, 398.
Kumbum, 74, 241, 249, 258, 282, 283, 296, 494.
Kung, 261. See also: Yabshi Kung.
Kung Ch'ing-tsung, 285, 286, 301, 302, 307, 308, 310, 314, 328, 341.
Kung Hsin-chang, 91.
Kung, H.H., 313, 338.
Kungribingri Pass, 377.
Kunlun Mountains, 42, 356, 357, 361.
Kunming, 299, 305, 307, 313, 340, 347, 460.
Kunphel La, 146, 161, 183, 217, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 261, 276, 496, 498, 500, 501.
Kuo Chang-kuang, 30.
Kuominchün, 163, 164, 176.
Kuomintang, 34, 86, 163, 177, 178, 180, 184, 188, 191, 192, 196, 198, 200, 210, 215, 219, 221, 222, 223, 226, 233, 238, 240, 244, 250, 283, 284, 302, 303, 307, 314, 318, 323, 326, 327, 331, 334, 335, 336, 338, 339, 345, 346, 347, 416, 431, 434, 458, 489, 492, 494, 496, 498, 499, 500, 502, 503, 505, 507, 511, 512, 515, 519, 529, 534.
Kuomintang Manifesto, 334.
Kusantse. See: Khemedse Dzasa.
Ku Wei-chün. See: Koo, Dr. Wellington.
Kwangsi, 38, 93.
Kwangtung, 38, 93.
Kweichow, 38.

Kweilin, 327.
Kyi Chu, 155.
Kyipup, 138.

La, A.T., 477.
Labour Cabinet, 132, 154, 184, 506, 507.
Labrang, 74.
Lachen River, 383, 383.
Ladakh, 50, 113, 154, 165, 174, 185, 228, 289, 296, 304, 350, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 385, 386, 392.
Laden La, 114, 122, 134, 135, 153, 155, 160, 161, 162, 175, 180, 182, 183, 185, 186, 214.
Lakhimpur, 437.
Lall, John, 388, 431.
Lamb, Sir Lionel, 49, 76, 209, 223, 492, 497, 510, 529.
Lampson, Sir Miles, 108, 133, 168, 180, 181, 202, 211, 212, 214, 225, 236, 242, 245, 252.
Lanak Pass, 356, 357, 358, 359, 388, 389, 390.
Lanchow, 197, 150, 166, 315.
Landor, A.H. Savage, 380.
Langdun. See: Silon Langdun.
Lansdowne, Lord, 5, 379.
Lapthal, 378, 399.
Lashio, 299, 305, 340.
Lattan, 483.
Lattimore, O., 105.
Lawrence, T.E., 204, 516.
Lax, Captain, 459.
League of Nations, 98, 112, 189, 208, 216, 450.
Ledo, 308, 309.
Lee-Enfield, 19, 25, 26, 58, 110, 111, 116, 202. See also: Tibet, Arms supply for.
Lee-Metford, 19, 25, 26, 110.
Leh, 386, 393.
Leiwuch'i. See: Riwoche.
Lenin, 164.
Leningrad, 46.
Lewis Guns, 201, 261, 274, 275, 317, 530.
Lhagyal, 358, 359.
Lhalu Family, 134, 146, 262, 447, 452, 472.
Lhamoi Latso, 282.
Lhasa: Americans in, 248, 314, 315, 316, 516; arsenal, 26, 154, 162, 227, 228, 343; police in, 153, 155, 159, 161, 179; British Mission in, 272, 277, 309, 321, 444, 457, 458, 468, 483, 488, 499, 502, 510 (See also: Richardson; Norbu Dhondup; Ludlow; Sherriff); British Missions to: Bell, 113-121; Bailey, 152-159; Weir 1930, 185-188; Weir 1932, 204-206; Williamson 1933, 226-229; Williamson 1935, 247-250; Gould 1936-37, 270-277, 281, 439; Gould 1940, 284-288, 299; Gould 1944, 329-333, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 489. Hopkinson, 480, 486, 487, 488, 526 (See also: Teichman, King, Coales); hospital in, 286; Indian Consulate-General in, 277; Indian Mission in, 502, 511, 534; proposed British visit to after 1947, 509, 510, 511; proposed United States visit to, 509, 510, 511.
Lhasa Convention 1904. See: Treaties.
Lhasa Regent. See: Regent.
"Lhasa Road", 417, 425, 434, 453, 477.
Lhatsa Gompa, 447.
Li Chung-lien, 106.
Li Fu-lin, 33.
Li Tieh-tseng, 132, 133, 140, 194, 235, 236, 264, 296, 297.
Li Yüan-hung, 38.
Liberal Government, 403.
Life, 332.
Lightfoot, Captain G.S., 24, 421, 425, 436, 440, 441, 443, 444, 445, 449, 452, 524.
Likiang, 311, 312, 313, 340, 500, 530.
Lingtu, 5, 379, 399.
Lingzitang, 386, 388, 389, 400.
Linlithgow, Lord, 294, 318, 319, 444, 445.
Lipu Lekh Pass, 304, 377, 378, 380.
Litang, 35, 36, 44, 86, 89, 424.
Liu Ch'en-ngo, Dr., 386.

Liu Chow, 327.
Liu Hsiang, 178, 200, 206, 208, 215, 221.
Liu Jui-heng, 38.
Liu Man-ch'ing, 182, 183, 186, 198, 201, 215, 216, 220.
Liu Man-yun, 220.
Liu P'u-chen, 236, 237.
Liu Shen-chi, 347.
Liu Tsan-ting, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 79, 80, 81, 84, 94, 196, 197, 220.
Liu Ts'un-hou, 213.
Liu Wen-hui, 49, 169, 171, 178, 195, 198, 199, 200, 201, 206, 208, 210, 214, 219, 221, 232, 233, 257, 258, 260, 262, 278, 302, 303, 311, 316, 317, 337, 340, 344, 348, 438, 499.
Liu Yu-chiu, 82.
Lloyd, Lord, 420, 436.
Lo Lama, 241.
Lo Wen-kan, Dr., 207, 211.
Lobsang Tsewong, 534.
Lohit River, 15, 304, 305, 332, 338, 355, 402, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 412, 417, 420, 422, 431, 452, 453, 454, 456, 458, 459, 460, 462, 463, 466, 470, 473, 474, 482, 484, 485, 487, 489, 490, 491, 524, 525.
Lohit Road, 408, 409, 410. See also: Rima Road.
Lokzung Mts., 386, 388, 389, 400.
Lönchen, 114.
Lönchen Shatra. See: Shatra, Lönchen.
Lönchen Sholkhang. See; Sholkhang, Lönchen.
London, 9, 11, 17, 18, 29, 30, 42, 44, 58, 83, 89, 92, 118, 119, 129, 130, 184, 194, 202, 208, 222, 226, 247, 251, 280, 286, 309, 310, 318, 320, 323, 344, 419, 420, 424, 456, 462, 464, 493, 502, 503, 510, 511, 514, 520.
London Memorandum of 26 August 1921, 119, 120, 121, 122, 132, 281, 320,
London School of Economics, 280.
London University, 173.
Long March, 252, 253, 255.
Longju, 476.
Lopas, 23, 411, 412, 445, 446, 447.
Loro Chu, 421.
Loseling College, Drepung, 24, 123, 138.
Lu Cheng-hsiang, 90, 93, 103.
Lu Hsing-chi, 32, 47, 107, 119, 167, 190.
Ludlow, Frank, 24, 138, 147, 153, 155, 163, 172, 227, 272, 277, 309, 310, 315, 372, 418, 419, 441, 445, 446, 447, 452.
Lung Yun, 316.
Lungshar, 146, 151, 159, 162, 163, 169, 178, 179, 185, 189, 201, 203, 215, 227, 230, 231, 261, 262, 276, 532; visits England 1913, 532.
Lungshogon, 259.

Ma Chen-lung, 199.
Ma Ch'i, 94, 100, 106, 200.
Ma Chin-si, 162.
Ma Chung-ying, 252, 263.
Ma Pu-fang, 200, 201, 206, 208, 210, 221, 237, 252, 283, 296, 303, 311, 317, 326, 331, 390, 438, 494, 497.
Ma Shen-chou, 33.
Ma Su, Brigadier-General, 198.
Macartney-Macdonald Line, 388, 389, 400.
Macaulay, Colman, 4, 5, 381, 399.
Macdonald, Brigadier-General, 8.
Macdonald, Sir Claude, 389, 390.
Macdonald, David, 117, 134, 135, 148, 160, 161, 217, 266.
Macdonald, John, 160.
MacDonald, Ramsay, 154, 158, 184.
Macdonogh, Major-General Sir G., 51.
McGovern, Dr. W.M., 124, 152, 161, 173, 175.
Machine Guns, 100, 116, 121, 137, 222, 261, 274, 275, 317, 376, 519, 530. See also: Maxim Guns; Lewis Guns; Bren Guns; Vickers Guns.
Macleay, Sir R., 154, 170.
McMahon, Sir Henry, 11, 12, 13, 15, 19, 23, 24, 25, 29, 35, 97, 98, 104, 407, 409, 415, 417, 418, 433, 474, 476, 483, 485.

McMahon Line, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18, 25, 166, 281, 293, 295, 304, 307, 320, 331, 332, 337, 350, 352, 353, 355, 362, 366, 377, 386, 402, 404, 406, 409, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 418, 420, 422, 424, 425, 427, 428, 431, 432, 433, 434, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 445, 446, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 470, 473, 474, 475, 476, 479, 480, 481, 482, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 492, 493, 508, 509, 517, 518, 523, 524, 527, 529.

McMahon Line Notes, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 279, 280, 281, 291, 351, 409, 412, 418, 422, 427, 428, 433, 438, 439, 442, 445, 446, 447, 450, 455, 464, 466, 467, 469, 470, 471, 476, 483, 526.

Mago, 24, 401.

Magtsi Tenpa, 248.

Makalu, Mt., 282, 293.

Mahommedan General at Sining, 21, 32, 61, 64, 94, 95, 100, 105, 106, 199, 200, 201.

Mainprice, F.P., 459, 460, 461, 475, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486.

Malaya, 320, 497.

Malihka River, 412.

Mana Pass, 367, 377.

Manas River, 401.

Manasarowar, Lake, 304, 365, 367, 377, 378, 395.

Manchuria, 143, 167, 177, 187, 207, 212, 216, 218, 242, 289.

Manchus. See: Ch'ing Dynasty.

Mani Singh, 39.

Manipur, 421.

Manjusri, 25.

Mao Tse-tung, 315, 329, 349, 511.

Mao Tse-tung *Thoughts*, 329.

Maps, Simla Convention (and "Red Line"), 12, 85, 86, 281, 387, 390, 391, 415, 422, 433, 434, 439, 440, 457, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 474, 480, 487, 526, 527; McMahon Line Notes, 12, 281, 387, 526; Chinese, 302, 415, 416, 417, 430, 431, 434, 438; British, 360, 415, 428, 429, 430, 437, 442; Indian, 360, 361, 392, 498.

Markham, 57, 171, 232.

Markham Gartok, 61, 65, 199.

Markham Teji, 61, 62.

Marshall, General George C., 514, 532.

Marshall, Margaret, 222.

Marx, 164.

Marxism, 163.

Matun River, 482.

Maxim Guns, 202.

May Fourth Movement, 94, 95.

Mediterranean, 9, 407.

Mekong, 41, 52, 55, 57, 68, 74, 199, 201, 220, 306.

Membas, 447, 448, 449.

Menilkrai, 403, 404, 405, 406, 408, 431, 451, 456, 459, 460, 466, 472, 483, 487, 493.

Menkong, 305, 306.

Menon, K.P.S., 340, 352, 356, 387, 391, 428, 437, 520.

Merrell, G.R., 495.

Meshed, 339.

Metcalfe, Sir Aubrey, 242, 267, 279.

Middle Ages, 141, 143.

Migyitun, 422, 445, 476.

Milam, 399.

Mills, J.P., 452, 457, 458, 459, 460, 470, 475, 477, 478, 484, 485, 524.

Military Intelligence, British, 45, 51, 356, 420.

Minneapolis *Star Journal*, 332.

Mint (Coinage), 155, 156, 161, 172, 179, 183, 227, 231, 276.

Minsar (Misar), 392.

Minto, Lord, 389, 403, 404, 406.

Minzong, 452.

Mipi, 482.

Miri Mission, 464.

Miris, 445, 446.

Mishmis, 403, 404, 407, 408, 411, 437, 451, 459, 460, 461, 472, 473, 483, 484, 524.

Missionaries, 49, 54, 75, 192, 194, 218, 220.

Mitsui, 137.

Mongol Mission to Lhasa 1927, 164, 165, 176, 181, 187.

Mongolia, 9, 16, 19, 25, 28, 29, 34, 40, 44, 46, 47, 48, 85, 86, 88, 92, 95, 96, 97, 99, 103, 115, 116, 118, 142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 150, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 171, 176, 180, 187, 192, 209, 226, 239, 243, 246, 260, 289, 311, 314, 320, 326, 334, 335, 337, 346, 348, 349, 438, 497.

Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, 86, 140, 177, 182, 194, 196, 198, 207, 210, 213, 219, 235, 237, 250, 256, 281, 282, 283, 284, 286, 296, 301, 308, 328, 336, 494, 500, 513, 519.

Mongolian, "Fat". See: Buriat Noyon.

"Mongolian Fringe". See: Mongolians.

Mongolians, 115, 289, 290, 291, 298, 299, 322, 329, 346, 384.

Mongols, 7, 40, 47, 50, 105, 139, 143, 150, 165, 183, 187, 189, 191, 192, 218, 241, 329, 349.

Monlam Festival, 117, 123, 271, 285.

Mönpas, 23, 411, 434, 435, 443, 447, 449, 450, 477, 478, 479.

Montagu, E.S., 122.

Montgomerie, Colonel, 398.

Mönyul, 401, 411, 427.

Moorcroft, W., 369, 398.

Mora-Geka, 56, 77.

Moravia, 75.

Morgan, Captain, W.S., 270.

Morley, Lord, 389, 423.

Morrison, G.E., 35, 42.

Morshead, Captain H., 447.

Moscow, 117, 153, 164, 341, 520.

Motor Cycle, 155.

Motor Roads, 128, 155, 161, 303, 305, 306, 315, 326, 330, 355, 361, 391, 456.

Mountbatten, Lord, 512.

Mukden, 167, 168, 169, 183.

Muli, 201.

Muling Pass, 367.

Mundo (Möndrong), 116, 135, 139, 161, 162, 227, 392.

Myitkyina, 307, 308, 309.

Mysore, 135.

Naga Hills, 421.

Nagchuka, 150, 165, 259, 286, 298, 304, 311, 314, 315, 316, 332, 502.

Nain Singh, 398.

Nair, V.M.M., 533.

Nam Tso, 139.

Namling, 267.

Nanking, 47, 177, 178, 182, 183, 186, 190, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 215, 219, 221, 222, 226, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237, 238, 239, 242, 244, 245, 246, 247, 249, 250, 251, 253, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 263, 267, 275, 278, 282, 302, 336, 489, 491, 492, 493, 495, 496, 497, 507, 510, 513.

Narendranagar, 368, 375.

National Geographic, 316.

Nazis. See: Germany.

Neame, Brigadier P., 202, 271, 273, 275, 292, 395, 396.

Nedbailoff, 519, 534.

Needham, J.F., 403.

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 356, 362, 389, 390, 391, 498, 502, 505, 512, 516, 517, 518, 535, 520.

Nepal, 2, 9, 30, 48, 99, 107, 111, 112, 113, 115, 152, 154, 161, 172, 174, 178, 179, 180, 182, 185, 186, 214, 215, 216, 234, 235, 242, 285, 286, 289, 293, 297, 304, 322, 341, 346, 350, 354, 355, 363, 369, 370, 377, 381, 385, 386, 387, 497, 504, 506, 518, 531. See also: Gurkhas.

Nepean, Lt. E.Y., 271, 275.

Nevill, Captain G.A., 24, 409, 414, 418, 4132, 440, 442.

New Delhi. See: Delhi.

New Territories, Hong Kong, 335.

New York, 522.

New York Times, 287.

New York University,

New Zealand,

Newfoundland, 85.

Ngabo, Kalon, 197, 220.

Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, 522, 523, 535.

Ngachen Rimpoche, 226, 240, 265, 276.

Ngolok. See: Golok.
Nicholas II, Tsar of Russia, 7, 46.
Nilang, 354, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 381, 382, 385, 395, 396, 397, 431.
Nilang Pass, 367, 376, 395.
Nilang Peak, 368.
Ningyuan. See: Sichang.
Niti Pass, 377, 378, 379, 397, 398, 399.
Nizamghat, 402.
Nmaihka River, 412.
Noel, J.B., 160.
Norbu Dhondup, 162, 163, 165, 175, 176, 180, 181, 185, 205, 214, 226, 233, 234, 235, 236, 244, 247, 253, 254, 255, 259, 264, 270, 272, 277, 284, 309, 340, 383, 384, 406, 439, 444, 457.
Norbu Lingka, 114, 138, 154, 163.
Norbu Tsoke, 161.
Norfolk, 75.
Norin, E., 386, 389, 400.
North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), 387, 428, 452, 457, 458, 459, 474, 478, 480, 482, 488, 489; British traxation in, 479.
North-West Frontier, 26, 241, 304, 334, 481.
Norway, 49.
Nyagzu, 358, 360, 361.
Nyara Monastery, 195, 219.
Nyarong, 49, 57, 62, 64, 65, 66, 75, 80, 86, 87, 89, 90, 191, 196, 197, 235.
Nyi Chu, 483.
Nyingmapa Sect, 80, 106, 109, 143, 144, 170, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 218.

O'Callaghan, T.P.M., 405, 406, 408, 409, 431, 451, 485.
O'Connor, W.F., 173, 175, 266.
O'Conor, Sir N., 4.
Ogden, J., 49.
Oirots, 153.
Oracles, 282.
Orde, C.W., 275.
OSS, 217, 314, 315, 316, 327, 341, 343, 459.
Ostrich, 154.
Ottley, J.S., 397.
Ottoman Empire, 204.
Outer Line, 10, 13, 23, 402, 403, 404, 406, 408, 409, 410, 411, 414, 415, 417, 427, 428, 432, 434, 436, 441, 442, 444, 447, 448, 449, 452, 453, 456, 458, 464, 473.
Ovis ammon, 380, 396.
Oxford, 265.

Pachakshiripas, 447.
Pacific Ocean, 513,
Pacific War Council, 321, 324, 344, 345.
Paiti, 483.
Pakistan, 339, 354, 386, 388, 394, 509, 517, 521.
Palairet, C.M., 167.
Palestine, 497.
Pa-lhe Family, 114, 134.
Pa-he-se, 114, 135, 176, 189, 232.
Palkhor Choide Monastery, Gyantse, 160.
Pallis, M., 364.
Pamirs, 22, 298, 386, 438.
Panchen Lama, 48, 50, 95, 144, 145, 146, 148, 151, 152, 171.
Panchen Lama, 6th, 2, 21, 145.
Panchen Lama, 7th, 171.
Panchen Lama, 8th, 171.
Panchen Lama, 9th, 124, 145, 148, 149, 150, 151, 154, 156, 157, 167, 168, 169, 173, 174, 178, 180, 181, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 193, 195, 196, 199, 201, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 214, 223, 238, 255, 384, 493, 494; visit to India 1905-6, 148, 150, 173, 175; flight to China, 148, 150, 151, 156; in China, 166, 167, 168, 169, 190, 195, 209, 238, 239, 240, 341, 250, 258, 259, 260, 302, 303, 311, 316, 326; death of, 148, 166, 240, 260, 383, 301; Chinese escorts for, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 266, 269, 270, 272, 276, 277, 494.
Panchen Lama, 10th, 301, 329, 493, 494.

"*Pandits*", 398.
Pangdatsang Family, 146, 165, 171, 262, 521.
Pangdatsang, Rapga, 171, 262, 336, 349, 499, 500, 501, 510, 530, 534.
Pangdatsang, Topgye, 171, 232, 262, 499, 501, 530.
Pangdatsang, Yangpel, 146, 154, 171, 179, 183, 190, 217, 283, 342, 496, 499, 500, 512, 535.
Pangin, 412, 450, 453.
Panggong Lake, 358, 359, 392.
Pango, 480, 481.
Panikkar, K.M., 387, 513, 518, 521, 533.
Papal States, 143.
Parker, Mr., Headmaster, English School in Lhasa, 337.
Paris, 84, 92, 93, 94, 103, 134.
Parsees, 160.
Partition of India, 386.
Pasighat, 411, 448, 449, 450, 450.
Passports, Tibetan, 512, 513, 514, 521, 532.
Patna, 377.
Patterson, G.N., 78, 262, 525, 530, 534.
Peace Conference, Paris 1919, 84, 90, 92, 93, 103, 134.
Peace Conference after World War II, 315, 329, 339, 333, 486, 495, 503.
Pearl Harbour, 337, 454.
Peel, Lord, 130, 347.
Peel, R.T., 320, 333, 334, 347, 348, 505.
Pei-li. See: Beri.
Peissel, M., 171.
Peking, 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 17, 31, 33, 35, 37, 38, 40, 43, 45, 47, 58, 60, 61, 63, 64, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 77, 83, 84, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 100, 101, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 115, 118, 119, 120, 128, 129, 130, 131, 133, 157, 167, 170, 170, 171, 177, 178, 180, 181, 194, 202, 206, 209, 215, 220, 222, 238, 239, 241, 247, 253, 255, 258, 286, 291, 423, 429, 430, 520, 521, 522, 523, 535.
Peking Leader, 170.
Pemakö, 410, 411, 412, 447, 450.
P'eng Jih-sheng, 33, 36, 37, 52, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 74, 76, 77, 78.
Pennam, 267.
Pennsylvania, University of, 515.
People's Liberation Army, 505, 518, 522.
People's Republic of China, 1, 11, 54, 67, 80, 93, 145, 182, 284, 300, 303, 320, 328, 347, 400, 405, 406, 407, 431, 456, 492, 494, 498, 511, 518, 521, 523. Indian recognition of, 534.
Pereira, Brigadier-General G., 25, 161, 175.
Persia, 51, 91, 110, 322, 339.
Persian Gulf, 339.
Petrograd. See: St. Petersburg.
Petroleum, 139, 306, 307, 310, 312, 339, 506.
Phari, 6, 124, 138, 153, 155, 161, 163, 353, 401, 472, 502.
Philadelphia Academy of Natural Sciences, 341.
Philippines, 266, 497.
Po (Poteu), 146, 165, 262.
Polhill-Turner, C., 49.
Poling, 371.
Political Officer in Sikkim. See: Sikkim.
Political Officer, Sadiya. See: Sadiya.
Po-lo-te, 165.
Pome, 165, 166, 176, 404, 410, 412, 420, 432, 446, 447, 448, 449, 453, 454, 464.
Popas, 411.
Posa, 402, 426, 434, 441, 444, 471, 479, 524.
Potala, 138, 169, 231, 274, 283, 295, 527.
Powo Kanam Gyalpo, 166.
Poyul. See: Pome.
Pranavananda, Swami, 393, 399.
Princeton University, 341.
Protestants, 49, 54, 139, 199, 218, 220.
Pulley, Major C., 379.
Punjab, 361, 370, 374, 376, 423.
Punjab Hill States, 374, 375.
Püntso Trashi, 496, 497.
Putao. See: Fort Hertz.

Quetta, 137, 157, 162.

Radio. See: Wireless.
Raja Dorji, 452, 453.
Rakas Tal, Lake, 365, 367, 377, 378, 395.
Ralung, 148.
Ram, Dr. K., Gartok Trade Agent, 359.
Rangoon, 309, 340.
Rashi Gompa, 259, 268.
Raskam, 388.
Ratna, 512.
Rawalpindi, 521.
Rawat Clan, 398.
Rawling, Captain C.G., 388.
Raza, Major-General N.A.M., 388.
Reading, Lord, 138.
"Red Line". See: Maps, Simla Convention.
Red Sect. See: Nyingmapa Sect.
Regent, Lhasa, 6, 144, 171, 230, 231, 241, 253, 254, 255, 257, 276, 288, 294, 301, 310, 468, 493, 501, 502, 510.
Regent, Tashilhunpo, 21.
Reid, Sir Robert, 24, 176, 432, 444, 452, 454, 457.
Reting Rimpoche, 217, 230, 231, 232, 234, 240, 241, 248, 256, 257, 273, 282, 283, 284, 296, 313, 336, 444, 500, 501, 502, 530.
Reuters, 429.
Revolution, Chinese. See: Chinese Revolution.
Revolution, Russian. See: Russian Revolution.
Rice, 525.
Richardson, H.E., 27, 147, 171, 217, 221, 236, 259, 260, 261, 264, 271, 272, 277, 293, 294, 296, 297, 340, 347, 348, 358, 359, 488, 494, 495, 496, 501, 502, 509, 511, 519, 527, 531, 533, 534.
Ridley, H. French, 109.
Riencourt, Amaury de, 529.
Riga, 409, 411, 448, 453, 454, 464.
Rijnhart, S., 219.
Rima, 304, 305, 338, 403, 408, 451, 454, 456, 460, 461, 475, 484, 485, 490, 525.
Rima Road, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 319, 332, 434, 452, 459, 473, 483.
Rinchen Lhamo. See: King, Mrs.
Ringang, 155, 160, 161, 189, 227, 228, 276, 467, 476, 494.
Ringkor (Long Pilgrimage), 446, 452.
Riu, 448.
Riwoche, 52, 55, 56, 57, 64, 74, 76, 77, 86.
Roads. See: Burma; Changlam, Gyalam, Lhasa, Rima.
Roberts, Lord, 379.
Robson, Major, 359, 392.
Rockhill, W.W., 172, 194, 218, 219, 248.
Rohilkand, 380.
Roman Catholics, 49, 54, 192, 218, 220.
Ronaldshay, Lord. See: Zetland, Marquess of.
Rongbatsa, 44, 66, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 80, 81, 84, 85, 92, 93, 94, 99, 100, 101, 130, 139, 193, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 219, 252, 346.
Rongbatsa Truce 1918. See: Treaties.
Roorkee, 398.
Roosevelt, Kermit, 189, 217, 266, 314, 341, 435.
Roosevelt, President Franklin Delano, 314, 315, 316.
Roosevelt, Theodore Jr., 189, 217, 266, 435.
Rosbert, Pt., 459.
Rose, Archibald, 109.
Rosemeyer, Mr., 138.
Rotung, 408.
Royal Air Force. See: Air Force, Royal.
Royal Asiatic Society, 280.
Royal Central Asian Society, 425, 426, 437.
Royal Engineers, 456.
Royal Geographical Society, 425, 429.
Royal Institute of International Affairs. See: Chatham House.
Rudok, 162, 357, 358, 359, 392.
Rugby, 116, 135, 138, 155, 160, 161, 189, 227, 276, 392, 467.
Rumbold, Sir Algernon, 256, 268, 295, 321, 385, 400, 424.

Rupa, 425, 434, 443, 445, 464, 471, 473., 478.
Russia, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 74, 85, 88, 89, 96, 97, 99, 103, 114, 117, 119, 125, 128, 141, 143, 147, 148, 152, 154, 157, 158, 163, 164, 174, 177, 178, 181, 183, 184, 187, 189, 205, 222, 237, 342, 243, 244, 245, 246, 252, 253, 263, 278, 289, 290, 295, 303, 309, 315, 316, 326, 332, 333, 334, 339, 347, 348, 356, 364, 398, 400, 406, 407, 438, 442, 497, 500, 504, 520, 531.
Russian Revolution, 14, 28, 44, 45, 48, 51, 97, 103, 115, 147.
Russo-Japanese War, 26.
Ruttledge, H., 380.

Sadiya, 166, 304, 305, 402, 409, 410, 411, 432, 448, 449, 451, 452, 454, 456, 460, 461, 462, 463, 472, 473, 474, 483, 484, 485, 510, 525.
Sadiya Frontier Tract, 409, 410, 411, 481.
Sadutshang Family, 311, 316.
Saint-German-en-Laye, 134.
Saishal Pass, 377, 378.
Saker, Captain, 399.
Sakyapa Sect, 143, 144, 171, 192, 195, 219.
Salar Moslems, 105.
Salt, 199, 201, 220, 426, 443, 446.
Salween, 33, 55, 74, 220, 306.
Samar, 483, 485.
Samding, 170.
Samrup Potrang Family, 24.
Samye, 474.
Sandjhieff, S., 154.
Sandwich, H.M.S., 239.
Sangpiling, 36.
Sangu, 483, 485.
Sansom, Sir George, 324, 345.
Sarda River, 377.
Sarikol Range, 438.
Sat Rajas, 434, 471.
Sati, 459.
Satow, Sir Ernest, 93.
Sazonov, S., 33.
Schäfer, Dr. E., 293, 294, 341.
Schaw, Dr., 298.
Se La, 15, 24, 325, 401, 409, 417, 421, 422, 425, 426, 434, 435, 440, 441, 443, 444, 445, 453, 457, 458, 461, 465, 466, 467, 470, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 486, 487, 524, 527, 535.
Security Council, United Nations, 506, 521.
Sendall, Lt., 343.
Sengedzong, 421, 477.
Sera Monastery, 14, 33, 101, 123, 145, 227, 230, 233, 234, 259, 464, 466, 467, 475, 480, 493, 498, 501, 502, 530.
Service, John, 347.
Seymour, Sir Horace, 310, 323, 324, 325, 326, 346.
Shakabpa, Tsepon W.D., 178, 262, 297, 512, 514, 515, 520, 522, 532, 535.
Shakespear, Colonel, 428, 437.
Shanghai, 26, 43, 104, 167, 215, 237, 263, 313, 513, 530.
Shantung, 84, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 103, 110, 129, 136.
Shape Mission, 279, 280, 295.
Shatra Family, 146, 227.
Shatra, Lönchen, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 20, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32, 50, 58, 104, 114, 138, 279, 281, 380, 409, 433, 474, 476, 483, 527.
Shawl Wool. See: Wool.
She Chu, 197.
Shelton, Dr. A., 49, 54, 61, 76, 79.
Shelton, Mrs. Flora, 79.
Shen Pao Atlas, 302, 337, 415, 416, 431, 434.
Shen Shih-hua, 328.
Sheng Shih-t'sai, 252, 263, 304.
Sheng Tai, Amban, 5.
Shen Tsung-lien, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 335, 336, 347, 486, 489, 493, 494, 495, 496, 499, 500, 513, 526.
Shensi, 74, 207, 253.
Sherap, Paul, 105, 125, 128, 139, 140, 194, 196, 219, 220.
Sherchokpa, 435.

Sherdukpen, 417, 434, 435, 443, 444, 471, 474, 478, 524.
Shergaon, 421, 434, 443, 445, 471, 473.
Sherpa Dhundui, 216.
Sherpa Gyalpo, 178, 179, 214.
Sherriff, G., 24, 147, 172, 277, 336, 337, 347, 418, 419, 441, 445, 446, 447, 452, 467, 468, 474, 476.
Sherring, C.A., 380.
Shigatse, 35, 144, 150, 161, 173, 188, 217, 229, 232, 249, 250, 258, 259, 262, 263, 267, 353, 436, 437.
Shih Ch'ing-yang, 70, 85, 264.
Shillong, 137, 157, 273, 275, 425, 448, 452, 454, 456, 470; Government House at, 452.
Shipki Pass, 363, 394.
Shiva, 365.
Shokas, 380.
Sholkhang, Lönchen, 114, 148, 154, 163.
Showa, 447, 449, 450, 451, 464.
Shuckburgh, Sir J.E., 89.
Shuopando, 32, 33, 36, 47.
Siakwan, 311, 340.
Siang, 10, 15, 165, 404, 410, 411, 412, 417, 434, 445, 446, 447, 449, 450, 452, 453, 454, 464, 470, 472, 475, 480, 481, 482, 487, 488, 509, 524.
Sichang, 58.
Signals, Royal Corps of, 271, 275.
Sikang, 33, 39, 81, 94, 171, 191, 197, 199, 200, 207, 214, 215, 221, 225, 233, 324, 235, 252, 254, 257, 258, 260, 288, 289, 300, 301, 312, 315, 308, 311, 312, 315, 316, 326, 331, 332, 337, 344, 348, 361, 415, 416, 429, 430, 438, 456, 489, 490, 491, 492, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 520, 521, 522, 534.
Sikang-Szechuan Development Corporation, 303.
Sikkim, 2, 5, 6, 8, 11, 13, 26, 69, 89, 99, 107, 108, 114, 123, 125, 126, 128, 134, 147, 152, 157, 158, 165, 168, 169, 170, 173, 174, 176, 177, 178, 181, 203, 212, 214, 225, 226, 227, 233, 237, 240, 243, 244, 252, 264, 266, 267, 270, 271, 272, 276, 277, 281, 282, 285, 286, 289, 293, 294, 297, 298, 309, 322, 330, 332, 335, 346, 350, 351, 352, 354, 365, 366, 371, 374, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 399, 406, 419, 422, 453, 457, 465, 470, 473, 480, 483, 486, 488, 509, 525.
Sikkim, British campaign in, 1888, 5, 350, 379, 382.
Sikkim-Tibet Convention 1890. See: Treaties.
Sikhs, 363.
Silcock, Flying Officer A., 305.
Silon Langdun, 114, 163, 205, 227, 228, 230, 321, 284.
Silver, 100, 179, 183, 186, 190, 515.
Simla, 13, 20, 21, 32, 34, 39, 42, 52, 83, 97, 104, 107, 130, 181, 363, 420.
Simla Conference, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 30,32, 34, 47, 50, 52, 58, 60, 63, 65, 71, 83, 85, 88, 90, 92, 94, 107, 118, 125, 132, 138, 210, 211, 227, 231, 324, 254, 278, 291, 299, 350, 356, 379, 395, 401, 404, 405, 407, 408, 409, 414, 417, 418, 437, 444, 455, 465, 483, 505.
Simla Convention 1914. See: Treaties.
Simon Commission, 385.
Simong, 411, 447, 448, 449, 450, 480, 481, 482.
Sinclair, M.R., 185, 205.
Sinha, Dr. S., 272.
Sining, 21, 32, 40, 47, 61, 64, 69, 94, 95, 100, 105, 106, 107, 192, 200, 237, 241, 249, 284, 303, 340, 343, 497.
Sinkiang, 22, 38, 45, 48, 115, 135, 148, 177, 232, 242, 243, 245, 246, 252, 263, 282, 289, 304, 314, 315, 316, 339, 341, 346, 353, 354, 356, 357, 361, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 394, 400, 522, 534.
Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute, 350, 354, 361, 362, 378, 380, 385, 386, 388, 391, 393, 401, 405, 416, 431, 434, 473, 476, 535. Middle Sector of, 350, 354, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366-381, 382, 385, 386, 398, 399, 431. Western Sector of, 354, 356, 357, 358, 360, 362, 385, 386, 392, 431, 438. Eastern Sector of, 354, 355, 401.

Sino-Swedish Expedition, 385, 389, 400.
Sippi River, 475.
SIS, 316.
Siyok River, 356.
Siyom River, 15, 410, 412, 445, 447, 452, 470, 472.
Slavery, 450.
Smyth, E., 398, 399.
Snelling, J., 174, 260.
Sonam Tobden, 285, 399.
Sonam Wangdi. See: Khemedse Dzasa.
Sonam Wangyal. See: Pa-lhe-se.
Soong Family, 338.
Soong, T.V., 307, 318, 319, 320, 322, 323, 324, 338, 345, 346, 506, 511.
Sorbonne, 328.
Sorensen, T., 49.
South Africa, 8, 22, 344.
Soviets, 7, 99, 148, 154, 163, 164, 174, 176, 177, 184, 187, 189, 205, 237, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 252, 263, 289, 290, 303, 309, 315, 316, 326, 332, 333, 339, 348, 400, 442, 497, 504, 520.
Spiti, 360, 361, 363, 370, 393.
Srinagar, 386.
SS, 293, 293.
St. Petersburg, 7, 28, 45, 46.
St. Petersburg, *Journal de*, 7.
State Department, 314, 319, 324, 325, 327, 342, 347, 495, 512, 513, 514, 515, 522, 532, 533.
Stalin, 174, 326, 333.
Stanford's Atlas, 429.
Staunton, Captain, 285.
Steele, A.T., 332.
Stein, Guenther, 349.
Sten Guns, 505.
Stiffe, Mr., 380.
Stevenson, Sir Ralph, 489, 490, 491, 513, 533.
Stillwell Road, 309.
Strachey, H., 392.
Strachey, R., 378, 379, 384, 398.
Stuart, John Leighton, 513,, 515.
Stubbs, Political Agent Tehri-Garhwal, 373.
Sturt, T.U., 380.
Subansiri, 15, 404, 417, 421, 422, 441, 446, 464, 465, 470, 474, 475, 524.
Sudan, 436.
"Sudeten" problem, 485.
Sun Yat-sen, 93, 163, 335, 338, 530.
Surkhang Depon, 512.
Surkhang Dzasa, 342, 486, 494, 495, 496, 499, 501, 512, 513, 526, 527, 529, 533.
Surkhang Shape, 494, 528.
Sutlej, 353, 360, 363, 368, 370, 374, 394.
"Suzerainty", 12, 35, 41, 85, 87, 120, 131, 204, 235, 236, 237, 242, 245, 246, 247, 266, 271, 278, 279, 280, 281, 291, 295, 299, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 330, 335, 344, 345, 351, 490, 503, 506, 507, 515, 516, 523, 533.
Sweden, 385, 389.
Switzerland, 514.
Sze, Alfred (Sze Sao-ke), 83, 104, 129, 136.
Sze Chu, 52.
Szechuan, 3, 9, 12, 19, 20, 21, 26, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 55, 60, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 80, 86, 93, 94, 95, 97, 101, 108, 122, 125, 139, 169, 176, 178, 191, 192, 194, 197, 200, 201, 207, 211, 213, 214, 220, 221, 235, 252, 260, 289, 302, 304, 311, 341, 347, 452.

Ta Lama, 342, 494.
Tachienlu, 27, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 58, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 88, 94, 101, 102, 125, 126, 127, 139, 140, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 203, 206, 218, 219, 221, 252, 260, 302, 303, 305, 311, 312, 326, 332, 340.
Taghdumbash Pamir, 388.
Taiwan, 221, 416, 529.
Taklakot, 186, 377, 378, 380.
Taklamakan Desert, 353, 391.
Takpa Shiri, 446.
Taktra Rimpoche, 276, 300, 310, 501, 502, 510, 527.

Taktser, 282, 283, 284, 296.
Taktser Rimpoche, 300,
Tali, 340, 424.
Tali (in NEFA), 446.
Talok Pass. See: Diphu Pass.
Talungdzong, 478.
T'ang Ch'i-yao, 94.
Tang Fe-tang. See: Chang Wei-pei.
T'ang Ko-san, 196, 197, 198, 220.
T'ang Shao-yi, 93, 104.
Tangka, 155, 172.
Tangla Mountains, 42, 86, 89.
Taowu, 39.
Taring, Jigme, 227, 248, 276.
Taring, Rinchen Dolma, 216, 227, 262.
Taron, 413, 433.
Tashi Dhondup, 480, 481, 482.
Tashi Lama. See: Panchen Lama.
Tashigang Dzong, 453.
Tashigong, 392.
Tashilhunpo, 2, 21, 124, 144, 148, 150, 151, 156, 170, 173, 186, 188, 223, 239, 253, 254, 276, 297, 301, 282, 493, 494.
Tashkent, 172.
Tawang, 14, 15, 16, 20, 24, 138, 277, 294, 333, 337, 348, 352, 355, 387, 401, 402, 403, 406, 407, 408, 413, 414, 415, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 425, 426, 427, 429, 432, 434, 435, 436, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 447, 453, 454, 457, 458, 461, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 474, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 486, 487, 488, 493, 524, 527, 535.
Taylor, Annie, 49.
Tea, Chinese, 21, 76, 149, 192, 194, 198.
Tea, Indian, 4, 21, 221.
Tebu Debdun, 166.
Teheran, 339.
Tehko. See: Derge Gönchen.
Tehri-Garhwal, 152, 165, 185, 228, 260, 277, 350, 354, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, 385, 395, 396, 397, 414, 439, 440.
Tehri-Garhwal, Maharajkumar of, 516, 533.
Teichman, Sir Eric, 27, 28, 30, 39, 44, 47, 48, 52-82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 90, 93, 97, 98, 99, 100 102, 104, 105, 108, 109, 111, 125, 128, 129, 130, 132, 156, 190, 191, 195, 200, 202, 205, 211, 213, 219, 222, 238, 239, 240, 254, 268, 272, 291, 303, 306, 310, 311, 326, 327, 333, 334, 346, 430, 438, 505; *Travels of a Consular Officer in Eastern Tibet*, 27, 102.
Telegraphs and Telegrams, 37, 70, 83, 122, 124, 137, 138, 164, 223, 233, 234, 251.
Telephone, 138, 480.
Tempo, 78.
Teng Hsi-hou, 200, 213.
Tengyueh, 78.
Tennant, Captain, 226.
Ter Dzong, 480, 481, 482.
Terra, H. de, 390.
Tezpur, 421.
Thacker Spinks, 500.
Thaga Pass, 367.
Thailand, 497.
Thinyik Co., 47, 166, 190.
Thirty-Nine Banners. See: Gyade.
Tho Chu Pass, 460, 483.
Thomas, Lowell, 516, 533.
Thomason Civil Engineering College, Roorkee, 398.
Thornburgh, Captain, 285.
Thubten Jigme Norbu. See: Taktser Rimpoche.
Thubten Samphel Dzasa, 495, 496.
Tibet: Arms Supply for, 19, 26, 31, 37, 43, 48, 56, 57, 58, 68, 74, 76, 77, 84, 110, 111, 113, 115, 116, 118, 121, 135, 137, 153, 162, 179, 183, 184, 185, 197, 199, 202, 203, 214, 216, 219, 222, 226, 251, 261, 262, 279, 303, 317, 343, 476, 505, 517, 518, 519, 521, 523, 530;
Autonomy of, 12, 32, 41, 96, 120, 206, 287, 335, 352, 493, 497, 500, 506, 517; border with China, 11, 49, 55, 62, 68, 70, 83, 85, 101, 234; British protection over, 122, 190, 203; Chinese "liberation" of, 22, 142, 146, 263, 272, 349, 353, 494; extradition, 152, 174, 226, 358, 359, 500; Inner, 12, 40, 70,

86, 87, 90, 129, 143, 177; "King" of, 231; monastic politics in, 117, 118, 123, 137, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 159, 160, 161, 180, 248, 348, 470 498; outer, 12, 40, 70, 86, 87, 90, 129,143; population of, 49, 50, 218; representation abroad, 486, 487,495; social reform in, 204; status of, 2, 3, 5, 10, 16, 35, 85, 86, 98, 110, 111, 117, 131, 184, 189, 277, 353, 498, 523, 532, 533; trade of, 55, 76, 179, 185, 190, 311, 312, 313, 514; traditional government of, 141-170.

Tibetan Army, 16, 25, 26, 27, 31, 37, 46, 57, 78, 116, 122, 123, 135, 153, 155, 156, 157, 159, 161, 165, 166, 180, 185, 186, 196, 221, 228, 229, 248, 254, 257, 273, 274, 275, 278, 309.

Tibetan "Dancers", 159.

Tibetan flag, 498.

Tibetan Goodwill Mission, 336, 490, 495, 496, 497, 498, 507, 508, 513, 515, 516, 526, 527, 529.

Tibetan Mint and coinage, 149, 155, 156, 161, 172, 178, 179, 183, 227, 231, 276, 525.

"Tibetan Revolutionary Party" (or "Tibet Improvement Party"), 499, 500, 501.

Tibetan taxation and fiscal administration, 6, 37, 149, 156, 172, 179, 202, 477, 478, 480, 481, 482, 487,

Tibetan Trade Mission, 217, 495, 510, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 522,532, 535.

Tibetan Trade Regulations, 1893, 1908, 1914, 4, 5, 6, 9, 12, 17, 18, 70, 117, 156, 171, 179, 181, 183, 185, 232, 280, 331, 382, 523.

Tibetan well diggers, 76.

Tiding River, 408, 410, 452.

T'ien Sung-yao, 213.

Tientsin, 43, 297.

Tientsin *Yung Pao*, 297.

Tilman, H.W., 272.

Times, 35, 122, 141, 236, 271, 286, 428, 429.

Times Atlas, 428, 430.

Tinai, 459, 483, 484.

Tokyo, 117, 302.

Toller, W. Stark, 176, 194.

Tolstoy, Ilya, 217, 314, 315, 316, 326, 329, 330, 341, 342, 343, 495, 526.

Towa Dzong, 78.

Toyama Military College, 26.

Trade Marts, 9, 35, 41, 42, 43, 87, 88, 89, 131, 186, 338, 359. See also: Chamdo; Gartok; Gyantse; Taklakot; Yatung.

Trans Tibet Transport, 309-316, 318, 319, 327, 340, 456, 485.

Trapchi, 227, 231, 276, 343.

Trapchi Regiment, 227, 228, 229, 259, 317.

Treaties: Dogra-Tibet Treaty 1842, 392; Treaty of Amritsar 1846, 392; Tibeto-Nepalese Treaty 1856, 357; Chefoo Convention 1876, 3, 4, 10; Burma-Tibet Convention 1886, 4; Sikkim-Tibet Convention 1890, 5, 6, 13, 14, 353, 354, 382, 283, 284; Lhasa Convention 1904, 9, 10, 18, 22, 43, 70, 93, 97, 125, 278; Anglo-Chinese Convention 1906, 9, 22, 34, 43, 93; Anglo-Russian Convention 1907, 8, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19, 23, 28, 29, 34, 43, 44, 45, 89, 110, 133, 137, 281, 295, 349, 389, 403, 406, 407, 433; Anglo-Bhutanese Treaty 1910, 190, 203; Tibeto-Mongol Treaty 1913, 16; Simla Convention 1914, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 27, 33, 36, 40, 43, 59, 62, 69, 70, 76, 79, 83, 86, 88, 89, 92, 103, 120, 124, 129, 130, 132, 146, 177, 188, 206, 210, 211, 221, 236, 237, 250, 251, 266, 270, 272, 276, 278, 279, 280, 281, 283, 290, 291, 292, 294, 295, 298, 319, 322, 329, 331, 333, 334, 349, 351, 352, 390, 415, 428, 433, 434, 439, 440, 455, 466, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 483, 486, 509, 523, 529; Anglo-Tibetan Declaration of July 1914, 12, 17, 97, 280, 467, 483, 515; Kiachta Treaty 1915, 34, 95, 103; Chamdo Agreement 1918, 64, 65, 66, 71, 72, 73, 80, 81, 85, 94, 97, 101, 130, 191, 193, 195, 196, 205, 272, 430;

Rongbatsa Truce 1918, 67, 68, 72, 73, 80, 81, 84, 85, 92, 93, 94, 99, 100, 101, 130, 191, 193, 195, 205, 272, 430; Treaty of Versailles 1919, 94; Arms Control Convention 1919, 111, 112, 134, 136; Kantze Truce 1931, 197, 198, 199, 220, 223; Sino-Tibetan Agreement 1951, 523, 525; Sino-Indian Agreement 1954, 535; Sino-Pakistani Boundary Agreement 1963, 388.

Trevelyan, Lord, 387.

Trimon, Shape, 27, 223, 227, 231, 232, 235, 247, 276.

Trinkler, Dr. E., 389, 390.

Trumba Dzasa, 161.

Truman, President H., 495, 514, 515.

Trungyik Chempo, 226, 240.

Tsa Serkang, 168, 180, 226, 235, 238, 261.

Ts'ai T'ing-kan, Admiral, 35.

Tsaidam, 41, 143, 316.

Tsang, 1, 50, 143, 144, 145, 146, 150, 172, 173, 174, 191, 195, 238, 241, 243, 249, 250, 350, 353, 384.

Tsang Chok Pass, 366, 367, 369, 397.

Tsanglas, 447.

Tsangpo River, 155, 165, 266, 353, 404, 411, 422, 427, 434, 445, 447.

Tsaparang. See: Chabrang.

Tsari Chu, 441, 445, 446, 452, 470.

Tsari Sarpa, 23, 470.

Tsarong, George, 534.

Tsarong Shape (the elder), 171.

Tsarong Shape (or Dzasa), 37, 48, 115, 137, 146, 154, 155, 157, 158, 159, 161, 166, 175, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 201, 216, 227, 229, 230, 231, 248, 261, 266, 273, 276, 285, 293, 411, 494, 499.

Tsepag Dorji, 164.

Tsering Wangdi, 205.

Tsiang, William. See: Chiang Chi-yu.

Tso Karpo, 23, 446, 452, 470.

Tso Tsung-tang, 73.

Tsona Dzong, 23, 419, 432, 435, 440, 441, 443, 473, 474, 477, 479.

Tsongdu (Tibetan National Assembly), 114, 126, 127, 145, 231, 234, 247, 259, 264, 300, 308, 348, 3775, 467, 468, 469, 476, 486, 493, 497, 502, 522, 527.

Tsul-trim, 165.

Tsungli Yamen, 3.

Tuan Ch'i-jui, 38, 70, 92, 93, 94, 95.

Tucci, G., 394.

Tuna, 504.

Tung River, 54.

Tungans, 252,316, 326, 329.

Turkey, 51, 497.

Turkistan, 51, 73, 357.

Turks, 153.

Turner, S., 21.

Tuting, 481, 524.

Twenty-One Demands, 29, 93.

Twynam, Sir H., 444, 445, 455, 469, 471, 472.

Tyau, Mr., 70.

Ü, 1, 50, 143, 144, 146, 191, 241, 353.

Udalguri, 413.

Ula (forced transport service), 204, 436

Ulan Bator. See: Urga.

United Kingdom, 493, 503, 511, 512, 523, 532.

United Kingdom High Commission, New Delhi, 488, 508, 509, 510, 511, 530, 533.

United Provinces, 368, 370, 371, 374, 376, 423.

United States of America, 26, 49, 54, 61, 79, 83, 84, 98, 104, 110, 112, 118, 147, 151, 153, 189, 190, 193, 194, 217, 218, 220, 248, 266, 277, 280, 299, 300, 304, 307, 309, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 321, 327, 328, 329, 330, 332, 333, 336, 337, 339, 342, 343, 344, 347, 457, 459, 462, 463, 486, 495, 497, 506, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 529, 532, 533, 534; loan to Tibet requested, 514; Embassy in New Delhi, 495, 512, 515, 516, 520, 521, 531, 532; policy towards Tibet, 512, 513, 514, 516, 522, 532, 533.

Unta Dhura Pass, 399.

Urga, 16, 25, 48, 85, 88, 103, 144, 164, 165, 187.
Urga Hutukhtu, 48, 95.
Urumchi, 135.

Vaccines, 467.
Vampilon, 153.
Vernay, Arthur, 248, 265, 266, 435, 436, 437.
Versailles, 94, 136.
Vickers Gun, 275, 530.
Vincent, J. Carter, 340.
Visnuganga River, 377.

Waddell, L.A., 175.
Wade, Sir Thomas, 3.
Wakefield, E.B., 359, 392.
Wakely, L.D., 75, 112, 129, 432.
Wakhan, 386.
Wai-chiao-pu, 31, 34, 35, 42, 43, 59, 69, 70, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 104, 107, 108, 116, 119, 120, 130, 132, 202, 204, 208, 211, 222, 251, 252, 255, 258, 260, 291, 310, 492, 508, 510, 526, 531.
Wales, Prince of, 167.
Walker, G.E.D., 481,
Wallace, Vice President H., 332, 348.
Walong, 408, 451, 456, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 465, 470, 473, 482, 483, 484, 485, 487, 489, 490, 491, 492, 525, 527.
Walong Promenade, 405, 406, 408, 468.
Walton, J.C., 237, 257, 266, 267, 292.
Wang Chien-ch'ing, 30, 31.
Wang Ching-wei, 262, 291.
Wang Lo-chieh. See: Trungyik Chempo.
Wang Shih-chieh, 489, 490, 491.
War Cabinet, 323, 324.
War of the Two Lius, 200.
War Office, 51.
Ward, F. Kingdom, 24, 127, 165, 305, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 435, 436, 437, 439, 440, 443, 445, 446, 447, 451, 471, 485.
Ward, Professor Marshall, 419.
Washington, 300, 307, 314, 318, 319, 320, 321, 323, 324, 327, 328, 338, 341, 345, 346, 495, 513, 522, 532.
Washington Conference, 119, 120, 121, 128, 129, 136.
Wassmuss, 51.
Watersheds, 353, 374, 387.
Wavell, Lord, 457, 495, 526.
Western Tibet, 9, 89, 186, 228, 350, 356, 357, 361, 364, 367, 387, 392, 399.
Webber, T., 399.
Weightman, H., 345.
Weir, Lt. Colonel J.L.R., 147, 159, 165, 170, 177-210, 213, 222, 223, 227, 260, 272, 359, 372, 374, 418, 420.
Weir, Mrs., 183, 185, 205, 216.
Weir, Joan Mary, 205.
Wellesley, Sir Victor, 69, 75, 112, 129, 212.
Wembley, 160.
White, J.C., 6, 173, 382, 383, 488.
Whitehall, 13, 321, 430, 502.
Williams, J.H.F., 449, 454.
Williamson, F., 147, 168, 212, 225-249, 260, 261, 264, 265, 270, 272, 273, 274, 275, 383, 384, 406, 414, 418, 419, 420, 422, 436.
Williamson, Mrs., 226, 233, 260, 298.
Williamson, N., 10, 403, 404, 406, 408, 410, 411, 431, 448, 523.
Williamson, R.H., 375, 376.
Willingdon, Lord, 217.
Wilson, E.H., 218.
Wilson, Colonel R.C., 380.
Wilson, President W., 335.
Wilton, E.C., 70, 109.
Winchester, 135, 265, 328, 452.
Wireless, 137, 232, 233, 234, 236, 271, 272, 273, 275, 282, 315, 330, 342, 459, 462, 496, 522.
Wolseley Helmet, 274.
Wong Pong, 312.
Wool, 37, 55, 98, 179, 183, 185, 190, 217, 301, 337, 357, 363, ĕ 364, 452.
World War I, 12, 16, 28, 30, 43, 59, 60, 73, 85, 103, 110, 111, 133, 134, 137, 189, 260, 304, 335, 408, 409, 435, 437, 452, 461.

World War II, 264, 299-349, 377, 434, 445, 454, 468, 470, 477, 493, 494, 502.

Wu Chung-hsin, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 296, 301, 323, 328.

Wu Min-yuan, 235, 236, 264.

Wu-je, 378, 397, 398.

Yaan. See: Yachow.

Yabshi Kung, Dalai Lama, 227.

Yabshi Kung, Panchen Lama, 150, 169, 209.

Yachow, 221, 302, 303, 311.

Yajima, Yasujiro, 26.

Yakalo. See: Yenching.

Yala Abbot, 194.

Yale University, 104.

Yalu, 518.

Yalung River, 57, 61, 64, 66, 86.

Yang Seng, 200, 213.

Yang Tseng-hsin, 38, 48.

Yangtze, 41, 49, 55, 62, 64, 68, 70, 200, 206, 210, 220, 258, 274, 303, 311, 322.

Yatung, 5, 6, 35, 42, 89, 113, 147, 161, 193, 197, 243, 260, 285, 312, 382, 500.

Yeh Chu, 56.

Yeh, George, 513, 529.

Yellow Sect. See: Gelugpa Sect.

Yembang, 408, 410, 411, 412, 432, 448.

Yenching, 68, 199, 201, 220, 305, 306.

Yepak River, 405, 466.

Yin Ch'ang-heng, 38, 39, 48, 49, 54.

"Young Tibet Party", 261.

Younghusband, Sir F., 8, 9, 18, 19, 22, 27, 46, 70, 97, 125, 133, 242, 266, 272.

Younghusband Expedition, 8, 9, 24, 58, 75, 128, 133, 138, 147, 148, 163, 173, 175, 204, 218, 254, 271, 274, 301, 338, 340, 350, 380, 381, 383, 398, 402, 403, 531.

Yü, Captain, 56.

Yü Sung-ling, Brigadier-General, 198, 199, 200.

Yuan Shih-k'ai, 11, 12, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 47, 78, 94, 95, 236, 292.

Yume Chu, 446.

Yungon Dzasa, 178, 181, 182, 210, 215, 219.

Yunnan, 3, 20, 21, 38, 39, 40, 48, 49, 54, 60, 64, 68, 69, 71, 78, 93, 94, 97, 101, 125, 192, 201, 207, 220, 252, 289, 299, 304, 306, 307, 308, 311, 312, 313, 317, 339, 340, 347, 404, 412, 424, 452, 489, 500.

Yutok Depon, 227, 248.

Zafarulla Khan, Sir, 528.

Zayul, 304, 403, 408, 413, 431, 451, 454, 460, 475, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 491, 525.

Zetland, Marquess of, 124, 242, 270, 280, 294, 445.

Zugmayer, 51.